

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THE CAVALRY JOURNAL




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PERIODICAL COLLECTION



FRANCIS H. D. C. WHITMORE



THE ALLIED SOVEREIGNS REVIEWING THE TROOPS.

HYDE PARK. — 1814. — LONDON.

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

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AN HISTORICAL REVIEW

THE ALLIED SOVEREIGNS IN HYDE PARK, JUNE 20, 1814

AT nine o'clock the different corps were on the ground, and the entire Hyde Park, from Tyburn to Hyde Park Gate, was covered with soldiers, equipped in their best regimentals. It was near 11 o'clock before the numerous regiments were properly arranged, when a spectacle was presented to the public which has not been surpassed for a series of years. After the lines were arranged the different bands belonging to the Cavalry and Infantry continued to play many martial airs, and the crowd became so excessive that it was necessary to send detachments of Cavalry to clear them to the extremities of the Park. Every beholder by this time appeared to fix his eyes on Hyde Park Gate, where the illustrious personages were to make their *grande entrée*. Every tree in the Park was laden with persons of various descriptions, and the balconies, windows, and roofs of the houses fronting the Park were crowded with a great assemblage of beauty and fashion. At 11.30 a royal salute of 21 guns gave intimation of their arrival. A detachment of the 'Greys' proceeded to meet the great Potentates, who were accompanied by the Hetman Platoff and a small detachment of Cossacks. They were received with the loudest shouts by the populace. The Prince Regent, who was accompanied on one side by the King of Prussia, and on the other by the Emperor of Russia, kept his hat off, and bowed

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respectfully to the populace. He was followed by Prince Blücher, and a most magnificent staff, superbly attired. The different lines were soon arranged, and the Royal party passed, while the troops preserved the greatest order and decorum, and the bands played 'God Save the King.'

After this the numerous regiments passed in Review, and then fired a *feu-de-joie*. The illustrious visitors were pleased to express the greatest satisfaction at their discipline. At about 3.30 the various corps marched off the ground, highly gratified with the honour paid them by the Sovereigns and great Generals.—*Extract from the 'Gentleman's Magazine,' 1814.*

The following Cavalry regiments were represented at the Review:—

	Officers	N.C.O.s and men
1st Life Guards	5	104
2nd Life Guards	11	97
Royal Horse Guards	11	131
2nd Dragoon Guards	22	407
2nd Dragoons	27	580
7th Light Dragoons	4	81
9th Light Dragoons	17	222
11th Light Dragoons	29	413
London Regt. of Light Horse Vols.	24	99
London Cavalry	9	55
Westminster Cavalry	7	36
Surrey Yeomanry	14	148
Wandsworth Yeomanry	3	40
	<hr/> 183	<hr/> 2413

The frontispiece, 'The Allied Sovereigns Reviewing the Troops,' is taken from the original painting by J. A. Atkinson, recently presented by Percy Morris, Esq., to the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution.

HORSE ARTILLERY IN CO-OPERATION WITH CAVALRY

By MAJOR C. E. D. BUDWORTH, M.V.O., R.H.A.

Co-operation.—On the subject of Horse Artillery acting in co-operation with Cavalry recent wars afford us but little guidance.

The great development in the fire-power of guns, machine-guns, and rifles considerably modifies the lessons which may be derived from the wars of the last century, while recent developments in aircraft, in rapid movement and transport by motor power, and in scientific means of communication are all bound to exercise an important influence in the future.

The following remarks are intended to emphasise the general principles which at the present day should be applied to the handling of Horse Artillery in co-operation with Cavalry.

The underlying principles of co-operation between Horse Artillery and Cavalry are the same as those that should exist between Field Artillery and Infantry.

The two essentials are the determination to co-operate and a mutual knowledge of requirements.

The desire to co-operate may be taken for granted, but the translation of this desire into the power and determination to co-operate is essentially a part of combined field-training.

Bayonet tactics for Horse Artillery are indeed to be deprecated, if by these are meant the pushing of guns into the open regardless of loss and without sufficient reason, but we all require to be constantly on the alert to push forward reconnaissance, so as to be able to move in closer, in order to render our fire more destructive and our co-operation more effective, to crown the position when won and to seize every opportunity of bringing oblique fire to bear.

Unless we practise these matters in peace, we shall not be able to do so in war.

For gaining a knowledge of each other's requirements much can be done by reading, by attaching officers of Horse Artillery to Cavalry and *vice versa*, and by combined instructional exercises.

To obtain a full knowledge, however, it is necessary that the Horse Artillery and Cavalry called upon to co-operate should, individually and collectively, know each other and be accustomed to working together.

The mainspring of co-operation therefore is combined field-training.

Organisation.—It is well to lay stress on the fact that a Horse Artillery brigade or battery on a war footing presents a very different appearance from that which we are accustomed to see at Cavalry training or at manœuvres.

A single Horse Artillery brigade comprises from seven to eight hundred men, a similar number of horses, and more than eighty vehicles; while on the move this huge mass of men, horses, and vehicles is without power of offence or defence and is at the same time highly vulnerable. Its power is represented by twelve guns and can only be exercised when these guns are stationary in action.

The latent power of co-operation of these guns must be great in order to justify the vast amount of labour, training, and expense which they represent, and great also should be the care exercised in order to insure that they are afforded every facility to demonstrate their intrinsic power.

Equipment and Ammunition.—Our Horse Artillery 13-pr. Q.F. gun is a small edition of our Field Artillery gun.

Its effective range (time shrapnel about 6100 yards) is approximately the same as that of the field-gun; its calibre is 3 inches and the weight of shell thrown $12\frac{1}{2}$ lb. (236 bullets), as compared with the field-gun's calibre of 3.3 inches and shell of $18\frac{1}{2}$ lb. (356 bullets); the ammunition is therefore not interchangeable.

Horse Artillery, unlike Field Artillery, cannot anticipate the aid of either howitzers or heavy artillery, and, since its ammunition consists of shrapnel shells only, the absence of anything in the nature of high-explosive shells would under certain circumstances probably militate against effective co-operation with Cavalry; for instance, in the rapid reduction of a hostile post blocking the line of advance.

Horse Artillery N.C.O.s, gunners, and drivers are now armed with a Webley revolver only, and, unless constant appeal is to be made to the Cavalry for escorts, it would appear that some more

effective weapon in the nature of a rifle or long-range pistol is required, in order to enable Horse Artillerymen to carry out many of those minor duties which fall to their lot in war, such as reconnaissance and communication work, foraging, and guards over ammunition both on the move and at rest.

In action the gunner's best defence is his gun, and he looks to the Cavalrymen to provide such further protection as may be required; but to assist in the protection of the wagon line some more effective weapon than the Webley pistol is certainly required.

Mobility.—The number of men and horses requisite for a Horse Artillery battery renders its initial cost and upkeep large, and considerable time is required to render its training efficient.

The disadvantages of maintaining a special class of Artillery for co-operation with Cavalry are obvious, and it may be assumed that strong reasons exist for so doing. Such is the case; the repeated experience of war has shown that the respective value to be assigned to the factors of mobility and power cannot be adjusted in such a way as to render one class of Artillery equally serviceable for the special requirements of Cavalry and for the general purposes of an army in the field.

At present the existence of Horse Artillery, as a special Artillery branch, can be defended only on the ground of mobility; if it is deprived of its mobility, it is not only unable to manœuvre with Cavalry, but it is too weak in shell-power to replace Field Artillery adequately.

The weight behind the horses of our Horse Artillery equipment is some 33 cwt., as compared with some 41 cwt. of the Field equipment. While this difference in weight does not appear great, experience in war has shown that it is, when combined with the saving of weight effected by not carrying men on the carriages, sufficient to enable Horse Artillery to march longer distances in a given time and move at a quicker pace than Field Artillery; in action also its gun-carriage and wagon are more easily man-handled.

Thirty-three cwt. certainly exceeds the weight permissible for Horse Artillery if due regard is paid to mobility.

Retention of mobility is obviously of vital importance to Horse Artillery, and the supply of suitable horses is an important factor. The short-legged, well-ribbed-up, active Artillery wheeler is what is

required, and all the horses of a battery should be capable of taking their turn in draught; the want of horses, commonly described as 'sergeants', 'trumpeters', 'detachment', 'gun leaders,' is not felt on service and the less of them the better.

On the march, mobility is a matter of training, discipline, and food.

The slow pace of the Cavalry trot is well suited to Horse Artillery, but on roads the slow pace of the walk is irksome, since Artillery draught-horses are taught to walk out, while Cavalry naturally prefer trotting up inclines and walking down declines; Horse Artillery, on account of their draught-horses, prefer the opposite course. Such little inconveniences are often unavoidable.

In moving across country Horse Artillery should be allowed as much latitude as possible with regard to position and pace, and should not unnecessarily be taken into deep hollows or across heavy ground, or required to gallop round on the flanks of Cavalry; like its ammunition, it should be husbanded with the greatest care on all ordinary occasions in order that full use of it may be made on special occasions.

On the field of battle, given a well-trained battery and horses in good condition, mobility is principally dependent on hostile fire; if therefore mobility is to be preserved, guns must not be placed where they cannot be easily withdrawn.

Fire Effect.—The chief characteristic of the modern Horse Artillery gun, as of other quick-firing guns, is its power of developing a great volume of fire in a short space of time.

It is this characteristic of Artillery fire-power which has assisted so much to prohibit the movement of large concentrated bodies of men on the modern battlefield; such movements are not only prohibited when a force is actually exposed to the fire of Q.F. guns, but the knowledge that such fire may be suddenly and rapidly developed renders caution necessary within a wide radius of cover behind which hostile guns may be lurking prepared to deal their sudden blow.

It is well to recognise that the effect of Q.F. guns on large concentrated formations may be sudden, rapid, and overwhelming, and the more unexpected the fire the greater is likely to be its moral effect.

On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that large bodies of Cavalry in widely extended formation cannot pass over exposed ground under the fire of Q.F. guns with but trifling loss, for as soon

as the Artilleryman is called upon to deal with rapidity of movement, and with irregularity and extension of formation, the difficulties of effective distribution and correction of fire assert themselves.

The results of the Artillery fire are liable to be as surprisingly small in this latter case as they are to be disastrously great in the former.

Firing at the rate of nine rounds per gun, a battery pours out some thirteen thousand bullets per minute, and this rate of fire by no means represents what individual guns, more especially some foreign equipments, are capable of.

Cavalry may come in on the flanks of Q.F. guns in action; may, thanks to dead ground, creep close up to guns in action behind cover; may override the wagon line; may surprise batteries limbered up; and in each case cut them to pieces with but little loss to themselves; but the days are gone when, given a fair field of fire, unshaken guns may be assailed with any reasonable hope of success by mounted frontal attack in anything but the loosest formation.

For Horse Artillery to manœuvre under the fire of Q.F. guns is suicidal. There is no reason to suppose, however, that a Horse Artillery battery cannot debouch from a hidden position and come into action in the open under Artillery fire, provided the distance to be traversed is small.

Whether it will ever be able to develop an effective fire, and still less whether it will be able to move again during daylight, is another matter.

Frontal time-shrapnel fire may be unable to inflict anything but slight losses on men sheltering behind gun-shields. It may well be sufficient, however, to prevent the development of effective fire, and to prohibit all successful attempts to limber up or replenish ammunition; oblique time-shrapnel fire is capable both of inflicting severe losses and of silencing hostile fire.

Under favourable circumstances foreign Artillery seeks to destroy hostile equipment with high-explosive shells; our percussion shrapnel may be used for the purpose, but it forms an inferior substitute for the high-explosive shell.

Frontal time-shrapnel fire may well fail to inflict any loss worth mentioning on troops sheltering behind only slightly improvised field-cover, but the same fire is quite capable of preventing them from

bringing accurate fire to bear on assailants, and may indeed cause them to suffer severe losses if forced to expose themselves in the attempt to do so; oblique fire is here as elsewhere the Artilleryman's chief agent of destruction and effect.

Time shrapnel is normally employed against troops in the open and behind cover; for effect it requires to be burst close up.

Percussion shrapnel may be effective against troops in woods and on rocky ground, and, provided direct hits can be obtained, against troops protected by single walls or shields.

Our shrapnel shells possess practically no incendiary effect.

The Element of Time.—Before opening fire for effect Artillery requires to carry out the process known as ranging, which entails the correct adjustment of elevation, line, and fuse.

Once fire is opened it is generally all-important that effect should be obtained as soon as possible; accordingly, when time permits, all preparations which may conduce towards this end should be made previous to the opening of fire.

The time requisite for efficiently carrying out these preparations and the process of ranging varies according to the nature of the task to be performed, but except under very favourable circumstances is always appreciable.

The more Horse Artillery are trained to be quick into action and quick to reach effective fire the better, but mistakes and misfortunes are always liable to occur, and war is not waged under practice-camp conditions; it is therefore wise to allow a good margin for unfamiliar country, unknown ranges, and unusual conditions.

Horse Artillery, with its numerous vehicles, defenceless on the move, and demanding constant care to preserve its mobility intact, must often be a cause of anxiety to a Cavalry Commander. When the time does come for its employment, it is better that it should be in action too soon than that its great fire-power should be lost through insufficient time for its development.

Range.—Recent years have witnessed a development in the long-ranging powers of Horse and Field Artillery guns, no less important, if less widely realised, than the development in rapidity of fire.

The value of long range in guns bulks much larger in war than

in peace; by it the selection of Artillery positions is facilitated, the enemy is hampered in his movements and in his choice of positions, and is forced to early deployment, and a feeling of insecurity in his ranks is created, but, above all, oblique fire and concentration of fire are facilitated. Oblique fire and concentration of fire are the two great principles of Horse Artillery, no less than of Field Artillery, which, ably applied in war, have repeatedly proved the secret of success.

The great advantage of the Horse Artillery gun as compared with the machine-gun and rifle is that it is enabled to effect its purpose at ranges denied to these latter weapons, which possess their own field of superiority. To employ therefore Horse Artillery guns systematically at short ranges is not only to deprive oneself of a great advantage, but it is to ask them to perform their task under unfavourable conditions.

Concealment and Cover.—It is easy to understand the intense relief which a Cavalry Commander must feel when, preparatory to settling on his plan of action, he rides forward to carry out his tactical reconnaissance and the position of the hostile Artillery is revealed.

The exposure of the gun position does much to reveal the plan of action. Exposed guns with their wagons alongside form an excellent mark for hostile Artillery fire, and they are consequently liable to forfeit their mobility, and may find it impossible to break off an unequal contest and to recommence it under more favourable circumstances, while the difficulties of replenishing them with ammunition are intensified, and they sacrifice the element of surprise in their fire.

Gun-shields afford a good protection against frontal-time shrapnel fire, and, beyond a distance of five or six hundred yards, against the modern sharp-nosed rifle-bullet, but they afford little protection against oblique fire.

Concealment therefore of the Artillery position, including that of the observing station, may be of great importance, and it may be assumed that a Cavalry Commander will be cautious in exposing his guns, especially in the early stages of an action.

On the other hand, the occupation of covered positions tends to complicate that rapid control and direction of fire which may be essential to the support of Cavalry.

As our shields afford us reasonable cover, the ideal position would

appear to be a direct-fire position, easy of access, and one in which the advantages of concealment are obtained by utilising existing topographical or artificial means; but such positions are not always easy to find, and demand time both for reconnaissance and preparation.

Horse Artillery are more often likely to be called upon rapidly to occupy the best position to hand than to search for one fulfilling all possible conditions. As a general policy, therefore, Horse Artillery should endeavour to preserve its concealment up to the moment of opening fire, and to select positions which, while permitting rapid control and direction of fire, are easy of access, and from which, in case of necessity, the guns may be withdrawn without undue difficulty.

Position on the Move.—When in proximity to the enemy, Horse Artillery must be prepared to cover with its fire the advance of the Cavalry from one tactical point to another.

If guns are attached to the advanced guard, their number should be small, as they tend to hamper movement, and because the quick-firing powers of the modern gun permit of the required task being performed by less guns than was formerly the case. If they do not accompany the advanced guard, some should certainly move, under escort if necessary, either in advance of, or at the head of, the main body, and prepared to support the advanced guard.

The remainder should move where they do not hamper the movements of the Cavalry, can easily extricate themselves, and avail themselves of as much freedom in pace and choice of ground as possible. It is dangerous to allow Horse Artillery to remain halted in low ground, whence it cannot readily occupy positions from which hostile action may be restricted.

Reconnaissance and Plan of Action.—It is advisable that an Artillery officer should always accompany the advanced guard; he is thus enabled at the commencement of an action to furnish his C.R.H.A. with information which may be of considerable use to the Cavalry Commander. Such information may often be usefully conveyed in the form of a rough sketch showing probable Artillery positions.

Before forming his plan of action, a Cavalry Commander will generally ride forward, accompanied by his subordinate Commanders, in order to carry out his tactical reconnaissance. The important rôle played by the Horse Artillery in this plan of action generally

necessitates its position or positions being at once determined within somewhat narrow limits.

No one except the Cavalry Commander concerned can lay down what latitude should be allowed the C.R.H.A. in the selection of the position and in the subsequent handling of the Artillery; it can, however, be safely laid down that the highest form of co-operation demands that the Artillery Commander should be capable of utilising wide latitude in these respects.

The Cavalry Commander will probably impose strict limitations on the number of officers or men accompanying him during his tactical reconnaissance. The C.R.H.A. does well to be accompanied by an officer, and the Horse Artillery should be on the look-out for, and be prepared to act rapidly on, this officer's signals.

The tactical reconnaissance of the Cavalry Commander is supplemented by the Artillery reconnaissance of the C.R.H.A. and his subordinate Commanders; the object of this reconnaissance is to determine the exact positions of the observing station, or stations, and guns.

The general character which fighting between mounted troops is likely to assume may require at any time prompt decision and quick movement on the part of Horse Artillery; its Commander must therefore be constantly looking ahead; in action this demands close attention to the tactical situation and a judicious use of reconnaissance with a view to future movements.

Economy of Force and the Opening of Fire.—No more guns should be committed to action than the tactical situation demands, and until the enemy has disclosed his hand it is generally advisable to retain some portion of the guns in a position of readiness.

What constitutes a reasonable target is largely dependent on the tactical circumstances, but firing on small parties of mounted men can seldom be justified, unless it is absolutely necessary to delay the hostile advance or to quicken retreat; the premature opening of fire is liable to have the gravest consequences, and no guns should ever open fire without a definite and obvious cause.

Concentration, Dispersion, and Control of Guns.—Dispersion of guns does not necessarily imply dispersion of fire. In fact, it is often a sound policy to disperse the guns in order to concentrate the fire

and to compel the enemy at the same time to disperse his own fire; fire thus coming from more than one direction is likely to prove much more destructive, and at the same time the enemy's task is rendered a more difficult one.

The policy of breaking up Horse Artillery brigades or batteries in action is not of itself to be recommended, but is a policy which, if perhaps we except a Cavalry mounted combat, is almost invariably imposed sooner or later by the tactical conditions; the comparatively extended front on which fighting takes place, the limited number of guns available, the varying tasks allotted to brigades or regiments of Cavalry, the importance of bringing oblique fire to bear, the necessity for pushing forward or retiring guns under the covering fire of other guns, &c., all tend towards dispersion in action.

The extent to which the control of the Artillery is allowed to devolve upon subordinate Commanders is another matter which the Cavalry Commander alone can decide. It may be taken, however, as a matter of general policy that a Cavalry Commander will retain the Artillery under his own command as long as possible. The extent to which central control can be effectively exercised is largely dependent on topographical conditions, rapidly descending in the scale as difficulties connected with field of view and communication increase.

Dispersion of guns does not necessarily imply devolution of command. 'Field Artillery Training' states that 'Units of the two arms associated for a distinct tactical operation should, as a rule, be under one Commander,' but this does not mean that guns directed to support this or that squadron, regiment, or brigade of Cavalry taking part in an attack or defence will necessarily be placed under the Commander immediately concerned.

It devolves upon the subordinate Artillery Commander to place himself in touch with that Commander with the object of securing the fullest co-operation, but at the same time he must maintain communication with his C.R.H.A. as long as he remains under his orders.

It is essential that explicit orders should be given to all concerned when guns are placed under the orders of a subordinate Commander, or when guns so allotted are replaced under the orders of the C.R.H.A.

Since a section of Horse Artillery is liable to be sent off on detached duty at any moment, every section should be self-contained; this does

not entail the provision of a large number of instruments, such as directors, plotters, &c., but it does entail every section being independent with regard to trained signallers, patrols, and look-out men, and the necessary division of the battery staff being determined beforehand.

The senior Artillery officer of a unit, large or small, is bound to devote his attention to the tactical situation, and he can seldom afford to do more than exercise a general direction and control over the fire.

The position of the C.R.H.A. in action will usually conform to that of the Cavalry Commander, which is likely to be near that of the guns if they happen to be concentrated in action; there would however, appear to be one distinct exception to this rule, and to this further reference will be made under 'Cavalry Mounted Action.'

R.H.A. in a Cavalry Mounted Action.—Since Waterloo, Cavalry weapons of mounted combat have changed but little, but the Horse Artillery gun has been revolutionised, and machine-guns have come into existence as an important factor.

Part of the rôle of Horse Artillery is to create favourable opportunities for the *arme blanche*.

The art of the Cavalry combat consists in subjecting hostile Cavalry to the devastating and demoralising effects of Horse Artillery and machine-gun fire, in order to reap the full harvest with sword or lance.

The ideal action will therefore be one in which the hostile squadrons are exposed to the full power of oblique or enfilade fire for as long as possible up to the actual moment of the collision, while the fire of hostile supporting guns is masked or rendered ineffective.

A Cavalry Commander who has decided to manœuvre with the object of thus crushing his opponent has, in so far as his Horse Artillery is concerned, the choice of three plans of action. No matter which plan of action he adopts, it will be his endeavour to bring off the encounter under conditions of ground and formation as favourable as possible to himself.

(a) He may elect to manœuvre with both Cavalry and guns.

Without a knowledge of the particular tactical and topographical conditions, the relative position of the Horse Artillery to the Cavalry can only be stated in the most general terms.

It must move where it is free to disengage itself at once, and at the same time it must be protected from sudden onslaught; it may

be assumed that it will move under cover as much as circumstances permit, and take all possible precautions with regard to reconnaissance and such preliminary arrangements as may facilitate a rapid occupation of position and development of fire.

This plan of action appears to be justifiably bold or recklessly dangerous, according to the moral equation of the enemy.

If the enemy are shaken in morale, are in retreat, or are anxious to avoid coming to blows, it may afford opportunity for close and effective co-operation between Cavalry and Horse Artillery.

The weak points are evident; the whole force is moving without the cover of Horse Artillery fire. Unless the hostile guns are engaged in a similar manœuvre there is grave danger that the Horse Artillery will come under Artillery fire while still on the move, with disastrous results.

For its successful issue the plan depends on nice calculation of time and distance; a slight miscalculation and the guns may fail to disengage at the right time, may fail to occupy the right position, or may occupy it without securing that time which has been spoken of as necessary to the effective development of its fire.

(b) The Cavalry Commander may elect to use his Horse Artillery as a pivot from which to manœuvre with his Cavalry.

This assumes a careful selection of the Artillery position, and the guns being concealed in a position of readiness or observation, with all due preparations made in advance for the effective development of fire, and implies a sounder appreciation of the possibilities and limitations of Horse Artillery fire.

It may be contended that an opponent is not likely to accept combat under such conditions; to answer this we must know not only the moral equation of the opposing Cavalry, but also the personal equation of its Commander.

War, and, I take it, particularly Cavalry war, is largely a question of stating and solving these two equations. Rifle and gun fire exercise such a predominating influence on the modern battlefield that the occasions on which a Cavalry combat on a large scale can be brought about are necessarily restricted.

When such a combat does occur, I think it will be due either to pure accident or to one of the Cavalry Commanders allowing himself to be drawn by his craftier opponent into exposing his Cavalry to the fire of Q.F. guns.

Before his squadrons can recover from the disorder created, his opponent has seized the long-sought-for and patiently awaited opportunity to attack him with the *arme blanche*.

He is placed in the invidious position of accepting the challenge under adverse conditions, or of endeavouring to extricate his force, as best he can, with fatal loss of prestige if not of men.

(c) The third plan is a combination of (a) and (b).

It is open in a less degree to the same objections as (a) and leads to a dispersion of guns; tactical and topographical conditions may, however, compel a Cavalry Commander to adopt it. It is a plan which I have seen foreign Horse Artillery employ, but not with altogether convincing results.

An opportunity of destroying hostile Artillery while on the move should be seized; otherwise the fire should be concentrated on the hostile Cavalry, so long as the action lasts.

In the absence of strong tactical or topographical reasons to the contrary, simplification of the plan of action and likewise of the control and direction of fire renders it desirable that the guns should be concentrated in action.

The Cavalry action, in my opinion, constitutes the case where, when once a Cavalry Commander has explained his plan of action to his C.R.H.A., the latter should return to, and remain with, the guns until the combat has been decided. It is only from the gun position that the C.R.H.A. can effectively exercise that prompt decision and initiative which the highest form of co-operation demands.

R.H.A. and Cavalry Fire Action.—For Horse Artillery this is a question of covering fire; by utilising time shrapnel it has the power of assisting its Cavalry to advance or retire in the face of hostile troops without undue loss.

This assumes, however, an accurate knowledge of the positions of hostile and friendly troops, and of where and when fire is required. To facilitate this, Horse Artillery in the attack should be on the alert to push in as close as it reasonably can; that is to say, without running an undue risk of its becoming engaged in a close-fire fight for its own protection to the exclusion of devoting its attention to the immediate needs of the Cavalry.

Horse Artillery of itself possesses but limited resources for obtaining information on the above-mentioned points, and it is to the

Cavalry that it looks to furnish it with much of the requisite information.

This information must, however, come through recognised channels of communication. It is quite impossible for the Horse Artillery to keep in communication with detachments scattered all over the battlefield.

In a fire fight in which Horse Artillery is dispersed, the C.R.H.A. should be in touch with the Cavalry Commander and in communication with his own Artillery subordinate Commanders, who in their turn should be in touch with the local Cavalry Commanders.

The local Cavalry Commanders being in communication with their own subordinate Commanders, a network of communication should be available for the collection and dissemination of the required information.

Effective co-operation is largely a matter of information, which it may be safely said that Cavalry is always willing to supply and Horse Artillery to receive; but no matter how good the intentions may be, one thing is still essential to the smooth working of the machinery: the particular Cavalry and Horse Artillery called upon to co-operate together must know and understand each other and be accustomed to working together.

Any system which rests on artificial communication is liable to break down, and consequently subordinate Artillery Commanders must be trained to exercise initiative; they must remember that to sacrifice their mobility recklessly may seriously jeopardise the Cavalry Commander's general plan of action, and, on the other hand, that the loss of guns nobly sacrificed constitutes an honour and not a disgrace.

R.H.A. in Pursuit and Retirement.—Both in pursuit and in retirement the chief assets of Horse Artillery are its mobility and the long range of its guns. These enable Horse Artillery in pursuit to move wide on the flanks and bring oblique fire to bear; in retirement to force the enemy to early deployment; and to slip away at the right time to a new position.

In a pursuit the Horse Artillery Commander must be constantly on the alert to push guns forward to positions from which they can more readily co-operate with the Cavalry. His policy may be summed up as one of early reconnaissance and covering fire, combined with initiative, activity, and boldness.

In a retirement the officer commanding the Horse Artillery is bound to work in close consultation with the officer commanding the rear-guard.

Deliberation and care must characterise the reconnaissance of new positions, the covering fire necessary to facilitate movement, the movements themselves.

The actual time of the withdrawal of the guns must be carefully gauged in accordance with the tactical circumstances.

When sufficient guns are available, the Artillery will generally work by bounds, a portion of the guns being always in position ready to supply covering fire.

R.H.A. in a General Engagement.—Its mobility enables Horse Artillery to co-operate with Cavalry on the hostile flanks, and to be easily transferable from one portion of the battlefield to another.

The extent to which the Horse Artillery will be utilised for general purposes when the Cavalry is temporarily unemployed depends largely on the strength of Artillery available and on the future tasks required of the Cavalry.

If it is required to co-operate subsequently with the Cavalry, care must be taken that it is not so drawn into the battle as to forfeit its mobility, more especially as it is likely to find itself engaged with guns of calibre larger than its own.

Ammunition Supply.—Ten minutes' rapid fire would suffice to empty all the firing-battery wagons of a Horse Artillery battery; this is not likely to occur, but it shows how miserly one must be in expenditure of ammunition on ordinary occasions, if one is to be prepared to utilise the quick-firing capabilities of the gun to its utmost capacity on special occasions.

The rare sight of a Horse Artillery battery with its full complement of wagons is sufficient to tempt a Cavalry Commander to devise means by which he can temporarily disencumber himself of some of them.

As a general policy it is advisable to retain the first-line ammunition wagons with the firing battery.

The Horse Artillery itself has not the necessary staff to guarantee the supervision of two lines of wagons in addition to the gun line either in action or on the move. As the Horse Artillery does not

possess a single rifle to use in its own defence, a separation of wagons will impose a severe tax on Cavalry escorts.

Occasions are certainly liable to occur, more particularly in advanced- and rear-guard actions, when it is advisable that guns should be accompanied by firing-battery wagons only, but in these cases it is likewise advisable that all the first-line ammunition wagons should be retained with the main body of the Artillery, and under the direct orders of the C.R.H.A.

Escorts.—Horse Artillery is, by the nature of its work, more likely to require escorts than Field Artillery, especially as it is now without rifles.

Where an escort is required, it should be strong enough, when on the move, to act by shock action and to afford the battery time to develop its fire.

In action it must prevent riflemen or machine-guns from occupying positions within effective range, to protect the flanks and wagon line, and to give timely warning of hostile movements. The position of the escort should be arranged accordingly and it need seldom be close to the guns.

The strength may be calculated, according to tactical and topographical conditions, at from one to two troops per battery. Rifles appear more suitable for the work than machine-guns, as protection against large bodies of the enemy must depend on the disposition of the Cavalry main body.

The officer commanding the escort should remain directly or indirectly in close communication with the officer commanding the guns.

In case of any impending alteration in the position of guns or escort, information should be communicated at once. It is as important that the guns should not advance or retire without warning the escort, as it is that the escort should not move without warning the guns.

On service, an escort would presumably always be commanded by an officer. In peace, escorts are often commanded by N.C.O.s, and the fatherly interest which they display in their charge is most marked, and, at times, amusing. I do not know what form of training is responsible for this, but long may it continue. It is a fine incentive to co-operation for the Horse Artilleryman.

LONG-DISTANCE RIDES*

IN view of the Olympic Games that are to be held at Berlin in 1916, in which a team of British officers will compete, the following information on the subject of long-distance riding should be welcome to our readers. The Summary of Continental Experience on this subject has been made by Captain Hamilton Grace, of the Cavalry School Staff, and the records of the ride recently held at Netheravon were compiled by Captain Tomkinson, Adjutant of the Cavalry School. Every patrol leader will find in this article hints which will help him in the care of his horses either on manœuvres or in war.

CONTINENTAL EXPERIENCE

1. Owing to the unfortunate experiences of the earlier long-distance rides, a large section of both military and civil opinion is distinctly hostile to them. That they have their value for military purposes hardly anyone will deny; if, then, they can be carried out without suffering to the horses it is desirable that they should take place.

The unfortunate experiences above alluded to were due to three causes :—

(i.) The lack of experience in the riders and the lack of data to go upon.

(ii.) The lack of training of the horses.

(iii.) The way the conditions of the rides were framed.

By paying due attention to the experiences of these rides we ought to be able to so conduct ours that we are able to reap all the lessons they produce, and at the same time avoid the misfortunes which befell our predecessors.

2. The most famous of these earlier rides were :—

(i.) Berlin to Vienna and *vice versa* in 1892, when thirty-one horses were killed and many others rendered more or less useless for

*Works consulted : *Paris—Rouen—Deauville*, Paul Bausil ; *Le Raid National Militaire : Lyon—Vichy*, Comte d'Ideville ; *Der Distanzritt und Die Pferdezucht*, Dr. Emil Pott.

the future. The distance, 353 miles, from Vienna to Berlin being covered in seventy to eighty hours.

(ii.) Brussels to Ostend, 1902. Many horses were killed.

(iii.) Paris to Deauville, 1903. The winner did $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour for 53 miles. Two stages, 81 miles to Rouen, to be done in between 13 and 15 hours; 53 miles at any pace.

(iv.) Lyons to Vichy, 1904. In four stages, St. Etienne $35\frac{1}{2}$ miles, Montbrison 21 miles, Noirétable 28 miles, Vichy 39 miles. Winner did 15 miles per hour for 39 miles. The first stages to be done at the rate of from 7 to 8 miles per hour, the last at any pace desired. One horse died.

(v.) Lyons to Aix, 1905. Four horses killed.

In the earlier rides there were no control stations and no time limits, and no rules as to the condition of the winner: all depended on who got past the flag first. Later, rules were made which prevented unfit horses starting or continuing the ride and made the condition of the horse on arrival and subsequently a factor in awarding the prize. By these means the mortality of the horses was greatly lessened.

3. All these rides led to the same conclusions, namely, that (1) It was more important to have a well-trained horse than a very expensive horse; at least two months' training is necessary. (2) A definite march programme was essential. (3) That some form of concentrated food was necessary. (4) That about $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour could be kept up for about $62\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and 15 miles could be kept up for about 50 miles. (5) The best pace is the gallop, with short halts and *slow* trotting up and down steep hills. (6) The best type of horse is a blood horse that has pluck and can gallop easily. (7) A careful study of the route is essential.

As the last three rides have been won by officers of the same regiment, the 28th Dragoons, their methods of training are given.

Not only does the horse require training but the rider also must be fit, plenty of exercise both on foot and mounted is absolutely indispensable.

4. As regards the horse: The first thing necessary is to get it into big condition and then by long slow work of six to seven hours a day to strengthen it by trotting and its wind by galloping; much of this galloping can be done by leading the horse. Plenty of variety in work is to be advocated. When once the horse is in fairly hard condition he must be accustomed to a regular pace of progression.

In a long-distance ride against time there is no place for the walk—maintain the gallop (at 15 miles per hour), the slow trot, and the halt. The fast trot is to be avoided like the plague—it means a constant strain on the muscles in contradistinction to the gallop in which they relax after every bound, and, further, they have to move one-third as often again as in the gallop. If you wish progress as fast by trotting as galloping the leg has to be moved one-third as often again; in other words, it takes 150 paces at the trot to cover in the same time the same ground as could be galloped over in 100 paces. Therefore the gallop is the essential pace—steep hills being ascended and descended at a slow hound jog with halts of a few minutes to allow the horse to regain his breath.

Much depends on getting a horse accustomed to a normal rate of progression, and one that can be recommended is:—

10 mins. gallop at 400 m.	= 4 km. (15 miles per hour approx.)
4½ min. trot at 220 m.	= 1 km. (8 miles per hour approx.)
10 mins. gallop.	= 4 km.
4½ mins. trot	= 1 km.
10 mins. gallop	= 4 km.
4½ mins. trot	= 1 km.
12 mins.	= 5 km.
<hr/>	
56 mins.	20 km. (12½ miles approx.)

4 minutes' rest, and sugared water.

This must be altered to suit the condition of the horse and the character of the country; for instance, if the ground compels you to gallop four miles because there is a steep hill further on, then do so; but keep at the same pace of gallop and make your next trot or halt correspondingly long. It is fatal to try suddenly to increase the pace.

The winner of the Paris-Deauville ride wound up his training by four hours of the above programme, riding the horse one hour and leading it the other three, coupled with a march of 6½ miles to and from the track.

5. The feeding of the horse in training for a long-distance ride is deserving of great attention. In consequence of the long slow work the horse's appetite will grow enormously, and finally it will be found that

a day's ration of 20 litres oats, 3 to 4 litres bran, 4 to 5 litres hay, $6\frac{1}{2}$ lb., sugar, is readily eaten by the horse.

During the training the addition of sugar to the ration is highly recommended, while for the actual ride itself it is absolutely indispensable.

It is best given in the latter case—2 oz. to 1 pint of water. During the ride from Paris to Rouen the winner consumed $9\frac{1}{2}$ lb. sugar. During the ride from Rouen to Deauville the winner consumed $2\frac{1}{2}$ lb. sugar.

6. The following were the measures taken by the winner on arrival at Rouen: Five pints sugared water, legs rubbed with hot vinegar, massage of whole body with camphor oil. Bandages soaked in lead lotion, and flannel bandages over these—then water and feed.

On arrival at Deauville, same treatment except for addition of bran poultices round the feet and a mash to eat.

7. Horses should not be shod the day before starting on a long ride as it always takes a day or two for the horse to get settled to his shoes.

The rider should wear good walking boots so that when opportunity occurs he can get off and lead his horse. Such opportunities occurred in the first stage of the 1903-4 rides when the rate had to be between 7 to 8 miles per hour.

8. Horse's temperature is the surest index to his condition, and therefore all competitors should have a thermometer, as also the 'vet' at the controls.

A horse's normal temperature is 37.7° Cent. (100° F.).

As soon as it reaches 40° Cent. (102° F.) great care must be exercised.

As soon as it reaches 42° Cent. (107° F.) a horse will almost certainly die.





THE 14th LIGHT DRAGOONS.

—
1814.



Lieut. H. F. Brace's Government Charger—No. 69,336—Winner.

THE CAVALRY SCHOOL LONG-DISTANCE RIDE.

Lieut. V. D. S. Williams' Hired Charger—"Magnate"—Second.



CAVALRY SCHOOL LONG-DISTANCE RIDE

(OCTOBER 8, 1913)

FOR A CUP PRESENTED BY THE COMMANDANT

DETAIL

THE course for the distance ride was :—

Netheravon—Tidworth, 10 minutes' halt.

Tidworth—Trowbridge, 30 minutes' halt.

Trowbridge—Bulford, 15 minutes' halt.

Bulford—Netheravon.

Control stations were at Tidworth, Trowbridge, and Bulford.

Horses for the ride paraded on October 7 in the riding school at 9 A.M. for inspection and weighing.

Officers informed the Adjutant a week before the ride what meals and horse feeds they required at Tidworth, Trowbridge, or Bulford, in order that arrangements could be made.

Carrying of nosebags was optional.

CONDITIONS

1. The horse which completes the course in the shortest time wins, provided that—

(a) He comes in sound in limb and back.

(b) He can negotiate six jumps in the riding school.

(c) He is not too exhausted to eat a small feed within an hour after arrival.

(d) He trots out sound next morning, and is capable, if necessary, of continuing the journey.

2. If the first horse fails to fulfil the above conditions, the Cup goes to the next horse that passes the tests.

3. The lightest officer will be graded as scratch. An allowance of a half minute per pound weight will be conceded to all officers heavier than the scratch weight.

4. Marks will be allotted by a committee of three.

5. Competitors will be stopped at the control stations if their horses are considered to be too exhausted to continue the journey.

6. *Dress*, Khaki, haversack, and mackintosh or cloak (no belts).
Saddlery, Regulation saddle and bridle (no swords).
7. Diaries to be kept showing—
 - (a) The preparation of the horse for the six weeks prior to the ride.
 - (b) Duration of halts, route, changes of pace, and feeds during ride.
8. Horses engaged in this competition will continue their 2½ hours' daily exercise under Staff-Sergeant-Major Blyth, but will be available for any extra training that officers wish to give them in afternoons. They can be put on special feeding according to officers' wishes, who must inform Captain Pollok of alterations that they wish made.

SUMMARY

The distance of the race was sixty-two miles as the crow flies. The actual distance covered would probably be about sixty-five or sixty-six miles.

The conditions, as far as the weather and going were concerned, were practically perfect. The whole course, with the exception of about five miles in and out of Trowbridge, and two miles in and out of Bulford, was across the Downs, the finest going in the world. The day was cool with a nice breeze from the south-east. There were two showers of rain during the morning, but not sufficient to soak the riders, and really refreshed the horses.

Of the fourteen starters two were stopped at the control at Trowbridge, one from exhaustion (the horse had fever), the other from lameness. One was stopped at Bulford. This horse had had no special preparation, but was ridden on the Army Exercise, and though it had no chance of winning the race, having had to allow the winner a quarter of an hour's start, made the best time to Bulford, arriving there three minutes quicker than any other horse. Two others, seeing that they had no chance, returned straight to Netheravon from Trowbridge. The horse which finished second was considerably fresher than the winner, and was unlucky not to win, the rider thinking that he was in front till within about five miles of Bulford, when he discovered that two other competitors, who had taken a different route from Trowbridge, were about a mile in front of him. All the remainder finished.

The horse which finished third was too beat to be put over the six small jumps. He could not feed for some hours, but eventually did so, and pulled out sound the next day, as did all the other horses with the exception of one which had fallen and cut its knee.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. The controls, chiefly owing to the difficulty of making the necessary arrangements, were not well situated, the distances between them being so unevenly divided. It would have been better to have had the first control at Netheravon on the return journey from Tidworth, the next at Trowbridge, and the last at The Bustard.

2. Too much start was given to the heavy-weights. In this ride it was proved that the good heavy-weight horse could make practically as good time carrying a heavy man as the light-weight horse with a light rider.

3. The horses must have a steady and thorough preparation.

They should be in good big condition before commencing the last two months' training. They must be regularly worked in the saddles in which they will be ridden in the race. Two horses had sore backs the day after the race, and these had done all their training in civilian saddles and then were ridden in military saddles.

4. Horses must get accustomed to taking feeds and stimulants that officers intend to give them during the race. Nearly all the officers applied for gruel to be provided for their horses at Trowbridge, but very few of the horses would touch it, being quite unaccustomed to it. The riders of the winner and the third both gave their horses beer at The Bustard. The winner was going very strong till about a mile from home, when his horse tired suddenly and rapidly, and the third collapsed half a mile earlier, and could only walk home. From this it would appear that to give a horse alcohol, though it doubtless has a stimulating effect for a short time, has no lasting effect and is not to be compared to sugar and water.

HISTORY OF LIEUTENANT BRACE'S CHARGER

Lieutenant Brace's charger, Army Number 69,336, was purchased by Colonel Wood on July 27, 1911, from Mr. W. Murphy, Waterside, Waterford, as a 5-year old, price £75.

The sire of this horse was 'Red Kangaroo.'


He was first issued to Second-Lieutenant Drake, 11th Hussars, on December 12, 1911. He was returned to Melton by that officer, who considered him unable to stand work as a Cavalry officer's charger.

Colonel Wood reports that the horse arrived at Melton in a very bad condition on August 31, 1912. After being well fed and cared for at Melton, he was issued to Captain Cavendish, of the 9th Lancers, on July 7, 1912, and hunted by him with the Pytchley Hounds. On Captain Cavendish taking up an appointment at the War Office the horse was returned by him to Melton on February 12, 1913, and was issued to Lieutenant Brace, on February 26, 1913.

Whilst he was under training for this race the horse ate 16 to 18 lb. oats, 2 lb. bran, 6 lb. hay daily, in five feeds, with a bran mash every Saturday night.

TIMES OF RIDE

Left Cavalry School . . .	7 A.M.
Arrived Tidworth . . .	7.25 „
Left Tidworth . . .	7.35 „
Passed Cavalry School . . .	7.58 „
Passed Market Lavington . . .	9 „
Arrived Trowbridge . . .	9.57 „
Left Trowbridge . . .	10.27 „
Arrived The Bustard . . .	11.50 „
Left The Bustard . . .	11.55 „
Arrived Bulford . . .	12.36 „
Left Bulford . . .	12.51 „
Arrived Cavalry School . . .	1.10 „



ROUTE

Cavalry School *via* Choulston Field to Tidworth and back same way, up road past Ruddle's Farm to Lavington Folly, Ell Barrow, Little Farm, Market Lavington, along road to Tinhead, right handed to Trowbridge, from Trowbridge *via* Steeple Ashton—Tinhead—Highland Farm—half mile south of John-a-Gore's Cross—half mile north of Tilshead to The Bustard—half mile south of Knighton Down—Stonehenge Inn—Bulford, straight back through Ablington House grounds over Figheldean Ford.

REMARKS

1. A little water at Bulford.
2. Chilled water and feed at Trowbridge.
3. Groom sent to The Bustard : warm water with 1 pint beer, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. sugar : cold water thrown over legs and head.

4. Bulford. Nothing available : own groom had a little chilled water.

I missed turning coming from Trowbridge, and lost one mile by going by Steeple Ashton, and again lost ground between Tilshead and The Bustard about one mile. Cast off fore shoe short of Bulford.

Total journey 70 miles
 Total time 5 hours 15 minutes.
 Average $13\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour.

N.B.—This was not counting compulsory halts. The horse rapidly tired by Syrencot House, and was led from Ablington House to Figheldean Ford.

H. F. BRACE, Lieut. 15th Hussars.

"MAGNATE" DIARY OF EXERCISE FROM SEPT. 8

Date.	Morning.	Afternoon.
Monday Sept. 8	2 hours (slow)*	$1\frac{1}{2}$ hour ($\frac{1}{2}$ -hour cantering)*
Tuesday, " 9	4 hours (on scheme)*	—
Wednesday, " 10	$2\frac{1}{2}$ hours (slow)	$1\frac{1}{2}$ hour ($\frac{1}{2}$ -hour cantering)*
Thursday, " 11	6 hours (on scheme)*	—
Friday, " 12	$2\frac{1}{2}$ hours (slow)	(Shod)
Saturday, " 13	3 hours (cub hunting)*	—
Monday, " 15	$2\frac{1}{2}$ hours (slow)	$1\frac{1}{2}$ hour ($\frac{1}{2}$ -hour cantering)*
Tuesday, " 16	2 hours (slow)*	2 hours (slow)*
Wednesday, " 17	—	3 hours (21 miles)*
Thursday, " 18	$3\frac{1}{2}$ hours (scheme)*	—
Friday, " 19	3 hours (slow)	(Clipped)
Saturday, " 20	$3\frac{1}{2}$ hours (32 miles)*	—
Monday, " 22	4 hours (slow)*	—
Tuesday, " 23	2 hours (slow)	$1\frac{1}{2}$ hour ($\frac{1}{2}$ -hour cantering, led)*
Wednesday, " 24	2 hours (slow)	—
Thursday, " 25	2 hours 35 mins. (30 miles)*	—
Friday, " 26	2 hours (slow)	—
Saturday, " 27	$2\frac{1}{2}$ hours (slow)	—
Monday, " 29	2 hours (slow)	2 hours (slow)*
Tuesday, " 30	2 hours (slow)	2 hours (20 miles)*
Wednesday, Oct. 1	2 hours (slow). Shod	$1\frac{1}{2}$ hour (slow)
Thursday, " 2	3 hours (slow)*	2 hours (slow)*
Friday, " 3	2 hours (slow)	$2\frac{1}{2}$ hours (slow)
Saturday, " 4	$4\frac{1}{2}$ hours (cub hunting)*	—
Monday, " 6	$3\frac{1}{2}$ hours (slow)*	—
Tuesday, " 7	$\frac{1}{2}$ -hour led in hand	$\frac{1}{2}$ -hour led in hand (horse examined)
Wednesday, " 8	RACE	—

Ration 18 lb. oats
 2 lb. bran } Daily.
 12 lb. hay }
 Mash Saturday nights.

* Denotes ridden by owner.

V. D. S. WILLIAMS, Lieut. 5th Dragoon Guards.

DIARY OF RACE

Start	7.5	A.M.	—
Arrived Tidworth	7.32	"	Horse had a mouthful of grass and walked for 10 minutes.
Leaves Tidworth	7.42	"	(Did not stale—efforts were made to make him)
Netheravon	8.5	"	—
St. John-a-Gore's	8.51	"	—
Edington	9.25	"	—
Trowbridge, arrived	9.59	"	Horse staled—drank half bucket of sugar and water, ate small feed of crushed oats and carrots with a little bicarbonate of soda mixed in.
Trowbridge, leaves	10.29	"	Well rubbed down and bandages changed.
Edington	11.5	"	—
Imber	11.30	"	Route to Imber from Edington round by the road.
Tilshead	12	"	—
The Bustard	12.17	"	—
Bulford, arrived	12.40	"	Horse drank half bucket of sugar and water.
Bulford, leaves	12.55	"	Ate a handful of hay
Netheravon	1.11	"	—

REMARKS

Pace.—A hand-gallop was maintained for the most time whenever the going was good, varied by a hound trot. Walking dismounted up steep hills and jog-trotting dismounted down.

I was under the impression at Imber on the way home that I was ahead, and accordingly lessened my pace slightly; it was not till arriving nearly at The Bustard that I discovered my mistake, from which place I pushed the pace.

I had a stable companion to meet me and bring me in the last ten miles.

V. D. S. WILLIAMS, Lieut. 5th Dragoon Guards.



THE TRAINING OF GROUND SCOUTS

'CAVALRY TRAINING,' 1912, gives (page 10) the signals a ground scout should employ, and states (page 215) every man should be instructed in ground scout duties, and a sufficient number of men, selected for their superior intelligence and good horsemanship, should be specially trained as ground scouts of the squadron, and on page 216 lays down that instruction is to be given in negotiating obstructions, &c.; again (page 226), it is stated that when practising mounted action ground scouts are to be thoroughly instructed in their duties, and in dealing with dismounted action says the line of advance from one fire position to another should be carefully reconnoitred—apparently by ground scouts, since the paragraph is indexed under 'Ground Scouts.'

Considering the comparatively few occasions when ground scouts are used, due, it must be presumed, to repeatedly working over a known terrain, is it worth while sacrificing the time necessary to ensure some efficiency in ground-scout duties, or, granted that it is worth while, how can the training be accomplished without unduly encroaching on the already few precious hours available? Above are questions that at once arise when such a subject is mooted—if indeed it ever is mooted.

The alarming and ever-increasing number of specialists that already crowd the ranks of a mounted unit might, at first sight, seem to settle the problem by producing the situation of leaving no intelligent material from which ground scouts could be selected. To the writer, however, the whole vexed question of specialists—and it is a vexatious question—seems somewhat to yield to the old saying :—

'Let us know something about everything and everything about something.'

Consider a squadron with its scouts, despatch riders, and signallers, &c. Presumably, every man is taught the duties of the ordinary

every-day trooper and thereby learns 'something about everything' before he elects, or is selected, to learn 'everything about something.' An ideal squadron would be one in which every man had a thorough training, say, for three years 'about everything,' followed by a thorough training as a specialist in 'something.' The ranks will be no more depleted by such an arrangement than if they only contained half a dozen specialists. Therefore, let it be assumed, if only for the purposes of this paper, that some specialising in ground scouting is desirable if it can be attained without undue expenditure of time and labour.

There are some, no doubt, who will maintain that the duties of a ground scout may very well be performed by either the squadron scouts or the two first-class scouts maintained in each squadron for regimental purposes. That all scouts might with advantage undergo the short course prescribed in this paper is unquestionable, but as scouts proper may often be absent from the headquarters of their unit, it would seem advisable to train a few other men for this particular duty.

It is well, perhaps, to emphasise that to demand from an ordinary trooper efficient service in the difficult task of ground scouting without some training is to 'ask for trouble.'

Many serious disasters have been brought about by endeavouring to work without ground scouts, or with badly trained ones. Two well-known examples will, perhaps, not be out of place.

1. The charge of the 6th Uhlans at Ligny. When a sunken road hidden by waving corn caused a loss of the Commandant, eleven officers, and many men without injury to the enemy, Blücher, who was close by with his staff, was driven back amidst the confusion, and actually himself unhorsed, and had it not been for the unerring resourcefulness of an aide-de-camp, who hastily threw a rug over his prostrate chief, which effectually concealed his identity from the on-rushing French troopers, another story might have been written about Waterloo.

2. The charge of the 23rd Light Dragoons at Talavera, when through lack of ground scouting the regiment fell headlong into a deep ravine and were almost annihilated.

As already mentioned, 'Cavalry Training' lays down that *all* troopers are to receive instruction in ground scouting, and certain troopers

special training. As the writer doubts the practicability of providing all troopers with a sufficiently comprehensive training as would ensure their utility, he recommends five or six days' instruction to a few selected men on the following lines.

The result would amply repay the hours devoted to it, and in India would not be a very obnoxious way of spending a few hours of a hot weather morning and evening.

Begin by taking the men one thinks as 'likelies' for a series of rides across country, commencing with fairly easy, and working up to more difficult, going. Vary the type of country as much as you can. As to the stamp of man that will give one the impression of being the right sort, it is not easy to lay down any guide. It is purely a matter of intuition. Fairly good horsemanship and sight are two essentials, and men who are likely to lose their heads are quite useless. As you come to obstacles, halt those under instruction and ask them if they consider a troop or squadron in line could cross, and at what pace, and if not, where and in what formation, correcting replies as you think advisable.

After a couple of mornings' work at this, make them work in front of you at some distance. Take with you a trumpeter and a trooper with two or three different coloured flags—quite small ones will do. Inform those under instruction that when you display a white flag it represents a squadron in line; a red one, squadron column; a blue one, column of sections.

'Cavalry Training' lays down two signals for a ground scout. It is suggested that the following three well-known ones be also placed at the disposal of the scout. The signal for forming line from squadron column and *vice versa*, the signal for the extend, and the signal for mass or rally. Also those for the walk, trot and gallop. Please note that no *new* signals are suggested. By placing above at the disposal of one's ground scouts their utility is considerably increased.

We will now consider a suppositional morning's work. You, as instructor, are moving along with the white flag, representing line, at a trot. The man with the flag must follow a straight course, in fact he should move as if the directing troop leader, and the squadron leader should move and place himself with reference to the flag as he would if he were leading a full squadron. The trumpeter is merely to halt the scouts or rally them for correction. Before starting off

the instructor must give his scouts his probable line of advance—e.g., 'I intend making for that hill 2 miles N.E. and wish to keep under cover from view from the low hills to our N.W.,' &c. The scouts are out in front and presently arrive at an obstacle where reduction of frontage to that of a section, and also of pace, is necessary if a wide *détour* is not to be made. One of the scouts glances towards the squadron to see what formation it is in and what pace it is moving at (this is necessary as both may have changed since he went out). Then, standing close to the obstacle at the point where there is a crossing, he gives the signal for squadron columns and the walk. The squadron leader now knows he has a nasty defile in front of him. Whether he chooses to conform or not is a matter for him to decide. The scout who gave the signal continues to watch the squadron whilst the other (scouts should always work in pairs) explores further ahead. If after repeating the signal he sees that the squadron leader does not reduce frontage, he must push ahead, accepting the non-compliance with his signal as a sign that for some excellent reason his squadron leader has no intention of reducing frontage. If, on the other hand, he sees the squadron conform, he should, without moving, at once repeat the signal, when the squadron leader will at once be apprised of the fact that a still narrower frontage will be necessary. Whether the squadron leader now conforms or not the scout must go ahead—the squadron will, by this time, be close up to the obstacle. If after proceeding a short distance he comes to ground where the squadron can again deploy and trot he halts and gives the necessary signal. Here again the squadron leader interprets the signal as merely a recommendation to form line. He must use his own discretion in accepting it. Let the scout now arrive at a piece of ground only passable in extended formation. He gives the necessary signal, and as soon as close formation may be resumed he again indicates the fact. Whether one was manœuvring in face of an enemy with whom collision might be expected, or only moving with the object of reaching some particular point as rapidly as possible, a few men trained as above ought to give one the 'whip hand' over him who has to muddle along with untrained material.

How far ground scouts should work in front of their unit depends entirely on circumstances, but they should be as far ahead as is consistent with being able to observe the movements of their unit.

As already mentioned, before sending out his scouts a squadron leader should inform them of his approximate line of advance. If subsequently he has to depart from that line his scouts will have to conform, one of them riding in to the squadron to inquire the new direction, the other making for the ground over which it appears the squadron will move. It must be remembered that ground scouts suddenly called upon to signal over ground markedly different from what they have been accustomed to, will not, at first, do themselves justice. For example, scouts taught to work in the Deccan of India will find themselves somewhat at sea in the country round Delhi and Meerut, with its dead-level plains intersected with canals, and obstructed at certain seasons with large tracts of sugar-cane and irrigated boggy patches. With one or two days' practice, however, they will soon pick up its particular characteristics.

An experienced scout who encounters a nasty obstacle will know where to look for a crossing or decide at once if none is likely, and ride in at once and say so, as prescribed in 'Cavalry Training.' It is astonishing, however, how soon an obstacle 'opens a way,' so to speak, when examined by a reliable ground scout. As reliability is only obtainable by experience, long-service men might well be utilised for this work.

Another point to be recollected is that ground scouts should, when possible, receive some instruction by the person who intends using them. For example, a new squadron leader might very well take his scouts out for a ride on a couple of mornings to see that both parties understand one another. Very divergent views exist on the subject of what can be negotiated by mounted troops, and what not; also the pace that should be maintained. If, therefore, you want really good work from your ground scouts, train them yourself; and it is well to bear in mind that where a man can walk without using his hands, as a rule a horse can be ridden.

It may be urged that in nine cases out of ten the squadron leader is sufficiently far in advance of his squadron to do his own ground scouting. Very often such is the case. But when working against an enemy it will occasionally occur that the squadron leader has to change the direction of his command on to ground that he has not himself reconnoitred. It is then that scouts are useful. In the case of the squadron merely following in the wake of its leader from one

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point to another, with no chance of meeting an enemy, ground scouts are really a luxury, giving the squadron leader advanced information which he can turn to account or not as he pleases.

The working of ground scouts with a regiment hardly needs discussion. Here, again, if the regiment is merely moving in the track of the regimental commander, more often than not the latter can do his own ground scouting. Certainly several ground scouts will only be a source of embarrassment to him and his squadron leaders. If ground scouts are required, and called for, they should be sent out by the directing squadron only. If, however, a regimental commander manœuvring in face of an enemy requires to suddenly change direction, it may be quite impossible for him to examine the ground. Here, again, well-trained ground scouts thrown out by the squadron from which the movement first commences may save delay and even disaster.

Ground scouting for units higher than a regiment should be carried out by one or more experienced officers.

Ground scouts are also useful for directing Cavalry transport across country, *vide* 'F.S.R.', page 58; also for selecting the best line for moving the led horse, and ought to be invaluable for night work of all kinds. They might also be used to select the line of advance from one fire position to another, but would require special training for this.

Ground scouts should either ride as serrefiles or in the rear rank, so that their coming and going may not disturb the ranks.

Whether the above suggestions are acceptable to the Cavalry arm or not, either ground scouts ought to be trained or the name expunged from official works, since an untrained man temporarily thrown out by a frenzied commander is more dangerous than no one at all.

Further, whatever the merits or demerits of the above suggestions may be, they have not been 'hatched out' on a General Staff office stool, but have been practically tried, with some success, by the writer *with his squadron*.



THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815.

BY 'A CAVALRY GENERAL OFFICER.'

THE first few days of the Campaign of 1815 afford a good example of an army concentrating for battle protected by a covering force, and of an approach march by an enemy whose leading idea is a vigorous invasion of the hostile country with his whole force.

The Prussian and British armies were quartered in Belgium, in billets which for supply arrangements were spread over a large area. In the event of Napoleon assuming the offensive, it was arranged that these two armies should concentrate on the road Namur to Nivelles, *via* Sombreffe. The position of the Prussian army is shown on the sketch map. Two corps (1st and 3rd) were pushed forward, like antennæ, towards the enemy. The vicinity of Sombreffe had been selected by Blucher as the area of concentration of the Prussians. Charleroi, the nearest of the corps areas, is distant from this point about sixteen miles. It was calculated that the remaining corps could reach the area as follows:—

2nd Corps from Namur in twelve hours.

3rd Corps from Ciney in thirty-six hours.

4th Corps from Liège in three days.

The resistance of the 1st Corps on the Sambre, and in its retreat to Fleurus, could not be relied on to cause delay of more than one day (from morning to evening) in the enemy's advance; night coming on would complete a period of twenty-four hours. In the worst possible case, therefore—that is, if the enemy's intention of attack were only discovered by his attack on the Prussian outposts—the 2nd Corps could, with certainty, reach Sombreffe in time to support the 1st Corps; the 3rd might arrive, but only with difficulty; the 4th would be late.

Before following the action of the 1st Corps in detail, let us glance at Napoleon's operations. His plan was to organise a rapid offensive movement which should overthrow the covering troops of the enemy and aim at his main force wherever they happened to be.

Early in June he stops communication across the frontier and from all seaports, including even fishing boats; he strengthens the frontier guards and begins to concentrate.

He decides to employ six corps (out of eight corps available) for operations in Belgium, and four Cavalry divisions.

The first jump forward was to the line Rocroi—Maubeuge. This was reached by June 11-12, and the army covered a front of forty miles.

The Cavalry did not move, but continued training, etc., about La Chapelle, Guise, Vervins, Cateau, Cambresis, and vicinity.

The next step was to concentrate on the front Solre—Florennes, an area of twenty miles by ten miles. These movements were completed on the evening of the 14th and brought the army into three columns. The right column consisted of the 4th Corps, some Cavalry; the centre, of the 3rd and 6th Corps, the Guard, and the greater part of the Cavalry; and the left, of the 1st and 2nd Corps.

On the 13th Napoleon had issued the following order:—

‘No changes in situation: frontier not to be crossed anywhere: not a single gun to be fired anywhere. Nothing is to be done which is likely to attract the attention of the enemy.’


‘To-day’s orders to remain secret.’

‘N.’

These movements remained unknown to the Allies until the 14th. The Prussian outposts stretched from Binche through Thuin—Ham-sur-Heure—Gerpennes—Le Châtelet and Taminés to Moustier. Thus the outposts of the two opposing armies were almost in contact. The river Sambre (the crossings over which were strongly held) limited the field of action for the French, and left no room to the Cavalry for strategical reconnaissance or for strategical protection.

From the point of view of the covering forces the situation has some resemblance to that with which the French might now be confronted on the frontier of Alsace-Lorraine in a war with Germany.

It was first of all necessary for the French to drive back the Prussian outposts, pierce the covering troops, and force the line of the Sambre. The operations had therefore to begin with tactical actions, and the latter were the duty of the outposts, which must be provided with the necessary Cavalry. The main Cavalry bodies could not be used until the Sambre had been crossed, when the plains of Belgium would be open before them, and it would be necessary to discover, beyond the scattered units of the covering force, the main forces of the Allies.



CAMPAIGN OF 1871.

References.

Anglo Allies
French
Prussians



The march formation of the French army which was ordered for June 15 was adapted to this situation.

The army was to advance to the Sambre in three columns forming a centre and two wings. The centre column, consisting of 65,000 men, was to march on Charleroi; the right column, 16,000 men, on Le Châtelet; and the left column, 44,000 men, on Marchienne.

Each of these columns was given the necessary Cavalry. That of the left had Cavalry Brigades belonging to the 2nd and 1st Corps, which were sufficient for the advanced guard for pushing reconnoitring detachments beyond the Sambre as the crossings were gradually opened, for watching Binche and connecting with Maubeuge. In the right column the Cavalry of the 4th Corps reconnoitred in front of the line of march and sent detachments in the direction of Namur. In the centre column the 1st Cavalry Corps under Pajol (2800 strong) reinforced the 3rd Corps of Cavalry (General Domont, 1100 strong), which was covering the march of the column, and was followed at a distance of two and a half to three miles by the Infantry advanced guard.

General Vandamme's Light Division (3rd Corps) was to be ready by 2.30 A.M. on the 15th and march by the Charleroi road. It was to send detachments to reconnoitre the country and capture the enemy's posts, but each of these detachments was to consist of not less than fifty men.

The main forces of the Cavalry, consisting of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Cavalry Corps (really Cavalry Divisions), under Grouchy and numbering some 8000 to 10,000 horses, were not employed during the first part of the march. The Emperor moved them on Charleroi by a special route in order to have them available when the army crossed the Sambre and the enemy had to be reconnoitred on the left bank, in the wild plains round Quatre Bras and Sombreffe.

The army was thus divided into a centre and two wings, which approached the Sambre on a front of seven to eight miles, and formed groups of manœuvre for the purpose of crossing to the other bank and entering an unreconnoitred country. Along the front, twelve regiments of Light Cavalry scouted ahead of the lines of march, and were supported a few miles behind by the advanced guards of the columns which were ready to engage the hostile detachments.

On the flanks, protection from the enemy was obtained by the march

formation of the army. The corps on the flanks were in a position to find all the necessary flank guards, and reconnoitring detachments were sent out to search for information in the directions which were dangerous for the columns.

For the whole of the strategical reconnaissance which would be required on debouching into the unknown country beyond the Sambre, not only for protection, but also for the eventual employment of the groups of manœuvre, the Emperor had, in addition, Pajol's Division, Lefebvre-Desnoette's Brigade, and all the Cavalry under Grouchy which would cross at Charleroi as soon as the bridges were secured.

Turning now to the Allies, on the evening of the 14th General Ziethen, who commanded the Prussian covering force (viz., the 1st Corps), observed that the enemy in his front had been reinforced and foresaw that he would be attacked on the following morning.

On the morning of the 15th the Brigades of the 1st Corps occupied the following positions :—

1st Brigade—Fontaine L'Évêque.

2nd Brigade—Charleroi.

3rd Brigade—Fleurus.

4th Brigade—Moustier-sur-Sambre.

The Cavalry was distributed among brigades. 'The 3rd Brigade,' says Clausewitz, 'may be considered as a reserve, the 2nd as that which really defended the Sambre, the 1st and 4th as flank guards.'

'The intention of General Ziethen, therefore, could not be to accept a decisive engagement on the Sambre; but he himself had chosen the position of the 2nd Brigade near Gilly, and he wished to defend the three crossings at Charleroi, Marchienne and Châtelet only so far as it could be done without endangering the troops who were allotted to these points. A second stand was to be made at Gilly, and the time would thus be gained which the flank brigades required to reach the area behind Fleurus where the whole corps was to assemble, and where it would gain, by a combined resistance, the time needed for the concentration of the army.'

About four o'clock in the morning of the 15th the Prussian outposts were attacked: at first those of the 2nd Brigade by the Light Cavalry under General Domont which was at the head of the centre column. The company in support of the outposts at Ham-sur-Heure was vigorously attacked at close quarters by the French Cavalry and

during its retirement. It was obliged to surrender. Three other companies of the same regiment assembled at Gerpinnes, and from there were able to withdraw under cover of the valley from Gerpinnes upon Le Châtelet. About the same hour Thuin was attacked by the French left column. Two battalions, five squadrons, three guns came into action against this locality, which was occupied by the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian Infantry.* This battalion had received orders, in case of attack in superior force, to cross over to the north bank of the Sambre, join the post of the 1st Brigade in Lobbes, and then retreat down the left bank. Had this order been carried out the battalion would have come to no harm. The commander, however, remained too long in Thuin, until in fact he was surrounded and his retreat across the Sambre cut off. He now tried to break through on the south bank. Two squadrons of the 1st West Prussian Dragoons then tried to come to the support of the battalion, but were driven back, and then the battalion was overpowered. Very few escaped. The destruction of this battalion must be attributed partly to the direction in which it retired. By moving along the broken ground of the valley of the Sambre it would have, without doubt, been easily able to escape the attacks of the French Cavalry. While these events were taking place, General Ziethen, who had been informed during the night of the attack which threatened his corps, had ordered his whole force under arms and to stand their ground until further information was received from the outposts. Under no circumstances did he intend to put up a fight with the main body of his command on the outpost line. He expected the latter only to inform him of the strength of the attack which was being delivered. The difficulty was soon apparent in carrying out this operation—namely, how to withdraw the troops which were on outpost. The Cavalry were ordered to support them, first of all the 1st Dragoon Regiment, but it was soon necessary to reinforce it with other squadrons. Between six and seven in the morning reports reached Ziethen which showed clearly that the whole of the French army was in movement. His 2nd Brigade was most seriously threatened; he directed it to avoid any serious engagement. With this object a line of resistance was to be organised on the Sambre, and the passages over it at Charleroi, Le Châtelet, and Marchienne were to be occupied. Eventually the brigade was to withdraw upon Gilly.

* See Ziethen's orders of May 2, 1815, at end.

The outposts of the 1st Brigade had not been attacked except at Thuin, where it had a battalion. Notwithstanding this, the brigade was ordered to withdraw in the direction of Gossellies, keeping level with the 2nd Brigade in order to prevent the latter from being turned. The 3rd and 4th Brigades, reserve Cavalry and Artillery of the Army Corps, were to concentrate in a position about Fleurus. This force formed a reserve which was drawn on in order to assist the retirement of the troops in close contact with the enemy. We shall see presently what use was made of it. These troops took up in succession several defensive points covering the whole front on which the enemy was advancing, so as to oblige the latter to make dispositions for attack. When, however, the attack began to come on, the positions were abandoned without offering serious opposition, and the troops withdrew on to another position in rear which had already been taken up by other units. The 2nd Brigade retired in this way towards Gilly and the 1st Brigade on Gossellies. By eight o'clock in the morning the French Cavalry had driven back all the outposts from the right bank of the Sambre and reached the river. Here they were brought to a stand. A raised causeway, 300 yards in length, connected Marcinelle with the bridge over the Sambre. The bridge-head was barricaded and the hedges on the eastern side were lined with light troops. Pajol attempted to carry the causeway at a gallop, but a fire of musketry smote his horsemen in flank and front, and he was compelled to retire. Now Vandamme should have been close behind him and ready to follow on, but it was seven before he quitted his bivouacs, so he was still some distance away. It was not until the young Guard under Duhesme arrived that the causeway and the bridge were carried, and it was noon before the Light Cavalry of the French rode through the passage opened for them by Duhesme's soldiers. Thus the centre column began to pass the river, but Napoleon had been obliged to employ the Guard. The Prussian battalion from Charleroi had already retired that morning in good order and reached the position at Gilly; the charges of the French Cavalry never broke it. While the French centre column was thus attacking Charleroi the left column was attacking Marchienne. According to the Emperor's orders, it should have occupied Marchienne at nine o'clock, but the obstinate resistance of the Prussian battalion at Thuin had delayed the movement. Nearly two hours were required to prepare the attack on the bridge at

Marchienne. In fact, it was not until midday that the bridge was taken, and at that time Charleroi was already in French hands. The retreat of the 2nd Prussian Brigade upon Gilly drew back also the 1st Brigade towards Gossellies. This was in accordance with the orders given by corps headquarters. This latter brigade (Steinmetz) was in real danger until it had passed Gossellies, for all its units were on the west of the road to Brussels. Through Gossellies lay their line of retreat, and between them and Gossellies ran the Pieton, a tributary of the Sambre. They had to be collected from widely separated points and to seek safety in crossing the road. Reille's vehement march, close pursuit, and rapid capture of Marchienne seriously endangered the retreat of this 1st Prussian Brigade, because the passage of the Sambre at Marchienne gave the French the means of marching straight upon Gossellies, and the arrival of Clary from Charleroi rendered it more probable that the retreat of the Prussians would be cut off. Ziethen, foreseeing the peril, sent a regiment from the reserve at Fleurus to occupy Gossellies in conjunction with Leutzow's Lancer regiment. It was a critical moment, for Steinmetz was still on the right bank of the Pieton when Clary's Hussars appeared at Jumet, and in his rear marched the leading Infantry Division of Reille's corps. Leutzow, seeing the danger which threatened the 1st Brigade, issued forth, and, charging with resolution, drove the French Hussars back upon Jumet. This happy charge enabled Steinmetz to pass the Pieton and hold in check the head of Reille's column, now pressing on, while his main body retreated by Heppignies upon Fleurus, covered by the 6th Prussian Lancers and 1st Hussars, and followed by General Girard commanding a division of Reille's corps.

These events around Gossellies show clearly the difficulties which have to be overcome during a 'manœuvre in retreat,' and how to overcome them. The particular danger is that of having one's line of retreat cut off by flanking movements of the enemy. The remedy is to retain troops in support (in this case the 29th Infantry and 6th Prussian Lancers) disposed in rear to receive the troops which are retiring (1st Brigade). These facts show very well the valuable services which troops in support can render. They stopped Clary's Cavalry until the 1st Brigade was able to extricate itself from its dangerous position. Having rendered this service, they immediately retired to occupy important points on the line of retreat (Ransart and the wood of

Ransart). The retiring troops must follow this movement without a moment's delay; they must not think of stopping, by means of a fight, forces which are very superior to them (Clary's Cavalry, reinforced by the 2nd French Corps); that is not a *rôle* which can be entrusted to troops manœuvring in retreat. On the contrary, they will only expose themselves to destruction or be cut off from their line of retreat by these very superior forces of the enemy. That is what actually happened. Steinmetz, having reached Gossellies in safety with his 1st Brigade, let go the support (29th Infantry) which had fortunately been extended to him and which saved him the first time. Instead of at once continuing his retreat on Ransart, which was occupied by the 29th, he halted at Gossellies and disposed his force for a fight which he lost; he was then obliged to continue his retreat on Heppignies, but found himself then cut off from his army corps by the French division under Girard which had occupied Ransart. He had considerable difficulty in rejoining his corps. Events of the same sort took place about the same time near Gilly on the road to Fleurus. The 2nd Brigade (Pirch) had received an order to concentrate at Gilly and to organise a second line of resistance there since the line of the Sambre had been broken through. We have already seen how he had evacuated the pivots of defence at Marchienne and Charleroi in succession, and how he reduced his force on the Sambre gradually as the enemy's columns came up. In the same way he withdrew the 28th Infantry from Châtelet and replaced it with the 1st West Prussian Dragoons. In this way he succeeded in concentrating the greater part of his brigade at Gilly by the time the French had penetrated into Charleroi and only had the detachment from Marchienne and Charleroi to withdraw. Pirch now established his brigade in rear of Gilly, his front covered by the boggy stream called Grand Prieux. Four battalions and a battery were disposed on the slopes on the left bank of the stream. It was a 'showy position.' The Prussians, extended from Soleilmont to the left bank of the Sambre, presented a line of battle which Grouchy's Cavalry dared not assail; in fact, the Prussian rear guard held their ground all the afternoon till 6 P.M. This position was secure because Steinmetz occupied the attention of Girard, who might otherwise have cut in upon its right rear, because Girard, whose corps menaced the left, had only just touched upon the bridge of Châtelet, and because the Prussians stood across the road converging on Fleurus.

But it was not their object to fight a battle. They were only displayed that they might retard the march of the French. General Pajol had found the enemy in this position near Gilly. His reconnoitring patrols, which were sent out on every side to discover the best means of turning the enemy, found the woods and the bridges held by Infantry, which were supporting the Cavalry squadrons. The Cavalry regiments were in observation behind the stream in order to prevent a crossing. The tactical points were held by Infantry as far as Ransart, where a battalion acted with the troops occupying Gossellies. The Cavalry, therefore, was confronted, from Gossellies to the Sambre, by a wide circle of woods, by which every line of approach was closed by troops of all arms. Since the Cavalry could not turn the position, it had to wait. The reconnaissances which had been made allowed Pajol to give the advanced guard all the information that it required for its action. This is the task of the Cavalry; and the Cavalry, while remaining in observation before the enemy's position, masks and protects the deployment of the advanced guard. It can, thanks to dismounted action, assure from the very first the possession of tactical points which allow it to hold on to the ground it occupies. The commander of the advanced guard, as soon as he arrives on the ground, makes his dispositions. The Cavalry will then form up and reconnoitre its flanks; it takes up a position under cover but near the battle, in order to follow the course of the latter and remain at the disposal of the commander, who will more often than not choose his position generally on the flank. Grouchy, seeing this barrier to his progress, rode back to Charleroi for instructions. He met Vandamme's corps, which had at length defiled through Charleroi, marching down the Namur road, and he found Marshal Ney, who had just joined the army, receiving instructions from the Emperor. Ney rode off to Gossellies, and Napoleon and Grouchy hastened to Gilly. It was now nearly six o'clock, and the Prussians, who had been attacked at eight in the morning at Charleroi, were still standing in battle array not five miles from that city. Twice had the progress of the French Cavalry been arrested because no Infantry were at hand. At length a force of all arms was collected, and Napoleon, rapidly scanning the enemy's position, directed an attack upon all points, the Infantry moving in echelon from the right, the Cavalry (Excelmans') striking at both flanks. The Prussians waited no longer. Exchanging shots

with the French, they fell back with measured steps. The French Cavalry on the Fleurus road were stopped by an abattis, and on the extreme right they found no opportunity of reaching the enemy. Napoleon, eager to strike, directed his escort, consisting of four squadrons under General Letort, upon three battalions retiring on the French right of the Fleurus road. Letort, an intrepid officer, charged home, cut up one battalion, but failed to touch the other two, one of which, protected by a display of Cavalry, got into the wood, while another, forming square, beat off the horse and retreated in safety. General Letort was killed. The Prussians continued to fall back, and in such fine order and with such method that not even Napoleon, who led the pursuit, could get at them. At dusk they were in and behind Fleurus, but the French halted at Lambusart, and Napoleon, overcome by fatigue, returned to meditate or sleep at Charleroi (Hooper's 'Waterloo,' p. 47).

The Prussians' retreat offered the French Cavalry a new field for reconnaissance and the opportunity of participating in the tactical action of the advanced guard.

Pajol was ordered to pursue the enemy who was retiring through the woods of Lambusart. The Light Cavalry had now been reinforced by Excelmans' Division (Dragoons), and Grouchy received instructions to take command of all the Cavalry and push his reconnaissance in the direction of Sombreffe—Gembloux. It was not at first easy to issue from the woods. Pajol had moved his three brigades in three columns; these met everywhere rear guards which they could not break through. 'Infantry supports,' says Pajol, 'would have been necessary to precipitate the retreat of the Prussians, break up their formations, and permit the Cavalry to charge.'

Shock action will be often difficult, and Cavalry will now find in its rifles and guns a means of supplementing shock action and accelerating the enemy's retreat.

Three regiments of Prussian Cavalry were deployed for battle, and were supported on the one hand by the woods along the Sambre which were filled with skirmishers, and on the other hand by Lambusart, occupied by two battalions and a battery which opened fire on the French Dragoons. The latter had, in fact, fallen into an ambush, but they succeeded in deploying at the exit from the woods, and were protected by two batteries which fired on the Prussian battery. Excel-

mans did not think it possible to attack the Prussian Cavalry in the defile which it was blocking. The latter, however, was about to carry out the retreat by echelons in co-operation with its Infantry on Fleurus, but darkness stopped operations.

These events show that when in contact with the enemy a strategical reconnaissance can only be carried out in its entirety by the co-operation of the Cavalry and a strategical advanced guard. Vandamme's corps, which played the part of the latter and was exhausted by the long day's march, halted at Gilly, and neglected even to push its advanced guard beyond the woods. The Cavalry stayed by itself and bivouacked during the night in a very exposed position. 'I should have occupied Campinaire,' Pajol wrote to Grouchy at 10 P.M., 'if General Vandamme had been willing to send me some Infantry for my support, but it seems that this General has made it his business to do everything that is contrary to the rules of war, for he has neglected to occupy Lambusart and the top of the wood between Gilly and Fleurus, which are the two principal points in the position we hold.'

The losses experienced by the Prussians at the time when they commenced their retreat from Gilly indicate in a striking way the difficulty which will be experienced in breaking off an engagement when troops wait too long to commence their retirement. This difficulty will become more apparent to-day, since modern arms are effective at longer ranges.

On the morning of the 16th, Grouchy at Fleurus reported to the Emperor that strong columns appeared to be coming from Namur and moving towards Brye and Saint Amand in rear of Fleurus. These were the 2nd and 3rd Corps, which were moving up to join the 1st. Notwithstanding the absence of the 4th Corps, the Prussians were able to put in the field on this day nearly 90,000 men; that is to say, a force considerably superior to that which the Emperor could bring forward. Ziethen's corps had suffered considerable loss but had obtained valuable results—namely, he had postponed the battle until the 16th, and he had enabled the concentration to be carried out. As Clausewitz has said, from these operations it is evident how, when the situation is at all complicated, circumstances will inevitably impose the greatest circumspection and slowness even on the most resolute general, as in this case Napoleon himself. Amongst the complications which Ziethen happily

turned to account should be noted the double retreat on the roads to Gilly and Gossellies, which prevented Ney from going to Quatre Bras, and which rendered the intervention of Napoleon necessary in that direction and so delayed operations on the Namur road. It should also be noted that this divergent retreat did not prevent the 1st Prussian Army Corps from having its four brigades all concentrated on the next day. These operations also show clearly how an advanced guard in retreat should fight, and how it discharges its double task—namely, to ‘observe the enemy’ and ‘to delay his advance.’ The enemy was delayed by obliging him to make dispositions for attack, to concentrate, to deploy, and to make use of his superior strength in order to outflank. The nature of the country, as well as the distance from the corps which is being covered, must certainly determine the length of resistance which should be offered, but in all cases the losses will depend on the amount of resistance which is made. For this reason recourse to fighting should be avoided when the necessary time can be obtained by any other means. As a rule, we should only seek to check the enemy and delay him in three ways:—

1. By making him cautious, and so render his march slow.
2. By prolonging resistance in a defensive position only as long as prudence permits, but never longer.
3. By carrying out the withdrawal as slowly as possible.

A slow and measured retreat will allow troops to reform and organise afresh wherever positions are offered on the way. The holding of positions and withdrawal, therefore, should be intermingled—that is to say, the engagement should only be broken off in one position when other troops are ready to take up the fighting in some other locality further back. We must act always, of course, in a systematic manner. The stronger our advanced guard is, the more will it delay an enemy, since in order to force it to retire the enemy will require a longer time in which to develop sufficient means. On this subject Clausewitz wrote as follows:—

‘There is a marked difference in the time gained by the resistance of an advanced corps when the enemy makes his first appearance after midday; in such a case the length is so much additional time gained, as the advance is seldom continued throughout the night. Thus it was that in 1815, on the short distance from Charleroi to Ligny, not more than ten miles, the first Prussian corps, under General Ziethen,

about 30,000 strong, against Buonaparte at the head of 120,000 men, was enabled to gain twenty-four hours for the Prussian army then engaged in concentrating. The first attack was made on General Ziethen about nine o'clock in the morning of June 15, and the battle of Ligny did not commence until about two on the afternoon of the 16th. General Ziethen suffered, it is true, very considerable loss, amounting to five or six thousand men killed, wounded, or prisoners.

'If we refer to experience, the following are the results, which may serve as a basis in any calculations of this kind.

'A division of ten or twelve thousand men, with a proportion of Cavalry, a day's march of twelve to sixteen miles in advance in an ordinary country, without running any great risk, will be able to detain the enemy (including time occupied in the retreat) about half as long again as he would otherwise require to march over the same ground; but if the division is only four or five miles in advance, then the enemy ought to be detained about twice or three times as long as he otherwise would be on the march.

'The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding reflections is, that an advanced corps effects more by its presence than by its efforts, less by the combats in which it engages than the possibility of those in which it might engage: that it should never attempt to stop the enemy's movements, but only serve like a pendulum to moderate and regulate them, so that they may be made matter of calculation.' (Clausewitz, Vol. II., p. 27.)

With modern arms an enemy would be forced to carry out the manoeuvre at a greater distance, so that it seems reasonable to calculate that the length of resistance possible will now be greater than Clausewitz has estimated.

We have seen what the difficulties of fighting during a retirement are, namely:—

1. The danger of being turned: an advanced guard, once it is turned, no longer covers the main body, and it can, besides, be cut off.
2. The danger of allowing itself to become engaged at close quarters; this will make it very difficult to break off a combat.
3. The necessity for carrying out the fire fight at considerable ranges in order to produce an effect on the enemy at a distance.

The tactics which are generally suitable to these conditions consist in occupying each of the successive positions with a strong

proportion of Artillery, as a rule all the guns at one's disposal, and only a proportion of Infantry sufficient to protect and support the Artillery, while the remainder of the Infantry is employed in preparing and occupying a second position in rear. A large force of Cavalry should also be detailed in order to discover and parry outflanking movements. The reserve for each position taken up ought also to consist of Cavalry.

A study of the part played by the French in this campaign shows us a plan of operations based on the enemy, on facts, and not on conjectures. And we see, too, how the Cavalry was used for a special purpose in connection with that plan; in fact, as a tool in the hands of the commander of the army.

The leading idea of the formation of the French army on June 15 was the vigorous invasion of the enemy's territory with their whole force. At the beginning their horizon was limited by the enemy's covering troops and by the Sambre. The Light Cavalry was closely associated with the advanced guards of the columns. It reconnoitred and co-operated in the tactical actions and then resumed its march. The Cavalry masses were directed on the principal crossings over the river, and remained under the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. As soon as the advanced guard had obtained a footing at the entrance of the wide Belgian plain, the whole of the Cavalry spread out into groups of varying size and improvised according to the requirements of the situation and the available means. It was now a question of determining the main forces of the enemy, of discovering his points of concentration, of ascertaining the unoccupied areas, and of guarding against a change in the situation. Since the army was confronted by an enemy who moved and acted, as on previous occasions, the Emperor thought that Cavalry alone was not sufficient, either for a strategical reconnaissance or for protection, and events justified it. *It was by the co-operation of all arms* that the Emperor learned that the Prussian army was concentrating in the direction of Fleurus and Sombreffe, on which all the detachments of Ziethen's Corps were converging, and where preparations had been made for a prolonged resistance, and that the English army had not yet appeared at Quatre Bras, so that all his efforts could be directed towards Fleurus. After the Sambre was crossed, and the country became open, the whole of the available Cavalry marched with the advanced forces. The commander

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of the army directed this strategical reconnaissance. The latter is a function of the plan of the Commander-in-Chief, who himself marches in the front line of the army, within reach of reports, and in a position to control the reconnaissance and direct the mass of the army. The characteristic feature of this movement was the march against the enemy with the two wings in advance and the whole army concentrated.

ORDERS GIVEN BY LIEUT.-GENERAL VON ZIETHEN, COMMANDING THE 1ST PRUSSIAN CORPS D'ARMÉE, ON MAY 2, 1815, TO BE ACTED UPON BY HIS BRIGADIERS, IN CASE OF THE ENEMY'S ATTACK.

Should the enemy advance by Binch or Maubeuge, compel the outposts to retire, and necessitate the whole corps being alarmed, the brigades of the corps will assemble in the following manner:—

The 1st Brigade in rear of Fontaine L'évêque.

The 2nd Brigade in rear of Charleroi.

The 3rd Brigade in rear of Fleurus.

The 4th Brigade in rear of Onoz.

Reserve Cavalry in rear of Gembloux, where it will receive further orders.

Reserve Artillery in rear of Egheze.

The 2nd Brigade will leave a battalion at each of the points, Châtelet, Charleroi, and Marchienne, upon which the advanced posts can fall back, and the 1st Brigade will leave two companies at Fontaine L'évêque for a like purpose.

As regards the outposts, the two rifle companies of the 1st Brigade will retire behind the defile of the Haine. The main body of the 1st Silesian Hussars will collect in rear of Lerunes, towards which point its advanced posts will retire. The post at Lobbes will retire close along the left bank of the Sambre. The main body of the 6th Uhlans will retire upon Charleroi, and unite with the 2nd Brigade. The post of this regiment stationed at Thuin will await the arrival of the detachment from Lobbes, with which it will then retire, by the left bank of the Sambre, to Marchienne. All the picquets between Thuin and Ham-sur-Heure will retire by Fontigny de Thigneu upon Marchienne: the posts between Ham-sur-Heure and Gerpennes will fall back upon Charleroi.

The 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the Westphalian Landwehr Cavalry at Près le Fort St. Eustache will cross the Sambre at Châtelet, and join the 2nd Brigade; the 3rd and 4th Squadrons will cross the Sambre



at Fallizole, their outposts falling back in the same direction, and the whole rejoining the 1st and 2nd Squadrons on the left bank of the river.

The passage across the Sambre, within the sphere of each respective brigade, will continue to be occupied until the brigades receive orders to retire from their points of assembly.

The baggage and the train will be sent to the rear as far as Temploux.

Should the enemy's dispositions render a further retrograde movement necessary—

The 1st Brigade, after having sent on its Artillery to Gossellies, will retire by Roux upon Jumet and Gossellies, and take post in rear of this town as advanced guard, and as a support to the posts on the Pieton.

The 2nd Brigade will take post in front of Fleurus.

The 3rd and 4th Brigades will take up a position in rear of Fleurus—the former on the right, the latter on the left, of the high road.

Should the brigades receive orders to continue their retreat upon Fleurus, the 1st and 2nd will still hold the passage across the Pieton, the 2nd occupying that part of the river between Roux and its point of junction with the Sambre, and the 1st Brigade that part between Roux and the Roman road. The 1st Silesian Hussars and the 6th Uhlans will remain as a support to the Infantry posted on the Pieton. The reserve Cavalry will move upon Sombreffe; the reserve Artillery along the Roman road in the direction of the defile of Gembloux, in order to be at hand should an action take place in the position of Fleurus, or to strike into the high road to Namur should a further retreat be ordered. In the latter case, the baggage of the brigades will proceed beyond Gembloux, accompanied by an officer, with the necessary escort, from each brigade.

Should the enemy advance from Beaumont or Philippeville the foregoing dispositions remain unaltered.

In this case the 2nd Brigade will continue to occupy the passages across the Sambre and Marchienne, Charleroi, and Châtelet, until the 1st Brigade falls back upon the same line with it; the remainder of the 2nd Brigade will form a support to these three posts, and then, taking up a position in rear of Gilly, upon the road from Charleroi to Fleurus, will become the advanced guard of the corps d'armée assembled at Fleurus.

Should the enemy advance by Philippeville, and drive back the outposts of the 4th Brigade, this brigade must defend the passages across the Sambre until the corps d'armée is assembled.

Should individual French soldiers present themselves at the outposts, they must be warned to go back, unless they are deserters, but if they pay no attention to the warning an endeavour must be made to capture them and have them conveyed to headquarters. In no case is a vedette to be allowed to retire in a peaceable manner.

In the event of the 1st Corps d'Armée concentrating at Fleurus, the headquarters will be in that town.

VON ZIETHEN.

Charleroi,
May 2, 1815.

A correct copy.

VON REICHE.
Chief of the Staff.



(We are indebted to Mr. Harry Payne for the above illustration, which will also be utilised for the front page of cover of the four numbers of the present volume.)

WALTER HAMILTON, V.C., OF THE GUIDES

By COLONEL R. H. MACKENZIE, *F.S.A., Scot.*

'Had he his hurts before?'

'Ay, on the front.'

'Why, then, God's soldier be he!

Had I as many sons as I have hairs

I would not wish them to a fairer death.'

THIS story of a short life, of the brief military career of as brave a young British officer as ever wore the King's uniform, will not fail to appeal to all who hold in regard cool, self-sacrificing bravery and steadfast courage in adversity and peril. Walter Richard Pollock Hamilton was an Irishman, a younger son of Alexander Hamilton, Esq., J.P., of Inistioge, co. Kilkenny. He was my school chum—we were in the Cadet Corps, and in the same house. But there is nothing remarkable to record of his school-days. He was a bright, cheery, high-spirited boy, pure-minded, manly, and fond of games, the first to own up and take his share of the responsibility for any scrapes into which we got. On passing out of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, he was gazetted in 1874 to the 70th Foot, now the 2nd Batt. East Surrey Regiment; but, his ambition being the Indian Army, he was, after the usual probationary period, transferred to what was then known as the Bengal Staff Corps, and appointed to the Queen's Own Corps of Guides, a regiment comprising both Cavalry and Infantry, and one of the finest in the Indian Service. Composed of men born and bred to the fighting trade, it was a corps after his own heart. Freelances, ready to take hard blows, they were hardy warriors, men who had faced death a hundred times from childhood upwards, and who had instinctively learned to be alert, brave and self-reliant.

Within a few months of his appointment in 1877 as squadron officer of the Cavalry portion of the Guides, Hamilton was on service in the Jowaki Afridi campaign, and in the operations against the Ramzai village of Skhahat; but the Afghan War of 1878-79 brought him his chance, and showed the metal of which he was made. A generous and sympathetic account of his services generally is given by Young-husband, in his story of the Guides, upon which this memoir is chiefly

based. One of the earliest of his adventures was in the action of Fatehabad, when the Guides Cavalry formed a portion of a small force sent to clear the road from Jellalabad to Kabul, which had been suddenly threatened in flank by a great gathering of Afghan tribesmen—bloodthirsty and fanatical Ghazis. In accordance with our usual tactics in dealing with Asiatics, the Cavalry were ordered to charge, and the Guides, led by their commanding officer, Major Wigram Battye, were launched to the attack; but they had proceeded only a few hundred yards when Battye was struck first in the left hip by a bullet, then by another which pierced his chest, and he fell to rise no more—the second of five gallant brothers who were destined to die on the field of honour in the ranks of the Guides. ‘Take ’em on, Walter, my boy,’ were his leader’s last words to young Hamilton; and right manfully were his orders obeyed. On swept the squadron over the undulating plain, until Hamilton was close enough to the enemy to give the orders ‘Gallop! Charge!’ With the gaiety of a foxhunter he gave a ‘view holloa,’ and, with that wild yell which so often, before and since, has struck chill to the heart of an enemy, the Guides dashed forward until some impassable ground was reached. But it takes a good deal to stop a brave young Irishman with such men behind him. A second or two brought them to the obstacle, and, sure enough, as Younghusband describes it, it was no cold-blooded chance—a sheer nine feet drop into the dry bed of a stream, and, opposite, another sheer cliff, and on top of that an exulting and frenzied enemy!

Without a moment’s hesitation young Hamilton leaped into the gulf, and after him, scrambling, sliding, jumping, anyhow and no-how, like a pack of hounds, streamed his fierce following. Like hounds, too, hot on the trail, they tarried not a moment there, but, scattering up and down the nullah singly, or in clumps of two and three, found egress somehow. And then came death, and the Prophet’s Paradise, to many a brave soul. From here and there, from front and right and left, by ones and twos, by threes and fours, charged home the gallant horsemen; and at their head, alone with his trumpeter, rode my school chum Hamilton. At this period, seeing one of his troopers, Sowar Dowlat Ram, down, entangled with his horse, which had been killed, and attacked by three of the enemy, Hamilton, without a moment’s hesitation, rushed to the rescue, followed by a few of his men. He tackled the three Afghans one after the other, cut down all three, and so saved the life of the sowar.

The enemy, brave as they were individually, were unable to stand the onslaught of determined Cavalry charging home. And so the great crowd broke, and for four long miles the pursuit continued, till man and horse were worn and tired, arms were too stiff to strike or parry, and steeds yet willing staggered to a standstill. In this brilliant charge the enemy lost four hundred men, while the squadron of the Guides lost twenty of all ranks and thirty-seven horses. To their young leader, Lieut. Walter Hamilton, was awarded the highest honour to which the soldier can aspire, the Victoria Cross, an honour which his brilliant conduct throughout the day had by universal admission thoroughly earned.

The first stage of the Afghan War ended with the treaty of Gandamak, signed in June 1879, one of the provisions of which was that a British Embassy, with a suitable escort, should be established at Kabul. And there on July 24 the British Envoy, Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, and the escort duly arrived, but not without grave apprehension as to their fate on the part of many who were unable to forget the long-drawn history of Afghan treachery. The escort consisted of twenty-five of all ranks of the Guides Cavalry, and fifty-two of all ranks of the Infantry of the Corps, under the command of Lieut. Walter Hamilton, V.C. For a month all went well, and there were frequent interchanges of friendly visits. But rumours of impending trouble soon got about, until things came to a climax when, on the entry of the Amir's Heratic regiments into the streets of Kabul, they set up loud cries of insult and abuse of Cavagnari, his staff, his escort, and of the whole detested race of Feringhis. But what could an escort of seventy-five men do against thousands, and tens of thousands, of armed men? They took the bold course which British officers, before and since, have taken, sat quietly, and with brave hearts faced the coming tragedy.

The storm burst with sudden and uncontrollable fierceness in the morning of September 3, when the ordinary routine of the day was going on. The troopers were tending their horses, and the infantry either on guard or taking their ease, when suddenly there rushed on the peaceful scene a torrent of mutinous, infuriated, half-savage, fanatical soldiery. Then came a shot, then another, and another, until the battle began—four British officers and some seventy of the faithful Guides against countless thousands. The residency, officers' quarters, barracks, &c., consisted of a number of detached buildings—mere death-traps—commanded from several directions, against which surged in

their thousands the infuriated fanatics, thirsting deep for Christian blood, and yelling the war-cry of the great Sunni sect of Moham-medans. On the other hand, there stood the young Irishman, Hamilton, who had hastily collected his threescore and ten men of the Guides, calm and steadfast; his followers men of an alien race, but all filled with high resolve and stern determination to stand by their British officers, even unto death. Unavailing were the repeated appeals to these brave men to desert. 'The Sahib gave us this duty to perform, to defend the Residency to the last,' was the reply of Jemadar Jeward Singh. Cavagnari, the first to seize a rifle, shot dead with quick precision, one after the other, four leaders of the assault, but was himself badly hit in the forehead by a splintered bullet. Yet he summoned enough strength to accompany Hamilton, Surgeon A. H. Kelly, Bengal Medical Department, and Mr. W. Jenkyns, C.I.E., Indian Civil Service, Political Officer, in a charge on the rebels, until another bullet laid him low and ended the fight for that brave soul. From this time the whole burden of defence lay on young Hamilton. A heavy rifle fire was poured on the garrison from the house-tops and loopholed walls while the assault continued, and an effort was made to fire the buildings. But though the attack waxed stronger and stronger for five hours, and though half the garrison were killed or wounded, no thought of surrender occurred to the stout hearts within. There remained now in the fighting line only Hamilton, Jenkyns, a native non-commissioned officer, and some thirty of the Guides, for the doctor's whole time was occupied with the wounded. At this juncture loud and exulting shouts from the besiegers announced the arrival of their reinforcements with two guns, which were placed in position, barely a hundred yards from the gateway. Kelly left his wounded, and Jenkyns, the young civilian, took again a sword and pistol, and with Hamilton as their leader, and with twelve staunch and true men of the Guides behind them, they opened the door, quickly crossed the bullet-swept courtyard, and fell with fury on the amazed gunners. But though they fought like tigers, and even possessed themselves of the guns, they were unable to remove them, and were driven back. Here Surgeon Kelly received his mortal wound—physician and soldier, he died a hero's death.

General Younghusband gives a vivid description of what followed. All was not over, for Hamilton made preparations for a further attempt. Again they threw open the door, and again these two young Britishers


at the head of their faithful few charged out on the guns, till, sword in hand, the gallant Jenkyns fell some seventy paces out. Then again began the dreadful heart-straining struggle of desperation for the guns, till the little band were a second time driven back. The flames had by this time got strong hold of the buildings, and here and there the roofs fell in, and dead and dying were entombed together. But, undefeated, Hamilton again laid his plans. His small remaining band of heroes were to try and bring in even one gun, while he alone faced the enemy. This was the fourth sortie he had led that day—the first with all four Englishmen in a line, the second with three, the third with two, and now alone. Over six feet in height, splendidly made, lithe and strong, with all the activity of youth, expert with sword and pistol, he was a noble specimen of the young British officer, and none more fit to stand in the deadly breach. For a third time these fatal guns were captured, and then alone to stem the fierce assault stood the hero, while his men laboured at the gun; but the odds were too great, and the gallant subaltern, after killing three men with his pistol and cutting down two more with his sword, was himself borne down to rise no more.

And so, fighting, died as brave a young heart as ever did honour to the uniform he wore. Swarming over his body the mutineers recaptured the guns, and again drove back the remnants of the forlorn hope, who, fighting to the last man, made their final stand on the roof of the residency. Round them lay 600 dead, as silent witnesses of twelve hours' heroic fighting. Hamilton lay where he fell, close to the gun, till darkening night settled down on the dreadful scene. But on the following morning it was noticed that the brave young fellow's body was laid across the gun, perhaps by the rough chivalry of one who had watched his heroic deeds. A national memorial was raised to these deathless heroes on which is written: 'The annals of no army and no regiment can show a brighter record of devoted bravery than has been achieved by this small band of Guides.' A life-size statue of my school chum has been erected in the Museum in Dublin, the capital of his native country; his name is given to a road in the neighbourhood of Maidan, the quiet home of the Guides; and I had the small satisfaction of being instrumental in placing in the chapel of his old school a memorial window raised by his school-fellows:—

'Dulce et decorum est pro patriâ mori.'



LIEUT. W. R. P. HAMILTON, V.C.
(Q.O.) CORPS OF GUIDES.



AN INDIAN CAVALRY STUD FARM

By MAJOR P. E. RICKETTS, 18th (K.G.O.) *Lancers*

GENERALLY speaking the main object of the Army Remount Department in India is to improve the country-bred horse throughout the chief breeding districts, in order to obtain a supply of suitable horses in sufficient numbers to mount the British and Indian Cavalry without assistance from outside. For the mounting of the Artillery the Waler market is a necessity, since the climate and soil of India cannot produce a horse of the necessary weight for draught. Bulk is contrary to nature in a dry, hot climate, on hard soil and fodder with a minimum of nourishment. This is as noticeable in India as in Arabia or other countries where conditions are to some extent similar. To obtain the supply of remounts for the British Cavalry, for which the Army Remount Department is entirely responsible, a part of the system in the Punjab is to grant land on the recently constructed canals on horse-breeding terms. The grantee has to keep mares in proportion to his grant and is allowed the use of Government stallions free, the Government having first claim on the young stock at a fixed rate per month of age. In the United Provinces the system is different. There are many wealthy landowners, who possess good mares of their own, with several generations of thoroughbred or Arab blood. If they wish they can have them branded and can get the use of Government stallions, and though Government has no absolute claim, they practically buy all the suitable young stock.

In both the Punjab and United Provinces young stock are bought at ages varying from nine to eighteen months and sent to the depôts at Mona and Sargodha, where they are well fed and given plenty of liberty, and where they remain till between four and a-half and five years old, when they are drafted to British Cavalry regiments. The average price paid by the Army Remount Department is about

twelve rupees eight annas per month of age, which is a rate sufficient to encourage the breeder.

In the Indian Cavalry the system differs totally. Each regiment is responsible for its own mounting. Some regiments have no stud farms and are dependent on the Waler, as country-breds of full age are impossible to obtain. Others have studs, of varying sizes. That of the 11th (K.E.O.) Lancers has long been established and is the largest; but the remainder are of recent growth, and their success has induced Government to extend the experiment, and, what is equally to the point, has encouraged regiments to accept the Government terms and attendant risks. That the idea is sound admits of no doubt. The increasing price of the Australian 'boulder'—that is, the small horse of no particular breed—the probabilities of a still further rise, and the possibility of the failure of the market altogether, not only in war time, but even in peace, make it most desirable for India to be self-supporting and independent, as far as possible, of any foreign supply. Government gave the land, chiefly irrigable, advanced money at interest to start operations, and then left regiments practically a free hand to run their own show in their own way. The Army Remount Department advises, and at studs where breeding is carried on has up till now provided the stallion power, but will probably do so no longer, owing to the increased demand of the breeding zamindar, and Cavalry studs will have to make their own arrangements. There had been much discussion as to whether regiments about to take up land should be given fifteen hundred acres, all irrigable, or two thousand acres, of which only seven hundred and fifty were irrigable. That plenty of liberty is a *sine quâ non* goes without saying, but the question is really one of finance, and the decision in favour of fifteen hundred irrigable acres was certainly the right one.

The stud of which I write was started in 1900, and is situated in the Punjab, in a part which was then a bleak and arid desert, five miles by *kuchha** road from the nearest railway station. The climate is a trying one, varying from severe cold—*i.e.* several degrees of frost and a biting wind in winter—to a temperature in the hot weather of 120 degrees in the shade, accompanied by plenty of 'lou' and more than a sufficiency of dust. Details as to early days are not necessary;

* A *kuchha* road is an unmade bullock-cart track.

mistakes were made, and always will be; vicissitudes and misfortunes have been not a few, as when twelve thousand rupees' worth of damage was done in a few hours by unprecedented floods. Growth has been gradual and changes have been introduced as experience has been gained. At the present day the total extent is about three thousand acres, of which eight hundred and fifty are paddock land, about two hundred and twenty home farm, buildings and villages, and the bulk of the remainder leased. The system of rental used formerly to be what is known as the 'Batai' system—i.e. the tenant took one half of the produce, the other half, representing his rent, being surrendered to the regiment. In course of time the 'Batai' system was given up in favour of the contract system, by which the land is let out at a rent fixed annually and varying according to the quality of the soil. Half the *bhusa*, or chopped straw, is also demanded. This system may not be quite so lucrative, but the income is certain, there is no risk, less work is entailed, and less supervision required. The land on the whole is not so good as that of other farms started at the same time. Cotton, the most valuable of crops, does not flourish; the seed drops before maturing, though why it is difficult to say. Chemical analysis has failed to find a cause. However, wheat grows well and the land lets fairly, the yearly income averaging between four hundred and five hundred rupees per square.*

The recent rise in prices, especially of gram—a kind of chickpea and the staple food of horses in India—is no small problem. Gram is exported in increasing quantities to Italy for the adulteration (so it is said) of other grains, and to England for the manufacture of cheap biscuits, and the consequent rise in price has considerably increased the cost of the keep of stock. Fortunately, in a way, the prices of other agricultural produce have also risen, enabling the tenant to make a greater profit, and therefore pay a higher rent. But the tendency seems to be for gram to go up faster than other things; hence the problem, the solution of which is not too easy to see.

The paddocks are divided into those for brood mares and those for young stock of various ages, from weaned foals upwards. There is also a segregation paddock and a cattle paddock. Once in four years every paddock is completely laid up, burnt, ploughed, and cropped, with the triple object of getting a supply of fodder, improving

* A square equals about twenty-seven acres.

the pasture, and, most important of all, sanitation. Once in three years would be better, but is at present unworkable. The paddocks are all commanded by the canal and during the hot weather are irrigated at intervals. Grass land takes longer to flood than cropped land, and there is less apparent result; consequently the tendency is to overflow. All Indians are apt to water too much; few have sufficient experience of canals and scientific knowledge to understand the dangers of water-logging. Their cry is ever for more water, in spite of countless experiments having proved that the increased out-turn is nothing like proportionate to the increase of water; and this applies to all crops. Moreover, and this is important, too much moisture in the air or in the soil is not good for the stock. Animals which have got to spend their working life on ground like adamant cannot be expected to remain sound unless to some extent brought up to it. Hard, dry soil tends to a better foot and a better quality of bone.

And now about the remounts themselves.

The total annual requirements of the regiment being taken at about seventy, the stud is satisfied if it can provide fifty to fifty-five, the balance for the Indian officers or heavy-weights being obtained from the Waler market. To produce this number the stud both breeds and buys. There are eighty brood mares, the great majority being by either Arab or thoroughbred English or Australian sires. Assuming that fifty to sixty foals are born annually, little more than half of these will find their way into the ranks at rising five years of age; some die, some are cast and sold, some become brood mares, &c. The balance of requirements, therefore, has to be bought. Purchases are usually made at from ten to sixteen months of age. It is inadvisable to buy younger—it is too risky—and young stock go off if separated from the dam too early. If older, they are usually the refuse unbought the year before; also they do not get the benefit of the farm life for so long. Bought stock seldom average as good as bred stock, and certainly not as level; which is natural, as the stud mares are carefully selected, not many being under 14.3 and fewer still over 15 hands, and since only two stallions are used the bred stock are, generally speaking, bound to run fairly level. Bought stock, on the other hand, vary considerably, since their sires and dams vary in size, build and breeding. Certain minimum measurements are laid down as guides for purchasing officers, but the writer, after some experience, has

arrived at the conclusion that the trained eye is the best guide of all, especially if a natural eye to start with. It sometimes happens that of two animals of the same age one comes up to measurements and the other does not, yet a few years later the latter outgrows the former. The shape, as well as the size of the joints, and a coltish appearance or a set appearance, are often indicative of how future development will go. But the breeder's lot is full of many surprises, and the most experienced at times go hopelessly wrong. Some youngsters grow up behind and down in front, and others *vice versa*; some grow leggy and others hardly at all; and in spite of all theory it is impossible at twelve months of age to be really certain whether a given animal will be 14.2 or 15.2 at five years. A knowledge of the parents is a great help, and in the case of home-breds one is not nearly so much at sea. The produce of certain mares often run very much to type, especially if they have Arab blood in them, and if mated with the same horse for a number of years one may fairly rely on results. One or two points are worth noting. Given two youngsters which are destined when full-grown to reach the same height, one with thoroughbred blood predominating and the other Arab, the former will probably be more leggy and bigger-jointed at birth and grow more rapidly for the first two years; after that age the growth is slower and stops earlier, and eventually the other catches it up. On the whole, also, it may be said the slower the growth the more true to type; very rapid growth generally tends to faultiness; it is too much to expect that it should all be in the right direction. Again, the forehead is the last to grow. Foals are higher over the quarters than over the withers, the latter being late to develop, as also is the neck to lengthen out. With all one's care, however, disappointments are frequent; one occasionally sees a ten-month-old youngster almost impossible to pick a hole in, yet at four years it has every known fault.

As regards the object to aim at. Assuming that the ideal of the Indian Cavalry is about a 15-hander, under rather than over, what is the best method of evolving him? The word 'evolve' is used deliberately in distinction to 'produce.' Various crosses may chance to produce an excellent remount, but with parents of different breeds the progeny may take after not only either parent, but the breed of either parent, as the characteristics in the blood are those which re-appear. By evolving is meant establishing a breed which, without

extraneous blood, adheres as a rule to a type, and this, of course, necessitates sires as well as dams. How many generations this may take is matter of guesswork; opinions differ also as to the best method to set to work. Experience at this stud points, perhaps, to more success with Arab sires and thoroughbred blood in the dams; but elsewhere it may be different, and the Army Remount Department is aiming at the present moment in the opposite direction—*e.g.* thoroughbred sires and dams by Arabs. There are *pros* and *cons* for each method. The writer would not venture to dogmatise, but the theory probably has truth in it, though exceptions may be numerous, that size and conformation more nearly follow the mother, whereas character and temperament come chiefly from the father. The advantage, then, of the Arab as a sire is that the character and temperament which he transmits are more suitable for the troop horse than those of the thoroughbred. The advantages of Arab blood in the dam are a greater probability of the produce being level in size, not too big and leggy, that it will be sound in constitution, and a good doer: moreover, mares thus bred make better mothers. The thoroughbred has its good points hardly less important. Where bone and size are wanted he gives them, also a longer forehead, a freer elbow, and more scope. Walers as mares are most uncertain—one does not know what their progeny will be; which is natural, as their breeding may be anything or nothing. They are shy breeders and poor mothers, being in reality strangers in a strange land, though individually acclimatised. Their soundness of limb is their strong redeeming feature.

The efforts of this stud to produce a really good stallion of their own breeding have not met with the best of fortune. They have been anxious to try the experiment of running a home-bred horse in a paddock with, say, fifteen or twenty selected mares. By this it is hoped the mares will hold well and the first step towards establishing a type be taken. But ill-luck has dogged them hitherto, and hopes are as yet unfulfilled. The breeder knows well what a lottery it all is; how much is still experimental, how frequent is disappointment, and that a lifetime with a slow-breeding animal like the horse is all too short to reach definite and certain results. Surprises are always in store. For instance, what of this? When breeding was first started at this stud the mares held well, but after some years results were

less satisfactory and hardly 40 per cent. were doing their duty in increasing the population. It was discovered that there had been some want of method and care in carrying out all details as they should have been, and when this was rectified improvement went up with a run. So far, so good; but the surprise came in when it was found that instead of the sexes of the foals born being as nearly as possible equal in numbers, with a very slight preponderance of fillies, suddenly the proportion changed to over 70 per cent. of colts and under 30 per cent. of fillies. At the same time, instead of running their full eleven and a third months, as had formerly been the rule, nearly every mare went a shorter time, some as much as two or three weeks; besides this, nearly every foal was born weakly, though they very soon picked up. The horse, mares, and conditions, it should be mentioned, were the same as the previous year. Again, the writer has known a colt of just three years old reach 16 hands, though the parents were a 14.3 Arab and a 14.2½ country-bred mare. Why do these things happen, and many more equally unaccountable? However, that they do the practical breeder has got to recognise, and after all there are two rules worth remembering—namely, that like breeds like, and that the wisest course generally is to use the breed of sirt most likely to correct the bad points of the dam.

One lives and hopes, and there is no reason why a remount of a good type nearly 15 hands should not eventually be evolved. But it would be foolish to expect too much. The country-bred horse is hardly yet the equal of the Waler as a remount, neither is he likely to be for some time, price for price. British Cavalry on the whole still prefer the horse from the Antipodes. But there is every prospect of the country-bred continuing to improve for many generations yet, and as much can hardly be said for the other.

The writer's belief is that to aim at anything over 15.1, even for British Cavalry, is inadvisable at the present stage. Conditions in India do not lend themselves to size without accompanying defects, and one cannot take on Nature without risk.



*SHERIDAN'S PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES
AND THE BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK*

APRIL 1865.

PICKETT'S disastrous defeat at the battle of Five Forks on April 1, immediately followed by the Federal assault on the Petersburg defences, necessitated the evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg.

Lee's line of retreat lay through Danville, through which alone he could unite with the Confederate forces in North Carolina.

Petersburg was evacuated during the night of the 2nd and 3rd, Lee's orders being for troops from both sides of the Appomattox River to concentrate at Amelia Court House on the Danville railroad, which he hoped to reach by the 4th.

The Federal forces were at once put in motion westward to intercept the retreat. On the 4th, Sheridan, with the Cavalry and the 5th Corps, reached the railway at Jetersville, where he captured a despatch from Lee saying that the Confederate Army was at Amelia Court House, short of food, and asking for 300,000 rations to be sent to Burkesville. The 5th Corps was accordingly intrenched astride the railroad facing north. On the afternoon of the 5th, Meade, with the 2nd and 6th Corps, came up in support, and Grant himself joined Sheridan late the same night. Finding the direct road to Danville barred, Lee, on the evening of the 5th, retreated westward from Amelia Court House towards Rice's Station and Farmville, hoping by a *détour* through those places and Prince Edward's Court House to regain the Danville Road further south, or else to retire on Lynchburg.

Sheridan's Cavalry, however, discovered this movement and captured five guns and a large number of Lee's wagons.


On the morning of the 6th Meade advanced north with his right in the direction of Amelia Court House, and Sheridan pushed Meritt's and Crook's Cavalry divisions westward towards the road from Deatonsville to Rice's Station.

Crook, who was leading, soon discovered the enemy's baggage

trains moving down this road, but could do little against them as they were strongly guarded. Sheridan accordingly left Stagg's brigade and Miller's battery at the point where the road from Deatonsville to the Appomattox River branches off from that to Rice's Station to harass the retreating column on the east of Sailor's Creek.

With the remainder of the Cavalry he pushed further south-west across the Creek, moving parallel to the enemy's line of march.

Meanwhile, Longstreet's Corps of Lee's Army had made a night march and reached Rice's Station at sunrise on the 6th. But the




SHERIDAN'S PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

progress of the other three Confederate Corps—viz. Anderson's, Ewell's, and Gordon's, which were hampered by the trains—was much slower. It was these Corps that Sheridan's Cavalry were harassing; the 2nd Federal Corps was also pressing them in rear.

A gap occurred between Ewell's rear and Gordon's leading troops. Stagg seized the opportunity to push in between them and force Gordon to take the road to the Appomattox, and to abandon his march to Rice's Station. The 2nd Corps pursued Gordon in the new direction, thus completely isolating him from the main body.

Anderson and Ewell had kept straight on towards Rice's Station, but after crossing Sailor's Creek they halted on the far side to wait for the trains and the rearguard.

This was Sheridan's opportunity. He promptly pushed Crook and Meritt across the Rice's Station road, thus completely cutting



off Anderson and Ewell from Longstreet. He also sent for the 6th Corps, which had been placed under his orders by Grant, to close in on Ewell's rear.

Meritt's Cavalry division was the first to gain the Rice's Station road west of the Creek, and made havoc of the wagon train which he found there. Crook, passing his division behind Meritt, struck them

further on and placed himself square across the road. Stagg's brigade connected Meritt's right with the left of the 6th Corps, which now came up, and the Confederates were thus surrounded on three sides. Anderson and Ewell fought desperately to extricate themselves, endeavouring to move north-west towards Farmville—the only direction open to them. This attempt was frustrated by Crook, who held them by a vigorous attack with two brigades dismounted and one mounted against Anderson's front; Meritt supported Crook on the right, attacking Anderson's left flank.

The advance of the 6th Corps, which had now crossed the Creek, was gallantly opposed by Ewell, who faced about to meet this attack in his rear, and delivered a vigorous counter-stroke which drove the Federals almost back to the Creek. The counter-attack was, however, stopped by the enemy's guns, and Ewell had nothing left but to surrender with his whole force. Anderson himself and about 2000 disorganised men escaped through the woods to Farmville, but six general officers, besides Ewell, and about 7000 men were captured.

The battle of Sailor's Creek thus virtually destroyed two out of Lee's four small Corps; while Longstreet was obliged to turn north again from Rice's Station, where with Lee himself he had been waiting all day for the remainder of the Army to come up. Lee was thus finally cut off from his line of retreat on Danville, and endeavoured to fall back on Lynchburg *via* Farmville, where he crossed to Appomattox with what remained of his Army. On April 7 he was obliged to halt and face Humphreys, who with two divisions of the 2nd Corps was pressing his rear. This gave time for Sheridan again to intercept him at Appomattox Station, which the Federal Cavalry reached on the evening of the 8th. Here they captured four train-loads of supplies which had been sent to Lee from Lynchburg.

At daybreak on the 9th Lee made an effort to break through Sheridan. The latter was obliged to fall back, but was reinforced in the nick of time by Ord with the 5th and 24th Corps. This combination destroyed Lee's last chance of escape, and at 1 P.M. the same day the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered.

THE WORK OF THE CAVALRY IN THE BALKAN WAR

Condensed from the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*

A MOST cursory glance at the map will convince any student of war that for the employment in this campaign of any large masses of Cavalry, in the Continental sense, there was only the great plain of Thrace, originally selected as the concentration zone for the main Turkish armies. This region is bounded on the west by the Rhodope mountains, on the east by those of Strandja—practically devoid of communications; it is a piece of country somewhat broken and undulating, but nearly everywhere practicable, and permitting, as events indeed proved, of movements on a wide front. Cavalry could move everywhere off the roads, and the different sections of the country were divided off by the rivers, so that mounted troops could easily be employed either in reconnoitring far to the front, in screening operations, or by intervention in action as an auxiliary arm.

ON THE TURKISH SIDE, in conjunction with the Constantinople corps, there was a Cavalry Division comprising the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th and 11th Regiments of Cavalry, each of four squadrons, a Horse Artillery Brigade of two batteries, and two machine-gun companies, of which the men were mounted, the guns and ammunition being carried both on carriages and on pack animals. There was a great dearth of horses at the outbreak of the war, and although requisitions were made among private owners, tramway companies, &c., the squadrons were not able to take the field with more than fifty horses apiece. The personnel of the Turkish Cavalry were armed with Mauser carbines, both single-loaders and magazine.

The division was commanded by Salih Pasha, formerly Adjutant-General to the Sultan, and at first was about Sejmen (nineteen miles to the north-east of Adrianople and between twelve and thirteen from the Bulgarian frontier) covering the main concentration of the Turkish

forces, an operation which continued until October 21, and which was effected on the line Kirk Kilisse-Haskoi, the 1st and 4th Corps in the first line, the 2nd Corps in rear of the centre. When on October 22 the army advanced against the Bulgarian forces which had entered the country between the Strandja mountains and the Tundja, the Cavalry Division was directed by Abdulla Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief, to move forward on the left flank of the 4th Corps then advancing on Gebeler. The reason why the Cavalry was placed on the outer flank and not on the inner, *appuyé* on Adrianople, was probably in the first instance due to topographical considerations, and also no doubt to the circumstance that the Ottoman commander had not then considered the possibility of the march of an opposing army across the Strandja mountains.

There is much contradictory evidence as to the exploration work of the Turkish Cavalry in general, and of the division in particular, during this early period of the operations. But this seems to be clear: that the Turkish Cavalry had not had any really efficient training in field operations—there had been too much ‘riding school’; then since October 18 very heavy rain had fallen making the country heavy and the roads impassable, and communication was almost impossible; again the population, chiefly Greek and Bulgarian, was hostile; and finally the signalling service in the Cavalry seems to have broken down, or to have been badly organised. An aviation service would here have been of the utmost assistance, and would no doubt have conveyed earlier the information of the advance of the Bulgarian forces. These appear to have been reported as crossing the Bulgarian frontier on the 20th, whereas they actually passed it on the 18th. It is unnecessary here to recapitulate the order of their advance further than to remark that at the outset the Bulgarian Cavalry Division was employed on the Bulgarian left, and that consequently in front of the Ottoman Cavalry Division there appears to have been only the 7th Regiment of Bulgarian Cavalry.

In accordance with the orders received from Abdulla Pasha, the Turkish Cavalry advanced on October 22 *via* Musultja; it had detached one regiment—the 3rd—for duty with the right wing, but it had been strengthened by the arrival of a brigade of Light Cavalry under Ibrahim Bey, hitherto employed about Adrianople. The division came in contact with a strong column of all arms, forming probably part of the

1st Division of the 1st Bulgarian Army Corps, and was taken in flank by dismounted fire from about Chiflik Hajiomir. The Turkish Horse Artillery, Batteries and machine guns were engaged, and, the enemy's advanced troops having withdrawn, the Cavalry Division passed the night about Chiflik Hajiomir. It was, however, obliged to fall back the next morning by the resumed advance of the Bulgarians. The ground was now so saturated and heavy that the divisional commander found himself obliged to send half his guns back to Chorlu; these were drawn by oxen, while the guns that he retained with him had to be furnished with additional teams of six or eight horses apiece, taken from his Cavalry squadrons and for which only rope traces could be provided.

In the meantime the offensive had already been checked to the north and west of Kirk Kilisse, and panic, originating in the indiscipline of the Redif troops, devoid practically of any sort of military training led to a disorderly retreat—the 3rd Turkish Corps retiring on Vitzza, the 2nd, 1st and 4th by Baba Eski on Lule Burgas.

It was not until October 25 that the commander of the Turkish Cavalry Division received any reliable reports on the general situation, and then Salih Pasha, leaving a small body to observe the enemy, drew his force together and fell back, reaching Lule Burgas on the 27th. From here he again sent out officers' patrols and reconnoitring squadrons, supported by machine-guns, in the direction of the enemy, but by this time his effective strength, already considerably reduced, was further diminished by Ibrahim Bey's Brigade being detached to the right of the army. The Cavalry Division was now again on the extreme left flank of the Turkish Army.

The force under the Turkish Commander-in-Chief had by this time halted behind the River Karagatch on the line Bunar Hissar-Lule Burgas, but it was not until October 28 that the Bulgarians re-established touch with their enemy. On the following day when the 1st Bulgarian Army approached Lule Burgas, the Ottoman Cavalry, seeking to prolong the left of the 4th Corps, came suddenly under a very heavy artillery fire, fell back in a somewhat disorderly flight, and having suffered many casualties and lost some guns, ultimately regained the south bank of the Ergene River. Apart from this incident the Division seems, on the whole, to have behaved very well.

During the two days' fighting which now took place the Cavalry

Division was not actively engaged. When the Turks fell back on Chataldja the Division covered the retreat; and its *morale* was considerably affected by the demoralisation witnessed on all sides, if one may judge by the account of the manner in which the Division permitted itself to be harassed by small bodies of Bulgarian Cavalry and even by patrols. It was engaged on November 7 with Infantry near Chorlu, and on the 9th, was safely behind the lines of Chataldja. Here Salih Pasha was relieved of his command, and the Division was broken up and reconstituted as a strong Brigade under Ibrahim Bey.

The Turkish Cavalry in Europe comprised twenty-two regiments, while there were twenty-four Nizam divisions; there was no reserve Cavalry. If from the above number of Cavalry regiments we deduct the Division and the Brigade under Ibrahim, we find that there remain no more than fourteen regiments—say fifty-six squadrons—or two to three squadrons per division, which formed the sum of the mounted bodies with the Army Corps. There was no Divisional Cavalry as understood in Continental armies. Further, while originally these squadrons contained at most fifty horses, this number was further reduced owing to the pernicious practice of using the horses of Cavalry regiments for mounting the staffs and other minor personages and officials. It is not to be wondered at therefore, that, when the very numerous casualties in horse-flesh are considered, the Turkish Cavalry was unequal, numerically as well as professionally, to the duties expected of it. During the retreat it is said that the Divisional Cavalry was represented in some Infantry Divisions by eight or twelve mounted men and a few mounted police.

It may be questioned whether it was not a grave mistake to organise a Cavalry Division at all and employ it as an Independent Cavalry. As to its leader, Salih Pasha, it may be said that he tried his utmost to work in co-operation with the chief command whenever opportunity was afforded him. The Horse Artillery with the Cavalry Division made bad practice owing to defective training, and matters went from bad to worse on the disappearance of the Artillery Brigade commander, who fell in action on October 22. The hospital arrangements in the Cavalry Division were hopelessly bad; there was only one doctor, who was wounded at Lule Burgas, and who thereupon left the front taking with him the whole of the hospital equipment.

THE BULGARIAN CAVALRY DIVISION, commanded by Major-General

Naslumov, was at the outbreak of the war attached to the 3rd Army (Dimitriev). During peace the Bulgarian Cavalry consists of a regiment of Life Guards of three squadrons, and of three brigades of three or four regiments, some of which have three and some four squadrons. The armament is the Mannlicher magazine carbine. The actual composition of the Cavalry Division in war is not accurately known, but it would seem that it consisted of regiments Nos. 1, 2, and 4, and another regiment either composite or newly created. It was divided into two small brigades, each having a machine gun and a telegraph detachment. Of the remaining Cavalry regiments Nos. 3 and 6 were with Taneff's independent Cavalry Brigade, No. 5 was with the 7th Division in Macedonia, No. 7 was with the 1st Army, while the distribution of the remaining regiments, Nos. 8, 9, and 10, is not known.

As has been said, after October 23 contact with the Turks was lost and was not regained for several days, and there are at present none but the vaguest of conjectures as to the action of the Bulgarian Cavalry Division; but since its presence was reported by the Turks on October 22 at Erikler, it was probably at first engaged in front of the 3rd Army in the direction of Kirk Kilisse. As to its services up to the battle about that place opinions seem greatly to differ, so far as the reconnaissance duty is concerned; but from October 23 onwards there can be no doubt that it was not equal to requirements, and does not seem to have co-operated usefully in action. On the 26th it advanced on Baba Eski to destroy the Salonika-Constantinople railway and to reconnoitre towards Hadjaboli and Rodosto; but when, later on, Colonel Salabatchev's Cavalry Brigade was specially detached towards the Lower Maritza, the Cavalry Division as originally composed then ceased to exist. Such of the army Cavalry as remained continued to operate on the right flank of the Bulgarian Army; but, moving forward to the south of the Ergene after the battle of Lule Burgas, it seems to have taken no part whatever either in the battle itself or in the pursuit, not even attempting seriously to engage the Turkish Cavalry Division then in its front.

The employment of the Bulgarian Cavalry Division on the outer (left) wing was correct according to the military situation; it might have usefully acted still more to the east, e.g. to screen the march of the column advancing from the Strandja mountains, or it might have been directed to act against the rear of the Ottoman Army; but the

ground was too difficult for much to have been accomplished thereby. The failure to pursue may have been due to the difficulties of supply, but there seems no excuse why touch could not have been maintained, considering that, as the population was largely Bulgarian, the invaders were operating almost as in their own country. It is noticeable that here, as with the Turks, the mass of the Cavalry was on one flank, thus making it impossible to *éclairer l'armée en front*.

The supineness of the Bulgarian Cavalry Division may be contrasted with the activity displayed by the 3rd Brigade under Taneff; this consisted of two regiments, each of three squadrons 125 strong. This brigade passed the frontier at mid-day on the 18th at the head of the 2nd Army (Ivanov) reconnoitring towards Mustapha Pasha, and supported by the 8th Division. On the 19th this division had an encounter action with an Ottoman force of equal strength advancing from Adrianople, and an issue successful to the Bulgarians was secured by a charge delivered by Taneff's Brigade on the Turkish left. The combat was renewed on the 22nd, the Cavalry Brigade again playing a useful part; and on the 23rd, reinforced by a battalion, a battery, and four machine guns on pack animals, it crossed to the southern bank of the Arda, watched the south front of the fortress, and reconnoitred thoroughly to the south-west. It was engaged during November in front of Adrianople, and at Dimotika, being detached on a special mission towards Dedeagatch on the 15th. In this movement, strengthened by four Macedonian battalions, a Horse Artillery Battery, and some Cavalry pioneers, Taneff's Brigade co-operated with General Geneff in the well-concerted movements which resulted, on November 27, in the defeat and surrender of Javer Pasha with 13,000 men near Bedekli. It seems probable that as details of these events come to hand, it will be found that the operations of Taneff's Cavalry Brigade will furnish lessons well worth examination and study. The Bulgarian Cavalry is described as being composed of a very intelligent personnel, useful on patrol, and ready and able effectively to enter upon dismounted action. The men are not so well fitted for the Cavalry combat in large bodies, partly owing to indifferent training, partly to the poor quality of their mounts; the Bulgarian Cavalryman, unlike his Servian comrade, is a bad horse-master.

THE SERVIAN CAVALRY DIVISION is composed during peace of two brigades, each of two regiments, of a Horse Artillery Brigade of two batteries, and of a Cavalry telegraph detachment. Each regiment has

four squadrons and a machine-gun section, while on the outbreak of war there were added a detachment of Cavalry pioneers and a Cavalry ammunition column. The commander of the Division was Prince Arsene Karageorgevitch. Besides these regiments and a squadron of Life Guards there was, in peace, no other Cavalry of any kind, so that on mobilisation it became necessary to create a Divisional Cavalry *de novo*. These regiments or squadrons—the number and distribution of which is not accurately known—were made up of reservists mounted on their own horses and providing their own saddlery. Only a few were provided with uniforms, but all were armed, like the Regular Cavalry, with Mauser carbines, and were officered by effectives drawn from the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks of the Cavalry Division.

When the 1st Army advanced on Kumanova on October 18 in three columns, the Cavalry Division accompanied the westernmost column moving by Vranja, and was hotly engaged alongside the 1st Division on the 23rd and 24th, on this latter date doing excellent service in covering the left flank of the army and holding off all menace of attack by the Turks falling back from Egri Palanka before the 2nd Army. The Cavalry lost touch after this action and entered Kuprulu four days later without having re-established anything like real contact. The further advance was much delayed, and it was not until November 14 that the Servian Cavalry Division had arrived on the east of Monastir, and had occupied Kenali in rear of the Vardar Army; of its share in the actions of the next few days nothing is accurately known, but its pursuit seems to have been very thorough, checking and breaking up between seven and ten battalions, which, under Zekki Pasha, were escaping towards Florina, at which place the Division effected a junction with the Greek troops on November 21.

As regards the work of the Servian Cavalry Division, the reconnaissance seems to have been effectively carried out and its commander was always well informed, but no doubt he was well served by the local troops and the population; the nature of the country—very mountainous, difficult and roadless—made the intervention of Cavalry in the battle, in the ordinary European sense, almost impossible.

THE GREEK CAVALRY was composed in peace of a single brigade of two regiments each of five squadrons, with two machine-gun sections, *plus* a third independent regiment of six (provisionally five) squad-

rons and a machine-gun section. It was armed with the magazine carbine Mannlicher-Schönauer. On mobilisation the 3rd Regiment was distributed as Divisional Cavalry among the eight Infantry Divisions, the Brigade being with the main army. The squadrons were at the outset 150 strong, but by the beginning of December contained no more than 65 to 70 effectives. The army marched on October 18 with the Cavalry Brigade in front of the left wing, occupying Diskata on the 21st, pursuing the broken forces of the Turks after the capture of Selfidje, being checked on the 26th near Kajalar, and moving next day on Jënitche. In the battle at this place on November 1 and 2 the Cavalry remained inactive—it was now on the right flank, and one hears but little of it until nearly the end of the month, when it followed up the Turks fleeing from Florina on Kortcha, and took twelve guns and many prisoners.

THE MONTENEGRIN ARMY has, of course, no Cavalry force in peace, but on mobilisation each Infantry Brigade was given a small section of mounted men for purposes of close reconnaissance, and drawn for the most part from ex-soldiers providing their own horses.

To sum up, it may be said that in the Balkan War the Cavalry did more work than would, from the nature of the country, have reasonably been expected. It is difficult to draw comparisons between the Cavalry of the Balkan States and that of other countries, the general standard being very different, the conditions being wholly dissimilar, and the organisation and training being on quite different lines. The fact remains that much had been learnt during the years of peace immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, and that the mounted arm of these countries must during the months that the war lasted have gathered many lessons which will be valuable in the future.



SOME FRENCH AND GERMAN CAVALRY THEORIES*

By A CAVALRY STAFF OFFICER

THE first thing that strikes one on reading this excellent little book of some 170 pages is how clear a 'doctrine' exists in the French Cavalry and how ably and competently the senior regimental officers expound it.

In 'Cavalry Training,' 1912, we have certainly the skeleton of the doctrine, but we lack books to amplify and interpret it, such as the book under review, and we are short of regimental officers who can write 'critiques' similar to those appearing in this book over the signature 'Chef hiérarchiques.'

The salient points of the French Cavalry doctrine as brought out in this book are :—

(1) *The Encouragement of the Bold Offensive*.—'C'est la doctrine ! Ne pas vouloir du combat, en discuter l'opportunité, c'est énerver les tempéraments, c'est abdiquer, ou se mettre à la merci d'une Cavalerie rivale entraînée à le rechercher.

'Une fois le combat de Cavalerie entre bien net dans nos tempéraments, nous le voudrions, nous le rechercherons, et saurons le livrer sans phrases. Ce jour-là, la Cavalerie française aura repris sa vraie place dans le concert des trois armes.'

(2) The seizure of the initiative without waiting for precise information.

(3) The division of one's force into 'un groupe de manœuvre' (as strong as possible and led by the commander) and 'un groupe de front pour fixer l'ennemi' (as small as possible).

(4) The necessity of fighting to gain information.

Among minor points of tactics, the necessity of keeping well away

* *Exercices pratiques de Cadres*, by Colonel Monsenerque. (2nd edit. Berger Levrault.)

from guns that are attached to one's force and the utilisation of the Squadron Scouts * as a formed body under an officer are continually being emphasised.

Il faut rester cavalier et non pas devenir artilleur.—On page 37 is the French answer to the old controversy as to whether Cavalry should have some form of 'arme blanche' for the dismounted attack. In a 'critique' on an attack through a wood, it is stated that Cavalry as a rule will have to dismount and follow Infantry tactics. 'On chemine par unités tactiques groupées (en serpentins) jusqu'à l'ennemi que l'on aborde à la baïonnette. Vous avez pris vos carabines; à défaut de baïonnettes j'eusse volontiers conseillé de prendre vos lances.'

On page 118 a half-regiment acting as advanced guard to a Cavalry Division is criticised for dismounting and opening fire at 1200 metres on same hostile Artillery, which will take in flank the proposed manœuvre of the division, and the advice is given to 'charge the Artillery, not with the notion of taking it, but with the firm intention of blinding its fire, even if it is only for one or two minutes just as your own division is deploying. Take no heed of hostile escorts, if they intervene all the better—the curtain will be more dense and difficult for the Artillery.'

The method of instruction adopted is as used in the French Army for the education of officers and N.C.O.s, namely, that each rank is taught by the one above it, the problems, their solutions, and the accompanying criticisms in this book being schemes actually executed in the Fourth Cavalry Division.

The director sets the schemes, and these schemes are of the simplest and so framed that the pupil cannot resort to dilatory tactics, but must take decisive action. The solution is handed in and criticised by the director, and then, and not till then, an alternative solution is perhaps advanced; on no account is the pupil's solution to be merely condemned and an alternative produced—'Il faut laisser le chef que vous voulez instruire agir d'initiative.'

On return to barracks the student writes the account of the scheme, accompanying it with a map and the director's criticisms. This is forwarded through each senior grade (who write their remarks) to the General, and then returned by the same channel. 'La critique enfin passée au crible bienveillant de l'annotation hiérarchique,

* The French squadron has one corporal and four or five scouts per troop; there is a scout officer and scout N.C.O.

dissipe les malentendus et pour le grand bien de l'arme assiste la doctrine.'

Much may be learnt by a comparison of the doctrines enunciated in the foregoing book and those contained in *Kavallerie-Uebungen aller Art im Gelände von einem Stabsoffizier* (Berlin, 1912). In minor details there is much that is similar between French and German methods; for instance, the division of the Cavalry into independent, protective, and Divisional Cavalry, the encouragement of the Bold Offensive, the utilisation of patrols backed up by reconnoitring detachments, as the means of acquiring information, are common to both. The big difference is this: that the Germans take the enemy for objective, and march to his encounter, employing the bulk of their forces for the direct blow, a small portion only being used for the flank attack.

This was the procedure at St. Privat and the manœuvre favoured by the German-instructed Japanese at the Yalou, Liaoyang, and Mukden. According to French ideas it presupposes a large superiority in numbers and ends in indecisive victories bought with the loss of myriads of men.


The French, on the other hand, modelling themselves on Napoleon's victories at Lodi, Marengo, &c., choose for objective some topographical feature, the loss of which will place the enemy in a bad position; a small detachment is then thrown out to the front to deceive and hold the enemy while the mass manœuvres and brings off the flank attack.

These two doctrines permeate the whole tactics of the two nations, even down to the action of single squadrons.

The method of instruction in this book is not so simple or so clear as in *Exercices pratiques de Cadres*; it deals with larger forces and is the rough outline of double Staff rides carried out round Metz. It is divided into three parts: Cavalry rides, Exercises in reconnaissance, Miscellaneous Cavalry duties in the field, each being preceded by a chapter bringing out the essential points of the exercise.

Perhaps the most important section is that on reconnaissance, and it is interesting to note the way in which a reconnoitring squadron is worked.

The squadron detailed for reconnaissance is first strengthened by attached officers' patrols. It is then given its objective and lateral limits (usually a breadth of some 15-20 kilometres), and finally, on occasions, an approximate position for its collecting stations for information.



On page 82 is given in tabular form the detail of reconnaissance of a Cavalry Division marching forward some 35 kilometres, the reconnoitring squadrons covering some 55-60 kilometres.

No.	Reconnoitring Squadron.	Roads and Flank Boundaries of Zones.	To reach by Evening of
1	1 Kur Regiment + Officers' Patrols 6 Motor Cycles 1 Signal Station	Roads. — Beaumont <i>via</i> Maastal to Verdun Eastern Boundary Western "	Verdun
2	2 Dragoon Regiments + 4 Officers' Patrols 6 Motor Cycles 1 Signal Station	Roads. — Beaumont — Stenay — Mouzay — Damvillers — Ornes — Maucourt Eastern Boundary Western "	Maucourt

Officers' patrols from reconnoitring squadron No. 1 Kur Regiment No. 1, one officer, two N.C.O.s, ten men, two motor cycles.

Route—Right bank of the Meuse *via* Verdun to Diene.

No. 2. Composition

Route

No. 3. Composition

Route

A collecting station for information, consisting of a troop, four motor cycles, and a signal station, being formed at Damvillers.

The points to be noticed in the above being the strength of the patrols and the method of giving lateral limits to the movements of the reconnoitring squadrons.

Another point to be noticed is the great use made of cyclists in conjunction with Cavalry. Although, on page 59, the author points out that on account of the fact that cyclists, owing to their uselessness without good roads, do not form an integral portion of the Cavalry Division, as they do in France, in nearly all schemes will be noticed the presence of cyclists.

On page 139 the cyclists are sent on independently, the Cavalry following on in rear!!

On page 72 is to be found an operation order in which the following curious paragraph occurs:—

The advance guard (consisting of —) starts at — from — and marches *viâ* — to —.

The main body (in order of march —) follows at 1500 metres!!!

There is much to be learnt from both books, and an unprejudiced and critical staff of a third Power (such as ourselves) should be able to benefit from their perusal, not slavishly following one or the other method, but making use of what is best in both systems, and adopting them to our own peculiarities.

SUBSCRIPTIONS.

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THE CAVALRY OF THE KING'S GERMAN LEGION

By C. R. B. BARRETT

It may be of interest to our readers to have a brief account of the force which was formerly known as the King's German Legion, as far as the Cavalry regiments are concerned, particularly as regards their position in the present day.

This paper can, however, in no way contain anything like a detailed history of these celebrated regiments. Their history at length is to be read in the two volumes of Beamish which were published in 1837, and in the new and most exhaustive book which appeared in 1907 and was given to the public from the accomplished pen of Major B. Schwertfeger, of the General Staff of the German Army. And here it may be well to specially recommend Major Schwertfeger's book to the notice of students of military history, seeing that it contains much that is new on the various services of these distinguished regiments.

The Cavalry of the King's German Legion consisted of five regiments—the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Hussars, and the 1st and 2nd Dragoons. With the Artillery and Infantry we are not concerned beyond this, that men from the disbanded Hanoverian Army were first enlisted for Infantry; the prime mover in the matter being Colonel von der Decken, with whom three late Hanoverian officers, Major Hinüber, Captain Offney, and Cornet Augustus Heise, were subsequently associated. The first style of the Force was that of the 'King's German Regiment.' This was in 1803. In December of that year his Royal Highness the Duke of York conceived the idea of forming a Legion of Horse, Foot, and Artillery—a small complete Hanoverian Army in fact; small because its numbers were primarily limited to 5000 men, who were to be enlisted for a minimum of seven and a maximum of ten years; and this plan was adopted. When the time came to enlist men for the Cavalry, Weymouth was selected as the depôt, and by

the end of the year four troops of heavy and four of light Dragoons were formed and the title of 'King's German Legion' was adopted.

In February 1804 two troops were added to each of these Cavalry regiments. They were brigaded together and quartered at Weymouth and Dorchester, their commander being Major-General von Linsingen.

In January 1805 we find Colonel von Bock commanding the 1st Dragoons and Colonel Victor von Alten the 1st Hussars, for the style 'Light Dragoons' had been already dropped. During the summer of 1805 both regiments were encamped near Weymouth, on, we believe, Lodmore Plain. The drill then used was Hanoverian, except in the cases of mounting guard and in parade movements, which were carried out according to the British Regulations.

War now broke out: the Prussians took possession of Hanover, and a British expedition under Lord Cathcart was despatched to the Elbe.



1ST DRAGOONS.
1803.

In November 1805 the 1st Hussars were embarked at Ramsgate and suffered from terrible weather. During December they reached their destination, and Verden was selected as headquarters. But it was too late. The expedition was recalled, and to the disappointment of the Hanoverians the day of vengeance was apparently indefinitely postponed. Now the order of recall provoked trouble. A report became current that on return to England either the East or West Indies, or both countries, would be their destination, and the prospect was by no means a pleasant one. The inhabitants of Bremen, where Lord Cathcart's headquarters were situated, were most energetic in spreading these unfounded rumours, and disaffection in the ranks of the Legion was rife. Many desertions took place—not in ones and twos, but in tens and twenties, and, what is

more, the men levanted with both their horses and their arms. However, Lord Cathcart was equal to the situation: repentance followed, and an issue of a general pardon brought back nearly all to their allegiance. Von Decken was now promoted to be Brigadier-General. His activities in recruiting were immense, and in the face of an intention to increase the Legion to 18,000 men recruiting depôts were established at Stade and Hanover. A second regiment of Hussars was now in process of formation in England; and the raising of a

third was also energetically taken in hand by Von Decken. This was followed by the enlistment of a second regiment of Dragoons. The increase in Infantry and Artillery and the raising of Engineers we neglect.

In February 1806 Cathcart's Force returned to England and landed at Portsmouth. Here the newly raised Cavalry regiments remained, while the 1st Dragoons and 1st Hussars marched to Liverpool and embarked for Ireland, in which country they remained till April 1807. While in Ireland it may be noted that the Dragoons had a serious encounter with an Irish Militia regiment, who attacked them in a most unprovoked manner. There were several casualties.

On May 29 they were ordered on foreign service and sailed from Cork. Bad weather again attended them, and the fleet took refuge in Mount's Bay. On June 7 the transports reached the Downs, where the 2nd and 3rd Hussars joined. The voyage was resumed on June 19 and July 1. On July 8 the first division reached Rugen, where the ships were compelled to anchor at a distance of two miles from the shore, so shallow was the water. Curious floats with a trap-door therein were used to disembark the horses, who were thence thrown into the water and led ashore. The Cavalry were employed on reconnoitring duties. Next, trouble arose with Denmark concerning the temporary cession of the Danish Fleet. The expedition proceeded to Denmark, and a part of the Force landed on August 16, 1807, at Wedbeck, about eight miles from Copenhagen, while the remainder anchored higher up the Sound. Forty horses of the 1st Hussars were landed that night, and with their riders formed Lord Cathcart's escort when he went to reconnoitre the approaches to the capital.

On October 18 Captain Kranchenberg, who commanded a squadron (the advanced guard), started out to capture a convoy of 180 wagons. He missed the wagons, but in a most daring way summoned the garrison of the small fortress of Friedereckswerk to surrender; and it capitulated, mainly owing to the bluff of the gallant captain, for a handful of Dragoons received the surrender.

Eight hundred and sixty prisoners and immense supplies of powder,



1ST DRAGOONS.
1812.

guns, and small arms were taken. There was, however, too much spoil to be removed, and only four guns and half the arms of the garrison were carried off. Daylight revealed to the unfortunate Commandant how he had been tricked. As the squadron withdrew some thousands of peasants appeared on the neighbouring heights and seemed likely to offer opposition to the withdrawal of the Hussars. They were at once charged by Lieutenant Ernest Posen and a few men, and incontinently fled, leaving fifty men and five horses as prisoners. Von Decken, who was in supreme command of the little force, reached his quarters in safety. The prisoners were beaten with the flats of the Hussars' swords and then turned adrift.

On August 18 and 19 the Hussars landed at Charlottenbund. Before Copenhagen a squadron acted with the centre division of Infantry. The Hussars took part in the defeat of the Danes at Kiøge. During the pursuit Lieutenant Rudorf was mortally wounded. Major Plessen's squadron captured fifty wagons of stores. Copenhagen was now bombarded, and capitulated on September 7. On October 13 the British re-embarked for home, taking with them the entire Danish Fleet. At Helsingfors the passage of nearly 1000 sail was watched from the shore by the King of Sweden, who received a salute of twenty-one guns from each vessel as it passed. A fairly large expenditure of powder this must have been. Weymouth was the next station of the 1st Hussars.



2ND DRAGOONS.
1812.

Then came the Peninsula Campaign; and here the exploits of the Hussars and Dragoons are too numerous to be mentioned in detail and, indeed, too well known to require it. Similarly the gallant conduct of those who served at Waterloo need not be detailed. We will, therefore, pass on to the later story of the Cavalry of the German Legion. After Napoleon had been despatched to St. Helena, and Europe was settling down again into a condition of peace, great reductions in the armed forces took place. Hanover was now no longer an electorate, but a kingdom, and as such needed more than ever an army.

In consequence all the Cavalry of the King's German Legion, as well as the remainder of the Force, was incorporated in the Hanoverian Army, and so remained until Prussia took possession of

Hanover. The Hanoverian Army was then absorbed into the Prussian Army, and the regiments which had once formed the Cavalry of the King's German Legion are now represented in the Imperial German Army by the Prussian 13th and 14th Uhlans, the 15th Hussars, and the 9th Dragoons. It may here be remarked that, true to their traditions as gallant soldiers, the regiments as Prussian regiments of Cavalry served with great distinction in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.

It is interesting to know that these regiments still bear as honours on their helmets distinctions which were won by them while gallantly serving under the British and Hanoverian flags. These honours were granted as follows :

The 1st Light Dragoons and the 2nd Light Dragoons were granted 'Peninsula,' 'Waterloo,' and 'Garzia Hernandez'; the 1st Hussars, 'Peninsula,' 'Waterloo,' and 'El Bodon'; the 2nd Hussars, 'Peninsula' and 'Barosa'; and the 3rd, 'Peninsula,' 'Waterloo,' and 'Göhrde.'

'Göhrde' not being so well known to the general reader, it may be well to state that the battle, which was fought on September 16, 1813, takes its name from the forest of Göhrde. The Allies here gained a victory under Wallmoden over the French Force commanded by Pêcheur. The regiments, while still Hanoverian, distinguished themselves in 1866 at the battle of Langensalza against Prussia.

On this occasion the Hanoverian Army was on its way to join the Bavarians and was attacked by the Prussians. Victory declared itself on the side of Hanover, who defeated their opponents, causing them a loss of about 1000 killed and wounded and 912 prisoners. The fight took place on June 26, but, though a victory, it was of little avail to stave off ultimate disaster, for the Hanoverian Army, quite outnumbered, was surrounded by Falckenstein and compelled to capitulate three days later. The terms of capitulation granted were, however, honourable. The El Bodon fight was a most gallant affair, and took place on September 3, 1811.

El Bodon was the centre of the British position outside Ciudad Rodrigo. As a position it was extensive and was also weak. El Bodon itself lay in advance of the whole. Around Fuentes Guinaldo



1ST HUSSARS.

field-works had strengthened the position; the rest of the force lay in the plain, where the superiority of the enemy's Cavalry gave the latter a great advantage. The right of the British was alone across the river Agueda. Montbrun with 14 battalions of Foot and 35 squadrons of splendid Cavalry crossed the Agueda by the bridge and sundry fords, and approached the heights of El Bodon. The British were unprepared for so sudden an attack. A brigade under Colville was summoned in support from Guinaldo. The heights of El Bodon were held by the 5th Foot, the 77th Foot, the 21st Portuguese, 8 guns, and 3 squadrons of the Cavalry of the German Legion; the last-named holding the summit. Picton, who was in the village of El Bodon, hurried his men up to assist, but did not arrive in time. For three hours the Germans withstood repeated and furious onslaughts, charging and charging again to repel the advancing enemy. It is stated that this took place at least twenty times. One account says forty. Still the enemy pressed on with praiseworthy perseverance, and at length obtained a footing on the crest, where they captured two guns. These guns, however, were speedily recaptured by the 5th Foot, who advanced and charged in line. The recaptured guns then reopened fire on the enemy while the 77th and the Portuguese drove them back down the hill. But a French division was now rapidly approaching, and Lord Wellington then ordered the gallant force back to Fuentes Guinaldo. It should be noted that Lord Wellington subsequently recommended the officers for medals, but these were not granted for El Bodon.

The battle at Garzia Hernandez was fought on July 23, 1812, and here the 1st and 2nd Dragoons greatly distinguished themselves. Briefly, what took place was this, as regards their share in the events of the day.

They were under the command of Major-General Von Bock, and as a brigade had been in reserve on the left during the battle of Salamanca, they were sent before daybreak on the morrow in pursuit.

At the Tormes they were joined by Anson's Brigade and the 1st and Light Divisions. Owing to delay at a ford while the British Infantry crossed, the French had time to get into a position which appeared to them to be more or less secure. Under Clausel they had taken the road to Peneranda along the valley of Garzia Hernandez. The approach to the river Tormes lay through a narrow marshy valley,

along which ran a small rivulet of which the banks were steep. The road was rough and stony and by no means favourable to Cavalry. Bock with his German Dragoons was in the rear of the Cavalry column. Anson's Light Brigade was in front. After proceeding for a league the enemy was sighted. They were posted thus: Some squadrons of Cavalry were in the plain in front, and several battalions of Infantry drawn up in squares occupied the heights in advance and to the right, with guns in the intervals. Owing to inequalities in the ground the disposition of the French Infantry and guns was not at first perceived.

The Germans were ordered to attack and advanced. They were in sections of three at first, and then in echelon of squadrons tried to form line on the first squadron without halting. Full of excitement the leading squadron hurried forward under Captain von Hattorf of the 1st Dragoons. General Bock was in front and sundry field-officers, besides Lieut.-Colonel May of the British Artillery, who had brought the order to advance. Bock was very short-sighted and asked where the enemy lay, as he could not see them; so Colonel May showed the way, and without waiting for the rest this squadron of the Dragoons dashed at the French Cavalry. Meanwhile the left wing of the French retired from Anson's Brigade, and the Cavalry in front went about without waiting for the Germans of Hattorf's squadron; but as the latter pressed on after them they fell under the fire of the squares, and Colonel May and several men and horses fell wounded. Colonel May remarked, 'This is what I get for leading the Germans!' The pursuit was now discontinued and the German Cavalry turned their attention to the squares of French Infantry. Captain Gustavus von der Decken, who commanded the 3rd or left squadron, saw one of the Infantry squares which would have caught him with a flank fire had he proceeded, and at once most daringly attacked it. It was on a lower slope of the heights when, about 100 yards from the square, Von der Decken fell mortally wounded. Captain von Uslar Gleichen then dashed to assist the other squadron, and in the event they got on two sides of the square, but could not break in until, when close up, a chance shot killed a horse, which with



2ND HUSSARS.

its rider fell forward on the bayonets. This made an opening. The Dragoons burst in and the French Infantry were mercilessly cut down. The swords of the Cavalry of the King's German Legion were in the habit of doing execution, and they certainly did so on this occasion. The 2nd squadron, under Captain von Reitzeuslen, then attempted to break the second square of Infantry. Many fell in the attempt at first, but presently the French, shaken by the destruction of the first square, gave way in one place. Von Reitzeuslen's men at once broke in, and this unfortunate battalion was also destroyed.

A third square, which was formed from fugitives from the other two, was supported by a body of the enemy's Cavalry. Against this Cavalry Captain Baron Marschalch led the 3rd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons, and being joined by the left troop of the 2nd squadron, under Lieutenant Fumetty, charged and dispersed them. In fact, the enemy did not wait to engage. Then, riding at the square, they broke and overthrew it. The wreck of the routed battalions now rallied and attempted to make a stand on some rising ground near Peneranda. Here, by good fortune or good leadership, they succeeded in getting into something like a compact formation.

Marschalch and Fumetty then attempted to charge them, but their losses had been very heavy, their horses were quite done up, and they found it impossible to make any impression. They were received with a heavy fire and showers of stones at close quarters. Captain von Uslar was killed and Lieutenant Fumetty wounded, besides several men and horses.

No further attempts being likely to succeed, the enemy were permitted to resume their retreat.

It was a brilliant affair, but the loss of the Germans was heavy—4 officers, 48 N.C.O.s and men, and 67 horses killed; 2 officers, 56 N.C.O.s and men, and 46 horses wounded; and 6 men and 4 horses taken. Fourteen hundred prisoners, all of whom were wounded, were captured, but the number of French killed was only comparatively small. The Chevalier Mollard, who commanded one square, was among the prisoners. Lord Wellington bestowed great commendation on the Dragoons for this gallant exploit. He ordered a guard of honour to be furnished him from the brigade to attend his person. Two days' rest on the field was given to the men, and very shortly afterwards the officers of the King's German Legion were granted

permanent rank in the British Army, the date being August 10, 1812. The uniforms of the five Cavalry regiments are given in Beamish, by means of illustrations, as follows :

1st Dragoons, 1803.—Coat, red; collar (high Prussian), blue, with two strips of gold lace with buttons; cuffs, blue, turn-back blue; wings, red, edged gold; lace on single-breasted coat, gold, with central buttons; breeches, white with small white thigh-strappings in front; boots, black, spurs steel; hat, cocked, with gold-lace strap; black cockade and white plume with red hackle at base; sword, straight, with steel scabbard and hilt of a somewhat more solid character than the usual type of the period; shoulder-belt and sword-belt, white leather, with buckle, bar, and tip in brass; no badge; sword-knot, black.

1st Dragoons, 1812.—Jacket, blue; deep Prussian collar and cuffs, plain red; plastron, red, with gilt buttons on each edge in threes; epaulettes, gold; shoulder-belt, red, with two gold stripes; sash, red, with three equal gold stripes (edge and centre); sword-belt, red, and apparently mounted gold; sword-knot, red and gold; overalls, drab or grey, with broad gold stripe; sword, curved, of 'Peninsula' type, steel hilt and scabbard; sabretache, black; shako, wide at crown, with sunk top, broad gold lace at crown; lines crossing shako back and front from crown to nearly the chin scale-strap, all being gilt; line on right side attached from crown of shako to right breast, close to epaulette, and finished by two tassels; red and gold wheel-shaped ornament in front of shako; red and gold cockade on gold lace; and a white plume with red hackle.

2nd Dragoons, 1812.—As the 1st Dragoons of same date, except that the epaulettes are silver; the overalls apparently have no gold stripe and the sword-belt is of black leather; the sword-knot is gold; the badge in front of the shako and scale chin-strap are both silver; as is the support for the plume; but the hat-lines are gold. This mixture of gold and silver is most uncommon; the buttons on the plastron are put on evenly.

1st Hussars.—A very handsome uniform. Jacket, dark blue, heavily laced in gold; overalls, dark blue with broad gold stripe; Prussian collar and cuffs, red with gold lace and ornamental gold lace on sleeves above the cuff; pelisse, dark blue, with brown (or black) fur trimming to collar, cuff, and on edge, heavily laced in gold; sash, red silk,

with four parallel gold bars interwoven at intervals; red silk cord with gold at intervals from the centre of belt in front, where it is terminated by two heavy gold and red tassels, and passes round the right thigh low down to the back; a gold cord attaches the pelisse to the left shoulder and passes round the right shoulder; sword curved and scabbard steel (Peninsula type); sword-belt, black leather, and sabretache also; plain white shoulder-belt over the left shoulder; tall busby, very wide at crown, with red bag; in front, a white and red plume. From beneath the bag two gold lines cross the busby diagonally back and front, and hanging down on the right shoulder are attached to the right breast, terminating in two gold tassels; black sword-belt, slings, and sabretache; red and gold sword-knot.



3RD HUSSARS.


2nd Hussars.—As the 1st Hussars, with these differences: the collar and cuffs are white, the fur on the pelisse is white; the pelisse is unlike that of the 1st Hussars, being lined with red; the belt is blue and gold; the sword-belt plain black leather; the overalls drab or dark grey and with a gold stripe; the shoulder-belt red with a broad gold centre. Instead of a busby a tall peaked shako crossed with a single gold cord from beneath the socket of the red and white plume, which passes down the left side and up to the top centre of the right, then down to the right shoulder, where it is fastened and terminates in two tassels. But the most remarkable feature of this shako is that it is furnished with a red busby-bag, which hangs down, not on one side, but behind.

3rd Hussars.—In main features as the 2nd, but the collar and cuffs are yellow trimmed with silver; the braiding of the jacket and pelisse is also silver, and the fur of the latter dark brown; the lining of the pelisse red; the sash and tassels are as in the 1st Hussars, the shako as the 2nd; the shoulder-belt is yellow, with a broad silver band; the sash cord is red, with gold tassels in the front. Beneath the collar of each uniform and showing above it and in front the usual deep stiff black stock appears. Again we find the uncommon mixture of gold and silver lace.



THE KING'S GERMAN LEGION.

1815.



NEW ZEALAND.
(Camp of the Mounted Rifles, Matare Sutton—Otago.)

THE NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED RIFLES

By LIEUT.-COLONEL A. BAUCHOP, C.M.G.

For the first time in New Zealand, Mounted Rifle Brigade camps have just been held in the different military districts, which means that approximately 5000 men were trained at the four centres.

The training area was chosen on account of its proximity to the headquarters of the majority of the troops, but, added to this, the extent of ground available for manœuvre had to be considered. Both conditions were satisfactorily fulfilled.

New Zealand is not yet possessed of many railroads, and to arrive at these main lines the horseman starting off for his training had often to ride 30 to 40 miles before he was able to truck his mount for the training ground.

The ordinary cattle-trucks holding six to seven horses each were used. To meet the abnormal demand on this class of truck the railway department attached a portable frame to the ordinary low-sided truck, and although over 1000 horses were trucked (often with the most primitive ramps) the damage claims were very small.

There were instances where a man arrived alone at a flag station and had to ride a considerable distance further to get help from other Territorials who were also trucking their horses.

The mounted soldier in New Zealand has not been in the habit of asking advice on such matters as to the locality of trucking his horse, and the feeling that he was owner, and solely responsible for it, often prompted great independence of action.

There were regimental arrangements made and advice sent to outlying troops as to the trucking stations, but citizen soldiers often think that their own arrangements are better than any staff fixtures.

This of course will disappear when they find that their Regimental Staff is fully alive to all the conditions which obtain in their part of the country.

To gather up these 1000 horses no fewer than 70 railway stations were used as entraining stations, while three ordinary and four special trains were used.

At the detraining station there was one railway loop 350 yards long, while a temporary ramp accommodated six trucks. There were six horses in a truck, and the best trucking record was sixty horses in six minutes by flare light and in very bad weather.

The Mounted Rifleman of New Zealand provides his own horse, bridle and saddle.

This in no way interferes with the members who voluntarily indicate that they wish to fulfil their military obligations to the Dominion in the mounted branch.

The horses are in nine out of ten cases owned by the soldier, but in some districts it has become the vogue to lend horses by way of showing goodwill either to the rider or the military scheme. The fact that the horses are inspected by a veterinary officer, in addition to having good hard feed for the training, and are more amenable to handling after the companionship of the other squadron horses, causes no reluctance in offering horses on these conditions.

The horses are fed three times a day, while a ration of hay was given late at night on the horse lines. As many of the horses are grass-fed before coming to the camp the change to hard feed without the chance of grazing is too sudden, and for a few days these horses are poor feeders and hunger alone forces them to feed along with their neighbours. By the end of the camp, however, they seem to have completely made up for their earlier deficiency.

The New Zealand horse seems less inclined to make a leisurely meal off hay than his brother in England.

The farriers in camp were of course farriers in civil life, but as many of them are not yet qualified as tradesmen, a sergeant farrier of more experience could always be found to supervise the work; no extra pay was given. Portable forges were used.

By a brigade order a man was fined who brought an unshod horse into the camp; but this order did not meet the owner, who often wanted shoes removed at the hands of his brigade farriers. To meet this a small charge was assessed by the brigade-major for removals, which seemed to give satisfaction to both sides. One regiment brought in a wagon-load of slippers, which were got at a smithy

for the price of old iron, and these, put on with considerable care, were in most cases able to see the horses right through the camp.

Schist rocks were very prevalent all over the manœuvre ground, and made the proper shoeing of horses a necessity.

The New Zealand Mounted Rifleman, although a good rider, cannot be considered a good horsemaster, and the opinion expressed by the General Officer Commanding in his report to Parliament on the want of horsemastership will draw general attention to a fact which is hardly realised by the average civilian.

The fact that a man is a good rider seems to have been held in more esteem than the man who would excel in knowledge and care of his mount. Private ownership of horses tends to some extent to the disregard of the small things which go to make stable discipline valuable both to the usefulness and the well-being of the animal.

Outlying squadrons from different parts chose to march to and from the camp accompanied by a wagon carrying their kits. They bivouacked *en route*.

One squadron of this party did 50 miles in two days with one bivouac; another squadron did 40 miles in two days with one bivouac; while a troop did 40 miles over a cross-country track in eight hours. This latter party found it impossible to return by this track, on account of the fog and rain, and took a longer path on a better road.

The work done at the annual camp was supposed to be the culmination of the training throughout the year. As many of the squadrons found it impossible, however, to make their drills through the year continuous and progressive, the scope of the field-work was accordingly affected.

Protection at rest and on the move was gone into carefully and thoroughly. A day was set aside for siteing and digging trenches, but the chief work was the Mounted Rifles Regiment and Mounted Rifles Brigade in attack.

Artillery was represented, but no Infantry was present.

The ground, as depicted in our illustration, Matarae Sutton, Otago, favoured bold mounted movement to the first fire position. Covering fire was then used to allow of a forward movement. This forward movement was often made mounted to a tactical position, to assist, in turn, the covering party. The fact that risk had usually to be taken at some stage in this forward movement was impressed on all ranks.

The configuration of the country made a series of short, sharp, mounted dashes over the exposed parts a necessity, and as cover in the rocks gave chances of re-forming before the next dash was made, the attack was composed almost entirely of alternate rushes under covering fire both from rifle and artillery, which obviated dismounting and carrying out long advances on foot.

As a concluding exercise a Mounted Rifles Brigade attack on a definite position was carried through, which was watched and subsequently criticised on the ground by the General Officer Commanding.

In this brigade attack the regiments deployed about three or four miles from the objective and the squadrons carrying out the decisive attack made a detour and covered about five or six miles.

The ground favoured the development of three important phases in the training of mounted troops:—

1. The quick establishment of a firing line, its first use being to distract the defender, its subsequent use being in providing covering fire.

2. The quick decision in regard to the moment for the forward mounted rush, and the choice of new fire position.

3. To retain the factor of surprise by careful leadership from point to point.

This latter phase was well exemplified in the brigade attack, when a regiment was moved across the front to carry out a decisive attack on a flank and was not observed by the defenders until within 800 yards.

The ground favoured the easy disposal of the led horses in the attack, and the consequent training in this regard was lost, and although this was a drawback it was more than compensated for by the other features which have been mentioned.

The Otago Hunt Club placed its pack and servants at the disposal of the Brigadier for an afternoon's sport.

Two drag lines were laid and 250 riders followed. The lines, which were about three miles, were run and then re-run to the original throw-off.

There were three bare-wire jumps in the line, the majority of the other jumps being gorse hedges. There were very few mishaps. One of the officers acted as Master, and the jumps were often taken six and eight abreast.

PROBLEM NO. XIII.—RESULT.

In all, thirty-five solutions were submitted in answer to this problem; but this does not nearly represent the number of Indian officers who competed, as only one solution per regiment was admissible. The Committee of the CAVALRY JOURNAL desire to thank the Indian Sub-Editor, who kindly set the problem, also those officers who kindly assisted him in adjudicating on the solutions, and particularly to Ressler Suraj Singh, Indian Staff Officer, Saugor Cavalry School. A pair of prismatic field-glasses has been forwarded to Wordi-Major Amar Singh, 18th King George's Own Lancers, who has been awarded the prize.

FAUJI SAWAL No. 13.

Ka Faisla.

Jo Hindustani Sardaron ke waste tha.

35 sardaron se jawab sidhe Indian Editor Sahib ke pas pahunche. Is ke ilawa bahut aur sardar shamil hue aur Rajmaton men se ek ek sab se achchha jawab chhantkar bheja gaya tha.

Indian Editor Sahib ko malum howa ki baz baz Rajmaton men 10 ya 12 sardar shamil hue.

Is shart ka inam—JEMADAR AMAR SINGH, Wordi-Major, 18th K.G.O. Lancers, ko mila—Chand dinon men Indian Editor Sahib unko ek *Do ankhi ki Durbin* jo inam men thi bhejdenge.

Munsif sahib ke khial men Jemadar Amar Singh ka Q. IVa ka jawab achchha nahin tha lekin baki sawalon men achchhe point hasil karnese unka pehla number hua.

Unko point aise diye gai :—

Q. I.	10	pointon	men	se	9
Q. II.	10	"	"	"	9
Q. III.	10	"	"	"	8
Q. IVa.	10	"	"	"	6
Q. IVb.	10	"	"	"	8
<hr/>					<hr/>
Kul	50	"	"	"	40

Is ke ilawa chand aur sardaron ke jawab durusti men Inami jawab ke karib karib the aur unmen se—Jemadar Harnan Singh, 4th Cavalry, aur Jemadar Rawat Singh, Wordi-Major, 34th Poona Horse, ke jawab achchhe the.

Aise 3 aur Sahiban ne jo sarhad ki halton se khub wakif hain Munsif Sahib ko faisle men madad di jinhon ne faisla karte wakat niche likkhi baton ko dil men rakha.

Q. I.—Is sawal men raste ka chunna convoy commander ki rai par mauquf hai yane agar woh sochta hai ke 'daku log' aisi zamin par Risale ke pas nahin awenge, jahan Risala kirach ya ballam se kam lesak-ta hai; to uska maidan men chalna munasib hai.

Ya agar woh sarhad ki mamuli chal yani donon taraf ki unchayon ko picquet karta hai to parhari ke nazdik se guzar sakta hai.

Lekan is tajwiz men siraf un sardaraon ko sab se achchhe point diye gai jinhon ne sab raston ka nafa nuksan khub ghaur se soch kar saf saf likha tha aur phir in sababon ko dil men rakhkar raste ka faisla kia.

Munsif Sahib yeh saf batlana chahte hain ke inam, aisa shakhs bhi jit sakta jo kisi dusre raste se jata agar uska baki kam thik hota. Lekan yeh yad rahe ki baghair Q. No. I. ke dusre hisse ke jawab dene ke siraf yeh likhdena ki ham falane raste se jaenge, khabhi ziyadah point nahin dilasakta aur na siraf ek hi sawal ka durust jawab kafi hota agar baki sawal thik nahote.

Aise shakhson ko bhi jinhon ne Q. No. III. ko parhkar baghair baki sawalon par ghaur karne ke convoy ko dakuon se bachane ke liye us jagah se jahan unki khabar mili, dur chalaya bahut point nahin diye gai—Kionke yeh khial hona chahiye ke daku, convoy ki rawangi ke bad kisi jagah hamla karsakte the isliye uski hifazat hartaraf se karke chalna chahiye.

Sawal No. IV. ke dusre hisse men siraf ek sardar ne yad rakha ki 15 ya 18 drabi bhi uske sath the, aur unka khial karna bhi zarur tha.

Bahut thore sardaron ne gaiti pharwa apne sath liya ya kar—toos barbad karne ki liye guncotton istemal kia.

Sab ko shart ke kaidan ka No. 5 fikra yad dilaya jata hai—yane aindah jawab sardar ka apne hath se roman urdu men likha hoaa chahiye—Is dafah type men chapkar bheje hue jawab kabul karliye gai the.

Lekin jis halat men do jawab barabar the uswakt likhe hue ko type kie hue se point ziyadah dia.

A. INAMI JAWAB.

YEH MAZMUN LAFAZ BA LAFAZ ASLI JAWAB KI NAKAL HAI.

SAWAL I. KIS RASTE PAR JAOGA, AUR KIYUN?.

JAWAB I.

'B' Rasta par.

Kiyunki rasta 'A' se jane men manderja zail nuqs hain. (1) Qrib 9 miles tak do paharon ke bich se bataur dará (pass) ke guzarta hai jis se (a) hamla hone ki halt men rasta tabdil nahin kar sakte. Jis ke sabab se dushman ne jo tajwiz soch li ho to us men farq dalna mushkal hai. (b) Rasta tang hone ki wajah se kanwai (convoy) ko chalta hua rakh kar dushman se lar nahin sakte aur nahi ek taraf dur alag ho kar larai ki ja sakte hai. Pas hamla hone ki halt men yo to kanwai (convoy) ho halt (halt) karna parega ya ritair (retire). Jab ki yeh donon baten nahin honi chahien.

(2) (a) Rasta men do gaon *Dodai* aur *Uba* hone ke sabab se guzarne men ziada waqt kharch hoga. (b) Gaon ke bashindon ko kanwai (convoy) ke guzarne ka hal malum hoga. Jab ki aisa hona hamare achha nahin. (c) Gaon ke guzarte wakat hifazat karne men diqat hai.

SARHAD KA FARZI NAKSHA

To Morani 13 miles

MAGNETIC

KIRI NULLAH 50°

THANA
Sarkari Post
30 Sower
70 Jawan Paitan

Khula pathrila
Maiden

3-6"

Poyab

100 ft. deep

Sutlej

OW

D

300'

UBA

Rahin

Rahin

Jhar

Gehra hellah
Rasta bahut
tang-kinaré
khare

Pathrili zamin

TORBERI

Pathrili zamin

Khali Khet

M

L

Namza kot

400'

B

A

K

WO

Saf zamin kheti

Xheti

400'

300'

200'

100'

200'

100'

Sarkari Post TANKEE 3 miles

Poharon ki Unchai Am salah
mulak ke lihaz se likhi gai-(Relative Heights)

Paimāni

0 1 2 3 Miles

H 2

Rasta 'B' se jane men faide

yeh hain. (a) Hamla hone ki halt men rasta tabdil kar ke aur kanwai (convoy) ko chalta hua rakh kar lar sakte hain. (b) Rasta ke donon taraf paharon ke silsila dur hone ki wajah se ziada hifazit hai aur koi, dushman achanak fair (fire) ya hamla nahin kar sakta. (c) Nalah (nullah) 2 se faida utha sakte hain.

Rasta 'E' men do nuqas

yeh hain. (a) Admion aur janwron ko pani nahin milta. (b) Nalah (nullah) 2 se guzarne men waqat ziada kharch hoga.

Yeh nuqas is tareh rafa kie jaenge. (a) Pahili pani kuan 'K' par aur fir *Kiri Nillah* par *Thana* post se shamal ki taraf qarib 2 miles par pilaya jawega. (b) khodne ke hathyaron se nalah (nullah) 2 ke kinare jaldi guzarne ke laiq bana lie jaenge.

SAWAL II. CHALNE KI TIARIANKIA KAROG?

JAWAB II.

(1) Khodne ke hathyar (axes 6, pick shovels 20) Squadron Commander Sahib se lena taki nalah (nullah) 2 ke kinare thik kar saken aur jahan se irada ho usi jagah se nalah (nullah) se par ho jaen.

(2) Fiuz (fuze) jala kar dekhna aur malum karna ki kafi fiuz hai.

(3) Iskart (escort) ke ghoron ki nalbandi ka mulahiza.

(4) Kamblon wale 5 khachron ka bojh baqi 45 khachron par taqsim karna taki yeh 5 khali khachar kanwai (convoy) ke riar (rear) men chalaen jaen aur zarurat ke waqat in par bojh lada ja sake. Jaisa ki kisi khachar ke langra zakhmi ya mare jane ki halt men.

(5) Jawaron aur janwaron ke waste duphir ki khurah ka bandobast.

(6) Ek ahudedar aur tin jawan bmae 4 bahishti aur 2 kirmaz (convoy) ke march (march) se ek ghanta pahile rawana karna take kanwai (convoy) ke wahan pahunchne se peshtar pani ka intzam ho jae.

(7) Baqi saman ke ilawa dia-silai aur chaqu bhi shath lena.

(8) Daraiwaron (drivers) ko khamosh rahine ki takid karni.

SAWAL III. ESCORT AUR CONVOY KI TARTIB?

JAWAB III.

Kanwai (convoy) ki tartib.

(1) Jahan tak ho sake 2 khachar barabar barabar chalaen jaenge is tareh kalam (column) ki lambai qarib 80 yards hogi.

(2) Aimuneshan (ammunition) wale khachar age aur unke piche uarane ke saman (explosives) wale aur sabh se piche 5 khali khachar honge jin ka zikar dusre jawab ke para 4 men kia gia hai.

(3) Kuan 'K' tak sark par aur fir sark ke dahine par yani shamal ki taraf sark se 600 alg chalenge. Sawal us ek mile ke jahan 'M' ka nishan hai jahan ki sark par chalenge (is se age dekho page 3).

Escort ki tartib.

Kuan 'K' tak (1) ek ahudedar aur tin jawan kuan 'K' ko jaisa ki dusre jawab ke para 6 men likha gia.

(2) ek ahudedar aur tin jawan kanwai (convoy) ke sath, taki wuh kanwai (convoy) ko chalte rahen aur thik tartib men rakhen aur distains (distance)

ziada no hone den khas kar agar kahin pani a jac to baghair ijazat janwaron ko pani na pilane den aur nahin draiwron (drivers) ko.

- (3) 2 jawan convoy ke riar (rear) men 500 par.
- (4) ek ek jawan convoy ke dahine aur baen par panch panch sau gaz dur.
- (5) baqi taman escort convoy ke farant (front) men $\frac{1}{2}$ mile sark par.
- (6) ek jawan escort ke farant (front) men.

SAWAL III. ESCORT AUR CONVOY KI TARTIB?

Kuan 'K' se age.

(1) 2 sowar rasta 'A' se *Thana* post ko usi waqat mai ek chithi ke rawana ho jaenge jab ke convoy kuan 'K' par pahunchegi aur chithi post commander ko denge chithi ka mazmun yeh hoga :—

'Convoy qrib 12 baje duphir se pahile *Thana* post men pahunch jaegi is lie ap 10 baje se bad ek troop ko tiar rakhen taki wuh zarurat ke waqat madad de sake aur do jawan pahar ke shamali raste se nalah (nullah) 2 ke payab ko fauran bhejden wuh wahan hamare jawanon se mil jawen.'

(2) Convoy ke kuan 'K' par pahunch te hi ek ahudedar ek sowar nala (nullah) 2 ke payab ko jaenge aur convoy ke nalah par pahunchne se peshtar nalah ki dek bhal karenge.

(3) 2 jawan convoy ke dahine falank (flank) par aur jangal 'L' tak jawenge aur convoy ke barabar pahunch jane par *Torderi* gaon ke janub se hote hue jangal 'N' ko jaenge aur nalah (nullah) 2 ki dekh bhal karke jangal 'N' men tab tak thairan jab tak ki convoy nalah (nullah) se par na hojae.

- (4) Escort convoy ke laifat farant (left front) men.
- (5) Bain taraf koi jawan nahin hoga.
- (6) mandrja bala ke ilawa baki, wuhi, tartib, hogi, jo kuan 'K' tak thi.

SAWAL IV (A). RAWANA HONE SE 3 GHANTA BAD Khabar MILTI HAI KI DUSHMAN DODRI GAON SE WEST KI TARAF HAI KIA KAROG?

JAWAB IV (A).

Dushman ki Khabar milne par.

Mandrja zail tabdilian aur bandobast kie jaenge.

(1) Convoy rasta 'B' se hote hui jangal 'L' ko aur fir *Torderi* ke raste se hoti hui jangal 'N' ke pas se nalah (nullah) 2 ko abur karke *Kiri Nullah* ke baen kinare ke sath sath *Thana* post ko jaegi.

(2) Dahine falaink (flank) wale jawan jinnka zikar tisre jawab ke para 3 men kia gia hai convoy ke dahine par chalte rahenge aur qarib 800 yards dur rahenge aur jab convoy *Kiri Nullah* ka baen kinare par chalegi to yeh *Nullah* ke dahine kinare par chalenge yani convoy se qarib 800 yards dur.

(3) Escort shamal wale pahar ke sath sath janub men convoy laifat farant (left front) men chalega.

(4) ek jawan fauran *Thana* post ko bhejdia jaega aur woh *Thana* ke post commander se arz karega ki wuh apna troop nishan 'D' ki jagah par pozishan (position) lene ke waste bhej de we aur wuh troop tab tak wahan rahe jab tak ki convoy *Thana* post men na pahunch jae.

- (5) ek jawan convoy ke age 500 yards chalega.
- (6) Un jawanon men 2 jawan aur barha die jaenge jo convoy ke sath

muqarr hain (dekho jawab tisra para 2, page 3) taki draivaron (drivers) ko be tartib hone ya bhagne se roken agar un ka aisa irada malum ho.

(7) Nalah (*nullah*) 2 wale jawan (dekho jawab tisra para 2) nalah ke bich bich se akar jangal 'N' se janub ki taraf pahunch kar escort se mil jaenge.

Note.—Dushman ki khabar us waqt mili jab ki convoy ke march (march) ko shuru hue tin ghanta guzar gae the is lie convoy tab qarib $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles fasla tai kar chuki thi yani ek mile chalne par 5 minat (minutes) ka shuru men halt (halt) kia aur fir $\frac{1}{2}$ ghanta kuan 'K' par pani pilane men kharch hua pas convoy $2\frac{1}{2}$ ghante ke qarib chalti rahi chunki convoy ki raftar ek ghanta men 3 mile thi is lie $7\frac{1}{2}$ mile safar hua.

**SAWAL IVB. AGAR DUSHMAN KA HAMLAA SAKHAT HAI AUR BARBARDARI
PAKRE JANE KA DAR HAI TO KIA KAROG?**

JAWAB IV (B).

Lachari ki halt men aimuneshan (ammunition) ko is tareh zaia kia jaega ki toman baks (box) jaman kar ke kisi ar ki jagah men ek dusre ke bilkul sath mila kar rakh denge aur yeh sabh kam is treh kia jaega ki dushman ki nigah se bilkul chupa hua ho.

Tab ek ahudedar aur 2 sowar 2 charj (charge) bana kar aur 16 feet ka har ek fiuz lagakar ikthe ag denge aur yeh tasli ki fiyuz ko ag lag gai hai fauran sawar hokar tez gailip (gallop) se alag nikal jaenge.

Note I.—Fiuz sefty (safety fuze) istemal kia jaega.

Note II.—Ag lagane ke waste 3 admi is sabab se muqarrar kie hain ki 2 ag lagaenge aur ek ghore pakrega.

(2) Khachron ko agar ho sakega to sath lejaenge warna nihayat hi lachari ki halt men mar die jaenge.

(3) Escort tab tak dushman ko dhil dale rakhega jab tak ke charj (charge) ur na jae.

(Sd.) AMAR SINGH, *Wordi-Major*
18th Lancers, Meerut.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Kavalleristische Monatshefte.—September.—Lieut.-Colonel Kerchnawe opens this number with an account of the tactical employment of Cavalry a hundred years ago, and affords an interesting comparison of the methods of the French Cavalry and of that of the other nations by which it was opposed—the mounted troops of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. He closes with an expression of surprise that the French Cavalry—numerically inferior, often improvised, made up of recruits made soldiers against their wish, badly mounted, and led by commanders who, though trained by a master in war, were still no better, if as good, as those on the opposing side—should have almost invariably triumphed over a Cavalry which was well led, better trained, and filled with martial enthusiasm, besides being better mounted. It is possible, however, that Colonel Kerchnawe makes too much of the unwillingness of the recruits, based on one's natural idea of the evils of conscription, and does not attach sufficient importance to the extraordinary devotion inspired in them for and by their great leader once they were numbered among his soldiers. It surely is incorrect to say that the *spirit* was better or more martial among the allies than among the soldiers who followed Napoleon; the inspiration was there on either side, if not derived from the same sources. Lieut.-Colonel von Müller-Kranefeldt follows with an account of the action of Liebertwolkwitz fought on October 14, 1813; the interest of the story lies in Murat's employment of his Cavalry, and a diagram is given of his last great attack with four divisions of Cavalry. It was not one of his best days, and from this and some other of his less happy efforts his detractors—Bernhardi among them—have drawn the conclusion that he was wholly unfitted for the command of really large Cavalry bodies; but even at Liebertwolkwitz his methods were preferable to those of Pahlen, his antagonist, who used his mounted troops in *petits paquets*. In a paper entitled 'Reitergedanken' an anonymous correspondent has put together a number of suggestions in regard to reconnaissance, how it can best be carried out, and the different arms to be employed. This is followed by some reminiscences of the 1866 campaign, mainly after Königgrätz. Lieutenant Schreiber describes, as he has done once before in an earlier number, how Cavalry can be employed to the best advantage in the mountainous, waterless region of Karst. 'How to engage the Lava' is the title of a very brief paper, and the writer suggests that this Russian Cavalry attack formation is best met by machine-gun fire, by an opposing formation of a similar kind, and by sending formed bodies against the Lava supports. Among the smaller contributions is one on 'The Increase of the German Army Cavalry,' by General von Gersdorff; another commenting on a recent opinion by a French writer on the measures for meeting Cavalry by frontier troops; and yet a third, by a Russian general, on the training of Cavalry.

October.—Lieut.-Colonel von Kerchnawe contributes a long and very readable article to this number on the action of the Cavalry in the decisive actions of the late summer and autumn of 1813—Dresden, Kulm, Weissenfels, Liebertwolkwitz, Leipzig, and Hanau. Then follows a very brief account of the general effect of the re-organisation of the German Horse Artillery; it is

stated that while hitherto the Horse Artillery were organised in seventeen *Abtheilungs*, each of two or three batteries, these have now been reduced in number to eleven, each of three batteries, each battery containing four guns. The reduction of *Abtheilungs* is regretted, but it is claimed that, tactically, the 4-gun battery is far superior for acting with Cavalry than was a battery of six guns. For these 4-gun batteries the peace and war establishment in men and horses is approximately the same, thus providing better training for the troops and better practice in command for the leaders.

November.—The first paper in the November number is a curiously restrained account of the work of the Army Cavalry in the *Kaisermanöver* of last year; its various missions are stated and their conduct described without very much detail and but little criticism, the writer contenting himself by stating in summing up, that while opinions may differ as to the manner of its employment in individual cases, nobody who witnessed the operations can fail to be impressed with the conviction that Cavalry can intervene with effect in the battle, and that such intervention will not be without important influence upon the result of the action. Lieut.-Colonel von Lauendorf entitles his paper which follows the above 'The Battle Value of Cavalry in Action against Infantry and Artillery,' but it is not altogether easy to follow his argument, and the greater part of his paper seems to become something of a plea for a further increase in the strength of the Cavalry. In 'Heeres Kavallerie und Funkenstationen' the writer utters a warning against placing undue reliance on the new and numerous technical methods of transmitting and receiving information in the field, but which have, however, only so far been tested during peace operations. He seems to suggest that these technical methods all require skilled and experienced operators, that none of them can as yet be considered absolutely reliable for service use; and while he disclaims any suggestion of relying solely on the old-time mounted orderly or despatch-rider, he vaguely warns his comrades against reliance upon new-fangled *Nachrichtenübermittlungswege*—(the word itself is not without terrors of its own)—which may play them false and dependence upon which may land them in misfortune or disaster. In 'The Lava a Hundred Years Ago' Rittmeister von Troschke describes the action at Lüneburg on April 2, 1813, when the Lava attack was employed successfully, not against a mounted opponent, but against Infantry and Artillery. An Italian Colonel of Cavalry gives an interesting account of the Cavalry manœuvres held in Lombardy during September 1913, and closes with a few words of criticism. He meets the complaint which has been put forward of undue interference by the Direction of the manœuvres with the statement that such interference was unavoidable if new situations were to be presented in which Cavalry were to be tested—in dismounted action and in the more legitimate mounted combat. The Cavalry commanders in these operations seem, says the writer, to have forgotten that their troops have other work besides reconnaissance, that there are for them many opportunities of intervention and employment on the battlefield, and that men and horses should not be so used up in the one part of their duty as to limit their usefulness in the other. Cavalry, unlike Infantry, cannot be reinforced by untrained reservists, and the quality of the remounts also deteriorates during a war. Cyclists have been attached to the Cavalry divisions for the increase of their fire power, but these were often left behind, and not employed as were the Horse Artillery and machine guns. The aircraft employed in Lombardy are stated to have been of great value in the strategic reconnaissance.

Militär-Wochenblatt.—In No. 140, dated October 16, there is a summary of an article which recently appeared in a Russian military journal discussing the difficulty experienced of late by Cavalry and Artillery officers in providing themselves with chargers. Every mounted officer, or, to be more correct, every officer of the mounted branches, must be in possession of a first and second charger, the one being apparently supplied to him by Government, while the other he has to provide himself. The matter of the provision of the latter has lately presented such difficulties that officers entering the military academy with a view to joining the Cavalry have now been required to put down 600 rubles (it was at one time only 350) for the purchase of the second charger. The price of horse-flesh has risen enormously since the outbreak of the Balkan War, when all the States engaged were giving *any* prices for horses of a military type; and an agitation has now been started in Russia urging that steps be taken to extend still further to officers the privilege of purchasing chargers from the remount at a certain fixed and reasonable price.

To No. 147 of October 28 Lieut.-Colonel Müller-Kranefeldt contributes a paper on the result of the recent large purchases of remounts in France required by the increase in the mounted services. The extra number of horses required is stated to have been as high as 22,000, of which some 11,000 had been purchased by the middle of July last at an average price of 1396 francs—slightly under £56 apiece; and of these about five sixths were between five and eight, the remainder between nine and twelve years. The quality of the remounts thus hurriedly purchased—beginning at the end of May and required to be completed by October 1 at latest—seems to have left a good deal to be desired, the commander of the Caen district describing the horses received by the regiments in his command as *une bonne réquisition plutôt qu'une bonne remonte*.

No. 155 of November 15 contains an account of the Cavalry manœuvres which were carried out in Holland during September last. This is, however, a bald recital of events and contains no comments whatever concerning the manner in which the operations were conducted. Holland is for the greater part but very ill adapted for the movements of Cavalry, and for this reason the Cavalry force maintained is a very small one—less than half the strength of the Belgian Cavalry—and consisting of no larger body than a brigade of twelve squadrons. It is, however, admitted that a Dutch Army might conceivably have to operate without the borders of the country, and representations have been made for the increase of the mounted force to a brigade of sixteen squadrons.

In No. 157-8 of November 19 we find a good account of the great Cavalry manœuvres held in 1913 in Southern Hungary. The intention of these large-scale operations is to accustom the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry to manœuvre in large bodies, and to give as many leaders as possible opportunities for the exercise of command. It is complained, however, that for these purposes, and especially for the last-named, the operations period is too short, owing to the procedure adopted of constantly changing the commanders, with the result that all ranks spend their whole time in *learning*, while no opportunity is afforded or affordable for the *practice* of what they may have learnt. The Cavalry regiments seem to have been numerically very weak; on paper the squadrons numbered 150 troopers, but when the usual deductions are made it is found that they were very appreciably below that strength; and it is probable that few squadrons left their garrisons over a hundred strong. The march casualties again reduced them by about 10 per cent.

Revue de Cavalerie.—August-September.—The first paper in this double number is a very detailed account of the battle of Hanau, fought on October 30, 1813—the one ray of success which brightened the close of Napoleon's Leipzig campaign. Reaching Hanau, with Schwarzenberg at his heels, the Emperor found the town in possession of an Austro-Bavarian force of 60,000 men under Wrede, who had come up from Würzburg *via* Aschaffenburg to cut off Napoleon's retreat westward. Horsetzky states that Wrede was 'driven off,' but from the account here given by Commandant Lefebvre de Béhaine it is clear that Wrede was ready, and, indeed, anxious, to renew the battle on the following morning; the French, however, had effected so skilful a retirement, though the bridge over the Maine was only partially destroyed, that touch had been lost, and the direction even of the French retreat was not known. This article is illustrated by a useful map. The *Loi des cadres de la cavalerie* has been so much and often adversely criticised that the management of the *Revue* is to be congratulated on publishing an article by General de S—, which strikes a more optimistic note; the main objection which this officer finds is that under the new scheme the needs of mobilisation oblige the retention, in the ranks of commander and captain, of a larger number of officers than are, strictly speaking, required to command these particular units in peace; and he expresses a fear lest, not having enough scope for their energies, the measure of their usefulness may be somewhat restricted. He suggests, however, that there is now a wider choice for squadron commanders. Commandant Lavigne-Delville also has something to say about Cavalry and the three years' service law; he writes exultingly of the advantages which the new law offers to his arm in permitting the French Cavalry to make up by improved 'quality' for the enormous 'numerical superiority' of the German Cavalry. General Armand Lucas, whose 'Causeries Cavalières' have now been running through several numbers of the *Revue de Cavalerie*, brings his studies to a close with the article on 'The Dismounted Fight,' commenced in a previous number. He ends on the same note as General de S—, that nothing but the very best is good enough for the mounted arm—*la cavalerie ne supporte pas la médiocrité*; and he seems to claim great advantages in the French organisation of permanent Cavalry divisions, laying much stress on the benefit accruing to all, commanders and subordinates, from always working together. Readers of German military journals will not need to be reminded that this very point has been repeatedly urged in favour of the creation of standing Cavalry divisions in Germany. Captain Lelong concludes in this number his very careful account of the work of Mischenko's Cavalry in the battle of Sandepu. It is to be desired in the interests of the Cavalry that this painstaking record may be republished in pamphlet form.

October.—A. Dry contributes to this number his impressions of Adrianople as seen in September after its re-occupation by the Turks. He describes the Ottoman forces; and while he has nothing but genuine admiration for their *morale*, and for the efforts which are being made by their new young leaders to instruct and equip their men, he does not seem to have any confidence in their power seriously to take the offensive, by reason of their defective transport arrangement and backward organisation. Turks and Bulgarians have for the present composed their quarrels under the stress of mutual hatreds, but once Bulgaria has regained her full powers she will tear up the Treaty of Bucharest and strive her utmost to regain the territories which she must have if she is to establish her seaboard on the *Ægean*. This,

the writer seems to imply, may and should afford Turkey her opportunity. There will for the present be no war in the Balkans, but come it must, and Turkey is preparing for it. M. Dry promises in future articles a discussion of what he calls *la griserie d'Athènes et la tristesse de Sofia*. In an article in the *Revue* by Colonel Cordonnier some three years ago—'Les coups de canon du Général de Rheinbaben'—an account was given of the circumstances (together with their justification) under which fire was opened and the battle of August 16, 1840, was commenced by Rheinbaben's Cavalry—the horse batteries with the 5th Cavalry Division. Colonel Cordonnier now furnishes something of the nature of a continuation of his former article—he calls it *un rassemblement bloqué*. He shows the part played by General Buddenbrock, who nearly spoilt the lead given him by the *coups de canon* of Rheinbaben, and who, arriving early on the 16th at Baraques, where he was admirably placed to open communications with the 5th Cavalry Division, learn what was passing, and discover for himself the presence of the French Army about Vionville, Rezonville, and Gravelotte—did nothing. This is followed by a brief record of the life of a French officer of the 4th Hussars and 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique, who, after seeing a good deal of African service, became a Trappist monk, and established himself among the Tuaregs in the hope of teaching them the blessings of Christianity. Captain Aubert continues his studies on the Cavalry combat, and deals in this number in very great detail on the circumstances under which Cavalry is to engage, whether mounted or dismounted; whether it is to risk 'using itself up' before the battle or reserve its full powers for intervention in the battle; whether it should act alone or in combination with the other arms; whether it should always attack in order to benefit morally by the exercise of the offensive, or permit itself to be attacked so as to reserve the advantage of ground. He then goes very deeply into the question of how the Cavalry attack should be carried out.

November.—This number opens with an account of the manœuvres of last year in France, directed by General Sordet, the Inspector of Cavalry. In his comments at the close of the operations the Director gave great praise to the Infantry for the manner in which it had prepared for and met Cavalry attack. He found fault, on the other hand, with the manner in which the three Cavalry divisions had acted against the Infantry. When Cavalry engages this arm it is of no use, he said, to employ purely Infantry methods—that way failure lies; Cavalry *must* act against the flanks, and if possible the rear, of Infantry if important results are to be obtained. Each of the three Cavalry divisions engaged attacked solely in front, and their opponents were consequently in no way disquieted or disturbed; whereas had the Infantrymen found themselves constantly obliged to deploy and make front to a flank or to the rear, they would have become fatigued and to some extent perhaps even disorganised, and might then have fallen a prey more easily to the charge of masses of Cavalry. '*Messieurs les cavaliers*,' concluded General Sordet, '*nous ne craignons de vous rien autre chose que la charge*.' Captain Aubert continues his studies of the Cavalry fight, and writes further on the organisation of the attack. This number contains a short paper intended to supplement all that has been written about General de Brack in the many memoirs, etc., dealing with his life and services—of which, moreover, what appears to be a very complete bibliography is appended. Then follows a report on the Spanish Cavalry drawn up in 1847 by General Concha; and the object of the publication of this document, for which Captain de Sainte Croix is responsible, is to show that the Spanish Cavalry authorities of that

period were very much ahead of their times and of the other Cavalries of Europe, which for the most part only began to arrive after 1870 at the point which their Spanish comrades had passed in 1847. The short article which follows is in effect a plea for the curtailment of the time at present devoted to the *manœuvres de cadres*, and the writer suggests that three days of solid work would be ample in place of the week at present given up to these exercises. One who calls himself Charles Canteranne has a short paper entitled 'Gare aux échelons !' in which he urges that the employment of echelon formations is apt to be rather overdone, and that it has its well-defined limits ; further, that operations worked out according to pre-arranged diagrams should be abandoned, and that Cavalry regiments should more frequently be practised in movements *contre un ennemi qui galope*—a doctrine continually preached by the late General of Cavalry de Bourgogne.

'The Mounted Police of Natal.' By H. P. Holt. Published by Messrs. Murray & Co. for 10s. 6d. net.

This is a very interesting book for all people who have had acquaintance with South Africa. It includes a Preface by, and a photograph of, Major-General Sir John Dartnell, K.C.B., the founder of the corps. It deals with all the South African wars and risings from the time of Chaka to the present date, and also gives an account of the ordinary police work of the Natal Police. It is written in a most interesting manner, and is very well illustrated.

'Songs of Sports and Pastimes.' By Captain Cyril Stacey, late 14th Hussars, published by Vinton & Co., 7 Bream's Buildings, Chancery Lane, E.C. Price 2s. 6d.

Is an extremely clever and witty book of songs. It is admirably illustrated by Mr. Finch Mason, in his well-known racy style, in which he has caught the spirit of the author. This is a book that will appeal strongly to sportsmen of all classes, and especially to cavalry soldiers.

Lord Roberts' Campaign Speeches are published by J. Murray & Co., Albemarle Street, for the modest sum of sixpence. These contain the four speeches delivered by the Field-Marshal at Bristol, Wolverhampton, Leeds, and Glasgow.

'Les Archives Militaires.'—*Revue trimestrielle des progrès réalisés et des modifications survenues dans l'organisation, l'armement, l'instruction et la tactique de toutes les armées, et des événements de guerre contemporains.* Seconde année, 1913. Berger-Levrault, éditeurs, 5-7 rue des Beaux-Arts, Paris.—Prix de l'abonnement annuel : 12 fr., étranger, 14 fr.

Titre des principaux articles du No. 7 (No. 3 de 1913). Organisation de l'aéronautique militaire en Allemagne, en Espagne, et en Roumanie. Fusil d'instruction avec acide carbonique comme agent propulseur. La seconde guerre des Balkans. Opérations au Maroc. Emploi, au siège d'Andrinople, de boucliers portatifs (Bulgarie). Contrôleurs automatiques d'angle de tir. L'arbitrage aux manœuvres. Les nouvelles lois militaires (France, Allemagne, Belgique, Honduras, Mexique, Paraguay, et Roumanie). La Mutualité militaire. Le Télégraphe Means à signaux de fumée pour éclaireurs aériens.

NOTES

EDITORIAL.

It is proposed during the next two years to publish in **THE CAVALRY JOURNAL** a series of articles on the Training of Specialists.

This series commences with an article on 'Ground Scouts' in the present number. The other subjects on which officers are invited to write and send in their MSS. to the Editor are :—

Regimental Scouts.
Despatch Riders.
Rough Riders.
Machine Gunners.

Drivers.
Farriers.
Pioneers.
Signallers.

REGIMENTAL HISTORIES.

The attention of the Council of the Royal United Service Institution having been drawn to the considerable number of regiments and corps who are now compiling, or about to compile, their Regimental History and Records, the Council desire to intimate that the Secretary and Staff of the Institution are prepared to render every assistance and advice in the matter, especially on the following points :

- (1) Suggestions as to an Author.
- (2) Selection of Printers and Publishers.
- (3) The style and size of the Book, Type, and Binding.
- (4) The method of Illustrating, Colour and otherwise, Artists, Photographers, &c.
- (5) Preparation of List of Officers.
- (6) Where and how research information may be obtained.

APPOINTMENTS AND COMMANDS.

Lieut.-General Robert C. R. Clifford, C.B., Indian Army, has been gazetted Colonel of the 22nd Sam Browne's Cavalry (Frontier Force).

Major-General Sir John P. Brabazon, K.C.B., C.V.O., has been gazetted Colonel of the 18th (Q.M.O.) Hussars, vice the late Major-General T. Phillips.

THE 'CAVALRY JOURNAL' COMMITTEE.

The meeting of the Committee was held at the Royal United Service Institution on Tuesday, November 25, 1913, at 3.30 P.M. Present:—Major-General E. H. H. Allenby, C.B., Inspector of Cavalry (in the Chair); Colonel J. Vaughan, D.S.O., Colonel W. C. Trotter, Lieut.-Colonel Noel Birch, and Lieut.-Colonel A. Leetham, the Managing Editor. Letters of regret were read from Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. French, G.C.B., &c., Lieut.-General Sir R. S. S. Baden-Powell, K.C.B., &c., and Lieut.-Colonel J. Watkins Yardley, for their non-attendance.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and signed.

The Managing Editor reported that he had received the sum of £100 from Army funds for the repayment to the guarantors on the initiation of the JOURNAL, which had been duly done.

Colonel Leetham submitted the report on the JOURNAL for the past year, and brought to the notice of the Committee the bound volume for 1913, who expressed their opinion that it was an excellent volume and an improvement on any of those previously issued. He further drew attention to the excellent work done by Mr. K. R. Wilson, of Messrs. Spottiswoode & Co., Ltd., in the matter, who took more than a personal interest in the JOURNAL. Colonel Leetham also expressed his thanks to Colonel Vaughan, Colonel Trotter, and to Colonel Birch for the very excellent work which they had done, and drew attention to the services of Captain Grimshaw, the Indian sub-editor, who had helped materially in supplying articles for the JOURNAL.

It was also reported that there had been a considerable increase in the number of subscribers, no less than two hundred and eight new officers having joined during the past year, which was considered a very satisfactory feature. It was again a subject of remark that while in most regiments every officer was a subscriber, yet in a few there was a comparatively small number.

The stock of the JOURNALS and bound volumes was noted, as also the amount of £133 still outstanding for advertisements which have appeared during the past year.

The accounts for the year were submitted and passed by the Committee as being most satisfactory.

The following officers have kindly undertaken to act as sub-editors, viz.: For the R.H. and R.F.A., Lieut.-Colonel Noel Birch, R.H.A.; Australia, Major C. B. B. White, Director of Operations, Headquarters, Melbourne; South Africa, Major J. J. Collyer, Staff Officer for General Staff Duties, Pretoria. (This officer had already been most energetic in increasing the circulation of the JOURNAL in that country.) It was decided to appoint Colonel N. M. Smyth, V.C., to be the sub-editor in Egypt and the Soudan, vice Major P. J. V. Kelly, 3rd Hussars. With regard to the sub-editorship for India, Colonel Vaughan drew attention to the fact that Captain Grimshaw's term at the Cavalry School would shortly expire. The Committee decided to endeavour to have this appointment filled by the Commandant of the Cavalry School at Saugor, in India.

It was decided to renew the advertising and trade publishing contracts with Mr. C. Gilbert-Wood for a further term of three years on the terms of the former agreements.

The question of paying contributors for articles in the JOURNAL was discussed, and it was decided to continue the present system.

A vote of thanks was accorded to the following officers, who have supplied articles to the JOURNAL during the past year, viz. :

Lieut.-Colonel W. A. Tilney, 17th (D.C.O.) Lancers.

Captain J. Charteris, R.E.

Captain R. W. W. Grimshaw, 34th (P.A.V.O.) Poona Horse.

Veterinary-Captain G. Rees-Mogg, 1st Life Guards.

Major Percy Hambro, 15th (The King's) Hussars.

Captain Hon. R. Bruce, 11th (P.A.O.) Hussars.

Captain R. Hamilton-Grace, 13th Hussars.

Brig.-General C. T. Kavanagh, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O.

Colonel N. M. Smyth, V.C.

Lieut.-Colonel G. K. Ansell, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.

Brig.-General Sir D. McKenzie, C.B.

Captain A. B. Pollock, 7th (Q.O.) Hussars.

Major F. D. Hunt, A.V.C.

Brig.-General H. De Lisle, C.B., D.S.O.

Major A. E. Wardrop, R.H.A.

Lieut.-Colonel C. Bulkeley-Johnson, Royal Scots Greys.

Captain C. H. Peto, 10th (P.W.O.R.) Hussars.

Major H. W. Davson, R.H.A.

Captain M. Crawshay, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.

Captain E. W. Cox, R.E.

Lieutenant F. F. Waldron, 19th (Q.A.O.R.) Hussars.

Lieutenant W. Lowry-Corry, 23rd Cavalry.

Major-General F. Smith, C.B., C.M.G.

Lieutenant D. G. M. Campbell, 9th (Q.R.) Lancers.

Captain P. F. Norbury, Aden Troop.

Major Stevenson Hamilton, late 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons.

Captain H. M. Johnstone, R.E.

Lieutenant R. G. Cherry, R.F.A.

Major W. J. Thompson, R.H.A.

Lieut.-Colonel M. Peake, R.H.A.

Major-General A. J. Godley, C.B.

Dep.-Insp.-General D. Bramley, Indian Police.

Lieutenant R. S. Timmis, Royal Canadian Dragoons.

Major A. H. Onslow, late 10th (P.W.O.R.) Hussars.

A vote of thanks was accorded to the Honorary Managing Editor and the Editorial Staff for their services during the past year.

ERRATUM.

It is much regretted that in the article *The Conduct of Operations with Green Troops*, which appeared in the October number of last year, the writer of which was Captain A. T. Hunter, 12th York Rangers (Canadian Forces), this officer should have been wrongly described as belonging to the 12th Regiment, U.S.A.

YEOMANRY TRAINING.

By A YEOMANRY COLONEL.

THE interesting letter from a Wiltshire Yeomanry officer in the last number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL tempts me to again put forward for the consideration of Yeomanry officers some points regarding the training of Yeomanry.

In my letter published in the CAVALRY JOURNAL of October 1912, I tried to ventilate opinions formed after some years' study of the various pros and cons of this question. I will not now touch on any of the questions raised in my former letter, which, though they did not then produce any criticism, as far as I know, might just as well be raised now as two years ago.

The letter I refer to is an interesting and instructive account of a bivouac scheme carried out by the Wiltshire Yeomanry, as I understand, during their training. Now the question a Yeomanry commanding officer has to consider is how to give his regiment the maximum amount of training so as to make it as far as possible efficient for service in the extremely limited time at his disposal, curtailed as it is by various inspections made by his superior officers. One of his first anxieties is his recruits; they at the present time will probably be found to average about 25 per cent. of the regiment each year. They will have had some idea of drill and the use of the rifle instilled into them before the regimental training while attending preliminary drills; but all knowledge of horsemanship, how to use their heads and eyes, or the duties of the camp and field, they will be quite ignorant of.

I allow it is wonderful how quickly recruits pick up their duties if the class of man is intelligent and keen, yet the three or four days' preliminary drills and troop training which have to be done must be waste of time for, and is very irksome to, the older men in the ranks, who go through it year after year.

My point therefore is, either you have to follow the programme laid down by your brigadier and start each training from the beginning, or you try and train your squadrons in the short time at your disposal in new duties which they would be required to perform if called upon for service.

I would therefore like to ask those responsible for Yeomanry training and Yeomanry commanding officers to consider the following points:

1. That all recruits should, during their first annual training, be trained together under the direct supervision of the adjutant and by the permanent staff S.S. majors, and only drafted into their squadrons after they are considered fit to take their places in the ranks.

2. That during the training the Yeomanry N.C.O.s should be obliged to carry out the various duties of their rank without the assistance of the permanent staff. (This is, I know, done in many regiments, and in that case the permanent staff could surely be better employed as suggested above.)

3. That squadron leaders should train their squadrons, without being hampered by the recruits, in the numerous duties essential for them to learn so as to be of any service if called upon to act with Regular troops.

4. That no Yeomanry regiments, still less Yeomanry brigades, should be sent to Army Manœuvres; but I suggest that:

(a) A composite squadron should, if possible, train with a Regular regiment, either at regimental, brigade, or divisional training or at manœuvres each year, composed of four troops, one drawn from each squadron of the regiment, and composed of trained men. That the squadron should be commanded by a Yeomanry major, with the regimental adjutant as second in command, and a full complement of junior officers, N.C.O.s, signallers, &c., with one permanent staff S.S. major.

I believe that in most regiments officers and men would be willing, if the ties of their various employments were properly considered, to come out for this period in addition to their annual training, provided they were given pay and allowances on the regulation scale in addition to the annual training.

(b) That a regiment could be formed of three such squadrons out of a brigade, commanded by a Yeomanry commanding officer, with the brigade-major as second in command, and put into a Regular Cavalry brigade without bringing discredit on their brigadier or themselves.

The Treasury would probably veto any such scheme owing to the small additional expense entailed, but surely it is better to train at any rate a proportion of the Yeomanry each year to be of real value in case of need. No one believes, I think, that if they are required for service they will be given the necessary time to be trained sufficiently to make them anything but an anxiety to any general officer who had them under his command when opposed to Regular troops.

I fear these suggestions will not appeal to Yeomanry commanding or squadron officers, as I myself know how one likes to have strong regiments and squadrons under one's command, yet even under these circumstances they would probably be as strong on parade as a Line Cavalry regiment; and if one looks at the question from the point of view of the efficient training of the Yeomanry, I hope they may be thought worth serious consideration.

I hope no one will think that I wish in any way to disparage the practical work that Yeomanry regiments can do. No one who has been at manœuvres and seen a Yeomanry regiment composed of partially trained men and untrained horses come on to ground in the dark and put down their horse lines and bivouac for the night could help being impressed, the more so as one knows it will be hours before their transport is likely to arrive, and they also will probably have to move off before it is daylight. All the same, with Regular troops, a squadron composed as above could much more quickly pick up what was required, and, helped by the practical aid and example of the Regular squadrons, would quickly become an efficient unit.

A NEW-YEAR HONOUR.

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to bestow the honour of Knighthood upon Lieut.-Colonel Arthur Leetham, Managing Editor of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL.

THE LATE SIR GEORGE ORBY WOMBWELL, BART.

'ONE OF THE SIX HUNDRED.'

On Friday, October 17, at his residence, Newburgh Priory, Yorkshire, Sir George Wombwell, one of the few remaining survivors of the Light Brigade, died in his eighty-first year.

Educated at Eton, he had only just been gazetted cornet in the 17th Lancers, when the regiment embarked for the Crimea, where he was present at Alma, Inkerman, and Balaklava.

On October 25, 1854, the day of Balaklava, he was acting as aide-de-camp to Lord Cardigan, and, on the evening after, wrote the following account in his diary of his thrilling experience and hairbreadth escapes.

'An order in writing came down from Lord Raglan telling us to attack some guns which were firing on us. The Light Brigade in two lines, the 13th Light Dragoons and the 17th Lancers in the first line, and the 4th Light Dragoons, 8th and 11th Hussars in the second line, was ordered to the front, and off we went at a trot, when suddenly a tremendous fire opened upon us, killing poor Nolan of the 15th Hussars, who brought the order down from Lord Raglan, close to me. We broke into a gallop, every man feeling convinced that the quicker we rode through the awful showers of grape shot, musketry, and shells, which they poured into our flanks as we passed, the better chance we should have of escaping unhurt.

'We charged up to the guns, which kept firing at us till we got up to them, and cut the Russian gunners down as they stood at their guns. The way the showers of grape and canister, musketry, and shells came among us was something too awful to describe; the men were falling in heaps all round me, and every time I looked up I could see our line getting thinner, till by the time we passed the guns and got up to the third line of Russian cavalry we were but a mere handful.

'My horse was shot under me, in what place I know not, but down he came. I luckily soon caught a trooper which had lost its rider, and got on its back and joined the second line—but in coming back he got quite knocked up, and refused to move. I at last got him into a slow walk, and was congratulating myself on having passed unseen two squadrons of Russian Lancers, when suddenly a horrid yell arose and I was surrounded by a lot of them, brandishing their swords and lances, and desiring me to throw down my sword, which, seeing resistance was useless, I did. They then seized my pistols in my holsters, and helped me in a very rough way off my wounded trooper, and marched me off a prisoner on foot between two of them, with three more behind.

'I, of course, walked quietly with them, but seeing the 11th Hussars coming back at a gallop, when they got near I made a rush forward and luckily caught another trooper, on which I jumped and joined the 11th, and rode back with them.'

Sir George related how the first person he met on riding back into camp after the disastrous charge was the late Duke of Cambridge, who exclaimed: 'Well done, young Wombwell—I'll write to your father in Yorkshire, and tell him how proud he ought to be of his son.'

At the close of the war he returned to England as fourth baronet, his father having died in 1855, and settled down to the life of a country gentleman.

In 1861 he married Lady Julia Villiers, daughter of the sixth Earl of Jersey. They had two sons and three daughters. Both sons found a soldier's grave, George, the elder, dying from typhoid fever at Meerut in 1880, and Stephen from enteric at Vryburg, while serving with the Imperial Yeomanry during the war in South Africa.

Throughout his life Sir George Wombwell was an active, keen sportsman, and was also for many years the popular master of the York and Ainsty Hounds.

The heir to the baronetcy is his brother, Henry Herbert, third son of the third baronet, late Captain, Royal Horse Guards.

IN MEMORIAM.

It is with great regret we have to record the untimely death of Major G. B. Lamont, 4th (R.I.) Dragoon Guards.

On Monday, November 24, whilst supervising the individual training of his squadron, a young charger Major Lamont was riding slipped and threw him clear but heavily. He was picked up unconscious, and though no fracture could be found he never regained consciousness, and died early the following morning in Tidworth Hospital.

Major Lamont joined the 4th Dragoon Guards in 1898, and soon came to the front as a polo player. His first important success was as a member of the winning team, Punjab Cup, January 1901.

He represented the regiment in inter-regimental tournaments in the following years, 1902, 1903, 1904.

In 1904 he had to retire hurt from a fall, but was well enough to play in the Subalterns' Cup at Umballa a fortnight later, and this his regiment won.

He then went with the regiment to South Africa and captained the winning team in the inter-regimental of 1906 and 1907, and in 1908 when the regiment was narrowly beaten in the final.

Major Lamont in Africa made a great reputation as a polo player, the smaller ponies and harder ground being better suited to his light physique. On the regiment returning to England, he found it very difficult to mount himself and compete with the heavy grounds.

He did not, however, play for the regiment in the inter-regimental 1909, 1910, 1912, 1913.

In 1911, when the regiment won the tournament, he was not able to play owing to ill-health.

His sad death will be a great loss to the regiment as an officer, a polo player, and a comrade.

IMPORTANT.

The staff of the JOURNAL is limited, and it is therefore necessary for all officers who obtain the JOURNAL direct from the Managing Editor to report any alteration of rank or address immediately, as it is quite impossible to follow up the stations of individual officers; every effort will, however, be made to trace the movements of regiments.


AN ALL-PURPOSE FARRIER'S TOOL.

By LIEUT. G. DE LA P. BERESFORD, *Adjlt., 10th (D.C.O.) Lancers (I.A.).*

It is not necessary to point out how often one is forced to have recourse to the farrier when working with mounted troops over normal country, but we frequently overlook the fact that all small bodies of mounted men are deprived of his services at a time when they are most needed. I refer to patrols and all the numerous small detachments that are sent out. Manœuvring in the British Isles, one is never far from a forge; in parts of India you might search the country for a radius of fifty miles and find your choice limited to an axe, a sheath knife, and a country shovel wherewith to do your own shoeing.

The farrier is too often regarded as a specialist, and the necessity of teaching every mounted man to do his own 'minor repairs' in the field is generally underestimated.

To consider the matter from an everyday point of view, the man who goes out in a motor has some means of effecting tyre repairs or of replacing tyres that go wrong *en route*; similarly, most people who travel on bicycles carry some means of effecting repairs; and yet we send out comparatively large numbers of mounted men without the means of replacing a cast shoe, or even tightening one that is getting loose. If we neglect the pain that is caused to a horse in having to travel unshod over stony country, it is scarcely economical to have a horse lamed because the means for preventing it have not been provided.



The writer has tried to design a light tool that will do all the work of a hammer, buffer, pincers, and rasp, and with which it is possible to shoe a horse if necessary. Its weight—17 oz.—is less than half that of a set of the tools it comprises, and, being combined, has the advantage of compactness. Length, 10 inches.

The attention of Indian Army officers is drawn to a *Protractor* specially designed by Lieutenant D. E. Whitworth, 2nd Lancers; it embodies all those useful scales that an Indian officer would employ, especially those of the Cavalry, when preparing military field sketches; it has been tried at the Cavalry School, Saugor, and found to meet all requirements successfully, and will be found extremely useful and handy for all ranks. It can be obtained from Messrs. J. H. Steward, Limited, 406 Strand, London, W.C. The price is 3s. 6d.

AN OLD RECRUITING POSTER

A photograph of this interesting old recruiting poster has been kindly supplied by General Sir R. Biddulph, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Colonel Commandant, Royal Artillery, and is now in the R.U.S.I. Museum.

**THE OLD SAUCY
SEVENTH,
Or Queen's Own Regt. of
*Lt. Dragoons.***

COMMANDED BY THAT GALLANT AND WELL KNOWN HERO.

Lieut. General

HENRY LORD PAGET.

YOUNG Fellows whose hearts beat high to tread the paths of Glory, could not have a better opportunity than now offers. Come forward then, and Enrol yourselves in a Regiment that stands unrivalled, and where the kind treatment, the Men ever experienced is well known throughout the whole Kingdom.

Each Young Hero on being approved, will receive the largest Bounty allowed by Government.

A few smart Young Lads, will be taken at Sixteen Years of Age, 5 Feet 2 Inches, but they must be active, and well limbed. Apply to SERJEANT HOOPER, at

N. B. This Regiment is mounted on Blood Horses, and being lately returned from SPAIN, and the Horses Young, the Men will not be allowed to HUNT during the next Season, more than once a week.

BOOTH AND WRIGHT. PRINTERS. NORWICH.

Henry Lord Paget, afterwards first Marquess of Anglesey, was gazetted Lieut.-General April 25, 1808, and General August 12, 1819. The regiment left Norwich in 1808, and was not quartered there again until 1832.

The above was probably only printed at Norwich for use elsewhere, presumably about 1808.

EUROPEAN ARMY MANŒUVRES.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL D. WATSON, 8th Royal Rifles, Canadian Forces.

THE general idea of imparting valuable knowledge to our Canadian Militia through the medium of the commanding officers received its origin with the present Minister of Militia some years ago, and the idea and plan have worked out since that time with great advantage to his department and the militia generally of Canada. It is quite an accepted fact that the best instruction can be secured by improvement on other systems, and this policy can certainly be applied with regard to the militia of Canada.

The present year, the Minister, Hon. Sam Hughes, undertook to take over no less than 23 officers, drawn from every part of the Dominion and from every branch of the Service, so that the very best and most modern idea could be secured and the operations watched with impartial views.

French and German Frontier.—Very little time was lost after arriving on the other side on August 30 last, for on September 4, the entire party left London for France and Switzerland, arriving at Berne on the 7th. The progress along through the French and German frontier was most interesting and instructive, and the numerous garrisons and fortifications between these two great countries were particularly marked. Everywhere throughout France, which resembled a vast armed camp, can be daily witnessed numerous preparations and enthusiastic operations. It would be almost impossible to describe the military enthusiasm that prevails throughout that country and the extent of determination so clearly expressed on every face. Not only on the borders, but throughout all the villages and cities of central and southern France, does 'ready and waiting' appear to be the watchword. The mobilisation of the French troops was quite an interesting feature, and the happy, contented faces in every regiment, brigade and division was especially to be noted. One very marked feature of the French troops is their full marching order kit, including trenching tools, equipments, ammunition, and strapped above all, a small quantity of dry kindling wood ready for the purpose of bivouacking.

Switzerland.—Coming into Switzerland another very marked feature is the large number of rifle ranges. In every little canton or village, marksmanship seems to be the principal objective and the particular form of recreation. Even on Sundays, in this very religious country, entire congregations at times seem to be concentrated on the rifle ranges. The high roads are also of a most superior character in this mountainous country, and the care and attention that is given to these is particularly appreciated.

The Swiss manœuvres, which were held near Aardburgh and Ins, commencing Monday, September 8, were particularly interesting and most instructive. A very large number of men were engaged in the two forces, the White force coming from France and the Blue force defending Zurich and the vicinity. The militia of Switzerland, composed as it is on similar lines to that of Canada, that is to say, citizen militia, were all of an exceptionally fine character, and the hearty enthusiasm which is thrown into their work by officers, non-commissioned officers and men, gave strong results in the admirable showing of the whole.

The horses, especially of the Swiss Army, are about the finest to be seen in the world, being of Flemish and Irish stock, and the greatest care being

exercised in their keeping and condition. It appears that the French Government purchase the stock in large numbers, then, after branding them on the neck, give them out to the various farmers in the surrounding country, with the stipulation that they are to be turned in for the annual mobilisation and field work when desired. Every troop and artillery horse is thus kept up to a high standard of efficiency.

Another rather noticeable feature of the Swiss Army is the variety of language employed in their regiments, some in Italian, some in French, and a great number in German, but all imbued with the same high ideals of patriotism. The Swiss Army are equipped with only one Service uniform, and instead of the leggings or long puttees now used, they have a small three-inch puttee just over the boot and below the bottom of the trousers. Their footwear is also of a very strong though light character, and particularly adapted to the Swiss mountains and roads. Their ammunition carts are equipped with large red flags for day and strong red lamps at night, making them easily visible to the troops when required.

Although complete strangers in every sense of the word, the Minister and his officers were received with marked courtesy, and every information that could possibly be given was accorded to him and his officers.

They had the pleasure of meeting General Sir Ian Hamilton every day during their visit to these manœuvres, General Hamilton being there in the interests of the British Government and also for the purpose of studying the Swiss methods of the citizen soldiers.

The aeroplanes figure very conspicuously in manœuvres of this nature. The mountainous condition of the country is particularly adapted to them, enabling them to give accurate and precise information.

The defending forces consist of infantry brigades, artillery brigades, mitrailleuse detachments, companies of sappers, numerous troops of guides, an aviation detachment, telegraph detachments, bicycle detachments, hospital and sanitary detachments, and several ammunition columns, besides a lengthy supply train at Kersers. The manœuvres covered an extent of about 30 miles from Aardburgh to Ins and Zurich.

France.—On Wednesday, September 10, the officers started back for Nancy to attend the French manœuvres. The Minister having accepted an invitation to attend the German manœuvres, left for Frankfort the same day. On arriving at Epinal, the Canadian officers were shown the greatest courtesy and attention by the French officers at that large garrison point, and were brought up to the large aviation shed and field, and an entire morning was spent in visiting and examining the big dirigible sheds and balloons at this station. Needless to say, the courtesy of the French officers was greatly appreciated. The Governor of the place, General Flamant, made a very hearty speech of welcome to the officers, welcoming them to his station and anticipating a very pleasant visit to the large army manœuvres taking place at Nancy.

These latter, which took place on September 21, were under the command of General Foche. Nothing was left undone to make the visit there as pleasant and enjoyable as possible. Every attention was shown by the French general and his officers, and the different manœuvres carried on on the 12th, 13th, and 14th were of a highly satisfactory and interesting character. The cavalry officers particularly were especially pleased with the wonderful evolutions and developments of the various cavalry brigades. During these manœuvres a night attack was made on one of the smaller

villages, which was witnessed by a number of the Canadian officers, who were highly delighted with the work of the defence and attacking forces.

England.—The English Divisional manœuvres started on Sunday, September 14, at Aldershot, for the southern division, and on Thursday, September 18, for the inter-division manœuvres near Linton and Winslowe.

Here again the Canadian Minister and his officers were treated with the greatest courtesy, the officers attending the manœuvres in uniform, where every facility was given them to obtain the fullest information and the widest knowledge possible.

In these inter-divisional manœuvres the White force was commanded by General Snow and the 4th Cavalry Brigade by General Bingham. General Sir John Grierson was chief instructor of these operations. The Brown force was commanded by General Rawlinson, with General De Lisle in command of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. Particularly noticeable in the operations of these divisions was the special work carried out by the Artillery. The very excellent operations of the entire brigades on both the defence and attack were most admirable.

The transport columns in England for these divisional manœuvres are sub-let to contractors, and in some instances were most amusing, the various equipages and transport waggons being manned by civilians in every manner of garb. The general supervision of these, however, was excellently conducted. In these operations the aviation section of both forces kept their respective armies well supplied with information.

The following week was taken up in attending the splendid army manœuvres which were carried on on a very much larger scale and extended over a large area of territory. These operations were conducted skilfully and with the greatest enthusiasm on the part of all ranks and file, the heavy work being borne by the men with the greatest cheerfulness, and the long marches, and, in many instances, real hardships, without the slightest trace of grumbling or discontent.

The presence of His Majesty the King lent an additional attraction to the entire proceedings, and the reception accorded by His Majesty to the Canadian Minister of Militia was most hearty and sincere.—*Canadian Military Gazette.*

RATES OF GALLOP

France : Ordinary gallop, 13 miles per hour.

Extended gallop, $16\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour.

In charging, the Cavalry start at either of the above paces; when at a distance of 50 or 60 strides from the enemy the command 'charge' is given, and the gallop is accelerated to the fastest pace compatible with the preservation of order.

Germany : Ordinary gallop (marching past), $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour.

" " (manœuvring), 13 " " "

Increased gallop (charging), $21\frac{1}{4}$ " " "

Italy : Ordinary gallop, 13 miles per hour.

Extended gallop, $16\frac{1}{2}$ " " "

Charge, The utmost speed of horse.

Russia : Ordinary gallop, $10\frac{3}{4}$ miles per hour.

Field gallop (used when manœuvring in open ground and under fire), 16 miles per hour.

Charge, The utmost speed of horse.

FOREIGN.

Germany.—A new Cavalry regiment, the 7th Jäger zu Pferd, has now been raised at Trèves, and is attached to the 16th Division; the uniform of this corps is grey-green, with green facings and shoulder-straps, and with yellow pipings on the head-dress.

Under the Army Bill of July 3, 1913, the following additions are made to the strength of the German Cavalry: the 1st, 6th, and 16th Army Corps will now each have three Cavalry Brigades; there will thus be fifty-five brigades of Cavalry, containing 110 regiments, each of five squadrons, except that the 2nd, 4th, and 7th Bavarian Chevaux-Legers will for the present have only four squadrons. The effective strength of each squadron is to be four or five officers, nineteen non-commissioned officers, 128 other ranks, and 145 horses, exclusive of officers' chargers. The instructional establishments of each of the Cavalry Schools at Hanover, Paderborn, and Soltau are being raised; the last-named school has only recently been created—on the same lines as that now for some time in existence at Paderborn.

On the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the raising of Queen Olga of Wurtemberg's Dragoon Regiment at Ludwigsburg H.M. Queen Mary, whose father was *a la suite* of the regiment, has presented a magnificent gold cup to the regiment, in memory of the happy days she spent in her youth at Ludwigsburg.

Holland.—The provisional Cavalry Brigade which took part in the manœuvres held between September 22 and 24 contained four regiments, two of these having four and the other two only three squadrons, with a Horse Artillery Brigade of two batteries, each of three guns.

Russia.—The *Russki Invalid* of October 1 to 14 announced that, at the suggestion of the General Staff, the War Council have decided that for the future officers of Cavalry and Cossack regiments, on completing their course at the War School and being attached to the General Staff, shall join the Cavalry School for a period—in the case of Cavalry officers, of two years, and in the case of officers of Cossack regiments, of one year.

The following alterations are announced in the distribution of some of the Cavalry Divisions: the 14th Army Corps (Lublin) will now contain the 13th and 14th Cavalry Divisions; the 17th Army Corps (Litovsk) will include the 7th Cavalry Division and the 1st Division of Don Cossacks; while the 23rd Army Corps (Warsaw) has been allotted the independent Guards Brigade of Cavalry.

It has been considered necessary to issue a special sartorial Prikaz detailing the different costumes permitted to be worn by military officers when playing games or engaged in sport. When hunting or shooting they may wear what is described as the 'ordinary costume'—whatever that may be; but details of the dress to be worn when engaged in gymnastics, fencing, boating, yachting, tennis, *le boxe*, 'winter sports,' and athletics of all kinds have been most rigidly laid down, and are under no circumstances to be departed from.

Spain.—The garrison decided upon for the military district of Ceuta is to contain a regiment of Cavalry which will be raised by volunteers from all the other metropolitan Cavalry regiments. It will bear the number 28, and will be composed of six squadrons each 150 strong.

SPORTING NOTES

POLO.

England's challenge for the International Polo Club has been accepted, and the first match is fixed to take place at Meadowbrook, in America, on June 9, 1914.

Eight teams competed for the Sir Partap Singh Challenge Cup in the Poona Open Tournament. The final resulted in a splendid match between the Poona Horse and the Inniskilling Dragoons, the former proving victorious by five goals to three.

Teams :

Poona Horse—Captains Raymond, Alderson, Hildebrand, and Lucas.

Inniskilling Dragoons—Messrs. Freer-Smith and Humfrey, Captains Ritson and Colmore.

At the conclusion Lord Willingdon congratulated the winners, and Lady Willingdon presented the cups.

The final of the Poona Junior Polo Tournament for the Challenge Cup presented by Lieut.-General Sir G. L. Richardson was a tremendous struggle between the 20th Cavalry, from Bangalore, and the 14th Hussars, from Mhow, the former winning after a 'great' game by six goals to four. A dozen teams competed.

Teams :

26th Cavalry—Messrs. Armstrong and Johnson, Captains Chaytor and Collum.

14th Hussars—Captains Bruce and Mewburn, Mr. L. de Wend-Fenton, and Capt. Mason.

On the handicap the 20th Cavalry gave the 14th Hussars one goal. Last year the cup was also held by the 26th Cavalry. Sir Richard Lamb, in a brief speech, congratulated the teams, and Lady Barrett graciously presented the cup.

The final of the Bareilly Autumn Handicap Polo Tournament was between the Inniskilling Dragoons and the 17th Cavalry, the former winning after a fast game by nine goals to eight. Teams: 6th Inniskilling Dragoons—Captains de Calry, Fleury-Teulon, Major Terrot, and Mr. Rimington. 17th Cavalry 'A' Team—Captain Duberly, Mr. Skipwith, Major Henderson, and Captain Brierley. The Inniskillings started plus four goals on the handicap. A most successful Horse Show was also held at the meeting.

ROWING.

The thirteenth rowing match between officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers took place over the Henley Regatta course. Each had won six previous contests. The first match was rowed in eights in 1869, but after three annual matches it was not resumed for thirty years, when the contests were recommenced in 1906 in four-oared boats. There was no contest in 1912, but the previous year the Artillery won with a crew which comprised three old Cambridge blues and old Eton eightsmen. The same crew have again won by two lengths for the Royal Artillery.

RACING.

Despite bad weather and a poor attendance, the Aldershot races on November 11 and 12 were a great success. The fields were large, and capital sport was witnessed, with close finishes. On the first day the Selling Hurdle Race was won by Mr. Tarrant's Wise Riot, ridden by Mr. G. N. Bennett, and the Selling Steeplechase by Mr. K. R. Palmer's Blue Devil, ridden by himself, and starting at 10-1. The Past and Present Military Handicap Steeplechase brought out six runners, and was won by a length by Captain W. Wright's Glenvictor, ridden by Mr. J. Phipps Hornby; Captain George Paynter was second on his horse Jack Symons, and Mr. F. Crossley third on his horse Irish Royalty. On the second day Mr. R. Wyndham Quin won the Long Valley Selling Handicap Steeplechase on his horse Honey II., starting at 8-1.

New rules for Point-to-Point Races have recently been framed by the National Hunt Committee, in accordance with the views of the Master of Hounds' Association. These rules can be seen in the latest 'Ruff's Guide to the Turf.' It is satisfactory to note that the N.H. Committee and Master of Hounds' Association are now in complete accord on this subject, and that the new rules have been framed in the interest of soldiers' point-to-point races.

The most successful gentleman rider in Austria-Hungary during the last year was Captain E. Folis, with sixty-seven victories. This is the third successive season in which he has headed the winning list, having ridden seventy-seven winners in 1912 and fifty-one in 1911.

HORSE SHOWS.

At the New York Horse Show the international contest for jumping two horses abreast was won by Major McTaggart, 5th Lancers, and Colonel Kenna, V.C., late 21st Lancers, and Surprise and Harmony, despite Colonel Kenna riding with a strained back. Captain Uyssens and Lieutenant Albert d'Oultremont, Belgium, were second, and Canadian officers third and fourth. The class for qualified hunters was easily won by Captain Stewart Richardson, 11th Hussars, with Clonsilla, Colonel Kenna being second with Harmony. The jumping competition for officers, three abreast, was won by the French officers, d'Orgeix, de Meslon, and Delascar-Diers on Saragosse, Amazone and Othello; Colonel Kenna, Major McTaggart, and Captain Stewart-Richardson were second on Harmony, Surprise, and Dan Leno, the Canadians being third. Owing to bad accidents the British officers were much handicapped at the show, but pluckily continued riding in the competitions, and with success. Colonel Kenna rode in great pain owing to a strained back, and Captain Stewart-Richardson had to hobble into the ring on a crutch and ride with only one foot in the stirrup. Captain Parker, unfortunately, broke his collar-bone.

In the jumping competitions at the Lourenço Marques Military Tournament, a number of officers, N.C.O.s, and men, from the Transvaal command, competed, but the Portuguese riding well carried all before them. The Britishers were certainly handicapped by the strange obstacles, which included a piano jump; and, owing to the Johannesburg strikes, their horses were not fit. Lieutenant Pitt-Rivers, Royal Dragoons, and Lieutenant Waterhouse, performed well.

THE GRAND MILITARY

WINNERS OF "THE GOLD

No records appear to exist with regard to this race-meeting; search has been made in the old sporting newspapers, and the succession of winners of 'The Gold Cup' are now published for the first time, which it is hoped will be found of interest.

In *Bell's Life* of March 20, 1851, it is stated that the first Grand Military Steeplechase took place in 1841, and in the conditions of the race is included 'The winner to give six dozen of champagne to the dinner on the day of the race.' In spite of the Crimean War, the meeting was held in 1854, and *Bell's Life* reports, 'Notwithstanding the departure of a great many officers for the East, the meeting was the best and most successful which had been held for some years'; but in 1855 and 1856 no meetings were held. In 1857, in order to mark 'the generous spirit of confraternity,' it was decided to open the Grand Military to our brave allies on the other side of the water,

Year.	Owner.	Regiment.	Horse.	Age.
1841	Captain Sir J. G. Baird, Bt.	10th Hussars	Carlow	
1842		No Race, did not fill		
1843	Lieutenant H. R. Boucherett	17th Lancers	Sawyer	
1844	Captain H. H. Frances	6th Dragoon Guards	Brenda	
1845	Cornet H. Langley	2nd Life Guards	The Cardinal	
1846	Captain H. B. Powell	Grenadier Guards	Cinderella	
1847	Lieut. Hon. R. N. Lawley	2nd Life Guards	The Roarer	
1848	Captain E. Dyson	3rd Dragoon Guards	Master Robin	
1849	Captain E. Dyson	3rd Dragoon Guards	Master Robin	
1850	Captain E. Dyson	3rd Dragoon Guards	Horkesworth	
1851	Colonel A. Shirley	7th Hussars	Fugleman	
1852	Captain A. Tremayne	13th Light Dragoons	Palmerston	
1853	Captain C. E. Thornton	86th Regiment	Minna	
1854	Captain E. A. Cook	11th Hussars	Torrent	
1855 and 1856	No Race on account of the War in the Crimea			
1857	Lieutenant W. G. Craven	1st Life Guards	Johnny Raw	
1858	Viscount Talon	Chasseurs d'Afrique	Magnet	
1859	Captain E. D' A. Hunt	6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons	Goldsmith	
1860	Captain J. H. Anderson	1st Dragoon Guards	The Hermit	
1861	Captain Hon. F. G. Ellis	4th Hussars	Inniskilling	
1862	Captain A. Fletcher	12th Lancers	Fanny	
1863	Captain E. W. Park-Yate	1st Dragoons	Rifeman	
1864	Captain A. U. Wombwell	12th Lancers	Bell's Life	
1865	Lieutenant J. Stevenson	12th Lancers	Glencairn	
1866	Captain J. J. Johnstone	Grenadier Guards	Iron Sides	

STEEPLECHASE.

CUP " FROM 1841 TO 1913.

and the race was won by Viscount Talon of the Chasseurs d'Afrique. This officer had previously ridden the winner of Marshal Pelessier's Grand Prize for horses of all nations which took place in the Crimea.

Owing to the South African War no meetings were held in 1900, 1901, and 1902. A. L.

NOTE.—The compiler of this article has in his possession four coloured engravings entitled 'The Grand Military Steeplechase run near Newmarket, March 24, 1856,' but it is evidently depicting a point-to-point race, and not the race for 'The Gold Cup'; no mention of this race occurs in the contemporary numbers of *Bell's Life*; and in the issue of March 22, 1857, it states, 'On the return of Peace no time has been lost in resuming the Grand Military meeting.'

Weight.	Rider.	Regiment.	Place.	No. of Starters.
12 stone 5 lbs. 5 lb. ex.	Capt. Sir J. G. Baird, Bt.	10th Hussars	Northampton	20
12 stone	Lieut. H. R. Boucherett	17th Lancers	Wetherby	12
12 stone	Captain H. H. Frances	6th Dragoon Guards	Northampton	16
12 stone	Cornet H. Langley	2nd Life Guards	Windsor	5
12 stone	Captain H. B. Powell	Grenadier Guards	Leamington	17
12 stone	Ensign and Lieut. Sir E. Poore, Bt.	Scots Guards	Leamington	8
12 stone	Captain E. Dyson	3rd Dragoon Guards	Warwick	11
12 stone 7 lbs.	Captain E. Dyson	3rd Dragoon Guards	Warwick	5
12 stone	Captain E. Dyson	3rd Dragoon Guards	Warwick	9
12 stone 10 lbs.	Lieut. C. C. Fraser	7th Hussars	Warwick	15
12 stone	Lieut. Hon. J. W. H. Hutchinson	13th Light Dragoons	Leamington	12
12 stone	Lieut. F. W. Fitz H. Berkeley	Royal Horse Guards	Leamington	14
12 stone	Asst. Surgeon H. J. Wilkin	11th Hussars	Leamington	12
No Race on account of the War in the Crimea				
11 stone 7 lbs.	Captain D. Barclay	16th Lancers	Rugby	9
12 stone 5 lbs.	Viscount Talon	Chasseurs d'Afrique	Rugby	8
12 stone 10 lbs.	Captain E. D' A. Hunt	6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons	Birmingham	9
12 stone 5 lbs.	Captain J. H. Anderson	1st Dragoon Guards	Northampton	9
12 stone	Captain Hon. F. G. Ellis	4th Hussars	Cheltenham	12
12 stone 5 lbs.	Captain A. U. Wombwell	12th Lancers	Warwick	13
12 stone 10 lbs.	Captain G. W. H. Riddell	16th Lancers	Rugby	14
12 stone 10 lbs.	Captain A. G. Smith	6th Dragoon Guards	Rugby	10
12 stone	Lieut. J. Stevenson	12th Lancers	Rugby	9
13 stone	Lt.-Col. G. W. Knox	Scots Guards	Warwick	10

Year.	Owner.	Regiment.	Horse.	Age.
1867	Mr. R. D. O. George's	7th Dragoon Guards	Tally Ho	Aged
1868	Captain J. D. Brabazon's	10th Hussars	King Arthur	6 years
1869	Captain H. F. G. Coleman's	1st Royal Dragoons	Juryman	6 Years
1870	Lord C. J. Innes-Ker's	Scots Guards	Knockany	6 Years
1871	Mr. H. R. Ray's	2nd Life Guards	Donato	Aged
1872	Major T. Byrne's	Royal Horse Artillery	Charleville	Aged
1873	Mr. W. H. S. Heron-Maxwell's	7th Royal Fusiliers	Revirescat	Aged
1874	Captain H. R. Ray's	2nd Life Guards	Marc Antoine	6 Years
1875	Colonel T. Byrne's	Royal Horse Artillery	Lady Sneerwell	Aged
1876	Lord Downe's	10th Hussars	Earl Marshal	5 Years
1877	Mr. A. W. M. Fitzroy's	Coldstream Guards	Chilblain	Aged
1878	Captain A. Paget's	7th Hussars	Chilblain	Aged
1879	Mr. H. Fenning's	53rd Shropshire Light Infantry	Boyne Water	Aged
1880	Mr. H. S. Dalbiac's	Royal Horse Artillery	Cymrw	Aged
1881	Mr. F. Waldron's	Royal Horse Artillery	Lobelia	6 Years
1882	Lord Manners'	3rd Dragoon Guards	Lord Chancellor	6 Years
1883	Colonel F. J. G. Murray's	3rd Dragoon Guards	Beaufort	Aged
1884	Major B. I. Tidswell's	Royal Dragoons	Larva (late Paddy Griffy)	5 Years
1885	Captain C. Childe's	Royal Horse Guards	Scorn	Aged
1886	Captain C. Childe's	Royal Horse Guards	Standard	Aged
1887	Captain R. Fisher's	10th Hussars	Dalesman	6 Years
1888	Mr. H. T. Fenwick's	Royal Horse Guards	Bertha	4 Years
1889	Mr. B. W. J. Alexander's	Rifle Brigade	St. Cross	6 Years
1890	Capt. Lord Annaly's	Scots Guards	Lady Sarah	4 Years
1891	Captain A. E. Whitaker's	5th Fusiliers	Hollington	5 Years
1892	Captain A. E. Whitaker's	5th Fusiliers	Ormerod	4 Years
1893	Mr. H. L. Powell's	Royal Artillery	Midshipmite	Aged
1894	Captain M. J. Hughes's	2nd Life Guards	Æsop	Aged
1895	Mr. E. Loder's	12th Lancers	Field Marshal	Aged
1896	Captain J. A. Orr-Ewing's	16th Lancers	Nelly Gray	Aged
1897	Colonel Hon. G. H. Gough's, C.B.	14th Hussars	Parapluie	6 Years
1898	Major H. T. Fenwick's	Royal Horse Guards	County Council	Aged
1899	Captain W. Murray-Threipland's	Grenadier Guards	Lambay	6 Years
1900-1-2	No Race on account of the War in South Africa			
1903	Major E. Loder's	12th Lancers	Marpessa	6 Years
1904	Mr. H. E. Brassey's	Royal Horse Guards	Dumboyne	5 Years
1905	Rear-Admiral Lambton's	Royal Navy	Ruy Lopez	5 Years
1906	Mr. R. F. Eyre's	Royal Navy	Royal Blaze	6 Years
1907	Mr. C. Bewicke's	Scots Guards	Old Fairyhouse	5 Years
1908	Captain G. C. B. Paynter's	Scots Guards	Mount Prospects	6 Years
1909	Mr. E. Christie-Miller's	Coldstream Guards	Fortune	Aged
1910	Captain E. Christie-Miller's	Coldstream Guards	Sprinkle Me	Aged
1911	Mr. D. H. B. McCalmont's	7th Hussars	Vinegar Hill	6 Years
1912	Hon. E. H. Wyndham's	1st Life Guards	Another Delight	Aged
1913	Hon. E. H. Wyndham's	1st Life Guards	Another Delight	Aged

The Port Said Golf Club course, a nine-hole sand course, is situated about a mile from the landing stage (cab fare 1s. each way). Daily tickets for visitors at 2s. 6d. each can be obtained at the golf house, and sets of clubs hired. Passenger ships to and from the East remain a considerable number of hours at Port Said, so this information may be useful to travellers.

Weight.	Rider.	Regiment.	Place.	No. of Start-ers.
12 stone 10 lbs.	Mr. M. G. Gerard	Royal Artillery	Liverpool	6
13 stone	Lt.-Colonel G. W. Knox	Scots Guards	Liverpool	10
13 stone	Mr. G. Pritchard	5th Dragoon Guards	Liverpool	12
12 stone	Lt.-Colonel G. W. Knox	Scots Guards	Liverpool	10
12 stone	Mr. G. Pritchard	5th Dragoon Guards	Windsor	10
13 stone	Mr. H. Browne	Royal Horse Artillery	Liverpool	8
12 stone 10 lbs.	Mr. W. H. Johnstone	7th Hussars	Liverpool	16
12 stone	Lt.-Col. F. H. Harford	Scots Guards	Liverpool	10
12 stone	Mr. W. H. Johnstone	7th Hussars	Liverpool	5
12 stone 10 lbs.	Mr. W. H. Johnstone	7th Hussars	Liverpool	3
12 stone 7 lbs.	Mr. W. B. Morris	7th Hussars	Sandown Park	10
13 stone 7 lbs.	Mr. W. B. Morris	7th Hussars	Sandown Park	7
13 stone	Mr. M. J. Hartigan	3rd Dragoon Guards	Sandown Park	9
11 stone 7 lbs.	Mr. H. S. Dalbiac	Royal Horse Artillery	Rugby	9
12 stone 3 lbs.	Mr. J. F. S. Lee-Barber	3rd Dragoon Guards	Sandown Park	8
13 stone 7 lbs.	Lord Manners	3rd Dragoon Guards	Sandown Park	8
12 stone 7 lbs.	Mr. J. F. S. Lee-Barber	3rd Dragoon Guards	Sandown Park	6
11 stone 7 lbs.	Mr. J. B. Murdoch	Royal Dragoons	Sandown Park	9
12 stone 7 lbs.	Mr. R. Barton	Scots Guards	Aylesbury	3
12 stone 7 lbs.	Mr. T. Hone	7th Hussars	Aldershot	9
11 stone	Captain R. Fisher	10th Hussars	Sandown Park	9
11 stone	Mr. A. H. Onslow	10th Hussars	Sandown Park	7
11 stone	Captain E. R. Owen	Lancashire Fusiliers	Sandown Park	8
10 stone 7 lbs.	Captain M. O. Little	9th Lancers	Sandown Park	11
11 stone 12 lbs.	Captain C. Lambton	5th Fusiliers	Sandown Park	11
10 stone 7 lbs.	Captain B. W. Bewicke	15th Hussars	Sandown Park	7
13 stone 7 lbs.	Major J. Burn-Murdoch	Royal Dragoons	Sandown Park	7
11 stone 12 lbs.	Sir C. Slade	Scots Guards	Sandown Park	8
12 stone 3 lbs.	Mr. E. Crawley	12th Lancers	Sandown Park	11
11 stone 7 lbs.	Mr. D. G. M. Campbell	9th Lancers	Sandown Park	5
11 stone 7 lbs.	Mr. D. G. M. Campbell	9th Lancers	Sandown Park	11
11 stone 7 lbs.	Major A. H. Onslow	10th Hussars	Sandown Park	11
13 stone	Captain W. Murray-Threipland	Grenadier Guards	Sandown Park	9
No Race on account of the War in South Africa				
12 stone 7 lbs.	Major A. H. Onslow	10th Hussars	Sandown Park	4
11 stone	Major W. F. Ricardo	Royal Horse Guards	Sandown Park	9
11 stone	Captain G. W. R. Stackpoole, D.S.O.	South Staffs Regt.	Sandown Park	8
12 stone	Captain L. S. Denny	1st Dragoon Guards	Sandown Park	13
12 stone	Mr. C. Bewicke	Scots Guards	Sandown Park	9
13 stone	Captain G. C. B. Paynter	Scots Guards	Sandown Park	10
12 stone 3 lbs.	Captain C. W. Banbury	Coldstream Guards	Sandown Park	7
12 stone 7 lbs.	Captain C. W. Banbury	Coldstream Guards	Sandown Park	7
11 stone	Mr. D. H. B. McCalmont	7th Hussars	Sandown Park	7
12 stone 7 lbs.	Hon. E. H. Wyndham	1st Life Guards	Sandown Park	8
13 stone	Hon. E. H. Wyndham	1st Life Guards	Sandown Park	10

An invitation has been received for British officers to attend the International Horse Show which will be held in Brussels in May next. In Brussels it is not only the *haute école* which will be needed, but qualities of practical efficiency; and a committee of Army men has been formed to organise a riding team for these games.

HOCKEY.

Probably in no other section of the community has hockey made such strides during the last few years as it has in the Army. The continued increase in the number of entries for the Army Tournament is one of the surest signs of the importance with which the game is regarded. Fifty-one teams have entered for this season's competition, an increase of nearly twenty over last year. Much of the success of the tournament has been due to the organising powers of Captain Godfrey, the Secretary of the Army Association, and it is unfortunate that recent orders take him to Ireland.

BOXING.

The Royal Navy and Army Boxing Association Championships will take place at Portsmouth on April 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1914, and the Army Boxing Association Championship early in March next.

The 9th Lancers held a most successful boxing competition in the Tidworth Garrison Theatre, and the 15th Hussars also held a good competition in the Riding School, Longmoor, the first meeting since the arrival of the regiment from South Africa. The Queen's Bays held their first meeting in the regimental gymnasium at Aldershot.

FOOTBALL.

ASSOCIATION.

ARMY F.A. CUP.

The following are results of ties in the second round:—

19th Hussars, 4, 2nd Essex, 2 (after extra time); 1st Royal Berkshire Regiment, 2, 2nd Highland L.I., 0; A.S.C. (Woolwich), 5, 3rd Coldstream Guards, 1; 1st Scottish Rifles, 2, and Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1; 4th Middlesex Regiment, 5, 4th Royal Fusiliers, 0; 1st Norfolk Regiment, 3, 1st Dorset Regiment, 2; 1st Royal Lancaster Regiment, 3, 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, 2, 32nd Brigade, R.F.A., 4, R.G.A. (Sheerness), 2; R.A.M.C. (Aldershot), 2, 1st King's Royal Rifles, 1; 1st Royal Irish Regiment, 2, 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, 0; R.E. (Aldershot), 4, 1st Loyal North Lancashire, 2.

IRISH ARMY CUP.

The first round of above resulted as follows:—

1st D.C.L.I., 3, 4th Hussars, 0; 1st Dorsetshire Regt., 1, 1st Cheshire Regt., 0; 1st East Surrey Regt., 3, 1st Bedfordshire Regt., 1; 1st Norfolk Regt., 7, 3rd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 2; 2nd K.O.S.B., 3, 2nd West Riding Regiment, 2; 1st North Staffordshire Regiment, 2, 3rd Rifle Brigade, 0.

RUGBY.

In the annual contest between the Royal Military Academy and Royal Military College at Woolwich, the former won, after a keen struggle, by 21 points to 16.

At Richmond the Army beat Richmond by 2 goals and 2 tries (16 points) to one dropped goal (4 points).

In a fine match at Portsmouth the officers of the United Services were beaten by Dublin University.



STATUE OF
GENERAL VON ZIETHEN.

By Schadow.

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

APRIL 1914

GENERAL VON ZIETHEN

By COLONEL H. C. WYLLY, C.B.

HANS JOACHIM VON ZIETHEN was born at Wustrau, a small estate belonging to his family and situated some thirty miles from Berlin, on May 16, 1699, the eldest of a family of six. His father was a very poor country gentleman, and the estate was not only much involved, but the elder Ziethen was engaged in several law suits, so that the future Cavalry leader had but few opportunities for acquiring even the ordinary education of those times. Young Hans seems from childhood to have kept two aims steadily before him: one was some day to restore the fallen fortunes of his house, and the other was to win fame as a soldier. He was only fourteen years of age when he left Wustrau to enter the service of Frederick William I., King of Prussia, as ensign in an Infantry regiment, then quartered at Spandau and the neighbourhood. He joined without a single one of the usual advantages; he was poor, and his parents had not been able to furnish him with any letters of introduction or recommendation; he was small, of poor physique, and unhealthy appearance; the general of the district, who was also the *Inhaber* of his regiment, appears to have been a clumsy bully; and while one may be astonished that under such adverse beginnings young Ziethen's zeal for military life remained uncooled, it is impossible to feel surprise that the measures by which he found it necessary to assert himself gave him the character of

being of rather a quarrelsome nature. About 1720 the command of the regiment in which Ziethen was serving was bestowed upon the Count von Schwerin, who, unattracted by his young subordinate's appearance, and failing to detect any promise of his future greatness, permitted him to be several times passed over for promotion by junior and more wealthy officers; until at last Ziethen, finding himself without prospects, offered the resignation of his commission, which was accepted, and Ziethen retired to Wustrau, where his father had died a year or so previously.

He at once applied himself to the settlement of his affairs and set to work, with some success, to extricate his property from the law suits by which it had been impoverished, but he does not seem to have ever wholly given up the idea of a return to military life. Some few years passed, and then it came to Ziethen's knowledge that a certain Cavalry regiment—Wuthenau's Dragoons—was to be augmented from five to ten squadrons. He happened at the time to be in Berlin, and was fortunate enough to obtain an interview with the King of Prussia, who offered him a lieutenant's commission. This Ziethen accepted, and thus found himself, in the year 1726 and at the age of twenty-seven, launched for the second time in the army and in a branch of it with which he had not previously served. His new regiment was quartered at Tilsit, and for the first year or two of Ziethen's service with it he was happy enough; later on, however, he became the object of the dislike of the junior captain of the squadron to which he belonged, and in the quarrel which resulted the senior officer was able to place his own conduct in the most favourable light, and to paint that of Ziethen in the blackest colours. As a result the junior was tried by court martial and sentenced, towards the end of 1728, to a year's imprisonment in a fortress. He served the full term, but had hardly been released when his old enemy again fastened a quarrel upon him; there was a duel, a second court martial, the captain was condemned to three months' imprisonment, and Ziethen was 'broke'—his military career being thus brought a second time to an end, and in a humiliating and apparently irretrievable manner.

By this time, however, Fortune had bestowed enough of her buffets upon the future Cavalry leader. In 1730 the King was engaged in the creation of a third squadron of Hussars to add to two others which he had before organised; he had already nominated the captain and

the cornet to the new squadron—he was looking round for a lieutenant. At this moment the name of Ziethen was suggested to the King by two officers of high rank, and, although at first Frederick William would not hear of re-employing one whom he regarded as a troublesome officer, he ultimately gave way. Ziethen was appointed, and thus, at thirty-one years of age, made his third entry into the military service of Prussia. At the end of a year Ziethen was promoted captain, his commission as such bearing date March 1, 1731—and some five years later the King, wishing to give all ranks of his new regiment the best possible instruction in their duties on service, sent a small party of them under Ziethen to serve immediately under the eye of a noted Austrian partisan leader of the name of Baronay; and in the various small affairs in which he was engaged, Ziethen did so well as to earn on his return in 1736 advancement to the rank of major. At this period Ziethen married, and then in 1740 the King died and was succeeded by his son Frederick II., to whom Ziethen was practically unknown.

When the Silesian campaign broke out Ziethen's Hussars were not conspicuously engaged, and even at the battle of Mollwitz in April 1741 they were scarcely more than mere spectators of the work of the Infantry. In July, however, Ziethen was promoted lieutenant-colonel, and had his chance in the affair at Rothschloss, where, under Winterfeld, he helped to defeat the Austrians, taking prisoners with his Hussars a whole regiment of Austrian Cavalry. In this affair Ziethen overthrew and nearly captured his former instructor, Baronay, who, like

‘The struck eagle, stretched upon the plain . . .
Viewed his own feather on the fatal dart,
And winged the shaft that quivered in his heart.’

Baronay was a generous foe, for the next day he wrote to Ziethen acknowledging himself vanquished, and happy in having effected his escape from the pupil who had outshone the master.

This first exploit of the Hussars made a great sensation in the Prussian camp, and Ziethen was advanced to the rank of colonel; while the six squadrons of Hussars were now united into one regiment, and Ziethen was decorated with the Order of Merit. The regiment was constantly engaged during this campaign in various small affairs, and when the army went into winter quarters the period of rest was

utilised for increasing the squadrons of Hussars from six to ten, and for dividing the regiment into two.

When, in January 1742, the new campaign commenced, Ziethen was directed to join Schwerin's army before Olmütz, and when the marshal was ordered to move on Znaym, Ziethen led the advance, occupied Stockerau a very few miles from Vienna, and spread alarm throughout the country. Schwerin thereafter fell back, and Ziethen advanced on Skalitz in Hungary, engaged the enemy successfully at Gedingen, Ungarisch-Brod, and Meseritz, and then, transferred to the corps of the Prince of Anhalt, he covered that general's retreat with so much skill and address that the army was able to regain Upper Silesia with small loss. When the first Silesian War closed in the 'peace signed at Breslau, Ziethen returned a colonel and commander of a regiment, having entered upon the campaign a mere squadron commander. He returned, too, with clean hands; always in the front of the army, he could easily, had he wished, have enriched himself, for opportunities were not wanting while he was over-running Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary; but he was as far above self-interest as he was incapable of cruelty and inhumanity.

The call to arms in June 1744 found Ziethen in bad health, and it was thought impossible that he could join the army for the new campaign; but his will enabled him to triumph over his bodily infirmity, and he was in time to cover with his Hussars the advance through Saxony into Bohemia of the first of the three columns into which the Prussian army was divided. Always in the van, Ziethen penetrated far into Bohemia; on October 3 he was promoted major general. The Prussian army was now obliged to retreat, and Ziethen, now in the rear with his light horsemen, was necessarily harassed and annoyed; but at Tein, on the Moldau, on October 9, with two regiments of Hussars and two battalions of Grenadiers, he held back 10,000 Austrians from noon until late at night, finally availing himself of the darkness to withdraw his sorely shattered force. When on the next morning Ziethen led his men into camp, the King himself came out mounted to meet him, and the soldiers ran cheering from their tents to see the man go by whom the great Frederick delighted to honour.

At the battle of Teinitz, fought in November, Ziethen and von Wedel did all that men could do to prevent Prince Charles of Lorraine

from forcing the passage of the Elbe, but this day decided the fate of that year's campaign, and the King, evacuating Bohemia, fell back upon Silesia. The King marked his appreciation of Ziethen's services by making an augmentation to his income; while the Empress of Russia was so interested in the story of his exploits, that she made him a present of three hundred valuable remounts for his regiment. At the opening of the new campaign Ziethen performed an important and valuable service. The main Prussian army had become separated from another corps, and the Austrians had occupied the intervening country. Communication was necessary but seemed impossible, when Ziethen marched with his Hussars almost through the intervening Austrians, re-established communications, and apprised the Prussian commander of the King's intentions. In the march which ensued to effect the necessary junction, Ziethen's Hussars brought up the rear, and lost heavily while reaping much glory.

At Hohenfriedberg, June 4, 1745, Ziethen was placed in rear of the second line at the head of a corps of reserve comprising twenty squadrons. But the fact that he was in reserve that day did not prevent Ziethen from playing a great part, for, as Carlyle says, splashing across the river, 'other regiments following, forms in line well leftward; and instead of waiting for the Austrian charge, charges home upon them fiercely through the difficult ground.' To Ziethen and to Dumoulin was given over the pursuit of the Saxon and Austrian fugitives, until, as Frederick himself wrote, 'so decisive a defeat has not been seen since Blenheim.' This was almost the last appearance of Ziethen in this war, for he was wounded in November at Hennersdorf, and before he was fit again to take the field peace had been signed at Dresden.

The years of peace that followed were employed by Ziethen in re-mounting and training his regiment, in the re-establishment of his own health—much broken by all he had undergone—and in the management of his estates. His rapid promotion had, however, gained him many enemies, and these at one time so poisoned the King's mind against him that in 1755 he had serious thoughts of resigning his commission. The mere report of this was enough to restore him to the favour of Frederick, and thenceforth he enjoyed to the full the confidence and affection of his Sovereign. The time, too, was approaching when Frederick had need of leaders like Ziethen, and

when the Seven Years' War opened Ziethen was promoted lieutenant-general, and accompanied the King at the head of his regiment.

At the commencement of the struggle Ziethen's Hussars were employed in the cutting off of the Saxon communications with Pirna, the next year they led the advance on Prague, not a day passing without an encounter, a victory and the capture of many prisoners; and in the famous battle of May 6, 1757, when the fiery old Schwerin met his death, it was Ziethen who repaired disaster and chased the Austrian Cavalry over the horizon. Perhaps, too, had the reports of Ziethen and others been believed, and their advice regarded, the great Frederick had not suffered his severe defeat on June 18 at Kolin, when Ziethen commanded the Cavalry of the left wing—a hundred squadrons—having under him a young colonel of Cavalry whose name was Seydlitz. It was here, at Kolin, that, under orders from Prince Maurice, Ziethen attempted with four regiments of heavy Cavalry to carry a formidable and well-served battery on the summit of a steep hill, and was wounded by a grape-shot in the head. He was, however, in the field again before the end of July and led the advance of the Duke of Bevern's corps at Liegnitz. The time that followed—the close of this year—was Frederick's *dies irae*; until in the early autumn came the news that England had produced a great man, that the convention of Klosterseven was renounced, and that a British army was to take the field in Germany.

Rossbach was fought without the help of Ziethen's sabres, but they were present in the right wing of the Prussian army at Leuthen on December 5, 1757, when they took whole battalions prisoners; Ziethen's own regiment captured 2,000 men; a cornet and six men of Ziethen's Hussars took the surrender of a complete regiment. It was in the pursuit that Ziethen displayed all the qualities of a great commander; he followed up the enemy relentlessly with five Infantry battalions and seven regiments of Cavalry, and, driving them continually before him, did not pause until, at the end of a busy fortnight, he had recovered all Silesia from the Austrians and had driven them beyond the mountains. During the next year, however, Ziethen suffered what was perhaps his most serious reverse in the attempt to cover the passage of a large convoy for the Prussians besieging Olmütz; his Hussars fought under another at Zorndorf; but at Hochkirch he covered the retreat of the Prussians, and then,

returning to the army of Prince Henry, covered in turn the march of that Prince and facilitated his junction with the King. In the fourth campaign—January 1759 to March 1760—Ziethen was for the greater part of the time employed in the lightning operations undertaken by Prince Henry; the exploits of the Cavalry commander were very brilliant; and at Kunersdorf it was a party of Ziethen's Hussars that saved Frederick from capture. During the winter Ziethen guarded the cantonments of the Prussian army with eight battalions, a division of Chasseurs, and forty-eight squadrons of Hussars. During the march from the Elbe to Liegnitz in August 1760 the squadrons of Ziethen acted as a screen, opposing the Cavalry of Dann and Landon, and after the battle of Liegnitz Ziethen was raised to the rank of General of Cavalry.

The battle of Torgau was not one of Ziethen's best days, for he seems to have been somewhat over-hasty in attacking with the troops of the right wing which had been placed under his orders; but he made up for any initial mistakes by the energy with which he supported the attacks on the Austrian guns about Siptitz. This was the last battle in which Ziethen was personally engaged; he wintered his command at Meissen, and in June 1761 replaced Goltz in command in Silesia; but during the last two campaigns of the Seven Years' War he had small opportunity for effecting anything of an especially important or decisive character.

When in 1778 Prussia again took the field, Ziethen was 78, but he was deeply disappointed that the King had decided to make the campaign without him. He died on January 25, 1786, full of years and honour, regretted by the King he had served so faithfully, and by his comrades of all ranks, who were devoted to him. He seems to have been of a singularly lovable disposition; generous; ready at all times to acknowledge the services of his subordinates, disinterested and unassuming, careless of approbation, kindly, humane and incapable of enriching himself by ignoble means. As a soldier he had measured himself with most of the great captains of his day, had rarely been defeated, never disgraced; unperturbed in action, foreseeing and prepared for all eventualities, he was equally admirable in attack and defence, and while capable of the most daring enterprises, he was, when necessary, both cautious and careful. Perhaps his most distinguishing trait was the ascendancy he acquired over the troops

he commanded, who believed that he would always lead them to victory and would never call upon them for needless sacrifice.

ILLUSTRATIONS

The statue by Schadow, which is the subject of the illustrations, and reproduced from old engravings of 1803, was erected to the memory of Ziethen in the Wilhelms-Platz, Berlin, is 16 feet high, and made of grey Silesian marble. The pedestal is inlaid with four blocks of white marble, which surround it, and are raised in bas-relief.

The *first*, as depicted in the frontispiece, represents the tiger skin which was worn in full dress by the officers of his regiment, and contains the following inscription: 'John Joachim de Ziethen, General of Cavalry, served from 1714 to 1786, under Frederick William I. and Frederick II. This monument was erected by Frederick William II.'

The *second* represents an incident in the battle of Rothschloss, 1741, and bears the following inscription: 'Ziethen and his former master, Baronay.'

The *third* depicts the surprise of the Saxons at Hennersdorf, 1745. Ziethen appears in this group as a general; he is giving his orders, and a trumpeter attends near him. One of his Hussars fires at the kettle-drummer of Obyern's Regiment, the horse is fallen and the bridle cut; in the background the Prussian Hussars are charging the hostile cavalry. The inscription is as follows: 'Ziethen takes four Saxon Regiments.'

The *fourth* represents the battle of Torgau, 1760. Ziethen is looking towards the heights of Siptitz; behind him is an aide-de-camp, before him a sergeant of gendarmes, with hat in hand, making his report. A second aide-de-camp sets off at the gallop with the General's orders to the heights where the Prussians are seen mounting to the assault. A Prussian Grenadier is depicted arriving bearing an Austrian colour, in token of victory. Ziethen's horse seems worn with fatigue, and that of the aide-de-camp gallops with apparent difficulty. The inscription runs: 'Ziethen carries the heights of Siptitz.'

A. L.

**GENERAL
VON
ZIETHEN**

The
Battle of
ROTH-SCHLOSS
1741




The
Surprise at
HENNERSDORF
1745



The
Battle of
TORGAU
1760



M. A. Hayes, pict.



16th (THE QUEEN'S) LANCERS.

1842.

THE CROSSING OF RIVERS
BY
CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY

(Communicated)

SUCH detailed reports and accounts of river-crossings by Cavalry as are at present available are few and incomplete. Even if accurate information were more plentiful it would be impracticable to fix a *normal* rate of crossing, for there can be no normal set of conditions under which a river is crossed unless it be by means of a permanent bridge.

The rate depends on many variable factors—the width of the river, rate of the current, state of the banks, number and condition of starting and landing places, and the number of boats and rafts available.

Much also depends on the training of the troops, for with sufficient practice it will undoubtedly be possible to herd the horses across without the assistance of boats or rafts, whereas without such previous practice they will have to be towed in rear of whatever boats and rafts are available, or be passed across by means of an endless rope.

It seems quite possible that in favourable circumstances a brigade will be able to cross a river of considerable size in three hours, while if the conditions are unfavourable as much as forty-eight hours may be required.

The following are some instances of river-crossings carried out under various conditions :—

GREAT BRITAIN

(I) 2nd Cavalry Brigade crossing the River Avon near Christchurch, August 1912.

Troops.—About seventy men from regiments of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade.

River.—Good shelving banks; width, 80 yards; current, tidal and up to 6 miles an hour.

Weather.—Cold and windy.

Time.—Under a quarter of an hour (horses only, no saddlery taken).

Method.—Driven in a mob across the river; no boats or rafts used.

Notes.—(a) This was after three days' practice.

(b) Very difficult in current, over 6 miles an hour.

(c) Only about six of the seventy men could swim really well.

(II) On September 4 of 1912 the 1st Cavalry Brigade and 7th H.A. Brigade crossed the Thames at two places:—

(a) *Crossing.*—Cuckoo Weir, Eton. Brigade Staff, 19th Hussars, one squadron Bays.

(b) *Crossing.*—Queen's Eyot, 3 miles west of Windsor. 11th Hussars, 7th Brigade, R.H.A.

(a) Crossing:—

River 75 yards broad.

River $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles an hour current.

Banks steep and 2 feet 6 inches above water which was 1 foot 6 inches above a gravel bottom.



Three means of crossing:—

(i.) Endless rope.

(ii.) A large punt for horses.

(iii.) Small punts for saddlery &c.


The endless rope was obtained specially for the purpose and was prepared with stops to prevent the horse's head-rope sliding down it.

Owing to the difficulty of finding suitable landing-places opposite one another on the two sides of the river, the rope had to be stretched transversely over the stream at a bend, so that from bank to bank it covered 90 yards of water.

It was worked by from forty to fifty men—twenty to twenty-five on each side of the river—and on the average pulled about ten or twelve horses across at a time. Between 7.35 A.M. and 8.30 A.M. sixty-seven

horses were pulled over, and between 8.45 A.M. and 9.20 A.M. fifty-five horses; in other words, the rate of crossing was just over a horse a minute.

The punt at crossing (a), which was propelled by means of a cable, had flat ends and carried about eighteen horses at a time. It crossed the river at right angles, and had therefore only to move 75 yards. The horses were led down a ramp of loose planks into the punt and stood facing across stream.



The punt was used from 7 A.M. until 9.50 A.M., and during this time carried 172 horses and two machine guns, or approximately a horse a minute.

(b) Crossing :—

The stream was 60 yards wide; rate of current, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles an hour.

The loading side of the river was good, presenting no difficulty. The landing side was steeper and rather congested, owing to a high bank about 4 yards from the water's edge. Inside this was a towing-path.

Number of Officers and Other Ranks (total of Brigade R.H.A.).—Fourteen officers, 196 other ranks, 237 horses, six guns (13-pr. Q.F.), six ammunition wagons (13-pr.), one wagon telephone.

Time and Method of Crossing.—The horses took 1 hour and 30 minutes to swim over. They were tied on in pairs—ten on the rope at a time.

The time taken to ferry over the thirteen vehicles was 2 hours.

Personnel.—Taken over in punts—in batches of twenty (approximately).

Equipment.—Harness and saddlery tied up in blankets and ferried over by sub-sections.

Material Available.—One 300-foot endless rope; two barges*—one

* Careful handling was necessary to get the vehicles into the barges, which rendered the operation of crossing the artillery a slow one in comparison with that of the cavalry.

taking three pairs of wheels, the other four pairs of wheels; several punts; one small float.

From experience gained on this occasion, it appears that in crossings of similar character:—

(i.) The working party on each bank should, when possible, consist of not less than twenty men.

(ii.) The rope should be sufficiently long to give the working parties freedom of action; each end of the rope therefore should, when the rope is taut, be about 40 yards inland from the river. Thus for crossing a river 90 yards wide the total length of rope should be 2×90 yards + 2×80 yards = 340 yards. To make this length of rope 230 'built up' ropes would be sufficient.

GERMANY

(III) 2nd Guard Uhlan Regiment, July 22, 1905.

River.—The Havel, near Nieder-Neundorf, 200 yards broad, with deep water a few feet from the bank.

Time.—Thirty to forty minutes per squadron.

Method.—Held alongside of boats. (There is no record of the number of boats available.)

Description.—The horses were led into the water by men stripped. In each boat there were three men, each holding a horse, while a fourth man rowed and a fifth steered. There was a strong wind blowing. The horses were released when about 20 yards from the shore; they then swam to the bank and were caught. A large number of horses were brought down to the river and swam it without being led by men in boats.

(IV) 22nd Dragoons, August 1, 1907.

River.—The Rhine near Neunburg; 200 yards broad; current, 4 metres a second, or over 8 miles an hour.

Time.—Each squadron $\frac{3}{4}$ hour; regiment, $3\frac{3}{4}$ hours.

Method.—Horses towed alongside boats.

Description.—The boats towing the horses were filled with men, arms, &c. The boats were carried down stream about 500 yards each journey, and had to be towed up stream again to the starting point by the horses. There was only one suitable starting point where the horses could be brought to the boats in smooth water and where they

could enter deep water immediately. It is important to find such a place, otherwise the horses try to climb into the boats. The landing on the steep walled banks was especially difficult. In ordinary circumstances the landing could have been effected in a smooth bay opposite the starting point, but on account of the strong current only the best-managed boats could reach this bay.

(V) Five Regiments of XVIIth Corps, in 1904.

River.—Vistula, 500 to 1,400 yards broad.

Time.—Not given.

Method.—Men, saddles, arms, &c., in folding boats and pontoons, former pulled by four horses swimming at the side, latter by six horses. Some horses free.

JAPAN

VI. H.A. battery of 18th F.A. Regiment, October 1912.

(1) *Troops*.—Personnel, 188; horses, 170; vehicles, ten (gun and limber counts as one vehicle).

(2) *River*.—Width, 1,000 yards; rate, 3 miles an hour.

(3) *Time*.—4½ hours.

(4) *Method*.—All horses and vehicles transported in boats, which were punted in shallow water, propelled by one oar in deep water.

(5) *Material*.—(i.) Five sets of two flat-bottomed boats, 35 feet by 5 feet (at centre), each set carrying two horses. (ii.) One set of two flat-bottomed boats 40 feet by 8 feet (at centre), set carrying four horses. (iii.) Two sets smaller boats, each set carrying one gun and limber.

(6) *Rate of Crossing*.—One horse every 1.43 minute.

(VII) H.A. battery, 18th Regiment, October 1912.

(1) *Troops*.—Personnel, 188; horses, 170; vehicles, ten (gun and limber counting as one vehicle).

(2) *River*.—Width, 300 yards; rate, 3 miles an hour.

(3) *Time*.—Three hours.

(4) *Method*.—All in boats, which were punted in shallow water and propelled by one oar in deep water.

(5) *Material*.—Four boats, 30 feet by 5 feet, holding three horses each. Two boats slightly smaller, holding two horses each.

(6) *Rate*.—One horse a minute.

CUSTER'S CAVALRY AT THE LITTLE BIG HORN

BY PERCY CROSS STANDING

THE Red Man's last battle, as it has been not inaptly called, was fought on a June day of 1876, between a few hundred United States Cavalry troops and an army of painted and feathered Redskins commanded by 'Sitting Bull,' the mighty Sioux chief. Under 'Sitting Bull's' orders were half a dozen Redskin leaders of great renown, including 'Crow King,' 'Gall,' 'Crazy Horse,' 'Hump,' 'Little Horse,' 'Spotted Eagle,' and 'Big Road.'

The cause of the quarrel was the decision of the United States Government to confine the Indian braves to the "Reservations," or plots of territory allotted them to live on. But the Red Man did not like this at all. He preferred to live nomadically as he had always lived, free to roam about and to hunt, trap, and shoot whatever and wherever he wanted to.

'Sitting Bull' was at this time forty-two years of age, and a great 'medicine man.' He was not exactly perhaps a 'first-class fighting man,' but what he lacked in courage he managed to make up in subtlety, cunning, and great resourcefulness. And his saturnine Sioux followers had implicit faith in him.

During the winter of 1875-6 the struggle went on fitfully between the Indians and the United States troops, whose aim it was to drive them back to their 'Reservations.' The scene of the fighting was the vast borderland of Montana, Dakota, and Wyoming. The remnants of two great historic tribes were involved, namely, the Sioux and the Crow Indians. These were led respectively by 'Sitting Bull' and by 'Yellow Face.'

In the early spring of 1876, 'Sitting Bull' with a large force of braves was camped about the Little Missouri River, whilst 'Crazy Horse' and his followers lay along the Powder River in Wyoming. The disputed region was a wild, rugged, and mountainous one, well adapted for scouting tactics and totally unknown to the United States troops.

The dashing General Phil Sheridan was placed in command of

a powerful force destined to act against the Indians. Sheridan's headquarters were fixed at Chicago, and General Terry was his second in command. Under Terry served, as leaders of the mounted troops, two distinguished soldiers of the American Civil War, Brigadier-Generals Custer and Crook, and on March 17, 1876, Crook was attacked and badly defeated by the contingent under 'Crazy Horse.' This led to a fresh plan of campaign, for naturally the Redskins felt greatly encouraged by their defeat of Crook. They scalped the dead, and wild orgies took place around their camp-fires on the night following the battle.

General George Armstrong Custer, then in the prime of manhood, should have been General Sheridan's second in command. But President Grant (then ruler of the United States) bitterly disliked Custer, and it was only at the personal request of the gallant Phil Sheridan that Custer was permitted to accompany the expedition at all. As it was, he went out to meet his death.

Custer was a magnificent man. He stood nearly six feet high and was splendidly proportioned. He had been a total abstainer and non-smoker from boyhood. Directly he left the Military Academy at West Point he had joined the Cavalry. He fought at the battle of Bull Run with the United States 5th Cavalry, and with his own hand captured the first colours taken from the Confederates in the Civil War. But, like the majority of his colleagues, the brave Custer did not know much about the Red Man's slippery ways of fighting.


We may as well come at once to the awful tragedy that was about to befall General Custer. He was assigned to command the 7th United States Cavalry, a fine regiment mustering 700 sabres. On May 31, 1876, they crossed the Little Missouri River, going in search of 'Sitting Bull' in the 'Bad Lands' (so called because the land was too poor for cultivation) of the Yellowstone River. From the very start Custer seems to have committed the fatal blunder of dividing his force and underrating his foe.

On June 25 'Sitting Bull' was 'located,' and Custer at once marched out at the head of his little regiment to try conclusions with the Red Man. They were going to explore the practically unknown valley of 'The Little Big Horn,' which gives its name to the battle. Custer's force was divided into three bodies, of which Major Reno commanded the advance guard, Custer himself the second party,

Captain Benteen the rearguard, and Lieut. Matthey followed in charge of the train of pack-mules. In command of troop 'C' was the General's brother, Captain T. W. Custer.

'I have never heard General Custer talk like that before,' remarked one of his officers before the battle. 'I believe he is going to be killed.' The General appears to have had a sort of 'presentiment' of impending calamity. But soon the smoke of 'Sitting Bull's' wigwams came in sight.

Custer divided up his small force with deliberation, giving half of it to Major Reno with instructions to 'charge the village.' He himself intended to descend upon the hostile camp from the hills. All seemed quiet in the Indian village. But Captain Benteen, whose



battalion formed the reserve, received the following written message from his chief shortly after they separated: 'Benteen, come on—big village—be quick—bring packs.'

From that moment to this no word or sign has ever been received from Custer's command! It was destroyed off the face of the earth. No man escaped to tell the story. Only the dead remained. . . . It was a tragedy more utter and complete than that of our own 24th Regiment at Isandula in Zululand three years afterwards, because then a few men did escape to tell the bloody tale. For sheer mystery of horror it resembles, on a bigger scale, the wiping-out of the 'Shangani Patrol' by the savage Matabili in 1893.

How can we reconstruct the scene of noble Custer's death? It

is very difficult to do so. A subsequent court-martial on Major Reno's conduct failed to find out much. That officer was himself in some danger, so he entrenched himself and waited for relief. He was closely beset by the maddened Redskins, and by the time General Terry arrived to his assistance he had eighteen killed and fifty-two wounded in his own small force. The Indians fled.

A visit to the scene of Custer's defeat and death revealed 265 corpses. They died to a man. Every one of them had been scalped except General Custer himself, whom the Indians knew well by sight and regarded as a skilful 'medicine man.' For some time afterwards a powerful force of United States troops scoured the 'Bad Lands' of the Yellowstone, but in spite of all their marchings and counter-marchings they failed to discover any enemies at all. The wily Red Man had totally disappeared.

I fear that, having fallen into a regular trap, it was impossible for Custer to do anything but what he did—die where he stood. Major Callwell, who is the author of a discriminating little work on 'Small Wars,' points out that it looks as if Custer's troops had 'moved to the right of the (Yellowstone) River, as firing was heard on that side, and eventually it got back to near the river some distance lower down than where Reno's force had taken up position—this at least was conjectured from the tracks. For the force was annihilated, and nothing but the bodies of men and horses served to tell the tale of the disaster; but it appears to have been the case that the five troops fell in with an overwhelming force of Indians, and that these afterwards came to attack Major Reno's party.'

Personally, I am of the opinion that the lurid tragedy of June 25, 1876, might have been averted if better attention had been paid to the duty of scouting and reconnoitring. But it is very easy to be wise thirty-five years after the event, and doubtless half the trouble was due to the fact that no one engaged on the United States side seems to have known very much about the Indian methods of fighting and tactics.

Doubtless Custer's 265 poor fellows managed to account for several hundreds of their savage foes before they died, but the Sioux carried off their dead. The Little Big Horn was 'Sitting Bull's' last effort in warfare, but it was a great one, even if he did outnumber his enemies by ten to one.

HINTS ON HOW TO LECTURE ON ANY SUBJECT

By LIEUT.-COLONEL J. D. F. DONEGAN, *Royal Army Medical Corps*

THERE is a time-honoured belief on the part of many that lecturing, or rather the power of lecturing, is a gift; and that unless one happens to be a born orator it is useless to try to do so. If such were my belief it would be exceedingly egotistical on my part to enter into a discussion on such a subject; but when I start by saying that lecturing is really not difficult, and by no means outside the province of an ordinary mortal, I shall be excused, I hope, for trying to devise a system of simplification of the art—if it can be so called.

There is not a single arm of the Service where officers are not nowadays supposed to lecture. Although they leave Sandhurst and Woolwich full of knowledge, they do not appear to have been instructed in the methods of imparting their knowledge to others, or maintaining interest on the part of their audience on the subject they are discussing.

Lecturing, as everyone knows, is closely allied to after-dinner speaking, as it is nothing more or less than a system of expressing one's ideas clearly, rationally and without hesitation.

Every junior officer should remember that he may be carrying a Field-marshal's baton in his Wolseley valise, and that some day it may fall to his lot to return thanks as a commander of a victorious army. If he leaves it till then to practise speaking in public where others are supposed to listen, he will fall far short of his own expectations, and also the expectations of others. If, on the other hand, he starts in early life to lecture and speak clearly even on such subjects as the removal of Barrack Refuse, he will in after years do better in an after-dinner speech than pulling the tablecloth off from nervousness. My suggestions are not intended for those who aspire to speaking on a political platform, but more for the ordinary officer who lectures to his men, and who may on occasions lecture on original subjects and

on particular episodes, such as specific experiences under peculiar conditions.

1. *The Audience*.—The first thing to consider in any lecture is the audience, and they can generally be divided into four classes:—

(1) Those who know absolutely nothing about the subject and care less.

(2) Those who do not know much, but are willing to be convinced if the lecturer is capable of so doing.

(3) Those who imagine they know infinitely more of the subject under discussion than the lecturer himself.

(4) Those who do not agree with the lecturer, but are devoid of any reason which they can state for so doing.

Members of Class 3 really only attend with a view to a discussion (should there be one), when they will air their opinions and say 'I don't agree with,' &c., before they have spoken for a quarter of a minute. As a class they are hard to convince; and, as their minds are made up, it does not pay as far as the lecturer is concerned to enter into a heated discussion with them. Class 4 will not say much, beyond perhaps supporting someone in a contention opposed to the views of the lecturer with such a remark as 'I agree with Colonel So-and-so.'

The thing to consider is what should the lecturer do? I think it is better to disregard the last two classes and deal with the former. After all, if a lecturer can convert Class 1 into Class 2, and convince Class 2, his words have not been in vain.

Barrack Lectures.—In ordinary lectures in barracks the audience usually consists of Classes 1 and 2. If lecturing on a professional subject the audience of non-commissioned officers and men will listen to a lecturer patiently because they have to, but they often pay more attention to observing the doings of flies on the window. Even when officers attend lectures on subjects on which they may subsequently be examined, provided the lecturer is not likely to be an examiner, they look on the lecture as a bore, and imagine they would derive more information from text-books. The two essentials for lecturing on any subject in a manner which will interest are as follows:—

(1) A sound knowledge of the King's English, with a good vocabulary of words, particularly adjectives, so as to avoid frequent repetition.

(2) A clear, reasonable knowledge of the subject one is talking

about. One does not really require to be the greatest living expert on the point. On scientific subjects the greatest living expert is in all probability a literary miser who could not part with one atom of useful information under any conditions, and very likely to be annoyed with anyone who even pretended to understand him.

To maintain interest in a lecture it is hopeless to keep on saying 'I mean to say'; the thing is, to say it whether you mean it or not. I once knew an officer who lectured on hygiene to troops in barracks. He could not leave statistics out of his contention for a minute, so while he devoted endless time to wiping out a blackboard and looking for chalk on the ground, he kept on using his stock expression, 'Most important.' After a while the men realised that everything could not be most important, so they conferred on the gallant lecturer the designation of good old Most Important—a sobriquet which he retained during his tour of duty at the station.

As regards the question of vocabulary, if not obtained at school, an ordinary rhyming dictionary will be found of the greatest assistance in finding comparative meanings for words. If one were to say 'It is very necessary, very important, and very desirable that so-and-so should be done' it would not sound as well as very necessary, exceedingly important, and highly desirable—holding 'most important' in reserve for a future occasion.

As regards the question of knowledge, if one looks up the subject to be lectured on an hour before the lecture and repeats it word for word from some text-book already in the hands of the audience, he cannot expect to impress or teach. A lecturer should always lead his audience to believe that he knows more about his subject than he really does.

If anyone tries to put a lecturer in an awkward position by asking him questions to which he cannot reply with the usual remark, 'That is my point which I want answered,' one might say to the person who interrupted, 'You have so many points to raise you are like a porcupine.' Should one be lecturing on the duties of sentries on outposts in war, reading or repeating out of a book what should and should not be done will not appeal to the ordinary soldier. On the other hand, if one were to say 'Napoleon said that the man who did, or neglected to do, so-and-so deserved to have his feet chopped into cats' meat before his eyes' you will fix the importance of your point on

those who are listening to you. It really does not matter whether Napoleon said it or not; if he said all he is supposed to have said he would have been so busy talking that he would have had no time for fighting. If a porcupine gets at you with one of his points, tell him there was more than one Napoleon: do not tie yourself down to one; and the next lecture you might substitute the name of Cæsar for Napoleon, as there are lots of Cæsars to pick and choose from. If your suggestion is so novel and original that you cannot quote support from the noble dead, and should you fear a libel action as the result of shouldering the idea on to someone living, say: 'I myself, as the result of my experience, consider that,' &c.

In lecturing to soldiers it is a good plan to use words which the men really understand. 'A rotten, unhealthy hole' would be better understood than saying 'The climatic influences were found to be unpropitious.' Likewise, 'Mean as a rat' would be better understood than 'Exceedingly parsimonious.'

It is a good idea to try and make one's subject appear as easy as possible. It also should be made palatable and not served up as raw meat, as it were, fact after fact. I once knew an officer who lectured on sanitation, and his idea was not to teach or try to simplify, but, on the other hand, to impress his audience with the wonderful knowledge of the branch to which he belonged by using as many long words and technical expressions as possible.

At the commencement of a barrack lecture, a lecturer should make up his mind that none of his audience should leave without learning something. He should not prick with his points like the before-mentioned porcupine, but he should rub them well in like an embrocation, if necessary going over the same place again and again, so that the dullest are made to understand. Scripture tells us there is more joy in heaven at the conversion of one sinner than the reception of one hundred just men, and, similarly, there should be more gratification to a lecturer in teaching one cast-iron duffer than numbers of men of greater intellectual powers.

In a barrack lecture you will probably find the duffers at the back of the house, as back benches are supposed to be outside the firing zone of questions. On a London stage if an actor wishes to make a play a success he will ignore the stalls and go for the pit and gallery, and a lecturer should do likewise; you have nothing to fear from the

back of the house. Should any porcupines be present they will be well to the front, so a lecturer should devote his attention to the man who is only capable of raising one point—the point of the bayonet.

Methods of Lecturing.—Should one be more ambitious as far as lecturing is concerned and go a step beyond the detailed class, who are simply ordered to lecture on professional subjects whether they like to do so or not, there are different systems to be considered.

(1) Reading a paper.

(2) Lecturing with the assistance of notes.

(3) Speaking without any literary assistance at all.

1. *Reading a Paper.*—A popular system at scientific lectures where the actual lecture itself is a secondary consideration to subsequent press publicity, and where the lecturer imagines that the ordinary press reporter would be unable to spell half the words he used. Reading a paper is not likely to appeal to anyone but an enthusiast on the subject. It certainly is the simplest method, as the paper may be written by someone else. Personally, I feel quite capable of reading a paper on Bull-baiting in Borneo, provided it is properly typed and the light is good, but I could not lecture on the subject, as I know nothing about bulls and less about Borneo. It is exceedingly difficult to carry a point or lay stress on a particular point in paper reading. Imagine counsel for the defence reading out a brief from a pile of typewritten papers and saying: 'Gentlemen of the jury, the prisoner at the bar is an innocent man and does not deserve to be hanged because——.' Then he turns over a page and it so happens that the next sheet is missing or disarranged. If there is a hitch or delay the jury, so to speak, put the rope round the prisoner's neck, coming to the natural conclusion that if his own counsel does not know why he should not be hanged, neither do they.

2. *Lecturing with Notes.*—This method is, in my humble opinion, vastly superior to paper reading, as points can be brought forward more forcibly and more interest can be maintained. The lecturer can have his principal points written either in the form of a synopsis or on a blackboard, and he can refer to them freely. For all practical purposes it is the best form of lecturing, as one cannot go very far wrong when important points can be referred to.

3. *Lecturing without Reference to Notes.*—In dealing with this subject my hints and suggestions are only intended for a person who

is a novice and one who is speaking in public for the first time. It may be a lecture on some original suggestion or invention, or it may be one relating peculiar experiences in foreign lands. Having said that I am only speaking to the novice, as I do not presume to speak to anyone else, I shall endeavour to describe the mode of procedure. In the first place, the lecturer should find out his time limit, and if there should happen to be none, I should advise him to fix his own at 50 minutes at the outside. Then he proceeds to write his lecture—never forgetting his time limit.

* Trouble can be saved in this respect by writing approximately a quarter of the lecture to start with, and then reading it over aloud to see how it fits in with time. If it takes more than twelve minutes to read, the fact should be carefully kept in mind when writing the remainder of the lecture; otherwise it may be too long and will require to be re-written. I will presume for argument's sake that the lecture is written and that it can be read aloud in anything from 40 to 45 minutes. Then it should be punctuated in proper English and ready for typing. The next thing is how to remember it. To write an article of three or four thousand words and remember and repeat in public every word of it would even be trying to Sir Herbert Tree. Even though one may be able to commit to memory the greater part of it in private, one would be exceedingly likely to break down when repeating it in public. It is, so to speak, playing on a one-string instrument, and if that one string goes the performance is concluded. Now suppose that instead of trying to remember it word for word one practised in private to say every sentence four or five different ways, after a little while it would come quite easy. Let us say that the lecture is written

as follows:—

'Mr. President and Gentlemen, I propose to-day to lecture to you on the subject of,' &c. If the ordinary person forgets to say 'Mr. President and Gentlemen,' and starts by saying 'I propose to lecture to-day on,' &c., he realises his error, and, so to speak, gets in a bunker to start with, and there is a hitch and a second start, which is undesirable. Suppose he repeated it to himself in the following ways:—

1st, 'Mr. President and Gentlemen, I propose to-day,' &c.

2nd, 'I propose to lecture to-day, Mr. President and Gentlemen,' &c.

3rd, 'It is my intention to-day, Mr. President and Gentlemen,' &c.

4th, 'With your permission, Mr. President and Gentlemen, I shall to-day endeavour to lecture,' &c.

On this system the lecturer has practised four different ways of expressing the same idea, and the knowledge that he is sure to strike on one gives him confidence. By a peculiar coincidence, without any effort, after some practice one will intuitively drop on the words written, and finally be credited with the power of wonderful memory which he really may not possess. It goes without saying that the lecturer must clearly understand his subject and that what he says must be in accordance with his sentiments. The whole lecture should be gone through sentence for sentence on this system, and granted that the lecturer is clear on his points, instead of making it more difficult it makes it far easier to one who tries.

It is the start of a lecture which presents difficulty; once over the introductory remarks, one warms to the subject and continues to the end with very little trouble. I may say that in my humble efforts in this direction I always prefer to lecture according to this method. One has time to spare as compared with reading a paper or looking at notes, and it certainly appeals more to an audience.

Jocular Remarks.—An occasional jocular remark during a lecture often acts as a stimulant, but a joke that will amuse when spoken will not read well in cold print. A facetious remark is often made in court, and even in Parliament; still, I would advise the novice—and after all I am only dealing with such—to use a joke as a cook should condiments. To start a lecture on a serious subject with a joke would be like starting a dinner-party with a *hors-d'œuvre* of red pepper on toast. Stories, similes, and jokes should come later on. If they appeal to an audience one can continue the experiment, but if the first effort falls flat I would not advise anyone to try a second.

I do not know any further suggestions which I can make on the subject of lecturing in public, and what I have said is only intended as a suggestion.

It is natural that my readers may ask who am I that I should lay down laws on such a subject, and I frankly admit—no one. I have lectured a great deal in public, as a matter of fact, and to my many critics I say I depend more on the common sense of my suggestions, given purely for what they are worth in the estimation of my readers, than on a reputation of efficiency.

Since this lecture was written I have had the honour of having a short discussion on the subject with Lieut.-General Sir R. S. S. Baden-Powell, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., and a general officer who has previously contributed a much esteemed and valuable article on the same subject to the *CAVALRY JOURNAL*. The General informed me that junior officers are now better instructed in the art of lecturing than they were; in fact, they are at some places told that a certain subject would be under discussion and they are then nominated indiscriminately to lecture on it.

Still, to those who have not undergone this very excellent form of training, my humble suggestions may be of some little assistance.



BUONAPARTE'S CAMEL CORPS

By PERCY WHITE

WHILST the recent disaster which befel our Camel Corps in Somaliland is still fresh in our minds, it may be interesting to recall the formation of the first European Corps mounted on these animals of the desert.

The idea originated during General Buonaparte's campaign in Egypt. Whilst inspecting the two routes which led from Cairo to Suez the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff came upon an Arab caravan escorted by men mounted on camels, and the quick eye of the great soldier soon noticed how easily they were handled and taught to manœuvre, their pace in the desert compared with the horse being much faster. He asked Eugène Beauharnais and Edward Colbert, together with other young officers who accompanied him, to try their skill on these mounts, and they were soon able to show him that they could manage these animals with almost as much skill as the Arabs.

Buonaparte thereupon gave orders for the organisation of a corps in the nature of Mounted Infantry, whose rapid movements would render the greatest service to the French Army. For this purpose the best and swiftest camels were procured, and employed not only in holding the lines of communication, serving as scouts and orderlies, but they also took part in the various Cavalry engagements against the Mamelukes.

The 'Régiment des Dromadaires' had only a brief existence, being raised at Cairo in 1799 and disbanded in 1801, but during this period they proved themselves equal in bravery to the oldest veterans.

The Corps was commanded by Colonel Cavalier, and when first organised consisted of a small force of about one hundred men, but was after-

wards composed of three squadrons, the troopers being picked from the Grenadier companies of various Infantry regiments, and recognised for their valour, each man having four or more years' service.

During the first months of the Corps' existence two men were mounted back to back on one animal and provided with arms, ammunition, and provisions for several days, but finding that they were



'RÉGIMENT DES DROMADAIRES.'

unable to operate together in unison, the space that had been occupied by the second man was utilised to better advantage for provisions and ammunition. Their arms consisted of a musket, similar in pattern to those carried by the Dragoons, bayonet, cartridge-case, and belt, sabre of the Light Cavalry pattern, and also a lance about 15 feet long, the latter being in use only for a short time and soon discarded. Many of the men carried richly engraved Oriental swords, which they had

doubtless captured from the Arabs, and were worn *à la Mameluke* by a red cord passed over the right shoulder. The camels were not guided by a bridle, but by the simple means of two cords attached to an iron ring, which was passed through the nostrils of the animal, very similar to the way in which oxen are guided in Italy.

The 'Dromadares,' after having been thoroughly trained, quite fulfilled the expectations of Buonaparte, and he employed them with great success against the Bedouins, who still offered a stubborn resistance. These ferocious tribes of the desert made continual raids into Cairo, killing and robbing everyone within their reach, and easily escaped pursuit by the French Cavalry on account of their superior horses. But the Camel Corps, who were able to cover from twelve to twenty miles without stopping, quickly overtook these robbers, and rarely returned to headquarters without bringing with them a number of prisoners. Their method of attack was to surround the Arabs—the camels, upon a word of command, would kneel down, allowing the men to dismount and take cover behind their backs, from which they poured in a withering fire on their enemies.

General Desaix, who had been placed with a division of three thousand men at the entrance of Upper Egypt, in order to conquer Mourad Bey, also raised a Camel Corps, with the object of capturing this notorious chief, but, like the giant in the fable, immediately the French troops came in touch with the remnants of his army, he would always manage to make good his escape, to reappear again with his followers in some other part of the country.

To form this new Corps Desaix chose about three hundred picked men from his division and mounted them on camels which he had collected for the purpose, the command being given to Adjutant-General P. Boyer; but, though pursued and harassed by the 'Dromadares,' Mourad Bey still continued to evade his enemies, and after an unsuccessful campaign the Corps returned without having obtained any better result than capturing or killing a certain number of the Mamelukes.

This new Corps was afterwards joined to those previously raised in Cairo, and the combination numbered about seven hundred men.

The 'Régiment des Dromadares' had a variety of uniforms, and, according to some accounts, General Buonaparte ordered them to parade through the towns several times over in these different costumes,

so as to give the inhabitants an impression that the Corps was a great deal stronger than was actually the case.

The interesting old print reproduced was published by Messrs. Booth & Co., London, in 1822, and hangs in the United Service Museum, Whitehall. It was evidently sketched from Nature, and no doubt by one of the English soldiers taking part in this campaign against the French. The inscription beneath the picture states that Colonel Cavalier and his men surrendered to Sir John Doyle on May 17, 1801. The English column under his command was composed of detachments of the 12th and 26th Dragoons, together with Artillery, and captured the 'Dromadaires' between Cairo and Alexandria, whilst they were escorting a convoy of provisions to this last-named place. About twenty-eight officers, five hundred and seventy men, four hundred and twenty horses and camels were taken, together with a gun and also a standard of the regiment (see p. 155).

When the Corps was first raised they wore a turban and short pale-blue jacket, with wide Oriental trousers, some of which were made of blue cloth, others red; but this costume was soon replaced by a French Hussar uniform. The turban was discarded for the 'caouk,' a sort of shako covered with red pleated cloth and surmounted by coloured ostrich plumes. This head-dress was again changed for the regulation shako of the Light Cavalry pattern, with plume at side.



The Bicorné hat shown in the English print is quite correct and was evidently kept for ordinary use, the shako being reserved for parade days. In full-dress uniform they wore the Hussar dolman and tight breeches of pale-blue cloth, and over the dolman a red tunic with short sleeves, mixture of blue and white cord, top-boots made of black, red, and sometimes yellow morocco leather. A white Arab mantle hanging from the shoulders completed this theatrical costume, which is said to have been designed by Kleber!

A section of Artillery was attached to the Corps under the command of a sergeant-major, and the gunners wore the same uniform as the rest of the men.

The regiment had three standards—one for each squadron, and carried by a sergeant-major—but it is impossible to form any idea

of the designs or colour of these flags, as no trace of the originals can be found.

It was necessary for the 'Dromadaires' to have trumpeters, as in the Light Cavalry regiments, but, as a sufficient number of these men could not be procured, the deficiency was made up by drummers; so, curiously enough, the Corps had both trumpeters and drummers at

the same time. They were distinguished from the rest of the men by a Hussar pelisse of pale-blue cloth, trimmed with grey fur. This was worn in place of the dolman.



TRUMPETER.

Captain François, who had joined the Camel Corps on its formation, states in his Memoirs that Buonaparte reviewed three hundred of the 'Dromadaires,' he being one of the number, and that they were the picked men of the Army, and their pay was higher than in the line regiments. They covered twenty or thirty leagues a day, and the camels went as long as six days without water.

François was captured by Turks and sold as a slave, but when in Europe he managed to escape, and by good luck came across his old Infantry regiment. This he rejoined and was able to take part in many battles of the First Empire. This old survivor of the 'Grande Armée' spent the latter part of his life at Nantes, where he died on April 3, 1853, in his seventy-eighth year.

The remains of the 'Régiment des Dromadaires' returned to France after the campaign in Egypt and were drafted into the 'Gendarmes-à-pied.' The men were greatly disappointed with this arrangement, as most of them had hopes of being incorporated in the famous regiment of Napoleon's Guides.



THE HORSE MOBILISATION OF THE ARMY

(A lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich,
October 23, 1913.)

By BREVET LIEUT.-COLONEL G. F. MACMUNN, D.S.O., R.F.A.

(From the Journal of the Royal Artillery.—By kind permission.)

THE subject of Horse Mobilisation of a large Army is perhaps one of the most complicated in connection with the modern administration of any modern army. All here know in outline the main principles on which a modern army is mobilised. Throughout Europe a large portion of the fighting force of a modern army is at work in the civil life of the country. It has passed through the ranks and is recalled to the colours on mobilisation. It is also within your knowledge that certain grades of the employés, of the officers, of the *personnel*, of the army on mobilisation need not necessarily have a military training, for this reason. There are certain commissioned ranks, doctors, veterinary surgeons, and when we get to the craftsmen, the drivers of motor lorries, the telegraphists, the butchers, and the bakers, who perform in war-time the ordinary duties of their civil life, and only have, as in civil life, to do as their employers tell them.

To a very great extent the horses required on mobilisation come in the same category as the telegraphist, &c.; that is to say, the draught horse, the trotting vanner, in peace time is only doing its every-day work when you put it to the gun. It will not perhaps drive through the pegs at Olympia with success, but it will certainly drive your gun into action for you. The same applies to the vanner and the transport animal of civil life. Therefore, throughout the whole of Europe for any general mobilisation—a general mobilisation of all the forces offensive and defensive of a country—the Governments rely on impressing or obtaining the services of a considerable number of the working-horse life of the country. You may remember in the early days of the Balkan War seeing pictures in the illustrated

papers of horses and vans being stopped by the authorities in the streets and the animals being carried off for military service. In more developed armies, in the armies of the Continent and our own, less improvised methods than that are adopted, but the main point remains that nowhere in Europe can you mobilise an army on a large scale without having very large recourse to the civil horses of the country, *always, of course, assuming that there are sufficient horses in the civil life of the country to meet your military needs.* Were it not so, before every army administration would come the problem of finding some other solution. For example, if we turn to India you will see that in that country a battery of Field Artillery stands in its lines in peace time with 168 horses (its war establishment) for the very reason that there are no horses in the civil life of the country that can be obtained on mobilisation to complete the Artillery ranks. The batteries therefore stand in peace at war establishment. Here, on the contrary, you see a battery standing with 70 horses in its lines because (though you may not believe it) there are sufficient horses available in the civil life of the country to bring it up to war establishment. The peace establishment here is only based on the economic minimum that can possibly be made sufficient for training purposes.

Before describing our own procedure for a general mobilisation of horses, I would like to separate two issues which to a certain extent are confounded in people's minds. We have all heard of and seen a certain amount of activity during the last year or two in the way of preparations for horse mobilisation, and people naturally in their minds have connected that with another thing which has, quite by chance, happened at the same time, and that is the diminishing of the horse population owing to the rise of the motor. It is merely by chance that the political situation which has made it necessary for the Government and the War Office to think seriously about promptly mobilising all the forces of this country has come up more or less at the same time as the introduction of the motor. The introduction of the motor might have come ten or twenty years before or after such a conjuncture, but by chance they have come together, and people are apt to take the one as the corollary of the other. That is not so at all, except, of course, that the diminution of the horse population of the country means that the horse mobilisation probably

is more difficult and more complicated. Now horse mobilisation and horse provision is in the Department of the Quartermaster-General, and is actually worked under his orders by the Director of Remounts.

About a year and a half ago a horse mobilisation section was started to deal with the more acute problem of horse mobilisation required by the modern conditions. The problem before our own War Office is twofold. First, a general mobilisation of the whole of the forces of the country which, as we know, consists of six divisions of the Regular Army, with Cavalry and mounted brigades, and fourteen divisions of the Territorial Army and fourteen mounted brigades with certain coast defence troops. It is the business of the War Office to take cognisance and to prepare for the largest possible occasions that may arise, that is to say the complete mobilisation of horse-flesh for all those units. Never in the history of England has it been contemplated, or been possible, to mobilise all the forces of this country *promptly* without resorting as on the Continent to the civil life of the country. It is the intention of the Government, as it always has been, if necessary to mobilise the forces by putting into force the laws of the country, which enact that, should his Majesty through a Secretary of State declare an emergency to exist, it is then lawful for every horse, vehicle, barge, ship, lorry, motor-car, bicycle, or air-craft to be impressed immediately for the Public Service at a fair valuation. That law is as old as 1692, and it is as new as 1912, when air-craft was added to the list of the items which could be impressed. But in those 220 years that law has constantly been brought up to date and revised, and therefore it is not, as people sometimes think, a new law passed through the House of Commons at midnight when every one was asleep, nor is it an old law brought out of the dustbin, but it is an old law constantly revised and brought up to date, and the only reason we are seeing and hearing more of it at present is the necessity for being able to meet an urgent general mobilisation rather than one in which we should have some months to turn round in; and we are merely evolving such a machinery that whenever the country chooses to put into effect its own laws the War Office shall be able to give effect to those laws promptly and effectively. The situation was exactly the same 100 years ago as regards the law and the intention of the Government if necessary.

In going through the various procedures which have been evolved and adopted, I would like you to make me one concession for the present, and that is, let me assume that that great *sine qua non* does exist, and that is that there are amply sufficient horses in the country to enable us to have what we want for our military needs, without crippling the whole horse life in such a conjuncture as a national emergency. I will go into the figures later.

Turning for a moment from the question of General Mobilisation, we have also to provide for a Partial Mobilisation, that is to say a mobilisation of the forces in which the Government would be averse to obtaining, or would not rely on, the general support of Parliament and the country for putting the Impressment Laws into effect. We can easily imagine this sort of situation; it has arisen in connection with the sending of reinforcements to South Africa, and on the many minor military occasions we have had in the past. To meet this we have at present what is called the Army Horse Reserve, which is only rather a more decorative name for what used to be called the Registered Horse, but the Army Horse Reserve now has two classes: one we call the *Artillery Section* (subsidised), which has an establishment of 10,000 horses and an actual strength of between 7000 and 8000, which is daily and slowly increasing and which will reach the 10,000, no doubt, before long; and a *Miscellaneous Section* with an establishment of 15,000 and an actual strength of over 14,000, including saddle and transport horses of various classes, some of the Artillery type and some heavier, which is what we used to call the old Registered Horse. Those horses, totalling over 21,000, are at the Quartermaster-General's call in 48 hours at ten miles distant from their stable whenever it is lawful for the Secretary of State for War to call out any section of the Army Reserve. The owners have entered into a civil contract to deliver on those terms and to forfeit a penalty of £50 for every horse they fail to provide up to the contract. As to the fee we pay for those, there are two different classes: the Artillery horse, or subsidised horse, we pay £4 a year for, half-yearly in arrears. That section was only opened at the beginning of the current year; in it we now have 7800 horses and they have all been inspected on first acceptance by Artillery officers, and they are inspected every six months *before we pay the fee*. We have only had the first half-year's inspection as yet, and

that has been uniformly satisfactory. The reason we pay £4, however, is not necessarily to get those on our books for an actual campaign, although that is a useful corollary, but because it was represented to the War Office very largely by several deputations from some of the largest horse owners, especially the business horse owners, of the country that a little assistance of that kind would definitely help a good many of the firms to make up their minds not to change to motor transport. They said that economically in business life a horse has either by a book transaction or actual cash to show that it is earning its keep, and with the present price of forage, and the fact that many horses are jobbed out to earn £4 here and £10 there, the extra £4 makes all the difference between a horse paying the interest on its money value and being a losing proposition. So on the strength of that the Government decided to pay, at any rate for three years, £40,000 a year. We only take that horse for the Artillery section on a contract extending over three years; the owner has contracted that we can obtain his horse during that three years on the payment of £4 a year under the penalty of £50. He is allowed to withdraw from the agreement at any time under certain penalties which I need not specify. That is how the case stands at the present moment for any mobilisation of a lesser kind, and in that way we can put our hands on 21,000 horses.

I now come for a moment, before going on to the major question of the impressment organisation, to the treatment of the peace establishment. It was laid down last year that as an unfit horse, that is a horse unfit to go into the field, costs as much as a fit horse to keep every year, and a Government horse costs the taxpayer close on £30 a year in forage, we would keep no horses on the peace establishment in any unit of any sort or kind, service unit, training brigade, Cavalry dépôt, or anything else, except perhaps the mounted band, that was not fit for at least a month's service in the field. Only a month was fixed because it was felt that if a horse would do a month we could much more easily replace him at the end of the month's time than if he was unfit immediately on mobilisation, and that it was often better to start out with some old horses than to cast too ruthlessly. The result of that has been the getting rid of a lot of really aged horses we had in the Service, especially in the Artillery, that the commanding officers and the high commanders

really thought were not fit for a month's service. The result of this regulation is rather important in this way, that we can now start with the assumption that every horse on the peace establishment is fit for active service except it is either too young as a remount or temporarily unfit for veterinary reasons. We accordingly start with the assumption that 10 per cent. in all corps except Cavalry, and 20 per cent. in the Cavalry, will be temporarily unfit for veterinary reasons or reasons of immaturity, and, normally speaking, we arrange to complete on mobilisation every unit to the extent of 90 or 80 per cent. of its peace establishment, as the case may be.

As regards the Cavalry, there have been large increases in the Cavalry establishment in the last few years, and it is recognised that for the next year or eighteen months 20 per cent. is not quite enough in this arm, but special provision has been made to cover that. As soon as a large batch of young horses are matured, and until the normal intake is coming, the 20 per cent. will cover the difficulty.

A Remount Statement has been issued mostly to units and shows the disposal of the horses to non-mobilised units on mobilisation. Certain units and corps do not mobilise, and we strip them of their service horses at the beginning, and certain of them we rebuild from impressed horses, the detail of which is laid down in the Remount Statement. The Remount Statement is a book prepared by the War Office, which shows every corps of the Regular Forces, the Territorial Forces, and the dépôts of reserve units which will require draught horses on general mobilisation. From the figures we know exactly how many horses we want, which alone is useful information. On the last page of the extract, I think it is page 6, we have made the Army very happy by making a mistake in figures in some detail which does not total up correctly. It has caused so much pleasure to everybody in pointing it out that we are not sorry we made it! I was responsible for it and the figures in the schedule on page 6 do not quite tally with some of the figures inside.

I now come to the major question, which is the completing of the War Establishment for General Mobilisation by Impressment; that is to say, the machinery evolved for putting the Impressment Laws into practice. I would like to make a point in connection with this, and that is that this is a machinery consisting of various component parts. A good many of you who have experience of it can

point out that there are weaknesses and flaws in each of the parts, and that probably is so, but we are getting very valuable information from various sources as to where the machine wants strengthening and touching up, and that sort of thing. But that does not matter; the machine is a going concern and each part can be taken out, looked at, and improved and put back. You will see as I go on that one of the component parts of the machinery is a horse census. A great many people say, 'Your horse census is not reliable or complete.' That may be so. The remedy is to improve it. And in the same way other people will say, 'Your purchases are not satisfactory.' If that is so, they can be improved. It does not affect the fact that there is a working plan which only wants oiling and improving instead of being in itself incomplete. The whole question of rapid impressment depends, first of all, on your knowing where the horses you are to take are, and therefore for that purpose we have been aiming at having a complete census of the horses of the country which are fit for military purposes. To do that during last year there were 503 officers in the United Kingdom carrying out that census right throughout the country. A good many had been at work the year before. Those officers came from various sources, but they are all officers of the Regular Army with one or two exceptions; they were very largely Territorial adjutants, but also from all the commands in England a certain number of Regular officers were detailed.

The first thing in this organisation was to divide the commands up into certain remount circles. There are now in Great Britain (apart from Ireland which is rather different) 19 remount circles apportioned among the commands. Each of those circles was divided up into certain census areas, and in each of those the census was carried out by a military officer. The result of that I will touch on later. This census was only made possible by an amendment of the laws of the land, that is to say the Army Act of 1911. An amendment was inserted by which it was lawful for any duly appointed military officer to visit the ordinary private stables of the country during reasonable hours for the purpose of noting down and seeing what horses contained in those stables were fit for military purposes. Should the owner refuse to allow the census officer to enter, it is lawful for a magistrate then to be applied to, and the

magistrate shall issue a search warrant and a constable shall carry it out so that the census may be effected. That is a very great change in the old system that 'an Englishman's house is his castle'; but without that law it was perfectly impossible to carry out the military census unless you went to the other extreme of ordering people to render a return of their animals, and even then you would be up against the same difficulty which the Income Tax Commissioners have, that the people would no doubt conceal a certain number of their horses and what they were fit for, or even with the best of intention misdescribe them! So we have been giving effect during the last two years to this new law. In no case (and I think it speaks a good deal for the good temper of the English folk generally) have we had to apply for a search warrant. One officer did have his ears boxed by a lady, but still she apologised. Now and again there has been unpleasantness, and so as to avoid, if possible, the search warrant, the War Office has issued to its own officers a supplementary ruling which has said that, 'Should the census officer be refused admittance, the remount officer of the remount circle shall, first of all, call on the objector and explain the law and the reason of the whole thing, and only then if permission is refused shall recourse be had to the search warrant.' It has not been necessary to take any exceptional steps. There have been a few recalcitrants, but generally everybody has thoroughly understood and has been helpful and agreeable about it. In these 19 remount areas the census was carried out last year, and it has given us a very large number of horses indeed, which I will go into a little later.

The next part of the machinery is to allot to each command the quota of horses it has to supply. The principle followed is that every command mobilises its own units under its orders with this exception, that when commands cannot do so we aid them in getting numbers from other commands; for instance, Aldershot wants this year 13,000 horses over and above what it can find in its own area—it has a very small area and a great many troops; so the quota for Aldershot is distributed, the orders being issued in this Remount Statement I have here which I referred to before, which tells each command what they have to put into Aldershot, what date those horses have to be there, and what classes of horses they have to be. But in the same way one or two of the other commands are deficient in certain types

of horses, and they have had to have help from outside, the general principle being that each command provides its own units from its own horse population. To equalise the demand we have distributed among them the quotas for horses for certain reserve units. I might refer to this here: the reserve units are the machinery for sending into the field reinforcements of men and horses. If 14 Cavalry regiments leave this country, 14 reserve regiments are immediately formed and completed with impressed horses, and they take over the young and temporarily sick horses which are left behind. Those have to be mobilised at the same time as the rest of the Army, also 3 horse and 12 field reserve brigades are mobilised at the same time as the field army. Behind the reserve units are the remount depôts, which are filled by impressment to a certain establishment, and once that impressment is finished (and we require by impressment this year 140,000 horses in working condition) the impressment drops, and we then have some four months' reserve of horses in our hands, and we look about us to see whether we can buy more or get them from over-sea. But the principle is this: It is probably not possible except in dire emergency to impress twice. You can imagine that if we impress 140,000 horses out of this country, distributed reasonably among the population, it is simply like scooping water out of a pond, and immediately the water finds its own level; that is to say, the remaining horse population of the country is bought, sold and hired according to the wants of its population, it finds its own level, and we cannot take 500 horses out of 2,000 horses which are suitable one week and then go back again next week and do it again, or we would drive the country, except in a very dire emergency, to despair.

In those 19 remount circles, as the War Office informs the commands of the number of horses they have to supply, so the commands distribute that demand among their remount circles, and each remount officer is told that for the ensuing year he will have to supply a certain quota of horses, which, of course, is based on the result of the census. We do not tell a command that the remount circles provide more horses than the military census shows available. When the remount officer of the circle (the Deputy Assistant Director of Remounts) has received from his command his quota, the next thing he has to do is to distribute those horses for impressment. For this purpose he has to organise his circle into a certain number of

purchasing areas, and the number of purchasing areas is naturally based on the number of horses required each day. For a rough calculation it is estimated that a man will buy 30 horses in the country and 50 in a big town in a day if we give him a motor-car. That is merely a working figure; it is a sort of outline figure on which they base their arrangements. If horses in a certain area have got to be produced very early in the mobilisation programme, you have a larger number of purchasers and a smaller purchasing area; we have more men buying each day. It is merely a matter of consideration of the situation and adjustment. We will say for the sake of argument that there may be in a remount circle perhaps 30 purchasing areas; each of those purchasing areas is presided over by a purchaser. In accordance with the system under which public service of a certain kind in this country is given free, as witness the Magistracy, the County Councillors, Municipal Councillors, and so forth, so we rely on free service for our purchasers in time of emergency, and some 900 private gentlemen in prominent positions in the counties and, to a certain extent, retired officers, have been good enough to accept service as a War Office purchaser. It is a service we cannot hope to repay in kind, but they have suitable allowances in war time, enough to pay their out-of-pocket expenses. The services they afford are probably quite beyond remuneration, but it is a part of the English tradition that well-to-do and public men give certain services in return for their position. Each of those purchasers, of whom there are some 900 altogether, have, or will have very shortly, but I fancy they will have by now, a box in which is their list of horses to be impressed (to which we always add 25 per cent. spare). If a man has to produce 400 horses a week or a fortnight we give him 25 per cent. spare in his list, and very often more, to account for changes since the last census and for horses being unfit. It is just possible that experience will show that we shall have to allow a larger percentage. In each purchaser's box there is a list of the horses he has to impress and the various warrants and machinery for doing so. He has the schedules to be taken to the magistrates, he has two or more cheque-books of payment orders for payment for the horses, he has a pair of branding irons and a lot of labels and other various items which he requires. The remount officer of the circle probably visits him once a year and

changes any of the papers which are necessary, sees that they are there, and sometimes talks them over with him. Some of our purchasers take an immense interest in the system, others do not take quite so much. Many, however, are very good in trying to get the people to understand about it, and in arranging with the local magistrates and the police to expedite their share in the machinery, which naturally lightens the duty of the D.A.D.R.'s of circles.

Now the Impressment Lists are arranged very much as follows: For the big stations, such as Aldershot and Woolwich, horses of the various types are sent in in bulk; that is to say, a remount area is told to send 200 draught, 100 saddle, and 300 transport horses to Aldershot, where they have a big temporary depôt to receive them, and the officer in charge of that sends them out to units. I fancy the same obtains in Woolwich. Where there are isolated units or where there are Territorial units the horses are generally bought and consigned to a separate unit.

As regards the impressment for the Territorial Forces the machinery is quite the same, only, as a rule, a purchaser is appointed not for an area, but purchaser for a Territorial unit or group of units. He may or may not be an officer of the unit, generally not, because the officers of the unit will probably have enough to do without, but in certain Yeomanry regiments it is arranged that the commanders of squadrons of the unit shall themselves purchase. Every Territorial unit (1) has information that its horses will arrive by train on a certain date, and it must take them over at the station according to telegram, *or* (2) it has a list of places to which it has to go to fetch horses impressed by the purchaser appointed to the unit, *or* (3) has orders and a list of horses it has to impress for itself. This is arranged exactly as for the expeditionary force with at least 25 per cent. margin to allow for horses having been changed since the last census.

We now come to the question of valuation. I have here a very ordinary thing, a cheque-book of what are called 'emergency payment orders'; they are merely an order to be signed by the purchaser paying so and so for so many horses. It is the duty of the purchaser to represent State and citizen. At one time our purchasers thought they were to accept the onerous duty of taking their neighbours' horses, and they rather naturally shied at that, but we have now explained to them that the people who take the horses are the

magistrates and the police. The purchaser is the go-between, the honest broker who values a horse, says what he thinks it is worth, tries to serve both the State on the one side and the subject on the other, and pays down on the nail an order which the owner can convert into cash through his bank. He cannot get hard cash for it but he puts it into his bank, and they are collected from the command paymaster without delay, and the law provides that should the subject feel himself aggrieved at the price paid he shall appeal to the County Court Judge, and the County Court Judge has the right, in fact it is his duty, to hear the case, hear what the remount officer has to say and hear what the owner has to say, and if he thinks right to enhance the price. If a man has received an average of £60 for three horses and is able to establish the fact that he should have had more, the County Court Judge may and shall quite rightly award him another £10 or £20, or whatever it may be. That is the machinery safeguarding the interests of the citizen.

Now I might just allude to the actual machinery of the impressment. The actual forms are bundles of warrants and orders, the legal machinery is as follows:—I should first say that by law any officer of field-rank, may, if authorised, impress horses for the units under his command; that is to say a major of a battery, if duly authorised, may impress horses for his own battery, or the Commander-in-Chief of a command may impress horses for the whole of the units mobilised within his command. That is the law. The first thing which happens is, that the order to mobilise having gone forth, the purchaser, who has the complete Army Form A2029 in his possession (ready signed and complete except for the name of the Secretary of State), receives a telegram, merely stating the fact that Mr. Secretary So-and-so (who ever the Secretary of State is) has issued the necessary Proclamation declaring an emergency to exist and when the first day of mobilisation will be. Having received that telegram (the name of the Secretary), which at present is necessary by law (it cannot be filled in beforehand as it depends on who is with the King), the purchaser, say at dinner-time, or in the evening, gets a telegram that the first day of mobilisation is to-morrow, or the day after to-morrow, whatever it might be. He at once fills in the name of the Secretary of State, who has issued the Proclamation, in the Form A (of A.F. A2029), which we call the *Requisition*, and he motors over, or drives over to

the nearest magistrate, whom he well knows beforehand, if he is in (and if he is away the next one) and fills in Form B, the *Demand*, and presents it to the magistrate. That is merely calling on him to issue a warrant for the provision of horses and vehicles as shown in the schedule attached. That as you see is only a matter of signing the name and filling in a few words and then attaching to it the schedule of horses for impressment. The magistrate shall then forthwith issue Form C, which is called *Justice's Warrant*. That 's merely an order to the police to provide the horses shown in the attached list, which you will remember includes at least 25 per cent. more than the requirements. Having got the Justice's Warrant, the purchaser probably goes round to a pre-arranged police station, and informs the police that he will call in his car for the necessary constable to-morrow, whereupon the next morning he picks up his constable and proceeds round, and with an indelible pencil the constable proceeds to fill in the *Constable's Order*, D, according to the scheduled list, the names of owners who have got to supply horses and the horses required. They are bound up together (as you will see from those few copies I have circulated) and each of those bundles contains one *Requisition*, one *Demand* on the Justice, one *Justice's Warrant*, and a hundred *Constable's Orders*. The hundred is only put there as a convenient number. He then goes round with the constable and leaves these *orders* at the houses of the owners of the horses, takes the horses if he is ready for them and if they are ready, or says when he will come back, when he wants to take the horses away. When he takes the horse and pays for it, he has a clerk or assistant with him, and he brands the broad arrow with the branding iron on the near forefoot, so as to mark the horse for the time being. That is the machinery, and at one time it seemed to be very cumbrous when we first took it up, but as people got to understand it, and as we talked it over with the police it seems much less so than we thought, and it is not probably possible of being very much improved. The only thing we should like is an addition to the law to say that when a horse has been impressed it should be incumbent upon the owner to deliver it for us within ten miles of his house at once under a penalty, and we should pay the man who brings it. At present, among other things, it is the duty of the purchaser to take on any grooms, countrymen, or anybody he

can get to take the horses into various villages and centres, where they would be either entrained, taken over in batches to the entraining station, or handed over to a military collecting party as the case may be. The arranging of all that is within the discretion of the purchaser and the two sub-purchasers who are told off to assist him. This collection will be done in most commands by the employment of civil labour, for which the purchaser has full authority, and he is given, the moment mobilisation starts, a cash imprest of £100 for the payment of such men and other minor items.

That is the main system of impressment. The various commands have authority within certain lines to modify it to suit the very peculiar conditions which in some parts of the country do obtain. The question of collection and despatch is, of course, a very important one, and is one which can only be studied locally by the commands and remount officers of circles.

The command has a railway-truck programme drawn up, and agreed to by the railway according to the dates necessary and the local impressment scheme. I should have said that, of course, a veterinary officer usually accompanies the purchaser in his car. It is the business of the purchasers to get their horses into those trucks corresponding with the requirements as laid down in their schedules.

The foregoing concludes the general description in outline of the impressment, which you will find detailed on very much the lines I have described it in Chapter 5 of the Remount Regulations which were issued last year. This chapter is the mobilisation chapter, and lays down the main system.

I now come to the interesting question I asked you to hold over, and that was the assumption that there are enough horses in the country for the purpose. Now the result of our horse census last year was to give us in Great Britain alone, apart from Ireland, 462,000 horses fit for military purposes. Out of 140,000 horses we require, on our present figures this year, only 120,000 are taken in Great Britain; 20,000 come from Ireland. So that to meet a demand of 120,000 horses we have a population of 462,000 horses that are reported to us by census officers, which to a certain extent we discount as fit for military purposes. Of those something like 189,000 are heavy draught horses. Now the heavy draught-horse is a type of horse which is hardly touched at all at present by the motor

transport. It is perfectly startling if you go into the City east of the Monument, and round to the docks in London, or to the docks at Bristol, or any big town, and round the warehouses. At present the heavy horse absolutely holds the field as a more economic proposition. For the constant pulling up over steep cobbled roads, stopping at every corner, he appears to be a better proposition than the motor lorry. Of course, at present he holds the field in this country for agricultural purposes. Therefore, this heavy horse population is one that is not going to fail us, and it has just been decided by the Army Council to horse all general-service wagons in the trains and all the ambulances, except the Cavalry ones, with two heavy instead of four light draught-horses. This at once puts at our disposal the dray horse you see right through the country in large numbers, and of which we shall not touch one in twenty of the population for a general mobilisation. It is the trotting vanner that is being hit by the motor traffic, and it will be as much as we can do in the future to mobilise the Artillery. In the new War Establishments coming out you will see that this is provided for. That reduces the number of trotting vanners we require for the expeditionary force by 6000, and put roughly 3000 heavy horses in their place, and we already use about 3000 of them. In a division the heavy horse brings many advantages. In the first place you are getting a horse which will be there, and not vanishing; in the second place you are saving space. You could see at manoeuvres, even with our divisions at half strength, what an enormous space on a road a division takes, and if we reduce that by a large number of horses, the space saved will be very considerable indeed. Secondly, you save a large number of Army Service Corps drivers. Therefore, by saving those you help the difficult mobilisation problem of transport. Then, again, two heavy horses will not eat as much as four light horses; they will probably eat as much as three, so you are saving forage also. This change, therefore, in addition to entirely suiting the Remount Service from its mobilisation point of view, has a great many other economic advantages.

The result of the census in most commands is that the horses may be divided mainly into two classes, those more immediately suitable for Territorials, and the idea has chiefly been that the Territorial troops being in England, it is supposed in its own climate

and with its own water and grass, that an older horse to a certain extent could be safely mobilised there. The table shows that there are 24,000 available saddle horses fit for the expeditionary force, and 27,000 fit for the Territorial Forces and Cavalry horses, and another 14,000 of what are classed for remount purposes as R2., that is a horse of a cobby or lighter type, and 34,000 more of those available for the Territorial Forces. There are 28,000 Artillery horses for the expeditionary force, and 43,000 for the Territorials, 23,000 light draught transport for the expeditionary force, and 58,000 for the Territorials. There are 52,000 heavy draught fit for the expeditionary force, and 145,000 heavy draught fit for the Territorial Forces, and so on, the main point being that the grand total is 462,000, and although a considerable number of those are heavy, still deducting those we have 273,000 to find 117,000 from (*i.e.* 120,000—3000 heavy already required), while with our forthcoming changes it will be less.

The system of the census enables us to see accurately whether the prophets who prophesy the disappearance of the horse are to be right. Every year we shall know exactly what people have given up horses and why, and as they cannot go all at once we shall know in ample time to be able to inform Government that some radical changes are necessary and to get a new system to work.

There is one point before closing I should like just to go into, and that is the Cavalry horse. Take the horse as he stands in civil life, the trotting vanner can take his place in the Artillery and transport ranks of the Army, and, although the saddle-horse of civil life is good enough for the riding horse for the various miscellaneous officers and people who have not got to ride in the ranks, he will not make a troop horse. The troop horse, if he is in civil life, must also be the trained horse, and training the Cavalry horse has been the subject of careful study. Two years ago a Committee sat, composed chiefly of Cavalry officers, to consider this question, and the result of that has been, that it has been decided to endeavour to make Cavalry regiments with their first reinforcement entirely self-supporting. They recommended an addition of 40 horses to every Cavalry regiment in their lines, and the gradual working up to a number of 120 boarded-out horses. This has been gradually worked at, and the additional extra 40 horses are just being completed; 20 were added last year, and 20 were added this. The boarded-

out establishment was originally 73 per regiment, and that has now been raised to 83, and it will probably be raised to 100 in next estimate, ultimately reading 120; that is to say, every Cavalry regiment will have in its lines next month 509 riding troop horses alone, and perhaps by the end of next year, or certainly the year after next, there will be 120 boarders. Ultimately we will have 629 troop horses per regiment at our disposal in war time. We know that a portion of those boarders will come in not immediately fit; as a matter of fact we estimate that half of them will be fit for service. Now we are getting them out among a good type of allottee, a very much larger proportion will be fit than when we sent them, perhaps erroneously, to the smaller farmer and the small tradesman, who could not be trusted to look after them. A Cavalry regiment on mobilisation requires troop horses and chargers and everything complete, 518 riding horses, plus 48 for first reinforcement, total 566, and it will have at its disposal 629, plus 45 chargers; that is to say, it will have 674 horses to provide 566 men. In addition to that we shall give them a small proportion of ordinary saddle horses which can be used for medical and veterinary officers, farriers, interpreters, and the like. These will be hunt and hack horses, and certain items of that sort.

This gives you in outline the main system for the general mobilisation.



TERRITORIAL ORGANISATION FOR CAVALRY

By COLONEL N. M. SMYTH, V.C.

IN connection with the subject of the proposed closer affiliation of Yeomanry corps to Regular Cavalry regiments the question of a territorial organisation for Cavalry regiments naturally suggests itself.

There have been famous Cavalry regiments recruited by necessity or by design upon a more or less territorial basis in most armies, and the following words, written in 1845 by Marshal Marmont, may be fairly considered to sum up the case as it stands in favour of the principle of territorial units.

As to the advantages, says the Marshal, they are great and undeniable. From the point of view of administration the service of recruiting is made much easier; the officers are themselves able to ensure the supervision of men on furlough; and, in the event of mobilisation, the transition from a peace to a war footing is particularly simple.

From the ethical point of view, the sentiments of honour are encouraged and increased, binding all ranks together in devotion to the glory of their regiment, for there is the additional motive of defending the reputation of the province which is their home and probably was that of their forebears from remote antiquity.

The great reward of the soldier for distinguished or exemplary conduct is not so much the praise of his superiors, or any other more tangible honour, as the high consideration which he enjoys in his corps.

But the system pursued in France, where the organisation and recruitment is not on a local basis, deprives the soldier of this consideration when he has retired from the Service, for on his return to his home he is barely recognised as respectable, and he loses the highest reward of this life, the worthy reputation which he has earned. If, on the other hand, he found at his home the companions of his

youth and manhood, who had been his comrades in the stirring experiences of military life, his good reputation would follow him there, and he would continue, till the last day of his life, encircled by the respect and esteem which he had deserved and been accorded owing to his good service while in the Army.

Self-respect is the mainspring of the character of the private soldier just as much as of the general. Thus in all ranks the nobility of the profession of arms inspires men to self-sacrifice, and their only adequate rewards are public esteem and glory.

This lofty sentiment of self-respect is also compatible with a scarcely less noble sentiment—that of friendship. The community of dangers, of glory, of interests, establishes the most lively and sincere friendships, friendships for life; and as all human institutions originate and are bound up in the great mystery of human society, it is in time of war and in times of peril—that is to say, under the precise conditions in which a people requires it most—that friendship is so visible and that the habit of comradeship and of jealousy for the honour and safety of one's comrades is so remarkably developed. 'A friend in need is a friend indeed,' an exchange of obligations, the sorely needed help in emergency, the spirit of generous reciprocity, doubles the strength of each individual and ensures the fair division of the burden of maintaining the security of all.

Thus that great factor for good, the respect and good opinion of one's neighbours, gives birth to men's good qualities and develops and exalts their virtues in proportion to the imminence of common danger.

When, in the cause of the safety of the State, a man is impelled beyond the limits of duty and determines to unhesitatingly lay down his life for the success of the cause to which all contribute, but with such varying degrees of devotion, when this courage is produced, for it is a rare thing, its reward should be honour, wealth, and consideration.

The opportunity of bestowing such rewards is so rare that no State will ever have cause to find the burden weighing heavily upon her. But the cheapest, and yet the most highly prized, of all rewards by the retired soldier is the respect and appreciation of those around him in his home.

The Marshal omitted to describe the reverse of the medal.

The spirit of provincial patriotism is particularly strong in those


who have not travelled or in those who have a legitimate claim to superiority over their neighbouring provinces. It is owing to the uneven standard of military virtue in the provinces of a country that it is not always desirable to recruit units from one area, but that it is preferable to endeavour to draw the most suitable men, especially for a *corps d'élite* or for employment as specialists, from all the provinces of a nation. We cannot forget the despondency which is caused by the news of the destruction of a force by the enemy, and the blow is more terrible, more lasting, and more harmful to the interests of the country when it falls upon a small district or township.

The Baireuth Dragoons of Frederick the Great were celebrated for repeated triumphs in a series of hardly won campaigns, but the Ziethen Hussars and Seidlitz Cuirassiers, named after their former leaders, have appealed no less to the imagination, and in the light of history no locally recruited Cavalry corps has shone more conspicuously than those recruited on a wider national basis.

In the British Isles, and more especially in the industrial districts, where circumstances tend to make the more enterprising workers migratory in their habits, great difficulties have been experienced, even in the organisation of the National Reserve upon a parochial and county basis.

The Cavalry service comprises many of the more intelligent and enterprising of the working classes and of the clerical class, who migrate in following employment from one district to another. It is evident that territorial classification is unsuitable in such cases; and, considering that few British Cavalry regiments have special local ties or associations, any change in the present organisation should not only be carefully considered, but the regiments themselves should be consulted.





By CAPTAIN B. GRANVILLE BAKER

THE spirit of stern utilitarianism must have imbued the first man who put harness on a horse, and no doubt his struggle with the primitive wild horse taxed his ingenuity sufficiently to exclude any attempt at a decorative scheme; how soon the desire for ornamenting horse-trappings arose must remain a matter of conjecture, but it probably originated when primitive man realised that there was 'business' in horse-breaking, and that a little touch of colour here and there impressed a buyer ignorant of horse-flesh. One can only judge by present-day analogy; who has not seen horses with bright-coloured browbands in the hunting field, and are they not usually ridden by men who hunt with an eye to business?

So primitive man returning from his ride may have noticed a frayed bit of rope, where it was knotted at the horse's temple, and turned the defect into a row of tassels which quite concealed a wall-eye, and applied a rough breastplate in order to cover a steep shoulder from the searching gaze of a customer.

Leather when it replaced rope in the clothing of a horse lent itself to further adornment, it could be stamped and embossed in gorgeous patterns, cowrie-shells and beads could be attached to it, and thus many pleasing effects produced. This style of ornamentation survives to this day; you will find gay tassels of red and yellow adorning Andalusian steeds; you may see saddles of embossed,

stamped, and stained leather in Portugal; and cowries and blue beads for luck still gleam on headgear, breast-straps, crupper, of the tats you hire at Constantinople and elsewhere in the East. Here, too, you will still see the primitive looped rope as stirrup, and the horse-man gripping it firmly between his big toe and the one next to it, side by side with the latest, simplest, and most enduring saddlery from England—the decorative sense of the East with the workmanlike simplicity of the West.



ROYAL SCOTS GREY.

1815.

This simplicity is akin to impressionism in art, in that it has eliminated every unnecessary touch, and is masterful as the real impressionism in the definite statement of essential facts; it is based on knowledge, the result of the experience of centuries. Yet even the workmanlike West can condescend to ornamental trappings on occasion; there are gorgeous survivals of the decorative period to be met with in European armies; see the full-dress horse-furniture of an

officer in his Majesty's 10th Royal Hussars, all studded with shells; note the white browbands and brass rosettes of a Lifeguardsman's troop-horse!

But military horse-trappings show survivals of yet sterner purpose—that of defence in battle. In this line human ingenuity has been at its best throughout the ages.

The Medes and Persians covered their horses with fine, pliable chain-armour, such as they themselves donned for battle, so both man



FRENCH CUIRASSIER.
1815.

and horse being comparatively safe they could speak the truth as freely as they chose. Other Eastern races protected the horse's forehead and breast with plate-armour, and mediæval knights encased the whole animal in welded steel, leaving free only its ears and legs. No doubt this burden detracted from the pace of the charge, but made it a very weighty matter indeed.

The Medes and Persians vanished as a fighting race, and with them went the lissome chain-armour as protection for the horse, all

but a little bit which remains to this day. Perhaps the forbears of those fierce Tartar horsemen who streamed into Europe under Arpad in the ninth century, and settled in Hungary, picked up some odds and ends of old chain-armour and made them useful. No doubt these relics became scarce as the centuries passed in constant warfare, and eventually the use of firearms rendered any kind of horse-armour a hindrance to light Cavalry work. Still, a strip of chain-armour protecting the horse's neck just behind its ears, a metal boss held by plaited straps on the horse's nose, were some protection against sword-cuts. Again, from this strip of chain-armour other plaited straps hung down and joined under the horse's jaw in a metal crescent carrying a horse-hair plume, a protection for the chest. All these surviving odds and ends of horse-armour migrated to Prussia when Frederick the Great raised his famous Hussar regiments, recruited among deserting Hungarians and horsemen from Wallachia. Hussars became popular in European armies and spread Westward; many regiments of them were formed during the first war of the French Republic, and the gay Oriental trappings found a welcome in France. Cowrie-shells, crescent and plume, bosses, strips of plaited leather depending from breastplate and crupper, added to the picturesque effect of Napoleon's light Cavalry.

The meeting of East and West introduced not only the already mentioned Oriental horse-ornaments but also the 'shabrach.' This word is probably of Polish origin, but the Poles were much under Eastern influence, thanks to having shared several Kings with Hungary. Colour and design of the 'shabrach' were probably a matter of taste like other decorative devices; it might be of sheepskin or the pelt of some wild animal; its purpose was to cover the saddle and wallets. A horseman with any pretensions to taste would have this skin lined with cloth, taking care to show a broad, coloured margin. This was not enough for East and West when they met, for a mediæval survival had to be fitted in somehow; the Western saddle-cloth insisted on being seen. This saddle-cloth was a much abbreviated version of the clothing which knights put on their horses for tourneys and other festive occasions where a brave display of colour lent life to the already exhilarating proceedings. Armour-plating was all very well for battle, but for tournaments under the eyes of fair ladies it was necessary to let your horse prance gallantly,

which the poor beast was little disposed to do when clamped up in steel. So flowing draperies, richly emblazoned with armorial bearings, covered the knight's charger from head to croup and gave it a chance of prancing proudly, as poets and troubadours averred—more probably on account of the discomfort and annoyance any decent horse must feel when dressed up like a popinjay.

These gorgeous trappings went out, or rather were reduced to a modest cloth laid underneath the saddle. Yet even this could be



PRUSSIAN HUSSAR CHARGER.

made decorative, and as soon as regular regiments of horse were organised, and uniformity came in fashion, the trooper became as proud of his saddle-cloth, in the colours of his corps, as any knight had been of his horse's blazoned housings.

The saddle-cloth had its place beneath the saddle, which, with its holsters and valise, was exposed to all sorts of weather, so the 'shabrach' was super-added, protecting the saddle, and in some cases holster covers were devised for important people like Cuirassiers; these covers were called 'shabrunken.'

All these trappings for use and ornament were at their brightest and best in those days, when warfare still had its picturesque side. Frederick the Great's Hussars, already mentioned, careered about with traces of chain-armour, waving plumes to their horses' throat lashes, the pointed ends to their embroidered 'shabrachs' streaming out over their flanks. Napoleon's Hussars decked their horses with cowrie-shells and plaited leather; his Cuirassiers' chargers wore the saddle-cloth half-covered by a white sheepskin 'shabrach' when at Waterloo they met the British 'Heavies,' on saddle-cloths the colour of the facings, laced with white or yellow, and holster covers to match.



FIELD-MARSHAL'S SADDLERY.

But those days of brave martial display have gone, yielding to the spirit of stern simplicity; only a favoured few, Field-M Marshals and the Household Cavalry, from time to time deck out their chargers in the ancient panoply of glorious war.

Glitter and sparkle have vanished in the interests of efficiency, 'tis said. Let us hope that it is so indeed.

NOTE.—The Dowager Viscountess Wolseley has recently presented to the R. U. S. Museum, the Field-Marshal's saddlery and horse-trappings (by Whippy), formerly the property of Viscount Wolseley, of which the above is a sketch.

THE TRAINING OF CAVALRY AS DRIVERS FOR MACHINE GUNS

By A. H. B.

Specialist Series—No. 2

IN Section 226, *Cavalry Training*, 1912, the mobility of machine guns is emphasised no less than three times. Yet if we turn to Section 11, which lays down the general principles of training, we find no reference to this mobility, nor how it is to be acquired. True, there is one section devoted to 'Driving Postillion,' which chiefly consists of extracts from and adaptations of *Field Artillery Training*, 1912. But the subject is condensed into three pages, and it may be profitable to enlarge upon some of the points contained therein.

Mobility.—Mobility is dependent upon two factors. The first is suitable horses. The second is capable drivers.

1. *Suitable Horses.*—It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that all the horses of a team should be of even courage and similar temperament. A light team of evenly matched horses, all working together, can pull a surprisingly heavy load over the roughest country; whereas an uneven team containing some fast and some slow horses, some keen and some sluggish, will take it out of themselves unnecessarily and will be in danger of jibbing on a steep hill. In a team of six it is possible to put one badly matched horse into the centre without doing much harm, but in a machine-gun section with no centre pair it is more than ever important to build up the team of even material.

A young horse should be put in the hand lead to start with.

2. *Capable Drivers.*—Driving postillion is quickly picked up by good riders, under efficient instructors; and it should be easier for a Cavalry soldier than for a short-legged Artillery driver.

A few men in each troop, and about the same number of horses, have to be trained in driving. It would, of course, be a mistake to try to work these two processes together. It would therefore seem

advisable to adopt the Artillery method of commencing driving without vehicles. By this means the drivers learn to keep the traces taut, and there is less likelihood of spoiling or over-tiring the horses. The riding school can very usefully be employed for this purpose.

Position Mounted.—The position of attention mounted is referred to in *Cavalry Training*, but it is nowhere defined. The driver should have an even feeling on both horses' mouths; he should pass his right hand through the loop of his whip, grasp the stock and thong together, and place the hand on his right thigh, back of the hand up and elbow a few inches from the body.

At 'sit at ease' both hands are placed on the pommel, right hand (holding the whip) over left.

Before dismounting, the driver should place the whip in his legging, stock upwards.

Length of Stirrups.—The trooper will at first experience considerable difficulty in applying his legs when the traces are taut, particularly if he is the wheel driver. For this reason he may find it advisable to ride a hole longer than he would do when riding across country. The pole sometimes gets beneath the foot of the wheel driver, with the possible result at a sudden halt of pitching him out of the saddle. The driver consequently likes riding long, and if not constantly watched he will be for ever letting out his stirrups and riding at an indecent length. If he is long-legged the pole may catch him on the knee, and he may require two leg irons.

Length of Reins.—There is a tendency for the reins to slip through the fingers. The reins are thus frequently held too long, a practice which should be guarded against. Some drivers even hold up their reins high and dead slack, especially when urging their horses on. This is not only very ugly, but very wrong. It is just as necessary to maintain a feeling on the horse's mouth and to keep him collected when driving as when riding. Anyone who has ever taken part in an Artillery driving competition knows that there must be a continuous feeling on the horse's mouth, and that this is best ensured by having the riding horse's reins *short*; the leading reins must, of course, be so adjusted that the hand horse carries his head straight.

Correct Use of Whip.—This is given in Section 106. It should be noted that it is practically never necessary to use the thong of the whip on the hand horse. Many batteries make it a rule that the

thong is never to be used. Using the lash on one horse may upset the other five, and it militates against steady and even draught.

Moving Off.—It is essential that all the horses start together. To ensure this two things are necessary :—

1. All the horses must be standing up into the collar with traces taut.

2. Each driver must apply the aids simultaneously on his two horses, the wheel driver in time with the lead.

The result of not starting together may be broken harness or jibbing. This will be discussed later on.

Halting.—It must be impressed upon the young lead driver that he has a heavy weight behind him, and that the distance in which he can pull up to a halt depends on :—

1. The pace at which he is travelling.
2. The state and slope of the ground.
3. The control the wheel driver has over his horses.

This seems obvious, but few young drivers take it into account.

It is not a bad plan to fix a point on sloping ground and let the carriage approach at varying paces from each direction with orders 'o halt at the point. The lead driver soon learns to judge with his eye the right distance at which to begin pulling up.

Where he is in any doubt as to the ability of the wheel driver to control his horses he should glance back over his shoulder to see that the traces are not becoming slack, with the possible result of a 'tread' or 'leg-over.' It is related by Mercer in his *Journal of the Waterloo Campaign* that during a review before the allied Sovereigns at Paris in 1815, one horse of a gun team of a famous English battery, which was galloping past, had the misfortune to get his leg over the trace. The Duke of Wellington without the slightest hesitation placed the Battery Commander under arrest.

As the carriage comes to rest, the wheelers are in the breeching and the leaders out of draught. The whole team must at once be put into the collar, so that when they move off they will do so all together. This must be done quietly and with discretion, or else the horses will jump up into their collars and either rebound, as it were, to their original position, or else the carriage will move on again. Only experience with the individual horse will teach the driver exactly how strongly to apply the aids to achieve the desired result.

The Brake.—The brake should not be put on so hard as to skid the wheel. This is bad for the wheel and bad for the brake; but a more serious drawback is that on rounding a sharp corner on a steep hill the carriage may skid bodily outwards, with consequences which are apt to be awkward if there is no parapet to the road.

Wheeling.—The aids for this are given in Section 106.

It will be noted that the wheel driver places his whip over his hand horse whether wheeling to the right or to the left (with the exception of right about). This may seem strange. The reason is as follows. In wheeling to the right it is essential that the hand horse should be slightly in advance of the riding horse—it is a kind of 'shoulders' formation; if this were not done his traces would become slack, and the hand wheeler might lie back in the breeching; the whip in this instance is used to keep him up and to make him go over the same ground as his leader: whereas in wheeling to the left the riding horse is kept up in the collar by the *legs* of the driver, and the whip is used merely to bring the hand horse round by pressure on the off side of his withers.

In wheeling right about, however, the wheel driver requires greater control over his inward horse than the whip alone can give, in order to prevent the carriage from locking or turning too soon. He therefore takes the leading rein in his right hand.

It will be noticed also that in wheeling to the right the lead driver is not to use his whip to keep his hand horse up. His right hand is employed in throwing him off to the right. By leaning slightly forward and sliding his hand along the rein and reaching his arm out to its full extent he can manage to keep the horse up in his collar; if the horse is awkward he can supplement this aid with a light touch of the whip on the near side of the neck. This procedure is not easy to explain, but is sometimes necessary to adopt with sluggish horses.

Wheeling at a Gallop.—Two points should be impressed upon the young driver.

1. Although theoretically the wheelers follow and draw the carriage in the tracks of the leaders, at a fast pace the carriage will slightly 'cut the corner'—therefore he must take a rather larger wheel than he wishes the carriage to follow.

2. Centrifugal force tends to overturn the carriage outwards when wheeling. The faster the pace the greater this tendency. If the ground

slopes away outwards, even quite a small rock or lump in the ground over which the inside wheel passes will upset the carriage. Probably more upsets are caused in this way than in any other. No driver should attempt to turn a sharp corner at a fast pace when the ground slopes outwards. The machine-gun limbered General Service wagon has a narrower wheel-base than the 13-pr. quick-firing gun and is more liable to overturn.

The Cavalry soldier will find no mention of aids to make his horses lead with the correct leg at a gallop. It is, of course, just as desirable that they should do this in draught as at other times; but, firstly, the outer trace pressing on the horse's quarters tends to induce him to strike off correctly (it will generally be found that he does so); and, secondly, with the best will in the world the driver cannot apply the correct aids to his hand horse—the rider is the only one he can influence.

Locking.—It has been pointed out that when wheeling about the wheel driver will probably require both hands on the reins. This is chiefly to ensure prompt and vigorous action on his part if the carriage locks; it is then in imminent danger of overturning. The lead driver should assist if he can by throwing his horses outwards, but such a case usually occurs when reversing in a narrow road, or turning through a gateway into a narrow road, when the bank prevents him from straightening out the team. The onus of averting an upset thus rests upon the wheel driver, who must apply all the strength at his command in throwing off his wheelers, probably against their inclinations, and against the action of the lead traces. This effort must be prompt, and this is where having both hands on the reins comes in.

Reversing in Narrow Roads.—It may be necessary to unlimber, unhook the leaders, and reverse the carriage by hand, but if the turn is not quite so sharp as the locking angle, with good driving it should not be necessary to unhook the leaders. This locking angle—in other words, the breadth it is possible to turn in without unlimbering—should be ascertained by experiment.

Driving up Steep Hills.—All horses can put more weight into their collar when ridden. The hand horse must therefore be ridden when necessary. For the same reason all men riding draught horses uphill should lean forward, just as one sits forward in a trap when going up a steep hill.

Another expedient is to hook in an extra pair in the lead ; this course involves considerable delay and requires good driving to make it worth while.

If there is fear of the team jibbing on a very short, steep hill it may be advisable to 'spring' the hill, but this involves more strain on the horses and should seldom be necessary.

If the team jibs, application of the whip is of no use. The wheels should be manned by the detachment, the team should be encouraged by voice, and the drivers should apply the aids absolutely simultaneously. It may be necessary to back the carriage a few feet to get a better start. A handful of gravel placed in the horse's mouth will often start a jibber pulling at once.

A 'wheel purchase' is the most powerful form of assistance if the carriage sticks. The end of a rope is fastened to the bottom of the wheel, and passed along the tyre to the front, and manned by the detachment. If the wheel slips round during this operation a thick rope should be wound in spirals round the felloe and tyre.

On the March.—The machine-gun section is usually preceded and followed on the march by mounted troops. In this case the section has to keep fairly well closed up ; but it is handicapped in this way, that whereas mounted troops prefer trotting uphill rather than downhill, the guns naturally make better progress downhill than up. The result of keeping close up to the unit in front generally is a series of bounds and checks, or trotting up and walking downhill.

Drivers can be of great assistance by *making all alterations of pace simultaneously*. The importance of all the horses in a team starting together has been impressed upon them ; they should now be taught the equally great importance of all the vehicles in the unit starting simultaneously. If this is not done the column quickly degenerates into a glorified goods train where each truck starts in succession and at the slightest retardation closes up and bumps into the one in front.

If each unit and each vehicle loses ever so little ground in starting, the aggregate ground lost will be so great that while the head of the column is trotting the rear will be galloping in its efforts to catch up. The lead driver must be taught, like a huntsman, to be ever casting his eye forward. When he sees the next unit or next carriage but one in front of him altering its pace he must begin to conform.

Of course, with only four carriages, the amount of opening out

and closing up is small, but when the guns are brigaded this evil will become apparent unless the drivers are practised in it beforehand.

At slight checks in the pace it is important to keep the team in draught and on the move. In the days of horse 'buses in London, if one took the front seat on top, it was noticeable how the chief work—almost the sole work—which fell upon the horses was in *starting*, and how a skilful driver would contrive to keep his horses just on the move, to avoid coming to a dead stop. In order to avoid this dead stop the lead driver has two means at command:—

The first and best way.—By casting his eye forward he perceives a check some way in front and slackens the pace accordingly. But the wheel driver cannot see what is going on ahead and requires some warning of this; and lead drivers have evolved a signal of their own, which is not official but is strongly to be recommended. They hold the stock of their whip upright and wave it from the wrist from side to side a few times. This means 'Check the pace,' and gives the wheel driver notice to conform.

The second way to avoid coming to a dead stop is given in *Cavalry Training*, and consists in throwing off to the left (or failing that, the right) of the carriage in front. But if the wheel driver has his wits about him this should not be necessary.

There is a small point of bad driving which is exceedingly common and bears mention. The team is pulling up from a trot to a walk at the foot of an incline, and the lead driver pulls up so suddenly that the wheelers have to be put back into the breeching to avoid treading on them. Momentum is thus unnecessarily taken off the carriage, and it makes one furious to see it; it is sheer bad driving. The lead driver *must* pull up into a walk *gradually*.

It should be impressed upon the novice 'in the wheel' that it is the lead driver who sets the pace, and that he must in all cases conform to him. For instance, going downhill, when the lead driver is going a trifle fast, one often sees the leaders' traces taut and the wheel driver putting his horses back into the breeching. He is thus working against both the hill and the leaders.

There are only two occasions when the lead driver can properly be blamed for slack traces. (In all other cases the wheel driver is at fault.) The first is when the carriage is temporarily out of control, such as when going down a steep hill or halting too suddenly. In this

case the lead driver must glance behind him to keep his distance from the wheelers. The other case is when crossing a ditch; but we will consider this in greater detail.

Crossing a Wide Ditch (which cannot be jumped).—The procedure adopted by an inexperienced team is usually much as follows. The lead driver checks the pace descending into the ditch, dashes up the far side, and slows down again on top. The correct procedure is precisely the reverse of this. All ditches should be taken square, and at a fair pace, so there is need for the leaders to slacken off as they are going down the hill—the carriage is still on the flat. But as the leaders are ascending the far side the wheelers are nearing the bottom and are just getting the full weight of the carriage on them; it is most essential that at this moment they should not have the extra pull of the leaders to contend with. Hence the lead driver must restrain the natural inclination of his pair to ‘spring’ the bank. As soon as the leaders have reached the top the carriage will be about at the bottom of the ditch. *Now* is the time to put in the work. Both drivers must apply whips and legs together, and *keep on* applying them until the carriage is well over the top of the bank. If the lead driver has hung back ever so little at the top of the hill his traces will be slack, and as the result of urging his horses forward they will run up suddenly into the collar, with the danger of either rebounding, as it were, and jibbing, or of some portion of the harness giving way.

Sometimes, when the ditch is narrow or deep, the leaders jump across. If this happens there is only one thing for the wheel driver to do: jamming in his spurs and applying his whip, he must endeavour to make his pair jump too, and without any hesitation, or else the leaders will fall back on top of the wheelers, and there will be a mess-up at the bottom of the ditch.

The net result of all this is that the ditch must be taken:—

- (1) Square.
- (2) Fairly fast.
- (3) At an even pace throughout.

The Officer.—These notes are primarily intended for the benefit of the trooper, but it may not be out of place to express the extreme desirability of the machine-gun officer being himself a capable driver. He should himself understand the limitations and possibilities of a postillion-driven vehicle and the difficulties he asks his drivers to

contend with. He should himself be able to get up in the driver's saddle and show by personal example how to control or quiet a fretting horse. And finally, is the occasion too fanciful in which, his drivers being shot down, he and his sergeant may have to spring to the saddle and drive the team out of action?

Harness Galls.—Of these the commonest and by far the most important are:—

Breast-collar Galls.—When the horse is in draught the breast harness has a sawing motion; the lower the collar hangs the more pronounced is this sawing motion, and consequently the greater the risk of galling. In fact it is difficult to get the harness too high. Roughly speaking, it should be so high as just *not* to interfere with the front of the neck. There is a common and almost universal tendency to fit it too low.

The presence of a little grit, or even a projecting stitch inside the collar, is capable of producing a gall. The bearing surface of the harness should therefore be kept absolutely smooth and clean and pliant. At halts on the roadside the driver should, if necessary, sponge it over to remove any grit or foreign matter.

It is one of the officer's most important duties to examine the shoulders of his draught-horses after a long day's work. The experienced eye will detect the advent of a gall before there is much outward sign. Pass the flat of the hand lightly over the suspected area. The presence of a rub will show itself by a series of wrinkles or slight corrugations in the skin, as the hand slides over it.

Treatment.—(1) If the skin is not broken, a solution of salt may be rubbed over the spot to harden it. But this should have been done days, even weeks, before leaving barracks. It is too late to do much good now.

(2) The breast collar should be raised or lowered a hole or two so as to remove pressure from the spot.

(3) If the rub is only on one side, in the case of the hand horse, it is probably due to his not carrying himself straight and square to the front. In this case he should be changed over to the near side for a few days.

(4) Sheepskin can be stitched on to the harness; but the benefit of this is only problematical; there is the danger of its caking hard and lumping with sweat if neglected.

(5) Finally, if all else fails, the horse must be taken out of draught for several days.

Pole-bar Galls.—These are caused by the pole-bar bearing on the sharp breast-bone. The supporting straps should be of such a length that the bar is carried the breadth of the hand above this bone. There is then no likelihood of galling.

Trace Galls.—Galls caused by the traces may appear on the flanks or the quarters, generally the latter. It is unusual to find galls on both sides at the same time. Generally the horse has not been carrying himself quite straight, and if he is changed over to the other side the trouble will cease. In any case it will be desirable to sew a piping of sheepskin on to the offending portion of the trace. This piping is not rigidly attached to the trace, and unless watched it may work out of position.

Within small limits the trace may be raised or lowered by adjusting the loin strap.

Breeching Galls.—Too tight or too loose fitting of the breeching may cause this gall. It should in any case be raised or lowered a few inches so as to get it off the injured spot. If it continues to rub, resort may be had to sheepskin, the horse can be changed to the other side, or finally taken out of the wheel and put into the lead.

Harness Cleaning.—Harness cleaning scarcely comes within the scope of these notes, but there is one small suggestion which may prove useful to the trooper turned driver. He may have wondered how some Horse Artillery Battery he is up alongside of on manœuvres manages to turn out with clean and bright harness in the early morning day after day. The secret of this is simple. Every good driver, whether he is ordered to or not, carries on his person a sponge and an oil rag; the sponge for his horse primarily, the oil rag so that at every little halt on the roadside he can put in some work on his harness. This goes on throughout the day, and if it keeps fine he will march into camp in the evening with his harness almost as clean as when he marched out in the morning.





MAJOR-GENERAL E. H. H. ALLENBY, C.B.

INSPECTOR OF CAVALRY.

Colonel, 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers.



BASUTO PONIES.

THE BASUTO PONY

By COLONEL N. M. SMYTH, V.C.

THE people of Basutoland, like all African negroes, are not by nature horse-owners or horse-riders, as, owing to the prevalence of horse-sickness from the Sudan to the Cape, the horse has only been introduced by the European colonists in South Africa within the last two hundred years.

The excellence of the Basuto pony is attributed to the introduction of Arabian blood through troop-horses from India, which were used in the Kaffir wars in the middle of the 19th century, being cast and sold in South Africa. The Basutos do not feed their ponies on corn for a great part of the year, and this fact, added to the severe mountain climate of Basutoland, resulted in the production of a small, hardy, and sure-footed breed of saddle-pony which to-day has been improved by the introduction of thoroughbred sires as well as Arabian sires from the Crabbet Park Arabian stud.

The inhabitants of Basutoland number upwards of half a million of the Bantu race alone, and they are computed to own no less than 100,000 horses, half a million oxen, and 25,000 ploughs.

The Basutos are disinclined to sell their ponies, but will occasionally exchange the worst ones for good oxen. The ponies are, however, very uneven in quality, though all have good stamina, and their reputation for general excellence is somewhat legendary.

Some of the best all-round general-utility horses in South Africa are bred in the great tracts of the best veld in the Hopetown district of the Cape of Good Hope Province; also parts of Griqualand West are eminently suitable for horse-rearing. Land there is cheap, and horses grow out, without artificial feeding, as they do nowhere else in the country.

It would be a move in the right direction if the Union Government

secured some of the most suitable land there and started horse-breeding as part of the agricultural policy of the State. The climate is healthy and horses in that neighbourhood always look in first-rate condition.

Doubtless their feeding is largely responsible, and a word on this subject may not be out of place.

Oat hay, which is always called 'forage' in South Africa, is the most wasteful feed possible unless put through the chaff-cutter and fed from a manger, as so much of the corn is lost or shaken off and the straw becomes trodden down and soiled. The winter oat is much superior for hay to Algerian oat hay; but a new kind of hay, made from Teff Grass, originally obtained from the highlands of Abyssinia, is being extensively cultivated at the Cape and is most nourishing and economical, costing from two to three shillings per hundred pounds.

For improving horses in poor condition the sugar plantations of Natal can produce any quantity of treacle at a penny a gallon, and this feeding is strongly recommended for mares in foal.

THE PREPARATION AND DESPATCH OF FIELD-SERVICE MESSAGES

By CAPTAIN R. W. W. GRIMSHAW, 34th (P.A.V.O.) Poona Horse

DURING the four years I held the appointment of Instructor at the Cavalry School, Saugor, over 200 Indian officers, Indian N.C.O.s, and British N.C.O.s passed through my hands, and the experience I gained in the subject which forms the heading of this paper may possibly be of use to those who take an interest in that kind of instruction work.

It is no exaggeration to say that during those four years I can only recall one or two instances where a student on first arrival at Saugor was able to frame the simplest message, written or verbal, without rendering it practically valueless by the omission of some important and necessary items. I may further add that the above remark is not based on mistakes which merely were a departure from some 'set official form' (always changing), but radical mistakes which destroyed, partially or entirely, the utility of the message.

Pedantry is generally the ruin of peace-trained armies, but as written field-service messages often have to be compiled and read with the aid of a flickering or dirty light, or hurriedly lit match, some order in their preparation seems desirable, and some care and practice should be observed, not only in the preparation of written messages, but also verbal ones. It may be added that it is just as easy to frame a message correctly as incorrectly. Little or no attention seems to be paid to verbal ones at all, and yet, if one is to believe those with war experience, a great deal of the clerical labour now expended in writing will, so far as Cavalry is concerned, be replaced by verbal work.

The Field-Service Regulations deal very fully with the compilation of messages, but many of the instructions prescribed therein are ignored, and, to add to the chaos, some units seem consumed with a passion for improvising a pattern of their own. As already indicated, adherence

to the exact 'Form' is a small matter if the messages were otherwise complete, but this is far from being the case.

As the committing to paper of important orders, instructions, and information cannot be avoided, the subject of written messages will first be dealt with, and to avoid unnecessary repetition a specimen one will be given. This specimen message is, so far as 'Form' goes, believed to be in accordance with the F.S.R.

Advanced Guard,
Cawnpore Rd.

Sender's Number.	Day of Month.	In reply to Number.
5	23	45 AAA
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx repeated xxxxx		
Van Guard		
1 mile N. of Dustypur,		
12 noon.		
J. C. Smith, Lieut.		
13th Dragoons.		

Above message can be conveniently divided into six distinct parts :—

(a) What is known in signalling parlance as the 'address to,' which comprises the formation, unit, or person the message is intended for, followed by the place.

(b) The number and date of the sender's message and, if in reply to a message, the number and date of the message it is in reply to.

(c) The text, which, in addition to the mere information it supplies, should always give the action which is about to be taken by the sender (if taking any). If copies, &c., have been sent to other formations, units, or persons, such information should be supplied at the end of the text.

(d) The name of the formation, unit, or person from whom the message emanates, followed by the address (in signalling known as the 'address form') and time of despatch.

(e) The name of the person who carries the message.

(f) The signature of the person who is responsible for the despatch.

Let one now consider some of the more common mistakes to be met with in field messages.

(a) So carelessly written that it is difficult to ascertain who it is for, or the actual address so imperfect that if the bearer cannot locate the

formation, unit, or person for whom intended no one else can help him to do so.

(b) Some of the details prescribed are omitted, partially or entirely.

(c) The actual text filled with useless expressions and redundancies, a very common one being the repetition of the sender's address. The omission to state what action the sender is about to take (if taking any), and the omission to say if the message has been repeated to any other formation, unit, or person.

(d) The omission to state what formation, unit, or person the message emanates from, and the omission of the address and time of despatch.

(e) The bearer's name omitted.

(f) Failure to sign the message.

With the exception of (e) and (f) any of above faults may lead to a message being quite valueless. It may be remarked that if a field message originally intended for transmission by mounted orderly or cyclist orderly, &c., is eventually handed over to a signalling unit, those details enumerated under (e) and (f) are omitted. *Vide F.S.R.*

Whether it is wise to thus omit the name of the person responsible for the despatch is open to question. I have corrected many hundreds of field messages while at Saugor, ranging over an immense number of situations, and I have rarely found two persons convey the same 'shade' of meaning about two similar situations. This may be regrettable, but the human element cannot be eliminated, and, personally, I prefer to know the name of the person responsible for the despatch. A message which shows it emanated from, say, the vanguard must, in the absence of the name of the person who wrote it, be accepted exactly as written. The vanguard commander may be temporarily disabled and some subordinate have written the message. I would like to know who wrote the message, as I can, if I know my subordinates, more nicely gauge the value of the report. Of course, such knowledge may operate two ways, and one may be led astray by paying too much attention to the sender's idiosyncrasies. However, I prefer to risk the latter.

Again, it may be questioned if the above 'Form' is a very suitable one for our Indian Army. To fill it up requires some considerable knowledge of units and formations. Of course, a purely personal 'Form' can be used, and in nine cases out of ten would be

used, but this seems hardly a desirable arrangement. I have had considerable experience in working with the Form just given and that which was pasted into Army Book 153 (in India), and, in my opinion, the latter is more suitable to the standard of education of most Indian officers and N.C.O.s.

The writer will be excused the platitude that a message is useless if one does not know where it emanates from, and is still more useless if it does not arrive in time. To ensure the latter, however, is more a matter of careful direction to the bearer than what is actually written in the 'address to.' This point will be returned to later.

Now the question of the sender's address may appear a very simple matter. A man has only to produce his map, spot his position, and put it down on his message, such as half a mile S.W. of the second *e* in Haseley, or any other of the forms prescribed in the F.S.R.

I cannot help thinking that many of us rather assume that a man can read, write, and speak the language of the country he is operating in; and here one arrives at a difficulty which makes itself apparent at Saugor, where British *personnel* is concerned.

For all practical purposes the British N.C.O. at the Cavalry School, Saugor, is working in a hostile country (in view of the treatment he may receive), the language of which he can neither read, write, nor speak. While at Saugor they are taught a few simple sentences, such as, Where does this road lead to? Show me the road to—. What is the name of this village? Have you seen any military folk about? Such sentences would probably be quickly picked up if, say, the British Army were operating in France, and are undoubtedly a help to a detachment leader who wishes to accurately orient himself. It is extremely difficult, however, for the average Briton to catch the correct local pronunciation, so necessary to gaining an intelligent hearing. It is immaterial whether the country is hostile or friendly; it is lack of knowledge of the local pronunciation which brings about an *impasse*. What is the use of the best of maps if one cannot ascertain the names of the villages, roads, and important physical features?

The quarter-inch Survey map issued in India is not so lavish in its detail as to enable one to orient oneself by a comparison of the prominent physical features on the ground with those depicted on

the map, except by the expenditure of much time and labour. Again, such things as dark nights, fog, snow, and rain seriously impair even the most skilful map-reader's power of saying where he is. Captain R. de Biensan in that excellent, if somewhat out of date, book, 'The Conduct of a Contact Squadron,' makes some pertinent remarks about this very point.

Again, Will maps be found in the hands of subordinate leaders, such as Indian officers and N.C.O.s? If not, they must be taught to give their addresses by some other means than by reference to maps. How can this be done? Even when maps are available, Indian officers, not to mention Indian N.C.O.s, in spite of the fact that they are cognisant of Oriental ways and means, if not, one another's local dialects, experience the greatest difficulty in describing their positions. While at Saugor every Indian officer is taught to make himself proficient at reading the quarter-inch Survey map. This implies no mean knowledge of the Roman character, both capital and italic lettering; and I have frequently found that, although they could read every character in a name, they could not pronounce it sufficiently lucidly to convey to a local ryot (yokel) any meaning whatsoever. Again, each nation has its own method of naming foreign places, and British schoolchildren are taught the English pronunciation, which as a rule is as far removed from that accepted by the local inhabitants as it well-nigh could be.

How would a British N.C.O. ask the way to Paris, Rheims, or Amiens? Surely not as any Frenchman would.

This question of one's address when no map is available, or, if a map is forthcoming, when one is operating in a country the language of which one does not know, requires some consideration.

In default of any better solution of the difficulty the following is recommended. That it is better to embody in the 'address from' the name of some place the position of which is known throughout the Army, rather than attempt to employ an unimportant local name, which, even if one can grasp the pronunciation and spelling of, may not be on the map which is in the possession of the person to whom the message is consigned. To make this more clear let a direct instance be given. A mixed British and Indian Cavalry Division operating in Egypt: The Division arrives at, say, Suez and despatches reconnoitring detachments westwards. Some of these detachments

may quite possibly be commanded by Indian officers, who, even if they had maps, would be hard put to it to orient themselves, especially if they did any movement at night. It is inconceivable that the leaders of these detachments would be unaware of the name of the place they set out from—viz. Suez—and, therefore, rather than risk using a name they picked up after leaving, it is better to refer to their position by using Suez. Thus their address on the third day out might be fifty miles west of Suez. All that has to be done to ensure reasonable accuracy is for the leader to carefully keep a note of his general direction and rate of progress. If after giving such an address the writer of the message feels confident that he has ascertained the local one, he can add the local one as well. By adopting above system I think one avoids many pitfalls, and to some extent nullifies the serious embarrassment of having no maps and working in a country the language of which one does not know. It may be pointed out that in the majority of cases minute directions concerning the position of the place from which a message emanates are immaterial. It is the approximate starting-point and time of despatch that are so important. Minute directions are only, as a rule, necessary if the sender is to await a reply and the reply is to be brought by a fresh man. This, however, will not be a usual situation, since small reconnoitring detachments, strategical and tactical, do not, as a rule, remain long in one place. If such a contingency occurs, it must be borne in mind that even if subordinate leaders do have maps the bearers of messages certainly do not.

If a despatcher of a message gives as his address 'half a mile south of the second *e* in Haseley,' the person who directs back the bearer with a reply must retranslate this into intelligent terms. The fact is such an address is a thoroughly bad one, except for staff officers possessing good large-scale maps.

If a man wishes to give an address so that he can be found he should fix on something that the biggest duffer can find without having to ask questions, *e.g.*

'Hill half a mile N.W. of Bagput Ry. Stn.'

Now Private Juggins can be told to return to Bagput, and having discovered the railway station, steer for the hill half a mile N.W., where he will find Sergeant X. One need not know a word of the language or how to read a map to find a railway station of a small town.

Apropos of bad addresses, here is another popular variety : 10th mile-stone, Cawnpore Road. Its value entirely depends on whether the receiver is sufficiently cognisant of local conditions to be able to guess whether it is ten miles from Cawnpore or ten miles from somewhere else. Another common method of indicating an address is to use bearings. More often than not the person wishing to so describe his position gives no indication which way the bearing is to be read. In addition to this defect the F.S.R. clearly lay down that only true bearings are ever to be made use of. One can picture a small reconnoitring detachment leader wrestling with a 'variation' problem. On service, to expect anyone but a staff officer to worry his head about such a matter as true or magnetic bearings is to expect the impossible. In order to elude the point I always recommended Indian officers and N.C.O.s in general to restrict themselves to the use of the eight cardinal points. These amply suffice for describing their positions.

Another common error when practising the preparation of field-service messages in peace time is to utilise one's local knowledge when writing down the 'address from.' Such knowledge would not be available on service in a strange country, and using it in peace time gets one into the habit of not thinking out an address that will enable the receiver to appreciate the position of the despatcher.

To sum up. In giving an 'address from' when one has no map and cannot speak the language, one must indicate one's approximate locality by stating one's position with regard to some place known throughout the Army.

Secondly, if it is deemed necessary to give more minute detail, one must seek as the key some object or place which any person can find without having to ask questions or use a map. Not always easy. An ideal 'address from' is, of course, one that can be recognised with and without maps.

The only practical way of getting right with the 'address from' difficulty is frequent practice in the field.

Whenever a troop or a squadron halts in a strange place, let a few N.C.O.s and men be called out of the ranks and told to say verbally what address they would give for the place they are halted at.

This would serve two purposes :—

1. Give practice at quickly framing an address.

2. Inculcate the necessity for every man keeping himself oriented, and thus fulfil the Cavalry soldier's first commandment :

'Thou shalt not lose thy way.'

Although 2 is not a point within the scope of this paper I cannot help alluding to it, as the frequency with which men lose their way on manœuvres in India due to 'mooning' about, without taking any trouble to observe changes in direction, is deplorable.

The remainder of the faults enumerated at the commencement of this paper can be eliminated indoors on a wet day by practice. With regard to the faults enumerated under (a), as already mentioned, the arrival of a message at its destination is more a matter of careful directions to the bearer than what is written. Still, a comprehensive 'address to' is desirable, and care should be exercised in its preparation. The original bearer may have to hand it to someone else, and may not possess the facile knack of giving the new carrier correct instructions.

Having completed a field-service message there are three or four points to be kept in mind before despatching it. These are generally overlooked :—

(1) It should be read to someone to see if the meaning is clear. Choose a stupid person as the judge, not a clever one. Be careful he really does understand it and does not merely say he does. If in doubt, re-write.

(2) It should be read to the bearer, so that he can remember the general gist of it in case it has to be destroyed. Even with long messages a few minutes devoted to drumming in the more important points are well repaid. Two birds can be killed with the same stone and time saved if the same person who carries the message acts as judge of its clearness, but in such a case an excess of stupidity is undesirable.

(3) The greatest care must be exercised in giving instructions to the bearer of the message as to the route he is to follow.

I now intend to make a slight digression. Every man should be able to carry a message a few miles. I take it despatch-riders are men specially trained to carry important messages at high pace over great distances. 'Cavalry Training' lays down that every man is to be taught the duties of ground scouting. It would be well if emphasis were laid on every man being taught to carry messages. If one examines the causes which contribute to poor work by Cavalry it will,

more often than not, be found that bad message-carrying is the predominant factor. Therefore, it behoves us to take special care to direct the man who is to carry the message. If the despatcher has a map, he should carefully examine it to see if there are any points about the route that the message-bearer will follow which require explanation, such as cross and bifurcating roads, fords, &c. If the carrier proceeds by a route he has already travelled over, minute instructions may be dispensed with, but if otherwise, it is almost impossible to give him too much information. The more comprehensive the instructions the better, and often a rough map of the route will help. Such a map is only useful to an intelligent and well-educated man; it is a source of danger to the ignorant. To employ an absolutely illiterate man to carry a message over any distance, be he European or Indian, is to court failure. A commonly accepted fallacy is that an illiterate man has been gifted with an extra sense of being able to orient himself. This is true in his own particular country. Take him on to a strange terrain and he is a lost soul. I have frequently seen examples of this at Saugor. A Pathan from the N.-W. Frontier is just as much at sea in a Saugor jungle as a man born and reared in the Old Kent Road. Both require most careful instructions if they are to carry messages over an unfamiliar route.

One often sees a message-bearer handed an envelope, and after a few sketchy and often inaccurate directions he is airily waved off in anything but the right direction. Between the despatching point and destination there may have been a fenced railway, a canal or two, and three or four roads. A few moments' perusal of the map by the despatcher and these vague arm-waving directions might have been replaced by something as follows: 'Here is your north. Strike a bit to the south of west, and after three miles you will come to a bridge over the railway. Follow the road over the bridge and it will carry you across both canals, and close by the bridge on the second canal you will find Major X, to whom you are to deliver the message.'

If the carrier suffers from a weak memory he must make some notes. I think it is always advisable for the despatcher to point out the direction of north. Of course, every Cavalry trooper, British or Indian, should and must be able to recognise north, south, east, and west, otherwise he is useless off the barrack square. Ability to recognise the north must be thoroughly dinned into every Cavalry soldier from

the moment he dons a Cavalry uniform, and every opportunity must be seized for making him proficient in this respect.

Before despatching a man with a message it is always well to ask him if he understands his instructions. Indians are very diffident about asking questions unless they recognise that they will not be snapped at if they admit that they do not understand what has just been plainly told them. How many messages have gone wrong in our Indian Cavalry due to intolerance of not being immediately understood?

VERBAL MESSAGES

Reports from strategical reconnoitring detachments should usually be in writing; those from tactical reconnoitring patrols should be in writing when time permits, but in urgent cases they may be verbal (F.S.R., Chapter II., p. 36).

As far as Indian N.C.O.s are concerned reports will nearly always be verbal. Efforts are made at the Cavalry School, Saugor, to teach the compilation of written messages, and some degree of proficiency is arrived at. The education of the average Indian N.C.O. is, however, too limited to enable him to quickly write out a clear and succinct message. Unless reports and messages can be quickly committed to paper it is infinitely better to make use of verbal ones, and for tactical patrol work no other kind should be encouraged.

Instruction in carrying verbal messages is, however, essential, and the writer submits the following simple little exercise as a means for improving troopers and sowars in such work. The exercise also embodies many other useful properties.

Reporting and Reconnaissance Exercise Suitable for a Troop

A certain zone of country (the farther from cantonments the better) with well-defined boundaries will be allotted to the troop (see sketch).

The troop leader must decide if he intends to practise the conveyance of messages to a fixed point or to a moving one. The latter is a more difficult exercise.

Let us assume he proposes using a moving one. In this zone he places eight points, marked by eight flags, so situated that good eye-work will be necessary to locate them.


These flags are so arranged that each section will have a separate line to work along, and thus overlapping will be avoided.

At each point is a man who can read and write, and he is given a written message, such as, 'Patrol reports 500 Infantry and 2 guns passed this village at 10 P.M. last night, moving north-west.'

The message can be made as easy or as difficult as one likes. The troop is assembled at some suitable point and the following orders given out:—

To Sergeant Z, commanding No. 1 Section:

'Take your section along the road, passing by the villages of A and B (if no maps are available or the section leader cannot read one a bear-



ing must be given). In the vicinity of this road are situated two points, represented by a man with a red flag. At each point you will receive a verbal message, which is to be transmitted to me as I move east along the Grand Trunk Road. Having located both points rally at P on the Grand Trunk Road. If no points are found by — P.M. you will rally at the same place.'

Each section leader receives similar orders, but with a different general direction. The points should not be more than six or seven hundred yards to either side of the general direction, as 1200 yards is about the limit of frontage a section can efficiently search. The use of bearings as indicated above makes the exercise much more difficult, but there is no other course open if there are no maps and the section leader is illiterate.

The troop now marches off. The section leaders dispose their

sections to suit the conformation of the ground. After proceeding some way one of the men discovers a point. He calls up the section leader, and 'the point' reads out to the latter the message he has in his possession.

The section leader will select a man, and makes over to him the message, telling him the time of departure and giving him description of where the point is—*i.e.* the 'address from.' The section leader must also give the man the fullest directions for finding the troop leader. Having despatched the man arrangements will be made for finding the second point.

The bearer of the message having arrived at his destination will deliver the message. This should be taken down in writing, the time of arrival and the place from where it has come being noted.

On arrival at P the troop leader can check the copies with the originals.

As above is an exercise, and *not* a competition, section leaders should be instructed only to employ men for carrying the messages who require practice. The old soldiers, signallers, &c., can do the reconnoitring work.

All writing materials had better be left behind, otherwise half the benefit of the exercise will be lost.

If it is found desirable to exercise more men in conveying the messages, more points must be introduced, or a message received at one point can be sent to three receiving points—troop, squadron, and regimental headquarters—all moving in different lines.



THE PASSING OF THE OLD M.I.

By 'IKONA'

THE statement of the Secretary of State for War, when introducing the Army Estimates for 1914-15, that Mounted Infantry had been abolished, comes as no surprise to the Army, though many will feel, with regret, that this corps has now ceased to exist. For more than thirty years, except on the North-West Frontier of India, no campaign or expedition has taken place without the assistance of Mounted Infantry, nor is it too much to say that in every case this arm has materially assisted towards success.

Throughout these numerous expeditions and wars the Mounted Infantry has consistently acted with all the best traditions of our Infantry service, combined with that spirit of enterprise which is sometimes thought to be exclusively the attribute of Cavalry. The reason for this is not difficult to understand when it is realised that the conditions of service with Mounted Infantry ensured that none but the best men, and, still more important, the best officers, were selected by Infantry battalions for the mounted branch. At first sight it may appear paradoxical that the very reason that has enabled the Mounted Infantry in the past to attain such high honour in war is now used by the War Secretary for its abolition; but it must be remembered that the *personnel* of the Mounted Infantry was contributed by Infantry battalions, and its gain was a corresponding loss to them.

In time of peace this loss may not have been a serious matter; but in time of war, for a battalion to lose one-eighth of its strength in men and one-fifth of its officers, and these of its best, has not only been most disheartening for the officers responsible for its efficiency, but a very material loss of fighting power. That battalions have given of their best without murmur for the general welfare of the Army speaks well for the loyalty of their commanding officers in obeying

the spirit of the orders they received. There can be no question that their best officers were surrendered. A glance at the Active List of Senior Officers of the Army shows two generals, three lieutenant-generals, and nineteen major-generals who have served in the Mounted Infantry in war, and in the Colonels' List the numbers are much higher. Not many years have passed since the Mounted Infantry was looked upon as the surest road to distinction, and not without reason. In this branch an officer had more opportunities of winning his spurs.

The chief reason, however, which has influenced our military authorities to abolish the Mounted Infantry is, in the words of the



Secretary of State, as follows: 'The increase in the Cavalry at home also enables the Mounted Infantry Schools at home and in South Africa to be dispensed with, and on mobilisation relieves Infantry battalions of the strain of detaching picked men to form Mounted Infantry battalions.'

There may be some who will not be satisfied that the reduction of the garrison in South Africa will raise the strength of our Cavalry at home to a higher level than it was before 1899, a period when the importance of Mounted Infantry was at its highest.

In numerical strength, it is true, our Cavalry will be exactly the same—namely, twenty-eight Regiments of the Line and three of Household Cavalry; but no one with the most scanty knowledge of Cavalry

will fail to appreciate the difference in the fighting value of our Cavalry at the present time and of fifteen years ago. It is not too much to say that the reason for improvising mounted troops from our Infantry battalions arose not only from the necessity of furnishing small expeditions with mounted men, but also because at that time our Cavalry was neither equipped to fight with the rifle nor was it trained to do so. However much we may commend our military authorities of the past generation for their forethought in organising Mounted Infantry at a time when it was a necessity, we can but wonder that more was not done to make the best use of the fine body of Cavalry then available, which was kept idle at home while its place was taken in our small wars by Infantry soldiers mounted on ponies or camels.

The consequence of this anomaly was seen during the South African War. Cavalry there had to learn, in face of a very clever and active enemy, how to fight with the rifle, whereas the Mounted Infantry had but to learn to ride. The former art requires months of training, but the latter, for practical purposes, in Mounted Infantry is a matter of weeks only.

Though not actually stated, there can be little doubt that in coming to the decision to abolish Mounted Infantry Schools consideration has been given to the fact that our Army is no longer being trained for small wars and a possible campaign on our Indian frontier, but to be able to take its part in a European war should the necessity arise.

However useful Mounted Infantry may have been in the past in Colonial wars, the same could hardly be expected of it in a European war, even by the most bigoted adherent of this branch. Were it otherwise it can hardly be conceived that the ever-watchful General Staffs of first-class armies like those of France and Germany would not have realised its importance long before now. The value of training Cavalry to fight with the rifle as well as with the sword has been fully recognised since 1900 in Continental armies. There have, indeed, been a few leaders who have advocated even more attention to the rifle than at present is given in foreign armies, but the tendency of scientific military thought on Cavalry subjects lies in the direction of training Cavalry to fight both mounted and dismounted, the first being considered the most important.

To officers of our Army in general this at first sight appears unreasonable, accustomed as we are to manœuvre in close country,

where a mounted attack by any force larger than a squadron is usually out of the question, except on the few spots, like Salisbury Plain, where there is room for a Cavalry Division to manœuvre. We are apt to overlook the fact that most of the country in which our Army is likely to be employed very closely resembles Salisbury Plain as regards its suitability for Cavalry manœuvres, and is just as unsuitable for rifle fighting as the Plain, owing to the convex profile of the downland.

Some years ago, when the value of Mounted Infantry was so fully recognised in our small wars, the Government of India, on the advice, no doubt, of the Army Headquarters Staff, refused to recognise the necessity of introducing this branch into India, on the grounds that there was nothing Mounted Infantry could do which the well-trained Indian Cavalry could not do equally well, and that there were many things the Cavalry could do which were impossible for Mounted Infantry. This is the view held on the Continent and by our own General Staff. Sympathisers with Mounted Infantry must not be led away by the high state of war efficiency attained by many of the Mounted Infantry battalions in South Africa after months and even years of fighting there, but must judge of the value of this branch in a European war by the efficiency, or the want of it, of the same battalions during the first month of that campaign, not in comparison with other mounted troops of that day, but in comparison with the best European Cavalry of to-day.

So much intemperate language has been used since 1902 on this subject, without due regard to actual facts, that an erroneous impression is liable to linger in minds not fully aware of both sides of the question.

None of this affects the high value of the work performed by Mounted Infantry in the past.

The nation generally has never recognised its debt to the many distinguished Mounted Infantry battalions which, in a few important years, acquired glorious traditions. On the disbandment of these Mounted Infantry battalions their deeds were forgotten, except perhaps by the few who served therein.

To the Mounted Infantry as a whole belongs a very large share of the honour of saving the Empire in its most trying hour, and it

is, no doubt, only an oversight that this has never been fully appreciated by the public.

All over England monuments exist to commemorate various regiments and corps for work performed in war. To the Mounted



Infantry there is none, because, no doubt, the necessity hitherto has not presented itself.

There can be no better moment than the present time, when we have seen the last of an honourable life which has never received the full recognition it deserved, to suggest that a monument should be erected in honour of the Mounted Infantry, in appreciation of its good work in many wars and in many climates.

‘LEST WE FORGET.’

NOTE.—The illustrations have been kindly supplied by Major A. J. McNeill, 2nd Lovat's Scouts.



THE 18TH HUSSARS AT CROIX D'ORADE

APRIL one hundred years ago saw the end of the Peninsular War, when on the 10th of the month Wellington defeated Soult at Toulouse, three days before official intelligence reached him from Paris of the conclusion of hostilities. With the intention of assailing the Marshal's strong position from the north, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army had thrown a bridge across the Garonne about fifteen miles below the town on the 4th, and a portion of his forces had effected the passage when a flood came down and cut the communication. It was not till the 8th that the bridge was restored, whereupon the rest of the army, except for Hill's wing, crossed the river and began to move southwards.

A tributary of the Garonne, the Ers, a narrow but unfordable stream, runs in a northerly direction, past Toulouse and about two miles from it, to join the main river a few miles below where the pontoon bridge had been thrown. In his advance southwards towards Soult's position Wellington moved a portion of his force (the 4th and 6th Divisions under Beresford) along the further bank of the Ers, which thus separated his columns. The French had destroyed all the bridges over this watercourse near Toulouse except that at Croix d'Orade, three miles north-east of the town and about two miles from the nearest point of the line of works which marked their position. All the bridging material at the disposal of the Allies was needed for the Garonne, and as it was necessary for Wellington's plan of attack that his entire army should be on the left bank of the Ers, it became of vital importance to him to secure this one passage. On the afternoon of the 8th Vivian's Cavalry Brigade, consisting of the 18th Hussars and the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion, moved in advance along the right bank of the stream, pushing back hostile Cavalry detachments, until they approached the bridge. Then Vivian

ordered the 18th to drive off the French who were holding it, and prepared to lead them himself. Just as the regiment was about to attack a strong force of French Cavalry—three regiments of Chasseurs—was discovered to be on the spot, and at the same time Vivian was severely wounded. He ordered Major Hughes, commanding the 18th, to charge. The French horsemen were also about to charge, but the Hussars were too quick for them. The two leading squadrons of the 18th crashed into the front rank of the Chasseurs, sabred many of them, and threw them into complete confusion, while the rear rank of the French made for the bridge and escaped over it. One hundred and twenty prisoners were taken, and then the 18th, following up their success, pursued the fugitives almost as far as the French main position, when they were recalled by Sir Stapleton Cotton, who had been, with Wellington and Beresford, watching the combat. They fell back and held the bridge until Infantry hurried up to secure what had been won.

The result of this brilliant affair, in which the 18th only had one officer and one man wounded besides having two horses killed and two wounded, was to give Wellington the means of uniting his army before the battle which he contemplated engaging in on the 10th. When he witnessed the success of the Hussars' charge he exclaimed, 'Well done the 18th! By God, well done!' And in a despatch to the Secretary of State on the 13th he wrote that 'the Eighteenth Hussars, under the immediate command of Colonel Vivian, had an opportunity of making a most gallant charge upon a superior body of the enemy's Cavalry, whom they drove through the village of Croix d'Orade and took almost 100 prisoners.' The following complimentary order was published in Cavalry Orders on the 9th:—

'Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton witnessed with great satisfaction the gallant and soldier-like conduct of the 18th Hussars when engaged with a superior force of the enemy yesterday evening near Toulouse.

'The Lieut.-General's thanks are due to Colonel Vivian, who with so much judgment and gallantry commanded his brigade, and who was unfortunately wounded at the commencement of the attack. The Lieut.-General begs that Major Hughes, commanding the 18th Hussars, and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of that

regiment will accept his thanks for their good conduct, and for the steadiness as well as courage which they displayed on this occasion.

(Signed) 'J. ELLEY, Colonel A.A.-G.'

Major Hughes was very anxious that his regiment should have been awarded some distinction in commemoration of the combat; but when application was made to Wellington on the subject by the Colonel, Lord Drogheda, the Duke, although paying a high compliment to its bearing, expressed himself unable to make any special recommendation. It is noteworthy that Vivian, who afterwards commanded a Cavalry Brigade with great distinction at Waterloo and rose to the highest positions in the Service, took for his crest when given a peerage a bridge, with a 'demi'-Hussar of the 18th holding a sabre in his right hand and a banner inscribed 'Croix d'Orade' in his left. Nevertheless, the 18th have not even 'Toulouse' on their appointments, although they took part in the battle itself as well as in preparing for it.

H. M.



LETTERS ON POLO

By COLONEL J. VAUGHAN, D.S.O.,
Commandant, Cavalry School, Netheravon

No. I

THE EDUCATION OF YOUNG PLAYERS

SINCE my return from India three years ago I have been impressed with the lack of young talent, both civilian and military, recently brought out in English polo. Indeed, most of the latest recruits to first-class polo in England have come from India.

To a certain extent this is natural, as polo is played much more generally and for a much longer season in India than in England; moreover, there is not the great counter-attraction of hunting in the leave season.

But my experience of young officers from many regiments at the Cavalry School has led me to form certain conclusions as to the reasons that young players in England do not make more rapid progress.

These are :—

(a) There is no lack of keenness.

(b) There is a lack of method in some regiments and individuals.

It is the consideration of (a) the evident keenness amongst our officers that has induced me to place my views before the readers of this journal. I think, also, that the subject is deserving of consideration from a strictly military point of view, for what is one of the great differences between the work of a Cavalry officer and that of an Infantry officer? A Cavalry officer should think at a gallop, whereas an Infantry officer can think at the halt. I remember some years ago discussing a problem on a Staff Ride with a well-known Infantry officer who in South Africa had earned just fame. 'Wait,' said he, 'till I get off my horse and look at the ground.' 'Right,' said I,

'and I'll gallop round to that spur and meet you back here.' We each solved the problem according to the methods of our own arm, but this incident shows that it is necessary for Cavalry officers to form the habit of thinking at the gallop. And the best way of making a second nature of this habit is to play as much polo and as good polo as often as you can.

Now as to (b): I know that some regiments take the greatest possible trouble about training their young officers at polo and in running their regimental polo clubs so as to help as many officers as possible to play the game. But there are others. Sometimes they are led away by concentrating too much attention on the mounting of the Regimental Team and putting up a good show for that one year. In other regiments the senior officers do not take the interest that they should take; and the young subalterns, who are keen, are left to wrestle with polo matters with no friendly and experienced hand to help them. The only sound basis for regimental polo clubs is to train the younger officers thoroughly, to train the ponies thoroughly, and always to anticipate the stud of ponies for next year and never try to buy for this year.

If this is done inter-regimental polo tournaments and, much more, the general improvement and satisfaction of the young officers with the the value they get from the game will be assured. Last, but not least, you will have a corps of officers accustomed to think at the gallop.

Having now been thoroughly candid to my brother officers who run their regimental polo clubs, I must be equally candid to the younger officers for whose benefit they labour.

Although Mr. Jorrocks says 'it is better to make himputations on any young man's morality than his horsemanship,' I feel constrained to state there are three reasons why young officers play badly:—

(a) Indifferent horsemanship.

(b) Inaccurate hitting.

(c) Want of thought.

As to (a), there is less excuse for Cavalry subalterns who are put through the mill of a regimental riding school (*albeit* nowadays a very mild one) than for civilians. But the fact remains that some officers come on the polo ground without any idea of using their legs except for the one purpose of driving their ponies forward, and even to do this they very often apply them quite wrongly. A favourite method

appears to be (by numbers)—‘One,’ advance the left hand as near the pony’s ears as possible; ‘Two,’ lean the body right forward and endeavour to overtake the ball if the pony can’t; ‘Three,’ to maintain your balance, draw back the legs and tickle the pony near the stifles with your heels.

Now, although this method shows keenness, it is quite a delusion to suppose that even if done vigorously in drill-time it will have any appreciable effect on the pony beyond bewildering him and making



‘HOW NOT TO DO IT.’

him dislike the game more than the whacks he receives from mis-handled sticks have already done.

Therefore, I say to the beginner, the first thing to do is to learn to ride your pony properly with your legs; to drive him, stop him, start him, turn him, balance him, make him change his legs, ride off—for everything the rider’s leg-work is essential. If you don’t believe this, go and watch Buckmaster, Barrett, or any other first-class player at work, and especially note their leg-work and balance of body.

As regards stopping ponies with the leg I used to teach the men in my squadron by numbers, thus :—

'One,' slightly draw back the legs and collect the horse, *i.e.* make him put his hocks under him.

'Two,' with the right hand lightly raise the head with the bridoon.

'Three,' as the head comes up to the right-angle, hold the bit steady by turning the left wrist, little finger towards the body. No straight pull back of the forearm is necessary.

Train all your ponies to do this; it gives you a great advantage. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in the Belgian Riding Regulations the aids for reining back are on the same principle. According to the Belgians, whom I have seen at work and whom I think very good (to rein back), you do not pull the horse's mouth at all; you collect him and press him forward with the legs and hold the bit steady: he recoils from this and reins back.

It is important for beginners to note that the action of collecting with the legs must just precede the action of the bit, otherwise the pony's head will not come up to the angle that gives you most power over him, nor will his hocks be under him.

I may seem to labour this point unnecessarily, and it may seem so simple that everyone must know it, but I have found from experience that it is this ignorance of the use of the legs which is the greatest stumbling-block to the progress of young players.

I will now pass on to (*b*) Inaccurate hitting.

Many officers practise either in a pit or knocking the ball about a good deal, but they are not always properly coached, and consequently their practice lacks method and hence there is a want of progress.

There are twelve strokes to learn at polo, *viz.* :—

Off side; forward, drive, cut, pull.

Near side; forward, drive, cut, pull.

Off side; backhander, drive, cut, pull.

Near side; backhander, drive, cut, pull.

First practise the drives.

Off side forward. Hit the ball just after your stick has passed the perpendicular and is beginning to rise—*i.e.* hit the ball as far forward as you can. Don't try to hit it hard, but try to hit it true, and be sure to carry your stroke right through till your stick and arm have almost reached the perpendicular.

Near side forward. Turn well in your saddle so that your right shoulder points the way you are going and your elbow is above the ball. Your pony may think this is a misjudged 'aid' of yours for him to turn to the left, and to counteract this you must have your bridle-hand turned to the right to feel his mouth and your left leg ready to keep him straight.

Start the stroke with a downward sweep of the right hand from the left shoulder and again hit the ball as far forward as possible just as



'How to do it.'

your stick is beginning to rise. Keep your right thumb down the handle of your stick to give you better direction.

Forward cuts are difficult; they can best be made from half-arm strokes, rather late, and a fair distance away from the pony as he turns. They should not be practised until you can make your drives easily.

Forward pulls are not difficult, but you must remember to ride your pony straight at the ball and not to one side of it, to lean right out of your saddle and hit well in front of your pony's legs.

How often you hear the exclamation 'Hard luck!' when a player hits the ball into his own pony's forelegs! It is bad, careless play, and there is no hard luck about it at all, except on the pony.

Backhanders should be hit as late as possible for the same reason that forward strokes should be hit as soon as possible—*i.e.* to enable you to get slightly under the ball when your stick is at its full swing and just beginning to rise.

Most players play the off backhander and the near side forward stroke (they are very similar) with the thumb down the stick to give direction.

It is very necessary to learn from the start how to cut and pull your backhanders if you wish to be of any use to your side. If you hit them straight back they will probably hit a pony or be met by a player coming up behind you. To cut backhanders it is necessary to hit them early—a chopping stroke with a wrist turn. You should also train your pony to bend his head to the left to give you more room to come down with your stick. To pull backhanders lean right back and hit them as late as possible behind your pony's tail. A tall man has an advantage in this stroke.

Near-side backhanders are very strong strokes; they should be hit as late as possible, again excepting the cut, which is a very difficult stroke and must be hit early.

If you practise in a pit, do not slog anyhow for ten minutes as hard as you can. Make up your mind that you will hit the ball in a certain direction, and change that direction, following the consecutive hours of a clock, all round the circle. When you can do this with a fair certainty you will be on the road to acquiring a good *répertoire* of strokes. When knocking the ball about on a pony always aim at something, real or imaginary goals, and vary your strength.

Then get a friend to practise lateral and forward passing, meeting backhanders, &c.

It is usually preferable for two men to knock about together; it is also more interesting.

We now come to (c) Want of thought.

This is a very heinous crime, not confined to polo or soldiers; indeed, I remember a libellous cartoon of a successful politician, who was once a subaltern of Hussars, in which the budding ruler of the King's Navee was represented saying 'I don't think, I talk.' In my next letter I will


deal with the tactics of the game, which I hope will give food for thought; but in this letter I must confine myself to the following two recommendations:—

(1) Anticipate what is going to happen and regulate your movements accordingly.

(2) The moment that you fail to do one thing start doing something else.

The last phrase is perhaps badly worded and needs a little explanation. Take the example of a man who misses the ball—this happens sometimes even in first-class polo—what should he do now? The bad man gallops on twenty or thirty yards, with his brain in a comatose condition, before he realises that he has missed it. The worse man stops to swear. The worst man jobs his pony in the mouth and calls it a bad name. He is afterwards surprised that his pony seems to play worse every day and that polo is an expensive game.

The useful man does something at once; either he gallops on so that his own side can pass him up the ball, or he goes straight for the nearest loose man of the enemy and collars him, or he turns in defence to liberate his back in the attack. Anyhow, he does something of use to his side, his best under the circumstances, *at once*. That is, he thinks and acts correctly and quickly, so that thought and action are simultaneous. This is what we want in polo, and this is what we want in our training for war.



NOTE.—The illustrations 'How not to do it' and 'How to do it' have been kindly furnished by Major A. J. McNeill, 2nd Lovat's Scouts.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Kavalleristische Monatshefte. December.—One of the opening articles in this number is an account of the work of the Cavalry at (Vionville)-Mars-la-Tour, but it is open to question whether there is now anything of importance to be stated in regard to this battle which has not already been said many times over. Rittmeister Pfleger inquires why the Cavalry attack should, as an almost invariable rule, be made in deployed lines. He considers that this ancient formation has been adhered to mainly because all the more important successes have been won in deployed lines; but, as he points out, it is an inconvenient manœuvre formation—it does not lend itself to changes of direction, does not easily adapt itself to the conformation of ground, and offers a wide target for Artillery. He suggests, in lieu of the line attack, one—when small bodies are opposed—of section columns; when larger forces are engaged, of squadron columns, claiming that the impact of these will exert an enormous effect upon an opposing line, that these columns can, at need, readily be deployed, and that they permit of better use of ground in the advance. Major von Kayser offers another contribution to the series of articles on 'The Training of Cavalry Officers in Patrol Duties,' which has now for some time past been carried on in this JOURNAL; and Rittmeister Scherber makes some suggestions from the Cavalry point of view on the new field service manual. Rittmeister von Dunkel has a very short but useful paper on crossing rivers, &c., by Cavalry patrols, emphasising the need for such patrols to be absolutely independent of artificial aid of any kind. He takes a patrol at a strength of six men; the whole of their clothing, saddlery, and equipment is tied up by the aid of the picketing ropes into two large bundles—helmet, carbine, and lance excepted—enclosed in the blankets. The lances are bound to the middle of each bundle. Quiet and good swimmers among the horses are selected to tow the bundles across, these being attached by picketing ropes to the horses' tails. The other men and horses give the lead. Rittmeister von Dunkel states that the blankets are waterproof and that the contents keep them afloat. He gives some useful hints as to the length of towing ropes, &c. Major von S. gives a short account of the present condition of the Cavalry telegraph service in the German army, and of the course of instruction afforded at the Cavalry Telegraph School. There are annually two courses held at the school, that for officers lasting four months, for other ranks five; and during the year forty-nine officers, ninety-eight non-commissioned officers, and 196 men are under instruction; and these numbers have been so calculated as to allow of every Cavalry regiment having one non-commissioned officer and two men annually under instruction, and one officer every other year. The course is very thorough and practical, and towards its close, exercises are carried out in the vicinity; while between the courses the officers on the staff of the school are employed on communication duty with a Cavalry division. Every Cavalry regiment has told off to it a telegraph section

composed of one officer, four non-commissioned officers, and four men; it has its own wagon, and its equipment consists of a telephone with four kilometres of ordinary wire and 350 metres of cable. Material is also carried for connecting with existing telegraph or telephone lines. Veterinary Surgeon Schulze has an article on forage, and among the shorter Papers in this number is a sharp criticism of the reported intention to arm the new regiments of *Jäger zu Pferd* with the Infantry bayonet in the field, the sword issued in peace being withdrawn on mobilisation.

January 1914.—General von Bernhardi opens this number with a paper on 'The Education of the Cavalry Leader'; he divides his treatment of the subject into two parts, in the first describing what he considers to be the scope of Cavalry action under the conditions of modern war, and in the other detailing a certain programme of progressive self-instruction whereby the Cavalry officer may gradually build up such an education as shall prepare and fit him for high command. But while the syllabus which General von Bernhardi draws up seems eminently calculated for the furtherance of the direction of Cavalry in the field, he closes on a despondent and discouraging note. He declares that, all things considered, it is extraordinarily difficult to afford a systematic education for the Cavalry leader, because it is practically impossible in peace to produce anything even approaching to the conditions under which he must act during war; and also for the reason that the leading of Cavalry, more than any other arm, requires peculiar qualities and instincts, which may be developed if latent, but can never be produced if they do not actually exist in the individual. He then gives a sufficiently comprehensive list of the qualities he has in his mind, and declares that in the whole history of war he has only met with two Cavalry leaders who embodied his ideals: these are Seydlitz and Stuart. 'L. L.' contributes a detailed account of the operations of the 'Red' Cavalry division in the army manoeuvres of 1913 in Southern Bohemia; this is chiefly of interest to the cavalymen of the Dual Monarchy, but the author makes some closing remarks which are applicable to all of that arm. He remarks that the country operated over was almost universally described as being 'unsuited for Cavalry'—a complaint which is not unfrequently heard on manoeuvres. But he points out that wide, open country, such as is usually considered typical Cavalry *terrain*, is emphatically *not* suited for the operations of the mounted arm by reason of the great range of modern firearms; on the other hand, ground which is frequently described as unsuitable for the movements of Cavalry actually favours surprise, from which this arm will obtain the maximum effect. 'Let us, therefore,' he concludes, 'have no more of the traditional complaint in regard to Cavalry *terrain*, for the more Cavalry accustoms itself to work in broken or enclosed ground—such as is usually classed as unsuitable to Cavalry—the greater will be the success of the results obtained.' Major-General Baron von Maltzahn, who himself rode in the charge, describes again the attack of the 1st Dragoons of the Guard at Mars-la-Tour. Count Lamberg replies to an article in the December number, in which the query was put as to why the Cavalry attack should always be made in deployed lines, and in which, too, a column formation was advocated. In his reply, Count Lamberg holds that the section or squadron columns will be exceedingly difficult to control in the charge, that the pace will become wild, and the columns open out until, as he describes it, *ist die Kosaken Lawa perfekt*. Then follows a paper on

'Horse Breeding and the Training of Jumpers'; another on the armament of the non-commissioned officer of Cavalry; and one on the half-bred horse of the French Midi.

February.—Lieut.-Colonel Beit of the 14th Uhlans asks the question in the initial number of this issue—'Is the Prussian supply of remounts equal to the requirements of War?' He takes as the basis of his discussion of the subject an article published some three years ago in the *Militär Wochenblatt* on the ordinary losses—as distinct from casualties in action—of the Cavalry in the war of 1870, which gave the loss in horseflesh as 576 in a Cavalry division of six regiments. Colonel Beit holds that we may accept such casualties in modern war as 100 per regiment, so that in the 110 regiments composing the German Cavalry these would work out at 11,000, or approximately the equal of three Cavalry divisions. He suggests that the remount of the European Cavalry is far too much coddled, that it is given no chance to become hard and sound in wind and limb, and he points out that while in the Turkish-Bulgarian war the Hungarian remount—very similar to the German—suffered enormous casualties, the small Asiatic horse stood the extraordinarily severe conditions of the campaign remarkably well. He pleads, then, for a more healthy life for the horse in the ranks, work to make his legs sound and his hoofs hard, tethering in the open in spring and summer; above all, doing away with straw bedding, which tends to make the limbs weak and prevents the ground from being properly aired. General von Unger makes some suggestions about the disposition of the First Line Transport of the Cavalry division, and 'Silvius' contributes some remarks on the composition and equipment of the communication detachment; he proposes that wire should no longer form part of the equipment, that the Cavalry should be relieved of telegraph and telephone work, which should be handed over to the army service corps, and that the properly co-ordinated and organised wireless, aviation, and other technical branches should be told off to the Cavalry divisions. Lieut-Colonel Count Spannochi has a paper on the regulations for the training of Cavalry in Russia published in 1912. In 'The demands on our Cavalry,' an anonymous writer describes very plainly the serious situation in which Germany would find herself on the outbreak of a war between the Powers of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, and the special difficulties which the German Cavalry would have to face. Not only, says the writer, would Germany have to bear, at any rate at first, the brunt of the attack, but her Cavalry would have to meet overpowering masses of Russian Cavalry on the one frontier, and permanently organised divisions of French Cavalry on the other. The writer goes at length into the question of the best preparation for the demands which will be made upon the German Cavalry; and though he does not minimise the severity of the task which lies before it, he has no doubts of its capacity to carry it through, chiefly because of his very natural belief that the horsemen of his own nation are better trained, armed, mounted, commanded, and morally equipped than are those of the nations which may take the field against them. Major Junk enters a protest against diminishing the length of the lance, a procedure which appears in contemplation, since the 1st Leibhusaren in Dantzic have been carrying out experiments with shorter lances. Major Junk sees no advantage in this measure; if, he says, the present length of lance is too much for the light Cavalryman, better deprive him of this weapon altogether—anything of the nature of a compromise is out of the question.

Militär-Wochenblatt. No. 5, of January 10.—This number contains the translation of a paper by Count Bagration in the *Vojenni Sbornik* on the Russian Cavalry and the quality of the remounts available. Count Bagration has no very high opinion of the bulk of the horses ridden by the Cossacks; the Cossacks of the Don are the best mounted, but the breeding of the horses is not conducted on scientific principles, and the men of that part of the country cannot afford to keep the young stock until they are four years old, when they are considered fit for training to take their place in the ranks. Matters are going from bad to worse, and, according to Count Bagration, something of a crisis must ensue unless remedial measures are at once adopted. He emphasises the need for the establishment of a special department of the Government Remount which should be wholly concerned with the breeding of a suitable type of army horse, and the creation of a Cavalry Committee, under the presidency of the Inspector of Cavalry, which should collate and make known the special qualities to be looked for in the war-horse. This Committee should also concern itself with the discussion and solution of Cavalry problems of all kinds. He also advocates the institution of Cossack central and brigade schools, horse-breaking establishments, and the serious and thorough study of the many technical matters which have come to the front of late years in the employment of Cavalry in modern war. Count Bagration points out that at the present moment there are no fewer than seven different departments all concerned in one way or another with Cavalry matters. He quotes the opinion in regard to the Cossacks as Cavalry of an officer who commanded a unit of these troops during the war in Manchuria; it is not wholly favourable, and it lays stress upon the serious disadvantage that, the horse being the private property of the man, no real reserve in horseflesh is forthcoming, while the actual supply—hitherto regarded as inexhaustible—now shows signs of serious diminution. He closes by urging that the Cossacks should have a fully constituted Remount Department on the same lines as the Regular Cavalry.

No. 20, of February 7.—Major-General von Unger, commanding the 20th Cavalry Brigade, contributes to this number 'Some Thoughts on the Leading of a Cavalry Division.' He seems to suggest that such a command is not the difficult post, requiring special training and special aptitude, which it is too often held to be, so long as men accustom themselves in peace to an almost automatic procedure of dealing with all the purely technical work of the command. General von Unger considers that the Cavalry leader should have during peace worked out every possible manœuvre or combination on paper, so that in the field his action will develop spontaneously, leaving his mind wholly free for devising the tactical procedure required by the situation. In the same way he should educate himself to an idiomatic, clear, almost telegraphic method of issuing orders, so that here again these, delivered in the field, may admit of no possible misunderstanding or of being read in two ways, while there may neither be delay in their issue nor confusion in their execution.

No. 29, of February 26.—This number contains a sympathetic notice by Lieut.-Colonel Müller-Kränefeldt of that portion of a book recently published by Germain Bapst, 'Le Maréchal Canrobert, souvenir d'un siècle,' which describes the Cavalry commanders of the French Army of the Rhine in 1870; these were Generals Forton, du Barail, de Valabrègue, de Clérembault, and Legrand. With the single exception of du Barail these were all

men of over sixty, and not even young bodily or mentally for their age, while Forton suffered so greatly from a painful complaint that he could not move out of a walk. None of the four except du Barail possessed the necessary knowledge or experience to command a large Cavalry body; and, further, by an unfortunate coincidence, on August 15 Forton's Cavalry Division was stationed on the southern Verdun road, where he was opposed to the German Cavalry, while du Barail was on the northern road; on the following day, too, when the great cavalry combats took place, du Barail, by an unfortunate chain of circumstances, exercised command over one regiment only of his whole division.

Number 33, of March 7, has a valuable retrospect of the work of Cavalry divisions from 1870 to 1914. The composition and distribution of the Cavalry divisions are described in the campaign of 1870, in the Balkan war of 1877-1878, the South African war of 1899-1902, the war in Manchuria, and the campaign of 1912-13 in the Balkan peninsula. Of these the Franco-German war receives an amount of attention, less due perhaps to the somewhat belated lessons now to be learnt from the action therein of the Cavalry on either side, than to the fact that in this campaign, almost alone of those cited, both sides disposed of really large bodies of the mounted men, and entertained clear, if sometimes mistaken, views as to their employment. This paper closes with the expression of the opinion that none of the modern *Techniks*, not even the advance and development of aviation, will effect any diminution in the importance of the Cavalry division. We cannot spare it either in reconnaissance or in the battle, while it will remain, as always, the only arm for the pursuit. Doubt is expressed as to whether the attachment of Infantry or cyclists may not seriously cramp the mobility of the Cavalry, though it is admitted that mechanical transport may serve to expedite the onward march of such riflemen reinforcement. But every effort should be made so to train and equip the Cavalry division that at need it may be able to act quite independently.

Revue de Cavalerie. December.—The April number of this Journal for last year contained an article entitled 'The Definition of the Initiative'; the December issue has another of the same character on 'The Offensive.' The writer examines his subject from all points of view, especially pointing out the confusion of ideas which exists between the 'offensive' and the 'attack,' and claiming that while it is the nation which does, or should, educate the army in the offensive, it is training which ensures that the army is properly instructed in the attack. He concludes: 'In the wars of the future, as of the past, victory will result from the valour, the self-confidence, and the degree of preparation for war of the race; it is the duty of the heads of the army in time of peace to contribute to such preparation by affording confidence to the people by wise and vigorous institutions and by preparing by every technical means to put the offensive force into operation. If we are become offensive in heart and soul, we shall be offensive also in fact.' B. Lévénetz contributes a translation from the *Russian Cavalry Manual* on the employment of the Lova, which is stated not to represent any particular formation, but certain tactical Cavalry evolutions devoid of any hard-and-fast rules, and depending for success upon the leader and also upon the possession of a large measure of initiative in all his subordinates. Captain Aubert continues his studies

on the Cavalry combat, dealing with the mechanism of the attack. There is an epitome of the German *Reitvorschrift* published in May 1912, which is spoken of in high terms as being of value to all arms of the service, though intended in the Cavalry rather for the use of officers, and especially of instructors, than as a means of educating directly the men in the ranks. This number of the *Revue de Cavalerie* contains two papers of historical interest. The first is called 'The Standards of the 4th Dragoons,' and is contributed by Commandant Oré: it recounts the story of the various standards borne by this regiment since its creation as Beaupré-Cavalerie in 1667. It was numbered 22 in 1721 and 3 in 1776, and it was not until 1791 that it was given the number which it now bears. At one time, as M. Oré points out, regiments carried a large number of standards, sometimes more than one per squadron, and this accounts for the large number of trophies taken in the victories gained at this period. Thus, at Rocroi the Spaniards lost no fewer than seventy colours or standards, and when in 1814 Marshal Sérurier burnt the trophies hanging in the Invalides rather than they should fall into the hands of the Allies, the ashes of 1600 flags of all nations were carried seaward by the troubled waters of the Seine. When at the Revolution the army was reorganised the old standards were called in or destroyed and a *tricolore* was substituted; and it appears that, so long as the three colours were represented, the fashion of their combination was permitted to become a matter of regimental choice or taste. Then came the Empire, and, while squadron standards were permitted, the regimental emblem became the Eagle—and the legend *les aigles ne seront pas renouvelées* made the Eagle a possession of especial sanctity. With the return of the Bourbon the 4th Dragoons received a new standard, only to have their Eagle restored to them during the Hundred Days, receiving the standard of the Restoration after Waterloo. The fall of Louis Philippe gave the regiment yet another standard, and the Third Napoleon restored the Eagle, to be eventually replaced by the standard of the present day. It is curious that the 4th Dragoons bore at one time upon their standard two 'Honours' to which they had no claim—Aldenhoven and Medellin; but to-day they have inscribed upon it Valmy, Eylau, Badajoz, Nangis—names which sufficiently indicate the extended and distinguished character of the services which the regiment has rendered during the 250 years that it has been in existence. Charles Conteranne tells the extraordinary story of 'The Twenty Dragoons of Arcola,' who, under Lieutenant Châtelain, captured 300 prisoners and five guns with a loss of a fourth of their number.

January 1914.—The direction of this journal announces that with the appearance of this number Colonel Fleury resigns the post of Editor, which for some little time past he has occupied with such distinction. There is the first part of a very detailed account by General de Witte of the work of the Cavalry at Rezonville on August 16, 1870; he calls it 'Comment se perd une bataille,' and he divides his account dramatically enough into a prologue, four acts, and an epilogue. The prologue opens at 9.30 A.M. with the initial intervention by the Cavalry; the first act endures until 12.30 P.M., and ends with the final crushing of Frossard's corps accompanied by several charges of Cavalry. With the opening of the second act the German army weakens in its turn, and its fortunes are only re-established about 2.30 by the opportune attack of Bredow's brigade. In the third act victory inclines once more to the French by reason of the intervention of Ladmirault

and the vigorous offensive of Grenier and Cissey; while in the fourth and last, about 6 P.M., there is the *grande mêlée* of Cavalry on the plateau of Ville-sur-Yron and the attack of the Brandenburg dragoons upon Cissey's division; the epilogue contains the general retirement and the twilight charge of the Mecklenburg Cavalry division. There is a good map and several sketches in the text. Captain Aubert continues his studies on 'The Cavalry Combat,' and deals in this paper with the tactics of the attack and the employment to the best advantage of the auxiliary arms; he is careful to make it clear that the mere mobility of the Cavalry arm makes it nearly always practically impossible to use wholly or to extract the full value from the co-operation of these auxiliary arms, but holds that the will of the commander and the initiative of the subordinate leaders should help to get the utmost possible out of them. Even their *partial* intervention, prior to the attack, will be the best preparation for and assurance of success. Some interesting extracts are given in this number from a book recently published by MM. Berger-Levrault, and written by Lieut.-Colonel Ernest Picard, containing the precepts of Napoleon on Cavalry.

'Story of the Jena Campaign,' by Lieut.-Colonel H. M. E. Brunker. London. Forster, Groom & Company, Limited, 16 Charing Cross.

Colonel Brunker tells the story of the crushing defeat of the Prussians in concise style. For the military student perhaps, as distinguished from the officer who wishes to pass an examination, the author is a little too concise, and deduces all the lessons to be learnt in a manner that leaves little to the reader's own imagination or powers of deduction.

The history is exceedingly well illustrated by a series of ten maps.

The same author and publisher also produce 'Questions on the Jena Campaign' at the modest price of 1s. 6d.

Just the thing for examinees or men in a hurry to get hold of facts.

The story is told in twenty-seven pages, and there are fifty-six questions on the campaign. The volume is interleaved with blank pages for the student to make his own notes on. All officers owe Colonel Brunker a debt of gratitude for his indefatigable work in assisting them to master various subjects of examination.

'Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.' By Colonel J. E. Gough, V.C., C.M.G. London. Hugh Rees, Ltd.

Colonel Gough's study of a period of particular importance is based upon a series of lectures delivered by him at the Staff College. The story of these two great battles is told wholly from the Federal side, and the author reminds us anew of the danger of civilian interference with the commander in the field; the expense and risk of employing half-trained and untrained troops; and—the effect of which so far we have happily had no experience—of the result of a severe defeat of the army upon the civilian population. Students will find this book both valuable and attractive, and the many maps unusually illuminating.

'A Cavalry Officer in the Coruña Campaign.' Edited by Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B. London. John Murray.

The publication of the Coruña Diary of Captain Alexander Gordon, 15th Hussars, edited by Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B., will be welcomed by all students of military history. As the editor in his brief but sufficient introduction remarks, 'it seems to supply something that has up to the present time been wanting in the history of the Coruña campaign.'

Captain Gordon's narrative, it would appear, was written up by him from the journal which he kept during the campaign immediately after his return to England. It may, on this account, presumably be an accurate description of events as he witnessed them. Of the hardships by the way and the disorders which occurred his journal does but confirm the interesting letters of Lord Vivian, who was also engaged in the same service. It is quite noteworthy how the touches of humour, which here and there appear in the pages of the journal, gradually cease as the progress of the campaign led the British Army more and more into a position of peril. But for this change of temperament the facts narrated in the book give, we think, ample justification.

Captain Gordon naturally and rightly deplores the excesses and lack of discipline which manifested itself in the Army during the retreat. Other writers, and Sir John Moore himself, accounted for the unhappy condition of affairs in other ways, and Sir John indeed allotted the blame in a certain direction and in no uncertain terms. That openly expressed criticism of superior officers by those under their command produced a feeling of indiscipline which spread to the rank and file is indubitable. Its effect must of necessity have been bad. Yet the criticisms in which Captain Gordon's book abounds would seem to indicate that he was not in this respect guiltless; and what is more, so tenaciously held to his views of the situation, that on revising or rewriting his journal at home, he adhered to them and expressed them with the utmost freedom. Hence, from its controversial nature, it is well that the publication has been delayed.

In his task as editor, Colonel Wylly has exercised that most valuable quality—self-restraint. He gives the journal as it is and unencumbered with that plague to the reader, a plethora of footnotes. We have already mentioned his introduction, and can but add that a most clear, terse, and well-considered synopsis is prefixed to each chapter. An excellent reproduction in colours of a miniature of Captain Gordon and three valuable plans will be welcomed by the reader, those of the actions at Sahagun and at Calcabelos being particularly useful. The book is one to be read, and Colonel Wylly is to be heartily congratulated upon the result of his work.

'Hazell's Annual.' London. Hazell, Watson & Viney, Limited.

A useful work of reference, giving the most recent, accurate, and compressed information on all subjects of the day. We have personally examined what this volume has to say about the Army, and we find everything that there is to be known about the armed forces of the Crown throughout the Empire in eighteen pages.

Other subjects are equally well and concisely dealt with, whilst a special feature which may interest our readers are the seventeen pages which describe the recent Balkan wars. There are maps to illustrate the new Balkans, the Panama Canal, and the Imperial wireless scheme.

NOTES

THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION GOLD MEDAL, 1913.

We are pleased to record the success of Major Algernon Lawson, Royal Scots Greys, in gaining this Medal, together with the first Trench-Gascoigne Prize of thirty guineas for his essay, the subject of which being 'How Can Moral Qualities best be Developed during the Preparation of the Officer and the Man for the Duties each will carry out in War?' Twenty essays in all were submitted.

This is the first time the medal has been gained by a Cavalry officer since its initiation in 1874, and the Editorial Staff of this Journal offer Major Lawson their best congratulations.

The essay will be published in the April Number of the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.

REGIMENTAL HISTORIES

The attention of the Council of the Royal United Service Institution having been drawn to the considerable number of regiments and corps who are now compiling, or about to compile, their Regimental History and Records, the Council desire to intimate that the Secretary and Staff of the Institution are prepared to render every assistance and advice in the matter, especially on the following points :

- (1) Suggestions as to an Author.
- (2) Selection of Printers and Publishers.
- (3) The style and size of the Book, Type, and Binding.
- (4) The method of Illustrating, Colour and otherwise, Artists, Photographers, &c.
- (5) Preparation of List of Officers.
- (6) Where and how research information may be obtained.

5TH (P.C.W.) DRAGOON GUARDS

The history of the 5th Dragoon Guards is now being compiled. The regiment will be very grateful for any information as to the existence and whereabouts of diaries, private letters, documents and papers referring to the regiment; also sketches, caricatures, portraits in oil, pastel or miniature, prints, weapons, war relics, uniforms, &c.

The regiment was formerly known from 1690 to 1746 as the 6th Horse, and from 1746 to 1788 as the 2nd Horse (Ireland).

Correspondence should be addressed to Captain Hon. R. L. Pomeroy, Greens Norton Court, Towcester.

*From the painting by M. A. Hayes.
In possession of the late
Major-General Sir Stanley Clarke, G.C.V.O., C.M.G.
(By kind permission.)*

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL—No. 34.



13th LIGHT DRAGOONS.

1845



Capt. G.C.B. Paynter's (Scots Guards)

"JACK SYMONS"

Winner of the
GRAND MILITARY GOLD CUP
1914

(By General Symons, dam by Culloden II.)

A TRAVELLING KITCHEN ON MANŒUVRES.

By A TERRITORIAL OFFICER.

BEING a great believer in mechanical transport of all descriptions, and for other reasons, I was determined, for the 1912 manœuvres, to experiment with something on the lines of a mechanical cooker, or, as it should be more properly described, a 'mechanical kitchen,' in opposition to the type of cooker now in use in the Army. I saw a cooker with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, to which I was attached during the Cavalry Divisional Training that preceded manœuvres, and was anything but struck by its adaptability, its capabilities, or its mobility. This made me all the keener to have a mobile kitchen for the 1st South Western Mounted Brigade of Yeomanry. I will say nothing of the want of adaptability of the one I saw, except that its weight was so great that it could not keep pace with Cavalry when drawn by two horses, and of its lack of room for either the cook's fuel, necessities or accessories.

During the march of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade across England from Lark Hill to the manœuvre ground, I watched the performance of this one, which was only horsed by a pair; the cooks had to walk, and, before it was sent home by the regiment to which it belonged, I had made up my mind that it was virtually useless, and determined to try one on a motor lorry.

I was able to get an old motor-bus chassis from the Great Western Railway Works at Slough, and a Lune Valley cooker through the agency of the Junior Army and Navy Stores at Aldershot.

This Lune Valley cooker was capable of cooking for 500 men, and was so much too powerful for my unit, the A.S.C., which, on mobilisation (the Yeomanry Brigade attend manœuvres as if mobilised), is split up largely among the other units of the Brigade, that I had to offer its services to one of the four Yeomanry regiments that formed the Brigade. This was really a far better test, as a Yeomanry regiment, with the usual addenda of civilians in the form of cooks, servants, valets, &c., is a big unit and a very difficult one to satisfy.

The difficulty that next arose was to persuade a regiment to accept the offer of my cooker, or, as it should be more correctly described, 'travelling kitchen,' as neither of the first two regiments to which I offered it on loan liked the idea of trusting their food to a mechanically propelled vehicle!

The Lune Valley cooker and the motor-bus chassis, which luckily had big side boards some 3 ft. 6 in. high, arrived at Baldock, the Brigade training camp, a week before the commencement of the manœuvres, so I had time to really test its worth and get things running in the right groove before handing it over to the Dorset Yeomanry, who were the only regiment in the Brigade who would accept my offer.

By the help of the G. W. Railway crane at the local station (Baldock) we got the cooker on to the 'bus chassis, took off its wheels and tied it down, and the only difficulty that arose was the shafts, which stuck out over the bonnet of the car. The motor driver's head was close to the dashboard of the cooker in the usual position of a horse's quarters.

The Great Western Railway, from which I hired the chassis, insisted on sending their own driver, and the man turned out A1. He had been a shoeing-smith in the 7th Dragoon Guards, and besides being a good map-reader, was sharp, active, and intelligent.

The Lune Valley cooker is well known by soldiers, especially Infantry, for doing its work well, so I will say nothing about its actual cooking powers, except that it cooked all the food for the Dorset Yeomanry, including the officers and a large retinue of civilians, a total of nearly 500.

It will be readily understood, I, with the 'train,' had little opportunity of studying the behaviour of this mobile kitchen which accompanied the first line transport, but I got the Quartermaster and Officer detailed to look after the Commissariat of the Dorset Yeomanry to give me a written report of its performances, and it will be noticed, these reports, from which I append extracts, are great on the fact of the food always being ready before the 'train' arrived with horse comforts, such as blankets, forage, &c.

The Report from the Officer of the Dorset Yeomanry, detailed as Regimental Commissariat Officer, runs thus :—

'Of the "cooker" itself I find it hard not to say too much, as we had no trouble with it. It consisted of a large square body with a paraffin burner in the centre, taking the place of the fire-grate in an ordinary range, a roasting oven on each side of the burner, and two large boilers, each of about 17 gallons capacity over the top, the whole body swinging backwards and forwards on an axis, while each of the boilers swung in a similar manner on their own axis, but their motion was across the cooker, instead of fore and aft.

'As far as I could learn from the cooks, the swinging of the boilers left nothing to be desired so long as they were not overfilled. The swinging of the main body of the cooker, designed as it was for horse traction, was too tender for use in a motor lorry, so I got the driver of the motor to fit four check springs, one at each corner, which prevented it from swinging too quickly.

'The cooks seemed to find the burner quite easy to start and regulate once it had been explained to them, and it gave out an intense heat and did its work perfectly.

'We did not have much opportunity to use the ovens, as roasted joints are a luxury seldom aspired to on manœuvres, but when we did use them in camp previous to the manœuvres the results were most satisfactory.


'The two boilers, on the other hand, were in full use, and when the "motor cooker" arrived at our bivouac there was abundance of excellent soup for all ranks. I had a cupful every night myself, and plenty of first-rate stew. We had to cater for between 450 and 500 men, including Officers' servants, grooms, transport drivers, &c.

'One thing must be added to the above remarks, which is, that as far as I could observe by personal tasting, there was no taint of paraffin in any of the food cooked. This rather surprised me, for most paraffin stoves, unless great care is taken, have that drawback. It must be remembered that all this cooking was done on the march, the latter part of which was always completed in darkness.

'With regard to the motor lorry on which the cooker was mounted I have not much to say. I believe that it was always up to its work, except on the occasion of the accident. It was not only capable of travelling at about four times the speed of any horse transport and going on practically indefinitely, but afforded a platform (with high sides) for the cooks to work on, such as no horsed cooker could have done. In fact, whereas a horsed cooker is rightly described as a "travelling cooker," one on a motor lorry would be accurately described as a "travelling kitchen."

'You can best judge of its work by a short account of its performances day by day.

'On the first day of manœuvres we did a march of thirty miles, and, owing to unexpected incidents, our direction was completely changed late in the afternoon, the result being that our bivouac was nowhere near where we had expected it to be. About dusk we got down the horse lines, and I began to hope for the motor cooker. I knew that it had been with the



TRAVELLING KITCHEN.

P, P, Paraffin tank under 10 pressure to supply burners; O. T. Oil tank; B B, Biscuit boxes; C. B. Chopping block; T. Table; Q, Q, Quarters of beef hanging from rail; S. B. Swinging boilers.

and Line Transport as far as Littlebury, and accordingly obtained permission to send a motor cyclist there to bring it on. He returned with the information that the cooker had left the 2nd Line Transport at Littlebury and gone on to Hundon, which had been our original line of march. Accordingly, I despatched the motor cyclist to scour the roads between Littlebury and

Barlow, &c. Just about 8 P.M. the motor cooker arrived, and before 8.30 P.M. a good stew was issued to all ranks.

'When I add it was somewhere about 10.30 or 11 P.M. when the horsed transport arrived with horse rugs and men's blankets, you can judge whether the motor cooker had justified itself or not.

'On the second day came a catastrophe. The motor driver had trouble with his clutch, which kept seizing, so that he had to "switch off" his engine whenever he wanted to stop.

'First and Second Line Transport were again marching together. We bivouaced after dark, got down the horse lines, and waited. Then report came in "the motor cooker was wrecked." No one knew how or where. I could not find even how the rumour had come in. However, soon after all the rest of the transport arrived, and I found that the wreck was only about a third of a mile away, and that the dinners were safe. I then sent down fatigue parties to bring up the dinners in "Dixies," but by the time they arrived many of the men were so tired that, having obtained their blankets from the horsed transport, they rolled themselves up and went to sleep empty.

'Now, on the face of it, this looks like a failure, but I contend that it is not, because even though the motor had broken down, the men were able to get their hot dinners almost as soon as they could have had cold rations—tinned beef and bread—served from the horsed transport, and if they had to draw raw meat from the latter and then cook it in "Dixies" as provided by Government, it would not have been breakfast nor supper when they got it. So at any rate, even on this one night when we did break down, we were better off than other regiments who had only the ordinary arrangements.

'The third day was a very strenuous one, and also a very interesting one. As soon as it was light enough to see I went down to inspect the wreck. I found that the clutch had seized as the motor was turning through a gateway, that the driver had been unable to stop quickly enough, and that he had snapped off a gate-post like a carrot and driven his starting handle right through his radiator. Clearly, the motor was "out of action" for that day.

'I transferred next morning the Lune Valley cooker on to a lorry belonging to the regimental transport. Meanwhile the motor driver had put his clutch shaft to rights—it was a worn-out "cam" that caused all the trouble—and hammered up the hole in his radiator so that he could get to the nearest blacksmith's shop and solder a plate over it. Fortunately, a blacksmith's shop was only a mile away, and all down hill. Here I may remark that this motor driver was an excellent fellow in every way, and he managed to rejoin us the same night. All this took a lot of time, and it was 10.30 A.M. before I rode through the village, followed by the steam traction puffing furiously with the cooker behind in the first trailer.

'It was now my intention to bring it along myself and hand it over to the Transport at Radwinter. When, however, I got as far as Smith's Green—a large farm and cross roads about two miles from Steeple Bumpstead, on the road to Radwinter, I heard that the road to the latter place was in the hands of the enemy; it was even reported that all the Brigade T.S. Column and Regimental 1st and 2nd Line Transport was captured. I rode on a little and saw some of the enemy in the wood. Accordingly,

I hid the traction engine and its trailers in a farm building and told them to wait my return and move for nobody.

'Then I rode across country and found the regiment. How I spent the rest of the day with my troop has nothing to do with this report. The point I am labouring at is that on this day the cooker acted like true 1st Line Transport, and was always about four miles behind the regiment, so that it could be brought up quickly. On the other hand, it was for a time perilously near the enemy, owing to the fact that the Red Cavalry had ridden right round our right flank and were actually behind us.

'As soon as "cease fire" sounded and our bivouac notified, a motor cyclist was despatched for the cooker, which steamed into camp within an hour's time with its hot soup and stew ready for the men almost as soon as they were ready for it. There was no bread, men crowded round the savoury smelling trailer, but you can't serve out stew by itself. A big fire was lighted and a sing-song got up to pass the time. Then the Regimental Transport arrived, but, alas, there was no bread there. It had all been eaten that morning, and no more would be issued from the T. and S. Column till after midnight. I regretted the old system by which we should have had one day's supply in the Regimental Transport wagons. The only things I had to serve out with the stew were pork pies, of which we had a quantity for haversack rations; so ended a day which was a triumph—as far as the cooker itself was concerned.

'On the next and last day all went well. The cooker was shifted back again into the motor lorry which had arrived the evening before, and sent off before the Brigade marched. As we knew exactly where we were going to I gave it a route of its own, and gave orders to secure sufficient bread for the dinners on the way or else buy on arrival at Baldock. The latter was done, soup and Irish stew were waiting ready cooked when the men arrived in camp, and as soon as the bread arrived from the bakers, which was soon afterwards, dinners were served up.

'I have only to add, to show how completely successful the "travelling motor kitchen" was on this occasion, that it was over three hours before arrival of the horse transport, in spite of their having made a very fine march of nearly forty miles.'

From the foregoing I think the success of a good travelling cooker, mounted on a motor lorry, is unquestioned. An interesting question arises between the comparative virtues of steam and petrol. The disadvantages of the former are its necessity for frequent replenishment of water and coal, whereas the petrol motor can carry sufficient motive power for 200 miles. On the other hand, when it comes to leaving the roads and negotiating broken ground, the petrol motor is not in it with the steam one.

I will not comment on the regimental arrangements, which, by this Officer's report, seems to be somewhat different from those usually adopted by a regular Cavalry regiment, but wish to point out the following:—

1. That it is a travelling kitchen as opposed to a travelling cooker, on which the cooks, the day's rations, and all the requisites of the cooks, fit in together and travel.

2. That it is capable of easily cooking for a Cavalry regiment, and as soon as the picket lines are down the men's dinners are ready.

3. That pace and distance are no object.

I venture to suggest, in conclusion, that this experiment is one more feather in the cap of mechanical transport.

THE LANCE CAP

By D. HASTINGS IRWIN.

Ever since Lancer regiments were first incorporated in the British Army in 1816, the cap has been of the same design, though alterations have been made from time to time; mainly in the height, size, and colour of the top, and in the dimensions round the waist.

The design is of Polish origin, and it is an interesting fact that most of the Lancer regiments in Continental armies wear a similar cap, though in some cases very much smaller than that adopted in the British Army.

In December 1816, when detachments of the 9th, 12th, 16th, and 23rd Light Dragoons assembled in London to be instructed in the 'exercise of the lance' under Captain Peters of the 9th Light Dragoons, they were ordered to wear a lance cap, 'very high, with a square top made of cane and covered with cloth the same colour as the facings of each regiment.' This explains the reason why so many different coloured lance caps exist in our Army; though the rule was broken in 1840, since when the 9th Lancers have continued to wear the blue cloth-topped cap which they adopted in 1830 when their uniform was changed from blue with crimson facings to scarlet with blue facings. According to the original regulations it should now be scarlet, as facings of this colour were ordered in 1842.

As stated above, the height of the cap and the size of the top have varied, and the following table gives the different changes:—

Year.	Height.	Square of top.	Plume.	Length of Plume.
1822.. ..	11 in.	10 in.	Feathers	12 in.
1826.. ..	11 in.	10 in.	"	20 in.
1831.. ..	9 in.	10 in.	"	16 in.
1846.. ..	8½ front 9½ back	9½ in.	"	14 in.
1857.. ..	6½ " 8½ "	7½ in.	"	12 in.
1859.. ..	" "	"	Horsehair	"
1874.. ..	" "	7 in.	"	"
1900.. ..	" "	"	Feathers	14 in.

From the above it will be obvious that the height of the cap and the size of the top have been gradually decreasing quantities, but from 1900 to the present time no further changes have been made.


The colours of the top part worn by the different regiments have been,

Year.	5th.	9th.	12th.	16th.	17th.	19th.	21st.	23rd.
1816..	—	Crimson	Scarlet	Scarlet	—	—	—	Crimson
1817..	—	"	"	"	—	Yellow	—	"
1822..	—	"	"	"	White	—	—	"
1831..	—	Blue	Blue	Blue	"	—	—	—
1842..	—	"	Scarlet	"	"	—	—	—
1858..	Scarlet	"	"	"	"	—	—	—
1897..	"	"	"	"	"	—	French Grey	—

The 19th and 23rd Lancers were disbanded in 1821 and 1817 respectively. The 5th Lancers were raised in 1858; and the 21st Hussars were converted to Lancers in 1897.

A picture of the 12th Lancers in a well-known series of military subjects published in 1842 shows the cap with a *blue* top; but this is, I think, merely a survival of the 1831-41 cap, and is not in accordance with the Dress Regulations.

From 1816 to 1828 the plumes were red and white; they were then changed to black, and continued so until 1857, when the 12th adopted scarlet feathers, the 16th scarlet and white, and the 17th white, the 9th retaining black as heretofore. In 1859, when horse-hair plumes replaced feathers, the same colours were retained, the newly raised 5th Lancers adopting green. In 1864 the 9th Lancers' plume was changed to black and white, and in 1874 the 17th was altered to black. In 1883 the 17th plume was again changed to white, the 16th adopting black. These colours are worn at the present time, the 21st Lancers also having white plumes.



Up to 1846 the bottom of the cap was straight; but it was then shaped more to the head, being deeper at the back than at the front; and the false 'turn-up' behind, shown in the illustration, was abolished. The body has always been profusely laced, but the arrangement of the different laces has been altered from time to time.

In 1822 the Dress Regulations state that, 'the skull is to be laced round with a 3 in. wide gold and crimson lace, with a gold and crimson $\frac{1}{2}$ -in. lace above it; and below it two sets of gold braid on a black leather ground, each consisting of a wide between two narrow braids, showing black stripes.' The peak was laced on the outward edge with a wide between two narrow gold braids, and the turn-up behind with a wide braid between a narrow one and a gold cord.

Gold cords were led up the four corners of the sides, crossing the top transversely.

In 1831 the lace round the body was reduced to two inches in width, with no other lace above, but with two stripes of $\frac{1}{4}$ -in. gold braid below, showing black leather between.

In 1846 the two rows of lace round the bottom of the cap were left off, the rest remaining as before. In 1857 the arrangement of the braid was completely altered, the Dress Regulations being as follows: 'A band of gold 1-inch lace round the waist, with two bands of gold braid below, the upper $\frac{1}{2}$ in. wide, the lower $\frac{1}{4}$ in. wide, a space of $\frac{1}{8}$ inch being left between the lace and the two braids; a similar double band of braid round the bottom of the skull; the $\frac{1}{2}$ -in. braid at the bottom, and the $\frac{1}{4}$ in. above it, with a space of $\frac{1}{8}$ in. between.'

This arrangement has been continued to the present day, but the peak has been embroidered with gold-purl since 1857. From 1822-30 the 17th Lancers had silver lace and braid on their caps, with narrow gold braid up the angles and across the top.

In 1845 the 9th Lancers were allowed to wear a cap of '*Regimental Design*,' which has been worn ever since. It is described in the Dress Regulations of 1857 as follows: 'Skull and top covered with black patent leather, the upper part only covered with blue cloth; dimensions of cap same as other Lancer regiments. Gilt metal ornaments at the four corners of the top attached to gilt metal strips covering the angles; on the left side a gilt metal rosette, with regimental button in the centre. A gilt metal 1-in. band round the waist; at back a ring and hook for line and chain. A gilt plate with a double "A. R." cypher and gilt arms to match, with badges. Black patent leather peak, with gilt metal $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch binding, gilt corded chain $\frac{3}{8}$ in. wide, attached to lions'-heads at the sides of the cap.'

When first introduced this cap had a black patent leather unembroidered 'turn-up' behind.

A gold bullion rosette embroidered with the Royal cypher on velvet was fixed on the left side of the cap, with a plume socket behind. The centre of the rosette was white in the 17th Lancers in 1822-30; changed to scarlet in 1831; blue in the 12th Lancers; crimson in the 9th till 1845; and scarlet in the other regiments. The 9th retain the metal rosette instituted in 1845.

The gilt metal cap-plate has always been a special feature of the lance cap. From 1822-30 the 17th Lancers had a silver plate with the Royal arms in gilt metal above, the skull and crossbones, with the words 'Or Glory,' below. Since guidons and the embroidered sabre-tasches were abolished the only place where Lancer regiments can exhibit their battle honours, except on the drum-banners, is on the cap-plate. Of recent years the plate has been of gilded metal, with the Royal arms and battle honours in silver.

Gold cap-lines, formerly with tassels and latterly with acorn-ends, have always been worn with the lance cap. They passed round the cap and body of the wearer, and were either looped on the breast or worn round the neck.

Gilt chains attached to the cap by means of lions' heads were always worn, except in the 19th Lancers who wore brass scales.

The men's caps only differed from those of the officers in their having but one line of regimental braid round the waist, and in the tops being covered with black patent leather instead of cloth, though the sides were

always of cloth of the colour of the regimental facings, except in the case of the 9th Lancers after 1845. Yellow cord cap-lines were also worn, and horse-hair plumes of the same colour as those of the officers. The sides of the top part of the men's caps were fluted like those of the officers; and they had ornamental brass corner-pieces, but no lines of braid across the tops. Since 1900 the 17th have had white patent leather tops to their caps. The dates of the different changes mentioned above are those of the Dress Regulations recording them, but it is quite possible that the alterations were made and taken into wear some time before they were printed.

YEOMANRY TRAINING

By 'BRIGADE MAJOR'

IN the last issue of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL 'A Yeomanry Colonel' makes suggestions on the training of Yeomanry, as to which he invites criticism. In other circumstances his suggestions might be sound enough; but, depending as we do on voluntary service, all schemes for improving efficiency have to be toned down by the necessity of making them popular and diminished by the time at the disposal of those who are patriotic enough to give personal service to their country.

I wish first to modify his idea that inspections necessarily curtail the time spent in training. An inspecting General sees more of the real value of troops if he watches them doing their ordinary work than by having a set inspection, where troops show off their good points and hide the bad ones, as far as possible. The former method is now almost universally adopted and no time is wasted.

'A Yeomanry Colonel's' first suggestion is that during the first year's training the recruits should not go into the ranks but be trained separately by the Permanent Staff.

This would be a most unpopular move from the recruits' point of view, as they one and all want to go out with the squadron as soon as possible. The idea, if adopted, would badly affect recruiting. Recruits of the right sort are not too easily obtained, and anything that stops the flow of enlistment must have great compensating advantages.

Men are often quicker in learning their work when with the squadron, where there are many instructors and they are surrounded by older soldiers who know something of their work, than in a squad where all are ignorant and there is only one instructor to about twenty-five men, however good that instructor may be. Taking the average recruits at 25 per cent., the squadron leader, under this arrangement, will never have a squadron of more than three-quarters its proper peace strength—that is to say, about half war strength: a state of affairs that is apt to make training in such duties as outposts, advance, and rear guards, &c., unreal.

The plea that the three or four days' preliminary drills and troop training which has to be done under present conditions are a waste of time and irksome to the older soldier, owing to the presence of the recruits, is not quite fair. A good grounding in the earlier lessons is a necessity for sound training, and the yeoman of three or four years' service is not so very proficient that these drills are waste of time where he is concerned. It is for the instructor to try to make them as little irksome as possible. If recruits are trained apart the Permanent Staff must devote their whole time to their training, and the C.O. and squadron leaders will be without their help.

R

'A Yeomanry Colonel' seems to think that this is a good thing, and that Yeomanry N.C.O.s should learn their work without the help of the Permanent Staff. Surely with time so limited it is better to have the help of instructors than to go on a principle of trial and error, which is always a long process and not very good for the men and horses, who get the full benefit of the errors.

The proposition that recruits should come out to annual training three days before the remainder was successfully tried in at least one brigade; but all have not found it possible to do this, partly because employers have become so used to the idea that training is for fifteen days that it is difficult to induce them to give leave for eighteen.

If this idea could be carried out by all regiments, recruits would be more up to the standard of the rest of the squadron, and the squadron leader would have a full squadron to train.

'A Yeomanry Colonel' next suggests that complete Yeomanry regiments and brigades should not go on Army manœuvres, but that, instead, one composite squadron from each regiment should train with the Regular Cavalry, and that a regiment composed of three such squadrons should be attached to a Regular brigade on manœuvres. This training to be extra to their annual training. A composite squadron from regiments could sometimes be induced to come out for a week extra in order to go on manœuvres or train with Regulars (it was done by one squadron last year); but I do not think that Yeomen will come for so long a period to train with Regulars and then go on to manœuvres afterwards, as seems to be suggested.

Men in country employments could probably come out for an extra week now and again, but men employed in towns already often find it difficult to obtain leave for their annual training, and would seldom be able to come out for a longer period. It is usually the employers who are the difficulty.

Granted that regiments with only a week's training or less are unable to get the full benefits out of the manœuvres, still, there are so many lessons to be learnt by all ranks at manœuvres which cannot be learnt in an ordinary annual camp that it would seem a pity to debar whole regiments from getting these experiences in order to give a few men a better training. After all, we have got to level up the bulk and not specially train the few. In many instances it would be the same officers and men who would always come out for the extra training, being either keener or better able to give the time; while those who could not do more than is at present demanded of them would never be able to benefit.

Recruiting is always a serious problem, and I think manœuvres bring in recruits. Although the men have a hard time they enjoy it, especially when it is over and they are able to tell their friends of their experiences. The advertisement given in the Press, particularly the picture papers, tends to rouse the enthusiasm of men likely to become recruits; and the prestige of a regiment that has been on manœuvres is certainly enhanced in the eyes of civilians.

'A Yeomanry Colonel' suggests that the Treasury might veto the 'small extra expense' of these squadrons on manœuvres: perhaps he does not realise how much it costs. One squadron whose headquarters were in the manœuvre area, and had therefore little travelling expenses, were out for seven days at a cost of over £500.

To take out two brigades (eighteen squadrons) as was done on last manœuvres would therefore cost about £10,000, while the batteries, T and S

columns, and field ambulances which belong to the brigades would cost another £2,000. Would this extra money be employed to the best advantage?

Whether on declaration of war Yeomanry will have time to make themselves fit to meet Regular troops is not for us to say. The question before us now is, 'With the means at our disposal, is it better to train a few officers and men a little better and the bulk rather less, or try to bring the whole up to a higher standard?' The latter seems to be the more practical, especially as the short extra time to be given to the few cannot make them equal to Regular Cavalry.

NOTE.—'Brigade Major' in the above letter appears to be a strong advocate of quantity and not quality.

It would be interesting to hear the views of other Yeomanry officers on the points raised in the letters on Yeomanry Training, published in the January and April numbers of this JOURNAL.—C. W. T.

FOREIGN

Austria-Hungary.—The *Armeebblatt* announces that experiments are now being carried out in certain Cavalry regiments with the cloak now worn, whereby it can be utilised in the field as a portion of a *tente d'abri*.

A new rank of sub-officer has lately been created; in the Cavalry the bearer of the rank will be known as *Stabswachtmeister*.

Certain augmentations have been made in the establishments of Cavalry regiments and Cavalry machine-gun detachments. Of the latter, those attached to frontier regiments are increased by ten men and ten horses, and the number of such detachments has been increased by six. In the Landwehr Cavalry the strength of the squadrons is raised to 166 men and 150 horses; and in the Honved Cavalry the sixty squadrons of Hussars are raised from 114 men and 100 horses to 166 men and 145 horses.

Germany.—Certain changes have lately been made in the regulations governing the organisation of the Cavalry telegraph school in Berlin. The school is designed to familiarise officers and non-commissioned officers of the Cavalry with the field telephones, &c., in use by Cavalry, and admits also a certain number of men of the Prussian, Saxon, and Württemberg forces. The staff of the school is partly permanent and partly made up by instructors detached from units; and there are also a number of men, taken on for a year, to look after the school horses. During the year there are two courses, each of four months' duration, for officers, and two each of five months for non-commissioned officers and men. Each course is attended by forty-nine officers, 98 non-commissioned officers, and 196 men. The officers must have between three and nine years' service, the non-commissioned officers not less than six years. The instruction embraces practical telephony, organisation and material of telephones in the field, and telegraph, postal, and railway.

Sweden.—A Norwegian military journal states that the Swedish *Riksdag* has voted a sum for providing the Cavalry of Sweden with a bayonet to be fixed on the carbine.

THE IRISH GRAND MILITARY STEEPLECHASE.

List of winners since 1862, when the race was first established, kindly compiled by Colonel J. W. Irwin, late 20th Hussars. This list has never been previously published. The race has always been run at Punchestown, Co. Kildare.

Year.	Owner.	Regiment.	Horse.	Rider.	Regiment.
1862	Major F. R. Forster	4th Dragoon Guards	Sir William	Capt. D. Barclay	16th Lancers
1863	Lt.-Col. F. R. Forster	4th Dragoon Guards	Sir William	Capt. D. Barclay	16th Lancers
1864	Lt.-Col. F. R. Forster	4th Dragoon Guards	Tony Lumkin	Mr. J. Laurence	4th Hussars
1865	Capt. W. Cunningham	11th Hussars	Stilton	Capt. W. Cunningham	11th Hussars
1866	Capt. D. Ricardo	15th Hussars	Marengo	Capt. D. Ricardo	15th Hussars
1867	Capt. T. Y. Benyon	5th Dragoon Guards	Topthorne	Mr. G. Pritchard	5th Dragoon Guards
1868	Lt.-Col. J. Ainslie	Royal Dragoons	Juryman	Capt. E. B. Hutton	Royal Dragoons
1869	Capt. H. F. G. Coleman	Royal Dragoons	Wild Fox	Capt. F. H. Harford	Scots Guards
1870	Capt. S. T. Ashton	14th Hussars	Merlon	Lt.-Col. G. W. Knox	Scots Guards
1871	Mr. W. C. L. Farrer	6th Dragoon Guards	Spanish Lord	Mr. G. Pritchard	5th Dragoon Guards
1872	Major F. P. Campbell	14th Hussars	Girl of the Period	Capt. Hon. F. Amherst	14th Hussars
1873	Mr. L. Martin	12th Lancers	Waterford	Capt. W. G. Middleton	12th Lancers
1874	Mr. L. Martin	12th Lancers	Waterford	Capt. W. G. Middleton	12th Lancers
1875	Mr. C. E. Swaine	17th Lancers	Revenge	Capt. J. C. Duke	17th Lancers
1876	Mr. C. E. Swaine	17th Lancers	Revenge	Lord M. T. de la P. Beresford	7th Hussars
1877	Mr. J. F. S. Lee-Barber	3rd Dragoon Guards	Jupiter Tonans	Mr. Lee-Barber	3rd Dragoon Guards
1878	Mr. M. J. Hartigan	3rd Dragoon Guards	The Swine	Mr. M. J. Hartigan	3rd Dragoon Guards
1879	Capt. F. Shuttleworth	7th Hussars	Witch Hazel	Mr. W. B. Morris	7th Hussars
1880	Mr. M. J. Hartigan	3rd Dragoon Guards	King of Athens	Mr. J. F. S. Lee-Barber	3rd Dragoon Guards
1881	Mr. H. Armitage	15th Hussars	Tame Kitten	Mr. J. D. Barry	R.H.A.
1882			No Meeting held owing to the War in Egypt.		

1883 Mr. A. W. M. Owen
 1884 Capt. W. H. Chetwynd
 1885 Mr. J. A. Orr-Ewing
 1886 Mr. J. A. Orr-Ewing
 1887 Capt. W. J. Mackeson
 1888 Capt. J. A. Orr-Ewing
 1889 Col. G. H. Gough
 1890 Mr. W. Leatham
 1891 Capt. F. E. Lawrence
 1892 Earl of Shaftesbury
 1893 Mr. F. H. Wise
 1894 Mr. H. Fiennes
 1895 Mr. F. J. Ryder
 1896 Major R. B. W. Fisher
 1897 Capt. Hon. E. Baring
 1898 Mr. E. J. R. Peel
 1899 Capt. E. Loder

1st Dragoons
 16th Lancers
 16th Lancers
 16th Lancers
 5th Dragoon Guards
 16th Lancers
 14th Hussars
 5th Dragoon Guards
 Rifle Brigade
 10th Hussars
 13th Hussars
 9th Lancers
 3rd Dragoon Guards
 10th Hussars
 10th Hussars
 R.H.A.
 12th Lancers

Miss Saline (W.O.)

Patience
 Forest King
 Weasel
 Lord Manners
 Cloister
 Trojan
 Roman Oak
 Paul Fry
 Day Star
 Hesperian
 Bondmaid
 Balbriggan
 Downey
 Allumette
 Gay Fawkes
 Ravenwood

Mr. H. White
 Capt. W. H. Chetwynd
 Mr. J. A. Orr-Ewing
 Mr. J. A. Orr-Ewing
 Capt. W. J. Mackeson
 Capt. J. M. Babington
 Mr. R. H. Dewhurst
 Mr. W. Leatham
 Capt. F. E. Lawrence
 Capt. C. T. McM. Kavanagh
 Mr. D. R. Aikman
 Mr. T. E. W. Bidgood
 Mr. D. G. Campbell
 Capt. A. Hughes Onslow
 Capt. Hon. E. Baring
 Mr. E. J. R. Peel
 Major A. Hughes Onslow

Scots Guards
 16th Lancers
 16th Lancers
 16th Lancers
 5th Dragoon Guards
 16th Lancers
 4th Hussars
 5th Dragoon Guards
 Rifle Brigade
 10th Hussars
 13th Hussars
 R.H.A.
 9th Lancers
 10th Hussars
 10th Hussars
 R.H.A.
 10th Hussars

No Race owing to the War in South Africa.

1900-1-2
 1903 Lt.-Col. J. Fowle
 1904 Lt.-Col. J. Fowle
 1905 Mr. L. E. G. Oates
 1906 Hon. R. Bruce
 1907 Capt. T. G. Gibson
 1908 Capt. W. A. Pallin
 1909 Capt. C. J. C. Barrett
 1910 Capt. E. K. Bradbury
 1911 Capt. W. A. Pallin
 1912 Major C. Dalton
 1913 Mr. E. Ramsden

21st Lancers
 21st Lancers
 6th Dragoons
 11th Hussars
 6th Dragoons
 Army Vet. Dept.
 Royal Scots Fusiliers
 R.F.A.
 Army Vet. Dept.
 R.A.M.C.
 5th Lancers

Rufus ii.
 Brown Study
 Gabriel
 Mon Prince
 Swindler
 Riversaint
 Scarlet Runner
 Sloppy Weather
 Prince Hugo
 Thowl Pin
 Curiosity

Mr. P. H. A. Anderson
 Mr. P. H. A. Anderson
 Mr. R. M. Wood
 Hon. R. Bruce
 Capt. T. G. Gibson
 Capt. W. A. Pallin
 Mr. C. P. O'B. Butler
 Capt. E. K. Bradbury
 Capt. W. A. Pallin
 Major C. Dalton
 Mr. E. Ramsden

21st Lancers
 21st Lancers
 6th Dragoons
 11th Hussars
 6th Dragoons
 Army Vet. Dept.
 R.A.M.C.
 R.F.A.
 Army Vet. Dept.
 R.A.M.C.
 5th Lancers

SPORTING NOTES

SPORTING EDITOR

Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Yardley, late 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, having been appointed to the Army Remount Department, has resigned the post of Honorary Sporting Editor of the CAVALRY JOURNAL. The Committee of the JOURNAL desire to place on record their great indebtedness to Colonel Yardley for his excellent services since the initiation of the publication, and to thank him on behalf of the Cavalry generally.

Colonel Coventry Williams (late Royal Scots Greys), Brigade Commander, North Midland Mounted Brigade, has kindly undertaken the Sporting Editorship. This officer will be glad if contributors to the Sporting Notes would kindly address him at 1 Weymouth Street, London, W., and especially hopes that officers in India and the Colonies will furnish him with reports on sport in those parts of the Empire.

THE GRAND MILITARY

By FINCH MASON

Author of 'Heroes and Heroines of the Grand National,' and part author of 'Gentlemen Riders (Past and Present).'

It is good to know that for one brief space, at all events, during the year we English are in a position to delude ourselves into the belief that ours is a military nation; the halcyon period I allude to being that festive week in the early spring when the one absorbing topic in the world of fashion, not only in London, but in those provincial towns where the hoarse 'fanfare' of the Cavalry trumpet and the shrill call of the Infantry bugle are familiar sounds, is the impending Grand Military meeting.

That it is a luxurious age we live in there is no denying, and there can be little doubt that the change of venue to Sandown Park, where it has been held steadily every year since 1886, is responsible in a great measure—one may say entirely—for the great popularity enjoyed by the Grand Military meeting at the present moment.

Dating from 1868, when King Arthur (13 st.), belonging to the still living Major-General Sir J. P. Brabazon, starting favourite at 2 to 1 in a field of ten runners, won the Gold Cup over an exceptionally severe country, in the hands of the late General G. W. Knox, popularly known as 'Curly,' who had ridden Ironsides to victory two years previously, the Grand Military meeting was held steadily every year until 1876 at Rugby. In 1877, however, the soldiers broke fresh ground, and the meeting took place for the first time at Sandown Park; and there, with the exceptions of 1880, when Rugby was once more the scene of action, 1885 and 1886, when Aylesbury and Aldershot respectively were the favoured spots, and 1900, 1901, and 1902, in which years, owing to the war in South Africa, the meeting was abandoned altogether, it has remained ever since, to all appearances, for what lodging-house keepers are pleased to term a permanency.

Looking at it from a purely sporting point of view, the old Rugby course, with its natural surroundings and big fences, in the opinion of many of the old brigade was a far more suitable country for testing the capabilities of our military riders and their horses than an enclosed meeting like Sandown Park, with its artificial jumps, its Guards band, and other attractions.

Then it was that the ladies stepped in. 'If you soldiers,' they argued, 'are really desirous for us to come in our numbers and look on and admire whilst you "witch the world with noble horsemanship," you must arrange for some convenient spot within easy reach of London, such as Sandown or Kempton or Hurst Park, where, if the weather be bright and fine, we can show ourselves and our spring costumes off to the best advantage on the lawn or in the Paddock, as the case may be, between the races; while, should the afternoon—as is not infrequently the case at this season of the year—turn out wet and disagreeable, we can beat a retreat to the grand stand and view the sport from its windows, and partake of luncheon afterwards as comfortably as if housed at the Cavalry or any other of the clubs to which most of us nowadays belong.

'Only make up your minds to be sensible and take our advice, and as the result of the moments snatched from Paradise we confidently anticipate spending in your company, you will find us one and all suffering from Scarlet Fever the next day, and murmuring in our dreams the "refrain" made famous in the long ago by her frolic Grace the Grand Duchess of Gerolstein in Offenbach's comic opera of that name, "Oh, que j'aime les militaires!"'

Of course the ladies had their own way. They always do. And the soldiers themselves, on thinking over the matter, arriving at the conclusion that after all said and done there would be far more honour and glory attached to a victory in the Gold Cup with a fashionable gallery looking on than with the plaudits of a lot of bucolic-looking countrymen such as were always *en évidence* at Rugby, it was definitely settled to the great joy of everybody—not forgetting the Sandown Directorate—that Sandown Park should in future be regarded as the abiding place of the Grand Military meeting.

There can be no question that to the officers of the 5th Dragoon Guards is due the credit of having been the original founders of the Grand Military meeting, and this is how it happened. Early in the thirties of the last century one of the officers, Captain J. F. Scott by name, on leaving the regiment, generously gave a cup to be competed for annually by horses belonging to the officers over a three-mile course, to carry 12 st. 7 lb. each.

Accordingly, starting in 1834, the race was run steadily every year, until 1841, in which year, Captain King having succeeded in winning the Cup for the third time, the trophy, as stipulated by the donor at the outset, became his own property. So far as the writer can make out, the first actual Grand Military meeting took place on March 24, 1841, on a course near Northampton, when a meeting extending for three days was held, the conditions of the principal race, which answered to the Gold Cup of the present day, being as follows:—

'A sweepstake of 10 sovs. each (half forfeit), with a purse added by subscriptions (not to exceed one sov. each), for horses which on or before February 1, 1841, were *bona fide* the property of officers on full pay in the Army; to carry 12 stone each, and to be ridden by officers on full pay three miles over a sporting country; winners extra. The second horse to receive

his stake and one-fourth of the purse after expenses had been paid out of it.

The line lay over some beautiful grazing ground about a mile and a half from Northampton, the distance being about three miles and a quarter over twenty-five fences, many of which were of a formidable character.

The few flags deemed necessary were not placed until the horses were nearly ready to start, the object being that none of their riders should become acquainted beforehand with the direct line selected for the race. Twenty horses faced the starter, and Carlow, carrying 5 lb. extra, ridden by his owner, Sir G. J. Baird, 10th Hussars, won by five lengths.

In 1843 a meeting styled—by courtesy as it turned out—‘The Grand Military,’ was held at Wetherby in Yorkshire, amongst the company present being the late Duke of Cambridge, then Prince George. There were three races on the card, but seeing that they were all confined to officers of the 17th Lancers it is difficult to see where the Grand Military came in, though *Bell's Life in London*, at that period the only sporting paper worthy of the name, thought proper to apply that title to the meeting.

In 1844 Northampton was again selected for the scene of action, the line, which was an exceptionally stiff one, the same crossed by Lottery and Cigar in the Northampton Steeplechase of 1840. The distance was two miles out and in. On this occasion there were sixteen runners, Brenda, belonging to Captain France of the Carabiniers, with her owner in the saddle, winning by a length from Humbug, the mount of Captain Broadley, one of the best-known steeplechase riders of his day, either in the Army or out of it.

The following year the Grand Military meeting was again held near Northampton, but this time over a different course, at Brixworth; the reason for the change being that the ‘shoemakers’ assembled in such force at the brook as to seriously interfere with the riders. The fact was that the sporting sons of St. Crispin, determined to cram as much fun into their day's outing as possible, blocked all the weaker places at the brook, thereby compelling the jockeys to ride at its widest point whether they liked it or no, thereby no doubt heavily handicapping those horses—not to mention their riders—who had no particular fancy for water. As it was, the number of horsemen who insisted on accompanying the competitors during the race proved a serious drawback.

Meanwhile, the conditions of the race had undergone some slight alterations, and on this occasion were as follows:—

A sweepstake of 10 sovs. each (half forfeit) for horses the property of and to be ridden by officers on full pay, 12 st. 7 lb. each; the second to save his stake and receive a bonus; the winner to give six dozen of champagne to the dinner on the day of the race. Three miles.

Of the fifty-three entries, twenty horses faced the starter, and after a tremendous race Captain Coles, on Mr. Barnett's (2nd Dragoon Guards) Boxkeeper, just managed to beat the famous Captain Powell, on Regalia, by a neck.

I may mention that, according to *Bell's Life*, the race, which now answers to the Grand Military Gold Cup, was won this year by Cornet Langley, 2nd Life Guards. In all probability, however, the newspaper in question confused it with the Grand Military ‘Point-to-Point,’ which would take place about the same time, and frequently got mixed up with the more important affair.

In 1846 the Grand Military meeting was held at Leamington, the Warwick Race Committee giving the use of their stand and course for the occasion.

In spite of the weather—which was too bad for anything, snow falling heavily throughout the day—a large and distinguished company, which included Prince George of Cambridge, Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, Lords Cardigan and Warwick, and a host of others, turned out to witness the sport. There were seventeen runners, and Captain Powell on Cinderella won by a short half-length from Captain Busshe on Marengo.

The following year the meeting again took place at Leamington, but for some unexplained reason was a comparative failure, there being only eight runners for the principal race, which was won by Sir E. Poore on the Roarer, beating Lord Cosmo Russell on Matchless by a neck. The fact that the race seemed to be losing ground somewhat caused a critic of the period to give vent to his feelings as follows :—

‘The Grand Military Steeplechases came into the world giving rise to the fondest anticipations, but their progress has not equalled the promise of their birth; and after a few doubtful years they now show symptoms of decline, and unless some means of restoration takes place the friends of the Grand Military Steeplechase must soon be called upon to witness their dissolution.’

In 1848 Leamington was again the favoured spot, when the weather, as was the case two years previously, could not have been much worse, snow and sleet alternately coming down heavily all the afternoon, to the accompaniment of a boisterous wind. All traces of the line of the brook were obliterated, and not only were the meadows on each side of it flooded, but on the course near the entrance the water was over a foot deep. As a result, the brook had to be abandoned, and a diminished line chosen which had to be crossed twice instead of once. At 2.30 eleven riders had the hardihood to face the elements, to be transformed in a few minutes into a set of objects hardly recognisable by their friends. As for the race, as may readily be imagined, it was a chapter of accidents throughout, only two being ‘left in’ to finish, which resulted in Master Robin, ridden by his owner, Captain Dyson (3rd Dragoon Guards), beating Mushroom, owned and ridden by Captain Harvey (13th Light Dragoons).

After this year the entries and fields fell off to such an extent that in 1851 another change in the conditions was made in hope of effecting an improvement.

The horses were to be the unconditional property of officers on full pay in the Army, and that had been regularly hunted in the years 1850 and 1851 with any established pack of hounds, 12 st. each. A winner of a steeplechase or hurdle race within the four previous years of the value of 50 sovs., to carry 7 lb. extra; twice of 50 sovs., or once of 100 sovs., 10 lb.; of 200 sovs., 14 lb.; of 300 sovs., 21 lb.; or of 400 sovs., 28 lb. extra. Any officer who had not ridden a steeplechase or hurdle race to be allowed 6 lb.

The object of this arrangement—which, I need hardly point out, would certainly not go down nowadays—was to keep out any steeplechase horse which some ambitious officer might see fit to purchase with a view to winning this particular race.

In 1852 we read that the race, which was won by Mr. Hutchinson on Palmerston (11 st. 2 lb.), belonging to Captain Tremayne (13th Light Dragoons), by a length from Lord Cardigan’s ‘Proceed’ (14 st.), ridden by

Captain Peel—Proceed, no doubt being the well-known steeplechaser—was chiefly remarkable for the number of accidents during its progress.

In 1854 the Grand Military was held at Warwick, when despite the fact that a large number of officers had left for the East, a sufficient number were left to make it a successful meeting. Twelve horses faced the starter, and Mr. P. Cook's (11th Hussars) Torrent won by three lengths.

After this, owing to the Crimean war, the Grand Military meeting was shelved until 1858, when it was held in conjunction with the Pytchley Hunt Steeplechase, near Northampton. Meanwhile a communication had been sent to the stewards of the French Jockey Club to the effect that officers of the French Army on full pay were welcome to run their horses in three of the races at the Meeting. Curiously enough, the only one of our gallant allies to accept the invitation was Vicomte A. Talon, a dashing officer in the Chasseurs d'Afrique, who had served with distinction during the war, and now not only entered and rode his horse 'Young Magnet' in the race, but actually won it into the bargain. Moreover, the following year, when the Grand Military was held at Sutton Coldfield, near Birmingham, he again entered the same animal in the big race, coming in third to Captain 'Jonas' Hunt on Goldsmith, who, carrying 10 lb. extra, won in hollow style after making all the running.

In 1861, in which year the race was run at Cheltenham, when Vicomte A. Talon again put in an appearance in the field, this time on a horse belonging to himself named Laudanum, on which he finished third to the Hon. F. G. Ellis on Inniskilling, the still living Major Tempest being second on Warrior.

On this occasion the meeting was held in conjunction with the National Hunt, and the following day the plucky Frenchman finished second on Laudanum to George Ede on Freshman, belonging to Charlie Symonds, the celebrated Oxford horse dealer, for the National Hunt Steeplechase.

That our officers were determined to keep up their cross-country riding in spite of the Russians, was plain, for we read that in 1855 a race entitled 'The Grand International Steeplechase,' open presumably to our gallant allies, was brought off near the English Camp, half way between the monastery of St. George and Kamiesch. There were nine runners, and it was won by Major Yelverton (R.A.) on Muster Roll, belonging to Captain Smith (R.A.).

Towards the conclusion of the war, too, the Sultan of Turkey presented three magnificent gold cups to be competed for by officers of the British Army. Two of these were won by Captain Tom Townely (10th Hussars) on horses belonging to friends, and but for an unlucky fall, he told the writer once, he would inevitably have won the third—this time on a horse of his own.

As it was, the Cup was won by Captain Paynter, father of the popular Guardsman of our own time, who, not content with winning the Grand Military Gold Cup in 1908 on Mount Prospect's Fortune, captured it again only the other day on Jack Symons, carrying top weight, his masterly horsemanship on each occasion 'bringing down the house,' as the saying is.

The Brigade of Guards have been very lucky in the Gold Cup, it having been won no fewer than thirteen times by their representatives since 1860, five of whom—viz. the late General G. W. Knox, Lord Charles Innes Ker, Mr. Barton, and Captain Paynter (twice)—belonged to the Scots Guards. 'Curly' Knox, as that gallant officer was familiarly termed, and who was one of the best cross-country riders of his day either in or out of

the service, won the Gold Cup three times, on Ironsides (13 st.) in 1866, King Arthur (13 st.) in 1868, and Knockany (12 st.) in 1870, starting at good odds on each occasion.

Nor were the Cavalry out of it. The late Captain 'Wenty' Hope Johnstone (7th Hussars) also won it three times. On *Revirescat* (12 st. 10 lb.) in 1873; Lady Sneerwell (12 st.) in 1875, and Earl Marshal (12 st. 10 lb.) in 1876; Mr. W. B. Morris (7th Hussars) twice, in 1877 and 1878, each time on Chilblain; Mr. (now Colonel) D. G. Campbell (9th Lancers) in 1898 and 1899, on Nelly Gray (11 st. 7 lb.) and Paraplue (11 st. 7 lb.) respectively; Major Hughes Onslow twice, on County Council (11 st. 7 lb.) in 1898, and Marpessa (12 st. 7 lb.) in 1903; Mr. E. H. Wyndham (1st Life Guards), each time on Another Delight, in 1912 and 1913; and Captain Lee Barber (3rd Dragoon Guards) twice, on Lobelia (12 st. 3 lb.) in 1881, and Beaufort (12 st. 7 lb.) in 1883.

Revirescat, mentioned above, must have been an exceptionally good horse, for the day following his victory in the Gold Cup, which he won easily from one of the best fields that ever contested the race, comprising sixteen runners, carrying a stone extra, he won the Light Weight Grand Military. *Revirescat*, it may be remembered, ran in the Grand National of the same year, won by the late Mr. J. M. Richardson on Disturbance, for which, again ridden by Wenty Hope Johnstone, he was heavily backed. Unfortunately, the horse was suffering from a cold at the time, and that he had no business really to have been started was soon made evident, for poor *Revirescat*—who, by the way, ran remarkably well—never recovered from the effects of the race, and died not long after, to the intense grief of his owner, Captain Heron Maxwell, and his family, who were devoted to the good old horse who had carried his original owner, the late Mr. Ned Maxwell, and frequently his daughter, in many a good run with the Duke of Buccleuch's hounds.

The late Mr. Maunsell Richardson, in whose capable hands *Revirescat* won his first steeplechase, had an amusing story about him which I venture to quote *in extenso* from a letter written to myself some time afterwards. 'I think it was in 1872,' he wrote, 'that my friend Ned Maxwell wrote word that he had entered a big—very big—and long chestnut horse called *Revirescat* in the Hunt Steeplechase at Lincoln, and would I ride him? When I got in the saddling paddock I found the biggest horse I ever saw, with the smallest bridle—a tiny snaffle, with the thinnest rein imaginable—which his Scotch groom had bought in the town that morning *because he thought it looked like racing!* Just imagine my feelings at seeing this enormous horse—it stood seventeen hands—with a one-rein pony snaffle on him and nothing else, to ride over a course made up of ridge and furrow, small fields and trappy fences, with ditches on the take-off side, and a narrow road to cross—quite a difficult country in fact! I might mention that a mare named Susan, who had won several races, was favourite, with Tom Spence in the saddle. When I was getting up, several of my friends wanted to know if I was insured, as my mount looked such an underbred hunter.

'Well, off we started, and to my surprise, not to say delight, instead of *Revirescat* going badly over the ridge and furrow, or taking any riding in that fearful and wonderful bridle, he went first rate, and when we got amongst the trappy fences I left the others, was never caught, and won easily, to the delight of his owner, as the horse, though he had carried him out hunting on many an occasion, had never run before in a steeplechase.'

It was after this that either Maunsell Richardson or Wenty Hope Johnstone, I forget which, suggested to Mr. Ned Maxwell that he should make a

present of *Revirescat* to his son Johnnie, then in the 14th Hussars, with a view to winning the Grand Military. With what results we know.

The recent Grand Military meeting at Sandown was admitted on all sides to have been the most successful ever held at that popular resort. The weather was ideal, the fields large, and the riding was voted workmanlike in the extreme. That of Captain Paynter especially so. Whilst the fact that His Majesty King George honoured the gathering with his presence gave additional *éclat* to the proceedings.

Good judges, too, did not fail to notice how very 'fit' the soldiers had got themselves for the big race, which is not always the case, the riders not infrequently in previous years on returning to the paddock looking far more distressed than their horses.

The favourites in the military races fared badly as a rule, a plunge on Finnigan in the principal race on the Saturday producing some long faces. On the other hand, there was plenty of money behind Ebonette, capitally ridden by Captain Dermot McCalmont, whose victory was very popular, no one being more hearty in his congratulations than Captain Paynter, the rider of the vanquished favourite. Needless to say, both Sir Hugh and Lady McCalmont were delighted to see their son take one prize back, at all events, to the 'distressful country.' They were hopeful, of course, that Father Roche would capture the Gold Cup, but the 10 lb. penalty proved too much for him when the time came to face the final ascent. The pretty little lady 'bookie' had a very large number of patrons, especially of her own sex, and as she always has something nice to say to everybody, her popularity is not a matter of surprise.

Captain Banbury ('Cakes') had a comfortable ride on Noble Roy in the Tally Ho Hunters Steeplechase, which was the best thing, bar accident, ever known.

Altogether it was a record Grand Military, and one which will long be remembered in the annals of the race.

At the Grand Military meeting of 1844, Sir Hussey Vivian, one of the most distinguished Cavalry leaders of his time, who was amongst the company present, took occasion to express his opinion that those gentlemen who had distinguished themselves as good horsemen over a country, generally proved the best soldiers in action. A statement, I fancy, which few will be found to differ from.

ROYAL NAVAL AND MILITARY TOURNAMENT

The 35th Naval and Military Tournament, which opens at Olympia on May 14, will be under revised rules as regards the competitions. There will be two fresh competitions. One will be called the sword, lance, and revolver competition, and takes the place of tent-pegging. The competitor will thrust at two dummies, leaving his sword in the second one; he will then draw his revolver and shoot blank cartridge at three balloon heads as he passes, and the lance he will take from a perpendicular position in the ground, and lunge at two rings and a peg. The second new contest will be a charging competition. The targets for the sword in this match will be Cavalry and Infantry. Stuffed sacks suspended from a bar will represent the Cavalry target, and a peg driven into the ground the Infantry. In fencing the Austrian rules will be in force for sabre *v.* sabre, and the international regulations will apply to the *épée* and foil. For *épée v. épée* the ground has been lengthened, and in the officers' jumping competition the height of the obstacles will be raised.

RACING.

The Grand Military meeting, which took place at Sandown Park on February 27 and 28 this year, eclipsed all records. His Majesty the King honoured the meeting with his presence. There were two gloriously fine sunny days, the crowd was far greater than ever, the fields were large, and the racing excellent. The riding was all round far better than we have ever seen it. Almost invariably owners were riding their own horses, and were themselves trained and fit to do so, as was evidenced by the good condition in which they returned after the races, and also by the few falls. The Grand Military Gold Cup secured a field of fourteen runners, all with two exceptions being ridden by their owners. After a grand race it was won by a neck by that good sportsman Captain George Paynter, on his horse Jack Symons. No victory could have been better deserved or more popular. Captain Paynter also won the Selling Steeplechase on his horse Le Viso. Mr. Phipps Hornby rode a good race when he won the Past and Present Handicap Steeplechase for Captain Grenfell on Middle March. That good horseman, Captain Tomkinson, came all the way from Spain to ride his mare Wellington III. to victory in the Maiden Hunters' Steeplechase. On the second day an accomplished race rider, Captain O'Brien Butler, won the United Service Selling Steeplechase on Captain Haworth's Parakitoe. The chief race, the Grand Military Handicap Steeplechase, was a popular win for Captain D. McCalmont on Ebonette, and the remaining steeplechases were won by Captain Banbury and Mr. F. Crossley on their own horses Noble Roy and Signal Red respectively. Details :—

FIRST DAY.

The SELLING STEEPLECHASE of 92 sovs.; weight for age, etc.; winner to be sold for 50 sovs. Two miles.

Capt. Paynter's b g LE VISO, by
Champaubert—Valette, aged, 12 st
3 lbOwner 1
Mr. D'Arcy Edwardes's b g VIZ,
aged, 12 st 10 lb (£100)
Capt. O'Brien Butler 2
Mr. F. Harvey's b g UNCLE
MICHAEL, aged, 11 st 12 lb*
Owner 3
Capt. Denny's Doubtful Boy, 6 yrs,
12 st 3 lbOwner 0

Mr. G. Granet's Lady Constance,
aged, 11 st 7 lb*Owner 0
Mr. H. Misa's Sterling Lady, aged,
11 st 7 lb*Owner 0
Mr. W. Murland's Calliope, aged,
11 st 12 lb*Owner 0
Mr. V. Simon's All Aboard, aged,
12 st 3 lbOwner 0
Mr. R. Thompson's Sun Dial, aged,
11 st 7 lb*Owner 0
Mr. H. Wernher's Saturn, aged,
11 st 7 lb*Owner 0

The GRAND MILITARY GOLD CUP of 295 sovs.; weight for age, etc. Three miles.

Capt. G. Paynter's bl g JACK
SYMONS, by General Symons, dam
by Culloden, aged, 13 st ...Owner 1
Mr. I. Straker's b g BALLINCAR-
ROONA, 6 yrs, 12 stOwner 2
Mr. M. B. Smith's b c DARK
COLLAR, aged, 11 stOwner 3
Mr. D'Arcy Edwardes's Marena,
6 yrs, 11 st 7 lb
Capt. O'Brien Butler 4

Mr. P. Wyndham's Rathnally, aged,
12 stOwner 0
Capt. Crawshay's Dutch Pennant,
aged, 12 stOwner 0
Mr. F. Harvey's Durrain, aged,
12 stOwner 0
Mr. R. Eyre's Carmeen, aged, 11 st
10 lb.....Hon. E. B. Bingham 0
Capt. McCalmont's Father Roche,
5 yrs, 11 st 10 lbOwner 0

* 5 lb allowance deducted under Rule 121.

Mr. W. Joynson's King of Meath,
5 yrs, 12 stMr. J. Ainsworth o
Mr. Wyndham-Quin's Ballymadun,
aged, 11 st 10 lbOwner o
Sir J. Tichborne's Don Hussar,
6 yrs, 10 st 9 lb*Owner o
Mr. H. Misa's Ragtime King, 5 yrs,
10 st 9 lb* (car. 10 st 10 lb) Owner o
Capt. H. Wyndham's Another De-
light, aged, 13 st.....Owner o

On settling down Rathnally was leading from Carmeen, the pair being followed by King of Meath, Ballincarroona, Dutch Pennant, and Father Roche, in that order, Marena and Dark Collar being the last pair. King of Meath fell at the station fence, where Rathnally was followed by Ragtime King and Don Hussar, the most prominent of the others being Father Roche, Dutch Pennant, Another Delight, Ballincarroona, and Jack Symons. When they came past the stands Father Roche had taken it up from Rathnally, and Carmeen had become last. At the first fence out of the straight Don Hussar and Ragtime

King fell, and a little further on Ballincarroona took up the running from Father Roche, Rathnally, and Jack Symons, Dutch Pennant and Durrain coming next, and Marena and Another Delight heading the others. Dark Collar made a bad blunder at the water, where Father Roche resumed the command from Ballincarroona and Jack Symons, Durrain, Dutch Pennant, and Marena heading the remainder, of whom Dark Collar was rapidly closing with the leaders. Father Roche was beaten about two fences from home, and when they had landed on the flat Jack Symons and Ballincarroona ran a great race home, which ended in favour of the former by a neck. Three lengths behind the second Dark Collar was third, and then came Marena fourth, Durrain fifth, Dutch Pennant sixth, Father Roche seventh, Ballymadun eighth, Another Delight next, and Rathnally the only other to finish. Time by Benson's chronograph, 6 min 42 3-5 sec.

The PAST and PRESENT HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE of 107 sovs. Two and a half miles.

Capt. Grenfell's b g MIDDLE MARCH,
by Forced March—Little Avis,
aged, 11 st 6 lb Mr. Phipps Hornby 1
Capt. Paynter's b g JIM MAY, aged,
11 st 10 lbOwner 2
Capt. Holland's ch g RESTITUTION,
4 yrs, 10 st 2 lb
Capt. O'Brien Butler 3
Mr. F. Harvey's Lycabettus, aged,
11 st 13 lbOwner 4
Lieut.-Col. Lindsay's Greenheart,
6 yrs, 10 st 12 lb.....Mr. Rogers o

Sir G. Abercromby's Pat McCarthy,
6 yrs, 10 st 10 lb
Hon. H. Alexander o
Mr. Fenwick Palmer's Greek
General, 6 yrs, 10 st 4 lb* ...Owner o
Mr. V. Simon's Flatterer, 5 yrs,
10 st 7 lb (car. 10 st. 8 lb)...Owner o
Mr. H. Goodson's Sweet Rathangan,
aged, 10 st 2 lb (car. 10 st 8 lb)
Owner o

The MAIDEN HUNTERS' STEEPLECHASE of 137 sovs. Two and a half miles.

Capt. Tomkinson's bl m WILLING-
TON III., by King's Limner, dam
by Diakka, aged, 12 stOwner 1
Capt. Banbury's ch g FLIP FLAP,
6 yrs, 12 st.....Owner 2
Mr. I. Straker's ch g APRIL MORN
II., aged, 12 st.....Owner 3
Mr. J. Ainsworth's Kedar, aged,
11 st 9 lb*Owner o
Mr. D'Arcy Edwardes's Lively
Harrigan, aged, 11 st 9 lb* (car.
11 st 13 lb).....Owner o

Mr. A. Hoare's Miss Lindy, aged,
11 st 9 lb*Mr. F. Palmer o
Major Pallin's Eileen Ruadh, aged,
12 stOwner o
Capt. Scott-Nimmo's Iola II., aged,
12 st.Capt. O'Brien Butler o
Mr. Wyndham-Quin's Aberhaven,
aged, 11 st 9 lb*Owner o
Capt. Paynter's The Stoat, 6 yrs,
12 stOwner o

* 5 lb allowance deducted under Rule 121.

The SANDOWN MAIDEN OPEN HURDLE RACE of 131 sovs; weight for age, etc.
Two miles.

Mr. F. Davis's b g BELLINGER, by
St. Aidan—Belle Vale, 4 yrs, 10 st
7 lbMr. J. R. Anthony 1
Capt. Hall's ch m ANOTHER BIRD,
5 yrs, 10 st 12 lb Capt. Springfield 2
Mr. A. Cunliffe's b c MICKEY FREE,
4 yrs, 10 st 7 lbA. Escott 3
Mr. J. Burchell's John Willie, aged,
10 st. 7 lb*T. Tyler o
Mr. J. Joel's Nutbourne, 5 yrs, 11 st
12 lb.....I. Anthony o
Mr. J. Longmuir's Persuade, aged,
10 st 12 lbF. Morgan o
Mr. J. Osenda's Toogood, aged,
10 st 12 lbTratthen o

Mr. E. A. Woodland's Speedy King,
5 yrs, 10 st 7 lb*
Mr. L. F. Woodland o
Mr. F. Barnard's Wild Ben, 4 yrs,
10 st 7 lb.....Dainty o
Mr. Francis Chapman's Thelma's
Amulet, 4 yrs, 10 st 7 lb
Capt. O'Brien Butler o
Mr. W. Dawtrey's Dan Dancer,
4 yrs, 10 st 7 lbC. Young o
Sir Duckworth King's Political,
4 yrs, 10 st 7 lbG. Brawn o
Mr. E. Patterson's Wherryman,
4 yrs, 10 st 7 lbWalkington o
Mr. Stokes's Sandburr, 4 yrs, 10 st
7 lbA. Smith o

SECOND DAY.

The UNITED SERVICE SELLING HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE of 127 sovs; winner to be
sold for 50 sovs.

Capt. Haworth's ch g PARAKITOE, by
Oxeye—Morglette, aged, 11 st 9 lb
Capt. O'Brien Butler 1
Mr. H. de Trafford's b h KING'S
CURE, aged, 11 st 5 lb*Owner 2
Sir G. Abercromby's b g BLAIR
HAMPTON, aged, 10 st 6 lb
Hon. H. Alexander 3
Mr. H. Wernher's Piper's Hill,
aged, 11 st 11 lb*Owner o
Mr. D'Arcy Edwardes's Viz, aged,
11 st 9 lb*Mr. Beech o
Mr. P. Wyndham's Ante, aged,
11 st 8 lb*Owner o
Mr. Wyndham-Quin's Comfort,
aged, 11 st 5 lb*.....Owner o
Mr. H. Wernher's Saturn, aged,
11 st 9 lb*Mr. H. Leatham o

Mr. H. Ethelston's Repp, aged, 11 st
4 lbMr. D. Rogers o
Mr. V. Simons's All Aboard, aged,
10 st 12 lb*.....Mr. E. Patterson o
Mr. V. Simons's Heather Lad, aged,
11 st 3 lbOwner o
Mr. Beckwith Smith's Nimrod VI.,
aged, 10 st 11 lb*Owner o
Mr. G. Granet's Lady Constance,
aged, 10 st 5 lb* (car. 10 st 6 lb)
Owner o
Mr. Lennox Harvey's Borough,
aged, 10 st 6 lb Mr. Phipps Hornby o
Capt. de Crespigny's Chapped Lips,
aged, 10 st 2 lb...Capt. Springfield o
Mr. F. Crossley's General Nogi,
aged, 9 st 9 lb* (car. 10 st 2 lb)
Owner o

The GRAND MILITARY HANDICAP STEEPLECHASE OF 154 sovs. Two and a half miles.

Capt. D. McCalmont's bl m
EBONETTE, by Wavelet's Pride—
Notre Mère, aged, 11 st 6 lb
Owner 1
Mr. H. de Trafford's b g DRINAUGH,
aged, 11 st 8 lb.....Owner 2
Capt. Paynter's b g FINNIGAN, 6 yrs,
12 stOwner 3

Capt. Christie Miller's Jack, aged,
10 st 9 lb.....Capt. Banbury o
Mr. W. Joynson's King of Meath,
5 yrs, 10 st 8 lb.....Capt. Stokes o
Mr. A. Summer's Bachelor's Luck,
5 yrs, 10 st 7 lb.....Owner o

* 5 lb allowance deducted under Rule 121.

The TALLY-HO HUNTERS' STEEPLECHASE of 147 sovs. Three miles.

Capt. Banbury's br g NOBLE ROY, by Noble Chieftain—Roy's Wife, aged, 12 st 7 lbOwner 1	Mr. I. Straker's ch g APRIL MORN II., aged, 11 st 7 lb.....Owner 3
Capt. Tomkinson's ch m WILLINGTON III., aged, 11 st 9 lb* Owner 2	Sir J. Dyer's Faugh a Ballagh, aged, 12 stMr. H. de Trafford o

The MAIDEN STEEPLECHASE of 77 sovs.; weight for age, etc. Two and a half miles.

Mr. F. Crossley's ch g SIGNAL RED, by Grebe—Red Rambler, aged, 12 st 2 lb*Owner 1	Mr. D'Arcy Edwardes's An der Wien, 6 yrs, 12 st 2 lb* (car. 12 st 3 lb).....Owner o
Mr. B. Kenny's br g PRINCE ARTHUR, aged, 11 st 12 lb Hon. H. Alexander 2	Capt. Wyndham's King's Pride, 6 yrs, 11 st 7 lb*Owner o
Mr. H. McMasters's br m SHANE-CRACKEN, 6 yrs, 11 st 7 lb*...Owner 3	Mr. V. Simon's Bwana Mkubwa, 5 yrs, 11 st 4 lb.....Owner o

* 5 lb allowance deducted under Rule 121.

POINT-TO-POINT STEEPLECHASES.

The Carabiniers Regimental Challenge Cup, a three-mile steeplechase, was run for at the Wye Races on March 16, and was won by Mr. K. S. Hunter's Moss Rose III. (owner), with Mr. P. M. A. Keran's Dawn IV. (Captain M. Kennard) second.

The 1st Life Guards Steeplechase took place at the Pytchley Hunt meeting at Ardingworth, being won by Sir Richard Sutton's Gold Coin (Owner). Twelve ran.

A Military Steeplechase for a cup given by Lord Annaly for officers who have hunted with the Pytchley during his mastership was won by Mr. Ronald Cross on Jury V. after a fine finish with Mr. Wyndham-Quin's Agnes III. Fourteen ran.

The 15th Hussars races were combined with the Hampshire Hunt near Alton. Results:

15th Hussars Regimental Sweepstakes, 13 st. 7 lb. and 12 st.

Light Weights: Mr. A. G. Cubitt's Priscilla (Owner).

Heavy Weights: Mr. J. Godman's Williamstrip (Owner).

15th Hussars Subalterns' race: Hon. E. C. Hardinge's Ginger (Owner). Eight ran.

The 9th Lancers and 4th Dragoon Guards held their races near Elmstree in the Duke of Beaufort's country, on March 14. Results:

9th Lancers race: 12 st. 7 lb. Captain F. Grenfell's Joe Boy (Owner). Twenty ran.

4th Dragoon Guards: Captain de Wiart's Lippy (Mr. Aylmer). Twelve ran.

At Mr. Fernie's Hunt meeting the 12th Lancers ran their Light and Heavy Weight races, the former being won by Mr. Wyndham-Quin, and the latter by Mr. H. Leatham.

The Inter-Regimental race between the Earl of Chester's Yeomanry and the Derbyshire Yeomanry took place on the Eaton Estate. The Derbyshire,

who won last year at Osmaston, were now defeated by the Cheshire. The first two riders to finish were Lieut. de Knoop and Lieut. Hermon, both of the Cheshire, who won by 126 points to 75.

The 5th Lancers meeting took place at Ratoath, Co. Meath, on March 12. Results :

Heavy Weight race : Major J. B. Jardine's Jim Hickey (Owner).

Light Weight race : Hon. H. C. Alexander's The Dene (Mr. Stringer).

The Grand Military Point-to-Point Steeplechases were held this year in conjunction with the North Warwickshire Hunt, at Dunchurch, near Rugby, on March 19. The Grand Military Light Weight Steeplechase, about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, was won by Captain M. A. Black's (5th Dragoon Guards) Mystery Play by a length from Mr. Wyndham-Quin's (12th Lancers) Agnes III. (Owner), with Sir R. Sutton's (1st Life Guards) Gold Coin II. (Owner) third. Twenty-two ran.

The Grand Military Welter Steeplechase was won by Mr. H. C. M. Porter's (King's Royal Rifle Corps) Follow Me (Owner), with Mr. G. W. I. Bairstow's (20th Hussars) Brilliant II. (Owner) second, and Mr. G. H. Loder's (Scots Guards) Lifebuoy (Owner) third. Won by two lengths. Fifteen ran.

The Royal Scots Greys had a sporting race at the Bedale Hunt meeting at Constable Burton on March 26. Thirteen stone, about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Major F. Swetenham's Robert (Owner), carrying 14 st., was first. Thirteen competed, and only three completed the course.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade Steeplechases were held at the Remount Dépôt, Arborfield Cross, on March 10. Results :

5th Dragoon Guards Heavy Weight race : Mr. V. D. S. Williams's Magnate.

5th Dragoon Guards Light Weight race : Capt. M. A. Black's Mystery Play.

11th Hussars Heavy Weight race : Mr. Arkwright's The Wasp.

11th Hussars Light Weight race : Mr. Norrie's Matchbox.

Queen's Bays Heavy Weight race : Major Browning's Bruno.

Queen's Bays Light Weight race : Captain Chance's Mayfield Lass.

The Subalterns' race : Mr. V. D. S. Williams's (5th Dragoon Guards) Mondele.

A large crowd witnessed capital sport, but the going was heavy.

The 2nd Life Guards races took place with the Grafton Hunt at Silverstone on March 24. Results :

2nd Life Guards Light Weight race : Mr. E. Speed's Top of the Morn (Owner). Eleven ran.

2nd Life Guards Heavy Weight race : Captain Ashton's Ebony (Owner). Seven ran.

The joint Point-to-Point Meeting of the Old Berkeley Hunt and the 19th Hussars (Hounslow) was held yesterday over a course on Great Moonshine Farm, Sarratt, Herts. Details :—

19th Hussars Regimental Cups (Light Weights) : Mr. A. S. M. Summer's Remnant II. (Owner), 1 ; Mr. J. G. Williams's The Mariner (Owner), 2 ; Mr. R. H. N. Settle's Redshanks (Owner), 3. Won easily ; moderate third.

Heavy Weights : Captain H. E. Platt's Black Knight (Owner), 1. Only the winner finished the course.

19th Hussars Subalterns' Cup : Mr. J. Gage Williams's Brummel II. (Owner), 1; Mr. P. E. Bowden-Smith's Sporting Times (Owner), 2; Mr. W. T. Bolitho's Bloodstone (Owner), 3. Won by two lengths; a moderate third.

POLO

THE INTERNATIONAL POLO CUP

Lord Wimborne has taken the polo question seriously, and at the beginning of the year shipped fifty ponies to Spain, where King Alfonso is finding him stabling in order to get them fit for the America Cup next June. The following names are given as practising for the team there—*viz.*, Captain F. W. Barratt, Major B. Matthew Lannowe, Captain H. A. Tomkinson, Captain E. W. Palmes, Captain V. Lockett, Captain C. F. Hunter, and Captain H. M. Railston. Unfortunately, Captain R. G. Ritson, Inniskilling Dragoons, who so ably captained the team last year, will not be able to play owing to bad health, and this will be a great loss to England.

The Army Cup, played for at Ranelagh, is this year to take place during the week ending June 27. Formerly it was generally played during the first week of the season, with continual postponements owing to bad weather. This week will be a great week for the Army at Ranelagh, as June 25 is fixed for Aldershot Day; also on June 27 will take place the Territorial Challenge Cup for teams from any Territorial Regiments. The County Polo week will begin on July 6, the last tournament being the Subalterns' Challenge Cup.

ABROAD

The Handicap Tournament at Khartoum, open to Egypt and the Sudan, took place at the end of December last with an entry of nine teams. In the final the Cavalry had to concede the Sudanese Infantry 13 goals, but unfortunately, owing to illness, the Infantry had to scratch. The second tournament, open to any four players in Egypt and the Sudan, for the newly inaugurated Sirdar's Cup, presented by Sir Reginald Wingate, secured four strong teams, and was played in the presence of Lord Kitchener, the Governor-General, and a large crowd. The final was between the Infantry and Departments and the Cavalry. At half-time the score was 3 to 1 in favour of the Infantry, but the Cavalry finally won by 7 goals to 4. Teams :

Infantry and Departments : Captains Knott, Gibbs, Webb, and Worsley.

Cavalry : Captain Gibbs (10th Hussars), Lieut. Whittle (15th Hussars), Lieut. Charrington (12th Lancers), and Major Kelly (3rd Hussars) (back).

The final of the Cairo Inter-Regimental Cup was between the 3rd Dragoon Guards and the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, the former winning by six goals to four. Teams :—

3rd Dragoon Guards : Mr. N. McL. More, Lieut.-Colonel O. B. B. Smith-Bingham, Captain P. D. Stewart, and Captain E. Wright (back).

2nd Gordon Highlanders : Captain G. N. McLean, Mr. E. H. Davison, Mr. P. M. Mackenzie, and Mr. L. Carr (back).

The final of the Indian Polo Association's Championship Tournament was played on December 29, in the presence of their Excellencies the

Governor and Lady Carmichael. The Travellers were the favourites, but the Viceroy's Staff gained a popular victory by 8 goals to 4. Teams :

The Viceroy's Staff : Captains Benson, Astor, Tod, and Atkinson (back).

The Travellers : Major Spencer (late 13th Hussars), Lieut. Railston (18th Lancers), Lieut. Lawson Smith, and Major Twist (13th Hussars).

The final of the Delhi Handicap Polo Tournament resulted in a fine match between the Rifle Brigade and the 11th Lancers. The 11th had 1 goal advantage on the handicap, and won close on time by 3 goals to 2.

PIG-STICKING

THE MUTTRA CUP

This competition, which was inaugurated last year by the Inniskilling Dragoons, has already become one of the most popular and important events of the Indian sporting world. The competition is for teams of three from regiments and tent clubs, and has for its object the death of the pig, the team securing the greatest number of kills being the winner.

The entries reached a total of fourteen—*viz.*, 11th Lancers 'A,' 8th Cavalry, 11th Lancers 'B,' 3rd Skinner's Horse, Delhi Tent Club, 12th Brigade R.H.A., 63rd Battery R.F.A., Inniskillings 'A,' King's Dragoon Guards, Meerut Tent Club, 9th Brigade R.F.A., Saugor Tent Club, 2nd Lancers, Inniskillings 'B.'

The line of coolies and fourteen elephants started near Farah and worked south; there were plenty of pig, but the going was difficult at first. The only runs of particular interest during the first rounds were Nos. 8 and 14, both of whom had bad luck not to score.

Heat 8: As soon as the heat came on the line a 27-inch sow got up in front. Paterson and Wootten hung it at a good pace across bad nullah country, into which Humfrey fell. At this point the pig disappeared, but being viewed by Paterson was quickly followed by him and Wootten. They were both about to spear when it dropped into a nullah. At this point they were rejoined by Humfrey, but Paterson, going very fast to cut the pig off some thick jungle, took a heavy toss. Wootten and Humfrey then took the pig through some thick jhow, when they both fell, and the pig, which was quite done, escaped.

At the beginning of the run the umpire fell heavily into a nullah. For heat 14 a small sow broke from the jhow, taking a line through the palm jungle and kept jinking. She then turned back, heading for thick jhow. Teulon then speared and left the head of his spear in the pig. Then Herringham speared and laid the pig out for dead. Unfortunately, she staggered into thick jhow, and was temporarily lost. De Calry, who, unfortunately, had changed his horse, found and finished her. The umpire ruled no score, which, of course, strictly speaking, was correct; but it was hard lines. In the third round ten kills were recorded. On the second day the meet took place at Aurungabad, about two and a half miles from Muttra. The cover, though fairly thin at first, held pig, and several exciting heats were run through. On the third day the line started near Mut. The five teams now left in were the Inniskillings 'A,' the King's Dragoon Guards, the Meerut Tent Club, and the 3rd Skinner's Horse. Pig were plenty, but some good boars got away owing to the forward heats being too far forward. The King's Dragoon Guards got their first run after a small boar. Gladstone rode the pig well, then Alexander took the lead, when Cooper

unfortunately rode over another pig, which he chased, and the original pig got lost in some thick jhow. In their second heat they had hard luck, as Gladstone, not feeling well, sat down and lost his heat. Meantime, Cooper and Alexander got after a decent boar, which after twice being speared and having cut Alexander's horse got into some thick grass and was lost. A third man would probably have settled the matter in their favour. In the end Skinner's Horse rode off the winners of the Muttra Cup. No doubt they had good luck, but they hunted well all through, and well deserved their win. It is hoped that this event will become a permanent annual fixture, and all thanks are due to Colonel Haig, Major Paterson, and officers of the Inniskilling Dragoons for having brought off so thoroughly successful a meeting. The competitors were all the best-known pig-stickers in India, and the two latest Kadir Cup winners were hunting in the same heat with Mr. Macdonald, who is a well-known thruster in the Delhi country. This was a fine team for the 11th Lancers, and Major Prichard, who has been three times in the final of the Kadir Cup, brought a strong team for the 2nd Lancers, so the 3rd Skinner's Horse have every reason to be proud of their victory.

BOXING

His Majesty the King gave a great impetus to boxing by dining with the 2nd Life Guards and attending their excellent boxing competition after.

ARMY CHAMPIONSHIPS

The third Army Championship meeting, which took place at Aldershot in March, produced the highest standard of boxing that has ever been witnessed in Service boxing. The improvement in the percentage of acceptors was remarkable. Last year, of 140 entrants 89 boxed. This year the proportion was about two-thirds, or 167 out of 238. Further, there was a surprisingly small number of 'quitters' or boxers voluntarily capitulating. The Noble Inter-Regimental Challenge Trophy was won by the 1st Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. Results:

OFFICERS' EVENTS

Light-weights. Lieut. Sir I. Colquhoun, Bart (1st Scots Guards) beat Lieut. A. B. Butterworth (A.S.C.).

Feather-weights: Lieut. B. J. N. Marden (9th Lancers) beat Lieut. P. J. Whitty (2nd Royal Irish Regiment).

Middle-weights: Lieut. H. F. S. Huntington (Welsh Regiment) beat Lieut. G. Le Q. Martel (R.E.).

Welter-weights: Lieut. L. H. Jackson (13th Rajputs) beat Lieut. M. A. Cross.

Heavy-weights: Lieut. E. C. E. Smith (9th Lancers) beat Lieut. V. L. S. Cowley (2nd Royal Irish Rifles).

Light-Heavy-weights: Captain G. M. Ellison (1st Lincoln Regiment) beat Lieut. E. F. Chinnery (Royal Flying Corps).

The 11th Hussars, who have done so much for boxing in the Army, have made it necessary for every man in the regiment to learn to box and to take part in the Regimental Inter-Troop contests.

The 9th Lancers at Tidworth and the 15th Hussars at Longmoor Camp have both recently held capital boxing tournaments.

J. W. YARDLEY,
Lieut.-Colonel.



"A VERY GALLANT GENTLEMAN"

After the Original Picture painted by J. C. Dollman, R.W.S., for the Cavalry Club,
and exhibited at the Royal Academy.

By the courtesy of Messrs. Thos. Forman & Sons, Nottingham—
vide Editor's Notes.

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

JULY 1914

RECONNAISSANCE *

By LIEUT.-COLONEL D. G. M. CAMPBELL, 9th (Q.R.) Lancers

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

'CAVALRY Training' divides Reconnaissance under three main headings:—

- (1) Strategical.
- (2) Tactical.
- (3) Protective.

It further points out:—

(1) That patrols or detachments engaged in a strategical or tactical reconnaissance should base their movements on those of the enemy rather than on the immediate movements of the force from which they are detached.

(2) That patrols and detachments engaged in protective reconnaissance should base their movements almost entirely on those of the force whose safety it is their duty to secure.

Strategical and Tactical Patrols really come under one heading, as it is impossible to draw any hard-and-fast line between them. They are both Reconnoitring Patrols, and they both have to obtain the information required as best they can.

A Commander does not say to a patrol leader, 'You are a strategical patrol and I want such and such information'; he simply says, 'I want such and such information,' and it all depends when the information has been obtained whether it is of strategic or tactical value. As

* These notes were compiled for the use of young officers and N.C.O.s. They are principally taken from *The Art of Reconnaissance* (Henderson), *L'Instruction pratique des Cadres dans la Cavalerie* (Commandant P. S.), and *La Cavalerie* (Loir).

a rule, when two forces are supposed to be out of striking distance of one another the information obtained will be of strategical value, *i.e.* information on which a Commander can base his orders for his march.

Again, when two forces are within striking distance the information sent in will usually be of tactical value, *i.e.* information on which a Commander can base his plan of attack or defence. A patrol, however, sent out on a strategical mission may only be able to obtain information of a tactical value, and a tactical patrol may obtain information of a high strategical value.

We may say, therefore, that there is little or no object in trying to differentiate between these classes of patrols, as so much depends on the information they acquire and not on what they were intended to acquire.

Is there any difference in the way these patrols should strive to get their information? Certainly not. These patrols should use cunning or force as seems most likely to give the best results in the case with which they have to deal.

The three following points may, however, help a leader of a patrol to decide whether or not he should resort to force:—

The further away a patrol is from substantial support, the more unwilling should the leader be to resort to force.

If an enemy knows he has been observed, as he must do if force is resorted to, he may alter his plans and so nullify the value of the information sent in.

The closer together two forces may be, the less time will a patrol have in which to acquire information. It may therefore be necessary to resort to force in order to obtain it quickly.

The point for the leader to carry always in his mind is that he has to obtain information that his Commander requires by hook or by crook, and that he has to get it back to that Commander in time for it to be of use to him. In future, in speaking of these patrols we shall simply refer to them as Reconnoitring Patrols.

II. MAIN PRINCIPLES.

Although there are, as we have already seen, several kinds of patrols, yet there are certain general principles which can be applied

to all, and these principles are the foundations of good patrol leading. Before going into these principles there are two remarks to be made :—

A patrol consists of two parts, viz. a leader and the men of the patrol.

That all classes of patrols, if called upon to make good any particular tactical feature, would act in the same general way.

Let us now consider the four main general principles for the conduct of a patrol.

(1) Once a tactical feature has been made good, the leader must get on to it with the least delay possible. Moreover, a leader must fully realise that, should the situation demand it, he must take all risks and shove boldly on alone right ahead of his patrol.

The leader is the man who is most likely to observe well, and to appreciate what he observes, and the sooner he gets on to the position the more time he will have for observing, and to observe properly one must, as a rule, be stationary.

(2) A leader should use the men of his patrol as circumstances demand, and should not detail any man to a hard-and-fast rôle.

A leader is accompanied by men to enable him to carry out his purpose.

That is to say :—

To prevent him falling into an ambuscade.

To enable him to defend himself against, or to attack, patrols of the enemy.

To make prisoners.

To keep touch with his support in rear.

To send messages.

To detach men for reconnoitring purposes as required.

At one moment he may require to reconnoitre to the front, at another to his front and flanks, at another to concentrate to fight, at another to get touch with the support, as occasion demands; so he must tell off his men.

(3) A patrol should move as concentrated as possible. This does not mean that the whole patrol should follow the leader, but :—

That he should make as few detachments as possible.

That these detachments should be of the minimum strength to accomplish the object in view.

That all detachments should preferably be within signalling distance, so that the leader can collect them at any moment should the necessity arise to change direction suddenly or to drive back a hostile patrol. This is not always possible, and then the rule is that detachments sent beyond signalling distance must have precise orders about rejoining so that they may not be lost.

It may be remarked that in enclosed countries this signalling distance will not, as a rule, be more than 500 or 600 yards on either flank, which gives us roughly a front of 1,000 yards which a patrol of the strength of a section may be expected to explore.

It must be further noted that a patrol which is not tied to any precise route should seek security by following hidden tracks, borders of woods, &c., and avoiding main roads.

When giving instruction, however, one should not make too great a point of always seeking security, as it is easy to smother the ardour of a young Cavalry leader. As is remarked in 'Essai sur l'Instruction pratique des Cadres':—

'The instructor, on the contrary, should make every effort to instil into the patrol leader that he is the only person in the patrol who can appreciate the value of what he sees; and that he must never hesitate to leave his men behind and to advance alone to "observe"; that, moreover, boldness backed up by the force at his disposal will often be the only means by which he can carry out his mission.'

(4) Patrols must advance by bounds, swiftly crossing all open spaces or low-lying ground from which there is only a limited view, and halting on those points from which either a good view can be obtained, or which are of tactical importance. Between these bounds patrols must move so as to escape observation. Sometimes it may be best to move closed up, at another time extended laterally, and at another, especially when the roads are flanked by high hedges, in Indian file. The leader must suit his formation to the country.

III. MINOR PRINCIPLES.

Before actually laying down any principles, we will consider the best method for scouts to reconnoitre a hill which cannot be reconnoitred

by sending scouts round it. Now there appear to be two distinct methods :—

Dismounted reconnaissance and Mounted reconnaissance.

Dismounted Reconnaissance.—In this case the scout should ride forward as far as he can until he knows that a further advance will bring him in view of ground that may be occupied by the enemy. He should then dismount, hand his horse over to his companion, and work forward on his hands and knees till he can get a clear view of the ground in front of him.

This method should only be employed where great secrecy is required, as it is a very slow one. Moreover, to escape observation from hills in front, it will often be necessary to dismount before reaching the crest-line, whereby the scout is absolutely at the mercy of any enemy holding the top of the hill.

It would probably be employed by a patrol anxious at all costs to keep its presence unknown to the enemy, or when a force was advancing with a view to surprising the enemy.

Mounted Reconnaissance.—In this case the leading scout should ride rapidly forward till he can see the enemy, or until he can see sufficiently far to his front to make certain that no enemy is in the vicinity of the crest-line. He should then rapidly retire under cover and make a close examination of the country dismounted.

It must be clearly understood, however, that if a scout can see sufficiently far to his front by peeping round a shoulder of the hill, or over the crest-line, he should on no account cross it. This, however, will only be the case when the hill is hog-backed in shape and the crest-line well defined.

The advantages of this system are :—

Rapidity.

The enemy, if present, is likely to open fire sooner, and the scout, being mounted, has a chance to escape.

The disadvantage, of course, is that the scout is more likely to be seen. We may say, however, that if the scout moves rapidly forward and then back under cover and does not hang about near the crest-line, he is quite likely to escape observation altogether, and, even if seen, the enemy may not have time to make sure what he is, especially if he lies well down on his horse's neck, and gives it the appearance of a riderless horse.

This method of reconnoitring a hill should be employed on all occasions when a maximum of secrecy is not required (*i.e.*, advanced points to an advanced guard, &c.), or when it is clear one's presence is known to the enemy and an ambush has to be guarded against.

We will now try to lay down some minor principles for recon-
naissance.

- (1) Scouts reconnoitring a hill which cannot be turned, should:—

Move quickly, *i.e.* trot till about 600 yards off, and then advance at a hand gallop.


Move up to the position with a distance of about 50 yards from one another. The leading scout should then make a mounted or dismounted reconnaissance, the second scout should remain under cover and take over the leading scout's horse when he dismounts.

If fired on, scouts should either gallop away to a flank and try to work round, or seek the nearest cover. Under no circumstances must a scout or a patrol halt in the open.

(NOTE.—The patrol leader should push forward the moment he sees his scouts on the position, and the main body of the patrol should, as a rule, advance at a trot.)

- (2) In enclosed country scouts should keep to the lines of the hedges rather than the middles of the fields.

- (3) If for any reason the presence of the enemy is suspected, every endeavour should be made to mislead him as to the point the scouts are making for, *i.e.*, direct them to make for the centre of the position, and when out of sight of the enemy to change direction and come up on a flank.



- (4) Having reached an observation point, a leader must:—

Receive report from scout.

Get into communication with detachments.

Examine country carefully, foreground, background, right, left, centre.

Decide where the next bound will take him to.

Decide how he will advance, what detachments he must make, where and how detachments will rejoin.

Decide how he can best support the advance of his detachments to the next position.

(NOTE.—By detachments are meant his advanced and flank scouts.)

If the distance between two observation points is too great to be taken at one bound, he must decide on an intermediary halting place.

Decide whether he has any information he wants to report.

(NOTE.—In the case of far-distant patrols, important messages must always be sent back in duplicate by different roads; it may even be necessary to send two or three men with each message if opposition is anticipated. All members of a patrol must keep constantly looking back, and noting landmarks, so that they may be able to find their way if sent back with a message.)

(5) Scouts detached to a flank should, when possible, be directed to rejoin the patrol by moving obliquely forward, as this saves horse-flesh.

(6) Small woods, farms, and villages which have to be examined should always, when time allows, be 'turned,' *i.e.*, scouts passed round the flanks so as to get an enfilade view. If these points are occupied, signs of the enemy are most likely to be found in the rear. It is also most essential to cut off the escape of inhabitants towards the enemy.

(7) Telegraph, post, and newspaper offices are the most likely places in a town in which to get news of an enemy.

Information about the country and maps will generally be obtained at municipal offices and schools.

(NOTE.—While seeking for information be careful to have 'Protective Scouts' pushed out in all dangerous directions.)

(8) The following points particularly apply to long-distance patrols :—

Hostile towns, villages, and inhabitants should be avoided when possible.

Towards evening the leader should think where he will stop for the night, but should not occupy the place till after dark.

Woods afford the best security to small patrols.

Small patrols should not rest together in one place, but should spread out, and always have a look-out man in a good position for observing.

The patrol must always be ready to move off at a moment's notice.

(9) The following points particularly affect protective patrols :—

All persons coming from the direction of the enemy should be stopped, and if necessary sent to the rear under escort. All persons moving in the direction of the enemy should be turned back.

Patrols and scouts should be directed on definite points where the enemy may be concealed, e.g., dead ground in the neighbourhood of cross roads, woods, villages, folds in the ground, &c.

Patrols and scouts sent to examine a particular locality must return to the body from which they are sent as soon as their mission is finished unless otherwise directed.

(10) In every circumstance, whether on the move or at the halt, a leader must try to anticipate any move on the part of the enemy and have a plan ready to put into execution.

IV. PROTECTIVE PATROLS.

We have already seen wherein lies the main difference between a 'Reconnoitring Patrol' and a 'Protective Patrol.'

There is however another difference. For whereas 'Reconnoitring Patrols' are, pure and simple, 'Information Seeking Patrols,' a 'Protective Patrol' has a dual rôle to fill :—

Information seeking.

Information denying.

It has to seek information for the force from which it is sent out, and it has to prevent the enemy from getting information regarding that force. Commander P. S. in his excellent book, '*l'Instruction pratique des Cadres dans la Cavalerie*,' lays down the principle that a

Protective Patrol should attack patrols of the enemy wherever met. This, in principle, is quite correct, but a great many people seem to think that this means that a Protective Patrol should attack any force of the enemy whenever encountered. This is absurd. We believe, however, this misconception is largely responsible for many of the ridiculous situations one sees at manœuvres and field days, viz. patrols dismounting in the open and opening fire on a position held by an enemy without any attempt to reconnoitre. Again, how often did we not see in South Africa a whole column held up by a handful of Boers, simply because the Protective Patrols would fight and would not reconnoitre?

When should a Protective Patrol reconnoitre and when fight? It is impossible to lay down any hard-and-fast rule, but the following points may assist a Protective Patrol leader to decide when to reconnoitre and when to fight.

A Protective Patrol should reconnoitre :—

- (a) When moving from tactical point to tactical point.
- (b) When a tactical point is found to be held by the enemy and the leader does not think he is strong enough to rush the position.

As a rule, a Protective Patrol must fight :—

- (a) When an enemy's patrol is encountered in the open.
- (b) When it finds a tactical point held by the enemy, and the leader believes he can capture it by a vigorous attack.
- (c) When a tactical point has been seized, it must be held at all cost, either till reinforcements arrive or till the time at which the leader has been told he can withdraw.
- (d) When driven back, followed up by the enemy, in order to give the leader of the detachment or force time to put his plans into execution.

As a rule, in cases (a) and (b) a vigorous mounted attack may be best; and in cases (c) and (d) the enemy may be best held off or checked by fire action. Finally it may be remarked that there must never be any half-measures about any attack, and especially a mounted attack made by a patrol, whether 'Reconnoitring' or 'Protective.' It must be made in the most dashing manner, by every available man,

as if there were a whole brigade in support. Sheer audacity will often succeed when more orthodox methods will fail. Military history contains innumerable examples of this.

V. RECONNOITRING DETACHMENTS

What is the main difference between a 'Reconnoitring Detachment' and a 'Reconnoitring Patrol'?

The main difference is that a detachment is capable of sending out many patrols, and thereby is able to reconnoitre several objectives at the same time, whereas a patrol is only capable of reconnoitring one. We say that a detachment is capable of sending out several patrols, but it does not follow it will always do so. In cases where strong opposition is likely to be met with, where the inhabitants are actively hostile, or where the distance to the objective is very great, a detachment may be sent where otherwise a patrol would suffice.

The main duties of a detachment are :—

1. To support its patrol or patrols by—
 - (a) In the event of their being held up, making a hole in the enemy's line through which they can slip.
 - (b) Forming a refuge for them to fall back upon in case they are driven in.
 - (c) Vigorously attacking and routing hostile detachments of the enemy.
2. To furnish reliefs for the patrols.
3. To arrange for the transmission of information obtained.

With reference to 1 (c), when should a Reconnoitring Detachment attack a similar detachment of the enemy?

Bernhardi lays down that, in order to establish a moral superiority from the outset, hostile detachments should always be vigorously attacked. This seems to be going a little too far, as very often such an attack against an equal force would lead to an indecisive result, and might mean the complete failure of the mission. In order to establish a moral superiority the enemy, if attacked, must be routed lock, stock, and barrel.

We may say that a Reconnoitring Detachment should always attack a similar detachment of the enemy when a decisive result may

be expected. When, however, such a result is doubtful a Commander must carefully consider the effect his action may have on the fulfilment of his mission before deciding to *force* an engagement.

If a Commander receives information from his patrols of the presence of a hostile detachment, he must make every endeavour to ambuscade it.

A Reconnoitring Detachment may be of any strength from, say, a troop to a regiment, according to its mission.

The Commander of a Reconnoitring Detachment should on no account send his patrols into the 'Blue'; they should, on the contrary, be as it were at the end of a string.

When he sends out a patrol he must tell the leader :—

Time to be away and where to rejoin.

Own troops, what is known of their movements.

Reports, where to be sent.

Information, on what special points required.

Direction and distance to go.

Enemy, what is known of him.

Memoria Technica 'To ride.'

By this means a methodical system of exploration will be carried out, and the Commander will know where and when his patrol will come to hand again.

The main body of the detachment will move by bounds, preceded by Reconnoitring Patrols covered by Protective Patrols.

As soon as each of these patrols fulfils its mission it will rejoin or await further orders according to the orders given. The Commander can then arrange to send out fresh patrols for the next advance, or issue fresh orders to the patrols already out.

How far ahead of the detachment should the Reconnoitring Patrols move?

It is impossible to lay down any hard-and-fast rule, as so much will depend on the nature of the country the patrols have to pass through, the hostility or otherwise of the inhabitants, the distance at which the patrols are working to a flank, and the tactical situation.


We may say, however, that it is most desirable that messages from the patrols furthest out to the flanks should be able to reach the

detachment in sufficient time, so that, if desired, it can move out to the place where the patrol is by moving forward and not by having to retrace its steps.

Example :—

Detachment moving along line A B.

Information Seeking Patrols reconnoitring along line A X Y Z.



Messages sent in from X Y Z respectively should reach the detachment before that body passes the points X' Y' Z' respectively.


The amount of law, therefore, that a detachment should give to its patrols will depend to a very great extent on the distance the furthest patrol is to a flank.

When seeking to gain touch with the enemy, what extent of front can a Reconnoitring Detachment be expected to cover? Roughly, in an average country, if required, a squadron might be expected to reconnoitre a front of, say, 8 to 10 miles. As contact is obtained and the situation develops, the Commander of the detachment will draw in his patrols towards that point where he thinks information is most likely to be obtained. He should move as close to them as possible, so as to be at hand to support them offensively or defensively as required.

Patrol leaders, when sending messages, must give their messengers a route to follow, so as to strike the road on which the detachment is moving ahead of and not behind that body.

Example :—

Main body moving along A B, and at the moment the patrol leader at Y wants to send a message he calculates the main body will be at A. How long will it take his patrol to reach the road? Say half an hour. In half an hour the main body should be about X; therefore he should send the message so as to strike the road A B between X and X', and not between A and X. It is better to strike the road a mile ahead than a quarter of a mile behind the detachment.



Where should a Reconnoitring Detachment spend the night?
Should the horses be off-saddled?

These are two questions which are constantly asked, and the answer is that the Commander alone can decide.

If he can find an isolated farm which he can occupy after dark, and from which he can ensure a safe retreat in case of attack, then there is *no doubt* that he should occupy it in preference to bivouacking.

He must be careful, however:—

To prevent any inhabitants escaping.

To prepare extra exits if sufficient do not exist.

To arrange to hold off an attack from any direction till the farm is vacated.

To arrange for early information of any impending attack.

Should the horses be off-saddled?

It is a much-debated point, but in view of the hardships which horses suffer by being saddled up all night, we are of opinion that, whenever the tactical situation allows, as many horses as possible should be off-saddled, but the Commander must arrange:—

For a reserve to move out at a moment's notice.

For the saddles to be so placed that the horses can be saddled up without any loss of time.

The Commander must further ensure that every man knows exactly where he is to go, and what he is to do in the event of alarm.

VI. INFORMATION

Information is obtained by means of Reconnoitring Patrols or Reconnoitring Detachments. A patrol can slip through where a larger body cannot, but a detachment can often make a hole for a patrol to slip through.

A patrol is only capable of reconnoitring in one direction, and is made up to sufficient strength to carry out that mission and no more. The leader may be told 'To find the enemy,' or he may be told 'To go to A and find if it is held by the enemy,' but he should never be told to 'Go to A and find the enemy.' This would mean two missions:—

Going to A.

Finding the enemy.

If while on the way to A the patrol encountered the enemy the leader would not know whether he should stick to the enemy, or go on to A; and so would probably hesitate which course to pursue, and hesitation where a Reconnoitring Patrol is concerned is fatal.

If a leader receives an order, 'Find the enemy: you will probably come across him about A,' the leader would naturally look in the direction of A, and if no enemy was encountered it would be his duty to endeavour to find him elsewhere, sending back at the same time a negative report. If, however, the leader received the order, 'Go to A and find if it is held by the enemy,' and on arriving at A he found no enemy there, then his mission would be ended, and he would rejoin, unless he had received other instructions.

In order, however, to avoid any mistake a patrol leader should clearly ascertain his Commander's wishes before he leaves.

A leader receives the order, 'Go to A and find out if the enemy is there.' Before leaving the Commander he should, unless the information has been given him already, inquire:—

Supposing I meet the enemy on the way, shall I avoid him and push on to A?

If the enemy is at A, am I to remain in observation or shall I rejoin?

If the enemy is not at A, what do you wish me to do?

We have already shown what information should be given to a patrol leader before he is sent out.

It is astonishing, however, how often the above instructions fail to be complied with. When this is the case it is the duty of the leader to ask questions so as to be quite sure he knows exactly what is required of him before setting out. Information Seeking Patrols may be required to reconnoitre an objective a hundred miles or one only a mile or so away.

In any case the leader must:—


Be given a free hand how he carries out his work;

Not be tied down to an itinerary.

Example:—

A force is advancing from A to D. Enemy reported advancing from X. A patrol leader should not be told, 'The enemy is reported

to be advancing from X, *I want you to move along the A D road*, reconnoitre towards X, and find out if the report is true and what strength the enemy is in.' The orders he should receive might be: 'The enemy is reported to be advancing from X; *I want you to reconnoitre the A X road* and find out if this is the case, and, if so, what strength the enemy is in.' Will the leader move along the A X road? Most certainly not.



Why not? Simply because if he does so he will butt into the first security detachment of the enemy, will be driven back, and be able to tell his Commander nothing beyond the fact that the enemy is on the road. No; as soon as the leader has received his orders he must consult his map and note carefully from what points off the road he will be able to observe the road. In this case he will see the range of hills, Y Y Y Y, which may be from a mile to two miles away from the road he has to reconnoitre, but from which with the aid of his glasses he can easily see everything passing along the road. By moving from one observation point to another he will be able to reconnoitre the road far more thoroughly than if he were on it, and, by avoiding the enemy's security detachments, will probably be able to send back valuable information regarding the enemy's main body. It must be remembered, however, that a patrol can move much quicker along a road than across country, so that, when a patrol has a long distance to cover to reach its objective, it should move along a road whenever possible until it arrives in the vicinity of its objective or is compelled to leave it to avoid the enemy or dangerous localities.

Whenever a patrol leader is in doubt how to act, he must ask himself the question, 'What was I sent out to do?' The answer will probably show him at once how he should act.

*THE RECENT SERVICES OF
THE EGYPTIAN ARMY CAVALRY*

A VERY complete account of the work of the Egyptian Cavalry Brigade in the Atbara and Omdurman campaigns has appeared in former numbers of *THE CAVALRY JOURNAL*, but no record has been published of the work accomplished in more recent years by the reorganised mounted troops of the Egyptian Army, which now comprises Egyptian Cavalry, Sudanese Arab Mounted Infantry, and Sudanese negro units, irrespective of the artillery, machine-gun, and various camel corps which are each allotted their own sphere of duties in the service of his Highness the Khedive.

The soldierly qualities of the Sudanese blacks are well known, and may be briefly summarised as loyalty, cheerfulness, contempt of death, love of fighting, smartness on parade, and patience under hardship and adversity. They also enjoy considerable immunity from malarial diseases and are capable of sustaining fatigue in a fasting condition.

It was these qualities which prompted Napoleon III. of France to arrange with the Khedive of Egypt, Mohammed Taufik Pasha, for a brigade of his Sudanese troops to be lent for the service of France in the expedition to Mexico, 1862-3, and when in 1885 the 9th, and later, the 10th, Sudanese battalions were raised by British officers for the Egyptian Army from the remnant of Gordon's garrisons which escaped from the forces of the Mahdi, there was a considerable number of old blacks who came forward for enrolment who were still in possession of the Mexican medal, as well as of Gordon's Star, the decoration made during the memorable siege in Khartoum and issued by the hero of Khartoum to his faithful garrison for exceptional services against the enemy.

It was not until after Khartoum was retaken by the Anglo-Egyptian Army on September 2, 1898, that the question of raising black Cavalry was mooted, and Colonel R. G. Broadwood, 12th (Royal) Lancers, who commanded the Egyptian Cavalry, lost no time in putting the scheme into execution.

It was not long before the necessity of utilising Sudanese in lieu of Egyptians for service in the malarial districts south of Khartoum was brought home to the authorities. In October 1898 some squadrons of Egyptian Cavalry were sent to Karkoj, on the Blue Nile, to join a force operating under Colonel D. F. Lewis, C.B., against the Emir Ahmed Fedil, who, with a force of 3,000 Sudanese riflemen, 4,000 Western Arabs, and 3,000 Gezira Arabs and riflemen, was retiring south from Gedaref, which, held by Parson's force of the 16th Egyptian battalion, the Arab battalion, and 1,000 friendlies, had just been relieved by the arrival from Khartoum of Collinson's brigade. Within a month the whole of this Egyptian Cavalry was on the sick list with a severe form of malaria, and while the men in every stage of illness were taken back to Khartoum by steamer the whole of the horses were led and ridden back to Khartoum by the friendly Arabs of the neighbourhood.

The Sudanese squadrons, originally numbered the 8th and 9th, were raised from the hillmen of Tagale and the Nuba Mountains, from the riverain Dinka and Shilluk tribes, and from the Berti, Fertitawi, Gawama, and Fur tribes of the Western Sudan.

The recruits comprised over eighty prisoners of war from the battle of Omdurman, and the units were brought up to strength by volunteers and from six Sudanese battalions. These squadrons are now represented by their successors of the 2nd Squadron Cavalry and the 3rd Mounted Infantry, the latter being a workmanlike corps of Sudanese blacks raised in 1911, equipped with carbine and sword-bayonet and mounted on mules as well as horses, for the purpose of service under campaigning conditions in the Southern Sudan, where the mortality from horse-sickness, the Serut fly, and equine malaria is less among mules than horses.

On October 15, 1899, the Khalifa, with a force estimated at 10,000 rifle and spear men, had formed a camp at the foot of Jebel Gedir, the 'holy mountain of the Mahdi,' and Lord Kitchener concentrated a division from Omdurman at Kaka, on the west bank of the White

Nile, in order to march thence to attack the Dervishes, and the Sudanese squadrons were among the troops detailed for the front.

On the 16th a squadron on picked horses was told off to reconnoitre to Jebel Fungur, which lay fifty miles inland on the way to the 'holy mountain.' Under command of Major Bryan Mahon, D.S.O., and accompanied by Major Gorringe, R.E., D.S.O., and Captain N. M. Smyth, V.C., the squadron moved out five miles to Kurwa, where they bivouacked for the night, the men and horses getting very little rest owing to the quantities of mosquitoes. They marched at 3 A.M. next morning and arrived at Fungur Mountain at 8 P.M., having traversed fifty miles of field and forest full of game, including roan antelope and corrugum hartebeests, which, inspired by curiosity, accompanied the Cavalry in large herds. Giraffe, antelope, and ostriches were in view at the same time, backed by the sombre forest and the bold outlines of the Nuba Mountains. The Nuba natives at Fungur proved friendly, and stated that the Dervish post there had been withdrawn the previous day, as the Khalifa was reported to contemplate shifting camp, his intention being to conduct a campaign with the object of taking Khartoum, and incidentally of replenishing supplies farther north, as his army was suffering from famine. The squadron slept until 1 A.M. when they started on their return journey and reached Kurwa by 6 P.M., having accomplished a ride of 100 miles in thirty-nine hours, the result of the reconnaissance being a very complete route report and the further information of the Khalifa's intended march.

On October 21 Sir Reginald Wingate, commanding the Infantry division, reached Fungur, and reliable information showed that the Khalifa's force had left Jebel Gedir on the 17th instant and marched north.

On October 24 Lord Kitchener recalled the force and determined to give up all thought of attacking the Khalifa until a more favourable opportunity presented itself; but the Cavalry regiments under Major Le Gallais,* D.S.O., 8th (K.R.I.) Hussars, of four squadrons, comprising the new black squadrons, were sent to reconnoitre Jebel Gedir with one company of the Camel Corps.

At 3 P.M. the same day the Cavalry started, and, guided by the stars, reached the Sheg El Hagar rock basins after dark, having accomplished a distance of twenty miles. The horses were watered

* An officer who fell in the hour of victory in the South African War, 1901.

from canvas buckets from the deep rock basins, and at noon the next day the Cavalry approached the 'holy mountain,' thirty-six miles from Fungur, trotting across the plain in column of squadrons at extended files. It was ascertained that the Dervish camp had assuredly been moved north, leaving a sick depôt behind at Gedir village.

Barely sufficient water was left for the needs of the inhabitants, and, it being out of the question to water the horses, an immediate return was necessary. Some prisoners were taken, including the Emir Sheikh Musa and Sheikh Bosh of Gedir. The heat was intense and several horses were unable to move far on the return journey, and their saddlery and riders were transferred to some of the led mules. The men also suffered much from thirst. Fortunately the officer charged with sketching the route had alone observed a pool of rainwater not far from the track, fifteen miles farther back, at Goz Abu Tebeldi, and this the column reached after dark. By carefully baling the water with cups into the canvas nosebags which were in use as buckets each horse was given a drink and each water-bottle filled. Early the next morning Fungur was reached, and on October 28 the Cavalry again drank the Nile water.

In this abortive expedition two Egyptian Cavalry troopers were sent with an important message towards the Nile, but lost their way and were never seen again, it being afterwards concluded that when exhausted by thirst they were taken by lions. Only two of the Sudanese who had been enlisted from the Dervish prisoners of Omdurman deserted to the Nuba hills with their horses and equipment, but were later reported to have been killed by the natives.

On November 12, 1899, a telegram was received from Army Headquarters, Khartoum, announcing that the Emir Ahmed Fedil, the Khalifa's General-in-Chief, was making rafts on the White Nile in order to cross at Aba Island to the Gexira, where he was to be joined by a general rising of the formidable Kenana tribe. Captain Howard of the Army Service Corps was at Goz Abu Guma with a small supply detachment when he saw the Dervishes preparing to cross. By chance a gunboat appeared, which he fought against the enemy. The next day before dawn the 9th and 13th Sudanese at Omdurman were warned to embark, and at noon they had left for the scene of action. Skirmishing continued daily and the advanced troops were gradually reinforced, till, on November 20, 500 Camel Corps, 1,000

transport camels, and a troop of Cavalry under command of Captain C. B. Bulkeley-Johnson, Scots Greys, which had arrived by march route up the east bank, were ferried to the west bank at Fachi Shoya.

The next day Ahmed Fedil's force, estimated at 2,000 to 3,000 men, was located at Nefisa, twenty miles S.W., and they were reported by deserters to expect in the course of a few days to be joined by the Khalifa's main body, which was advancing north by easy stages with the avowed object of retaking Omdurman, where it was rumoured that some of the inhabitants were pledged to join their former ruler, and that they had large stores of buried rifles and ammunition.

Sir Reginald Wingate assumed command of the following force, which marched at 3.30 P.M., and slept in the plain five miles S.W. Owing to the waterless character of this part of Kordofan very few horses could accompany the column :—

Detachment 7th Squadron with 100 Arab horsemen of the Gimma tribe, Captain C. B. Bulkeley-Johnson (Royal Scots Greys).

One battery, four maxims, Captain Simpson-Baikie (R.H.A.).

Four companies Camel Corps, Major Henry (Northumberland Fusiliers).

Two companies 1st Egyptian Battalion.

9th Sudanese, Major W. B. Doran, D.S.O. (Royal Irish).

13th Sudanese, Major F. I. Maxse (Coldstream Guards).

Six hundred Jehadia equipped as Light Infantry and raised from blacks taken at Omdurman in 1898, who had been employed in rebuilding Gordon's old palace.

These were officered by Major Gorringe, D.S.O. (R.E.), Captain E. S. Herbert (Black Watch), and Captain Sir Henry Hill (87th R.I.F.).

The transport camels were under Captain A. R. Hoskins, D.S.O. (N. Staffordshire Regiment).

The column marched on by night and into the morning. At the fifteenth mile some Dervish horsemen were driven back, and the troops reached Nefisa at 8 A.M. to find only a party of thirty Dervishes, who retired south, leaving a large heap of grain. The horses were watered at a large muddy pool, and a sick Dervish, who was found near, stated that Ahmed Fedil was at Abu Aada, five miles farther south, with the advanced guard of 3,000 men.

Colonel Mahon, D.S.O., was at once sent ahead with Captain



KHARTOUM.


EGYPT

The Cavalry

MARCHING ORDER.



TYPES OF UNIFORM.(CAIRO)



N.C.O's 2ND SQUADRON.

From a sketch by
Colonel N. M. Singh, V.C.
(The Illustrated London News).
By kind permission.



THE BATTLE OF ABU (22nd November, 1898).

"During the attack on Sir F. Wingate's advance guard, the Dorsetshires, who had long been fellow campaigners, came on with their hands clasped, and there at last met together, rejoiced not to be separated even in death. They had their wish."

Smyth, V.C., as staff officer, the Cavalry, forty Gimma horsemen, two guns, four maxims, Camel Corps, and the Jehadia. Near Abu Aada a position of readiness was taken up in a horseshoe-shaped hill and the Dervish position rapidly reconnoitred.

A commanding hill which was occupied by Dervish horsemen was cleared with maxim fire, and the hill crowned by a charge of all our mounted troops, the Jehadia following echeloned in support. From the summit we saw to our right large numbers of Dervishes surrounding the wells and water, under the shade of a wood which was about 800 yards off. Our Jehadia were echeloned to our right front, concealed behind a ridge, from which they could have opened a cross-fire if we were attacked. They were, however, told to reserve their fire until ordered by Colonel Mahon to open on the enemy. We now directed howitzer and maxim fire against the enemy. After a few minutes they opened a hot fire against us and delivered an assault, firing as they advanced. The charge was repelled by the Camel Corps, machine-guns, and howitzers, but owing to a piece of dead ground many of the enemy got to within 100 yards.

A remarkable incident illustrative of the determination of the enemy was witnessed during the attack. Two Dervishes who had long been fellow-campaigners came on with left and right hand clasped and their arms tied together, resolved not to be parted even in death. They had their wish.

The Cavalry, who were eager to charge, had to be husbanded for the important duties of reconnaissance, for the theatre of operations had not been scouted and the question of water-supply was so vital that a special staff officer had been told off to supervise the finding of water and the digging out of wells, as also the allotment and issue of the precious fluid.

The enemy left 400 on the field, and numbers of prisoners were taken. The pool of water contained only some slime, which not even the animals would drink, and the wells were found to be dry.

One of our well diggers was buried by the caving-in of a well, and the men and officers' horses had to drink from the slender supply of water which we carried.

At midnight, November 22-23, the march was continued, and at 9 A.M. the Cavalry, moving in advance, saw that the wells of Gedid were not held by the Khalifa's force, as had been expected. It was

still uncertain whether we should find any water, but, though the wells were dry, our scouts discovered a deep pond of clear water in the vicinity. It was necessary to surround this with a ring of bayonets and to take every precaution against the camels or irregulars rushing into it. In due course all drank in turn, and our well diggers found that on cleaning out the wells water quickly oozed in from the sides.

During the day a reconnaissance was made of the Khalifa's position a few miles farther south, at Debrekat. A Cavalry officer, Yubashi Mahmud Effendi Hussein, rendered important services during this reconnaissance, for which he was promoted Saghkologhasi on the field, and was subsequently decorated.

At midnight, November 23-24, the force again marched, leaving the transport guarded by the two Egyptian companies at Gedid. At about 4 A.M. the Khalifa's *nogara* (drum) was heard sounding the alarm in measured beats. At 4.45 A.M. a position was taken up north of the crest of a sandy ridge falling southwards with trees upon it. About 5 A.M. the scouts found the enemy half a mile south in the trees, and at 5.30 A.M. Colonel Mahon rode into some Dervishes 500 yards from our position, mistaking them for our own scouts.

The enemy then were seen coming on.

Our guns now opened and the action became general, though the left of our position was particularly attacked. At 6.30 A.M. the enemy's fire slackened and then died away. Our line ceased fire and the brigade advanced. After advancing 400 yards the 9th Sudanese marched over the dead bodies of 500 of the Khalifa's bodyguard and then came on the bodies of the two Khalifas—Abdallahi, the Taaishi, and Ali Wad Helu, of the Degheim Kenana tribe. The remaining son of the Mahdi, the General-in-Chief, Ahmed Fedil, who died smiling, and all the principal fighting Emirs, had sat on their *furwas* (the sheepskins taken from their saddles and used as prayer mats), and disdained to retire, in accordance with the Mohammedan custom, when it has been decided to seek death in preference to a dishonourable flight.

Thus in sixty hours our column had marched sixty miles, made three consecutive night marches, and fought two decisive actions.

The camp was taken with many wounded and there was no further resistance except some sniping at night.

By the evening of November 27 the column had returned to Fachi Shoya, bringing with it 6,288 captives.

In 1904 the Cavalry, under Major W. H. Persse (Queen's Bays), formed part of the Jerok Expedition, which had for its object the punishment of a notorious slave-raiding Sultan on the Abyssinian frontier, whose fortress was bombarded and stormed, he himself being pursued across the border and captured. He was subsequently tried by the civil power for the murder of several Arab merchants, whom he had caused to be flung from the cliffs of his stronghold, and was executed in due course.

In the same year the 1st Mounted Infantry was formed and attached for service in Kordofan to the Camel Corps. Three years later they were brought under command of the Officer Commanding Cavalry, and the 2nd Mounted Infantry was raised. These corps consist of Arabs of the Sudan tribes, famous Jaaliin and Shaigia, with a few Abyssinian and horse-riding Arabs from Darfur.

These two corps are mounted on riding mules, with a proportion of horses and on Sudan horses respectively.

In 1908 the Cavalry was despatched to the Blue Nile to repress the rising of a malcontent named Abdel Kader, who, having murdered an English inspector and an Egyptian officer in cold blood, had taken the field with some 400 followers and made a night attack on two companies of the 13th Sudanese, which formed the escort of the Governor. The result of the action was the defeat of the rebels with heavy loss and the eventual capture and execution of their leader. The stubbornness of this night encounter may be gauged from the losses of the troops, which amounted to one British and seven Egyptian officers killed, two British officers wounded, and some sixty casualties in the 13th Sudanese.

The same year the Cavalry were again employed on the Blue Nile, hunting down fugitives from justice, from September 9 to September 29. Only two weak troops were employed, under command of Major P. J. V. Kelly, 3rd (K.O.) Hussars, numbering two Egyptian officers, fifty N.C.O.s and men, with fifty-four horses. On return to Khartoum they again left for active service in Kordofan on October 4, returning January 15, 1909. In this expedition they took part in the operations in Southern Kordofan against the Nubas, under the command of Major Lempriere. The distance actually marched from Dueim on the White Nile (where the squadron was

conveyed by steamer) to the most southern point reached was some 344 miles; the total distance covered, not including actual operations, was some 768 odd miles, the average on the march up being 26 miles a day.

The loss in animals was considerable—twelve of horse sickness, one of colic, and one which dropped dead during a night march of heart disease.

A detachment was next ordered to the front for the Tagoi Patrol, October 22, 1910, to January 7, 1911: strength—one British officer (Major Kelly), three Egyptian officers, fifty-nine N.C.O.s and men, with sixty-four horses and six mules. A circular march of some 700 miles was made, from Kosti on the White Nile through the Southern Nuba Mountains, returning *via* El Obeid and Bara to Dueim. The Camel Corps and a brigade of infantry took part in the assault and capture of the Tagoi hills in face of a determined resistance by a strong force. The loss in horse-flesh was slight, being two killed, two through horse-sickness, and one of exhaustion. This latter was quite a veteran Arab, and arrived within twelve miles of the river, when he succumbed.

The actual accounts of these various patrols are uninteresting to the student of military history. They are chiefly of interest from the lessons learnt in stable management, and the experience gained in marching horses long distances with very little water and a change of diet from that which they had been accustomed to.

Their feeding prior to these patrols had been as follows: barley, 6 lb.; dura, 4 lb.; bran, $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb.; tibbin, 2 lb.; salt, 10 dirhems, with 11 lb. green burseem, which corresponds to lucerne.

They looked and did very well on this ration, but as they could only get dura and indifferent grass once Khartoum was left, it affected their condition seriously. The habit of watering the horse three times a day, and as often as five times a day in the hot weather, was also unsound.

As a general rule, when once the river is left the horses can only be watered once a day, and if the day's march can be fitted in so as to arrive on water once in 24 hours one may be considered lucky. The grain of the country is mainly white and red dura and dukhn, a small, very hard, red millet.

Prior to these two patrols efforts were made to alter the method of feeding and watering, the idea being to give an 'all dura' ration and to water once a day. It took some considerable time before the animals became accustomed to it, and as a matter of fact the squadron started only half prepared. The result was that, in spite of having to cover long distances, the horses were only able to consume 7 lb. of white dura, 6 lb. of red (which is very hard and unsuitable), or 5 lb. of dukhn; if more than this was given severe colic was the result.

These severe attacks of colic absolutely incapacitated horses, but they had to march, as they could not be left in the desert.

The small amount of grain, very little water, &c., resulted in a considerable loss in condition. However, all horses from seven to twelve years of age did well.

One of the great points about the Arab is that with one or two days' rest he will always bob up again and be ready for another big effort.

The necessity for altering the feeding and the methods of watering was apparent, and an 'all dura' ration is now given, and the animals get through 10 lb. a day with ease and do not get colic; they are also watered twice in the hot weather and once during the winter months.

Horses, like human beings, can be made to do with less water. There are parts of Kordofan where the Arabs only water their animals once in two days, and sometimes once in three days; their animals do not look up to much, but when you come to working alongside of them their true value is at once apparent.

In the Cavalry all the horses are stallions. It is sometimes found necessary to geld one or two animals for vice, but it is inadvisable to do so if it can be avoided. Experience has taught us that geldings have no stamina; those few geldings which have been taken on service turned out to be practically useless and were led most of the time.

[The writer of this article begs to acknowledge the kind assistance he has received in compiling it from H.H. Prince Mohamed Ali Hassan.]

AMONG THE MISSING OF THE HEAVY CAMEL CORPS

By the EGYPTIAN SUB-EDITOR

TOWARDS the end of 1897, during the advance up the Nile against the Dervishes under Lord Kitchener, Colonel R. J. Tudway, D.S.O., then in command of the Egyptian Army Camel Corps, found in the course of conversation with some Arabs of the Jaali tribe that they were able to furnish him with an account of the fate which had befallen two British soldiers of the Household Cavalry Camel Corps who had been missed after the battle of Abu Klea. It was supposed that they had gone to sleep on their camels during the night march and had thus lost the column. The account which was then given has again been repeated and written down as dictated by Ibrahim Mohammed Farah, Sheikh of the Jaalin tribes of the Sudan, who are among the highest caste of Arabs, being descended from Abbas, the uncle of the prophet Mohammed.

This tribe, to the number of about 20,000, was opposed to the British force at the battle of Abu Klea, so named from the wells of Abu Teleih.

The following is the statement made from memory by Sheikh Ibrahim in the year 1913:—

The battle of Abu Teleih was on Saturday, January 17, 1885.

On Sunday night the British Army moved against Metemmeh.

One soldier half-way between Metemmeh and Abu Teleih slept alone in a watercourse; the Army had gone on.

The retreating Dervishes found him asleep, and as he slept they killed him with a spear in the body. He woke up and appeared to say, 'That is enough; I shall die,' and signed to them not to strike him again. He soon afterwards died.

The Arabs took his rifle, bandolier, and water-bottle.

The second soldier had lost the Army and was moving eastwards

alone, without any arms; he had probably fallen off or lost his camel. He wandered along to half a mile north of Metemmeh, and was moving towards the palm trees which mark the Nile banks at about 8 A.M. in the morning of the Monday. There was firing south of Metemmeh, as part of the British column was engaged with the Arabs, and the soldier began to move south towards the sound of the firing. He was seen by Arabs who were herding sheep north of the town. They approached him and endeavoured to parley with him, and said, 'Come with us and we will take you to the Emir at Metemmeh.' He appeared to be mad, and would not go with them, but suddenly seized a rock, as he had no weapons, and attacked one of the Arabs and tried to snatch away his spear; a fight ensued, and an Arab plunged a spear into his body; but the soldier then possessed himself of it, and as the Arabs closed round him he attacked them with the spear, three of whom he stabbed. He was then killed by two Arabs from behind.

Some of the Jaalin said that he killed three Arabs. The next day they buried him, and I, Ibrahim Wad Farah, who was then a boy, went out from Metemmeh with others and saw him buried.



REGIMENTAL SIGNALLERS

FROM time to time much has been written on the subject of communication, which embodies the use of telegraphs, telephones, despatch-riders, &c., but few pamphlets have appeared offering suggestions as to the training of the men from the initial stage (which is so important to the eventual efficiency of the men on whom we have to rely in war). The object of this article is to help an officer taking over the signallers of his regiment for the first time, with only recruits to deal with. The task on first sight looks hopeless, but it is a position that arises in every regiment at various intervals and invariably comes right, for at the end of the second year the signallers are well up in the annual classification, and the men are most keen to prove how good they really are.

The question is, how to bring about this much-desired result. Two points stand out very clearly with regard to the men to be selected, and preference should be given to (a) men who volunteer to be employed as regimental signallers, and (b) to those who show a higher education and intelligence qualification; these latter can be easily distinguished by their manner of speech, their general bearing, and how they were employed in civil life before enlisted.

The number of signallers required in a Cavalry regiment is laid down in King's Regulations, and in order to show up the right number at each 'annual classification' it is necessary to have the pick of about forty recruits, as soon as they are off the square and out of the riding school, and gradually weed them out for various causes until you get about the right number with two or three spare men on whom to fall back.

Begin by weeding out any man who cannot speak, spell, or write distinctly; no matter how good a man he is in other ways, he will always be causing delay and mistakes in the field afterwards. These three points are most important in all signalling work.

Having finally selected the men, it falls to the lot of the officer (who is usually a junior one) to proceed with the utmost tact to deal

with the regimental authorities and to keep on the right side of the squadron leaders. In England the shortage of men at stables is always a trouble, and therefore no squadron commander is likely to welcome any suggestion that the signallers might be excused from stables; yet, on the other hand, it must be remembered that there is little encouragement for the Cavalryman to induce him to take up signalling; therefore, the more the signallers can be considered, the more likely is signalling to become popular with the men.

The following are some of the methods suggested to induce soldiers to become signallers: to be excused stables and parades when possible; leave from evening stables when signalling with lamps; being quartered together in a separate room; the first call on the dates for furlough in the winter; various prizes and special rewards to men who at the annual classification come out in the 1st class. The question of guards, stables, parades, &c., requires, of course, the support of the squadron leaders, so the more the signalling officer can ingratiate himself with them, the more likely is he to gain his point without friction.

These important preliminaries being settled, then comes the actual method of instruction. This can only be a matter of opinion, but the idea of the writer is to ensure perfect and accurate reading under all conditions, proceeding with the sending of letters slowly and correctly—the pace will come afterwards.

To make certain of the reading it is suggested that 'sound' is the key to all successful reading, and for this reason it is considered that a man should be taught to read on the dummy key, buzzer, click of the helio, or on the shutter of a lamp before he reads by the eye; and, further than this, all letters should always be made at the proper rate of sending, leaving as long a pause between the letters as one likes, but the letters themselves should *always* be at the correct rate of sending. The method of slowly sending a continuation of dots and dashes on the square appears to be wrong, as it is a sure way of making the beginner rely on counting the number of dots and dashes in his mind and then thinking out what it is; and when one considers that all reading is eventually done by *timing* the wave of a flag, or flick of a light, the man who has learnt to count on sight is never likely to be as good as the man who originally learnt to read by time. When one is taught to read as a child one is shown that a certain combination of strokes makes a certain letter, and not by counting the number of vertical,

horizontal, or circular lines first. It is the same with music; we are taught that the note we see on the score corresponds to a certain note on the keyboard, and not by looking at its position or character first and then deciding where and how to strike the board.

This method which has just been suggested may possibly take a little extra time when a man is learning to read for the first time, but when this same man can once read fairly well by sound, it will be found that when he begins to read by eye he will come on at a great pace; and the moment he has a real grip of it, it will never leave him any more than the ability of going through water leaves a man who has once learnt to swim. It will also be found that the man so trained from the start will be able to read a running flag or the flick of a helio or lamp with absolute accuracy and comfort where others fail.

During the time the men are being taught to read by sound, it must be remembered that they are also doing elementary flag drill on the squares, so they will very soon pick up the right number of dots and dashes in a letter, without it being necessary to teach them by slowly waving a flag in front of them from which to read. A very important point in connection with reading for the first time is for the instructor to bear in mind that he once had to learn to read himself, and to recall in his mind his own moments of utter disappointment with himself when he seemed to be quite incapable of making any improvement, and to remember how disheartening it all is to a beginner at first. There are days when it may be windy and cold, and the idea of ever being able to read with certainty seems quite hopeless; therefore do not make the mistake of keeping men too long at one thing, until they get really interested and find they are improving, otherwise they will soon get bored.

A man has lots to learn besides sending and reading before he is of any practical use; he must know all about his equipment, book work, which includes theory, counting, station work in the field, and many other matters, and later, simple telephones and telegraph, map-reading, &c. There is plenty of variety, and as soon as a man gets disappointed with himself and seems to get worse at any one particular branch, the best thing to do is to knock him off this one thing completely for about ten days and get him forward with something else. A man gets stale with signalling in exactly the same way as with everything else, whether it be polo, cricket, or any other game connected with the eye.

A keen class who are interested should be getting useful at the end of six months, as long as the work is more or less regular; but owing to the shortage of men for stables and the men's efficiency as soldiers having to be considered, the work cannot be regular; in consequence, during the first year it will take a man all his time to give a good account of himself at 'classification time.'

The following hints may be useful :—

1. Whenever it rains, as it so frequently does in England, remember there is a great deal to be learnt in the Manual; therefore time is never wasted in the lecture room, and the part of the book that takes the longest time to get hold of, and the easiest to forget, is the counting.

2. Sight of the sun being scarce the helio should be brought out on every possible occasion.

3. Instruction in setting the helio should be most carefully given and perfect accuracy insisted upon; there is nothing so annoying to a distant station in the field as a badly set helio.

4. Men should be taught to call correctly; *i.e.* they should call the word in its entirety first and then spell it out in groups of three letters.

Single letters such as A should be called thus: 'Letter ac.'

Single figures such as 5 should be called thus: 'Figure 5.'

All this is best taught in the lecture room with one man calling a message from a blackboard, another sending on the ticker or shutter of a lamp which the whole class can hear, and the instructor answering and correcting. To take real trouble teaching men to call clearly and correctly is the most important, and the extra time spent in this will repay itself over and over again; there is nothing more common, or more annoying to an instructor, than to have to watch at an annual classification a really good sender being unmistakably failed by his caller.


5. All guessing at words, either in reading or sending, should be severely checked. It is a very bad habit to get into and a far worse one to get out of, and frequently leads to untold confusion and delay in the field over a line of stations. It is the business of every signaller to read *exactly* what is sent, and not what he thinks is meant (he is practically always wrong when he guesses). If every man carries out his duty on a station correctly the signal I M I, the sign of all bad signallers, is never seen.

6. Before the annual classifications come off everyone should recognise that the men must be given every chance; it is for the regimental authorities to do their best to strike the signallers off all duties for at least two months; if this is not done the results will be disappointing.

7. In all visual signalling accuracy is of far greater importance than pace. Every signaller in the whole Army can read well up to a certain point of pace, but only a certain number can read after that point has been reached; therefore, if a signaller sends too fast for the man at the distant station to read, he has merely sent I M I, so that nothing is gained at all, and valuable time is lost.

8. It is essential that recruits should be taught the correct way to trim the wick of the lamp; a badly trimmed wick will always give a bad light, a thing which is very irritating to the reader at the distant station.

9. In conclusion, let it be drummed into the head of every signaller from the very first lesson: (a) that all his equipment must be kept perfect; (b) that once he takes over a message in the field or in a telegraph office, that message must at all costs, no matter how, reach its destination and be delivered to the officer for whom it is intended; (c) that the secret of all success and smooth working in the field is that every single man should do his own work to the best of his ability and no one else's (provided there are enough men on the station). Our motto must be 'one man one job,' and it is of the utmost importance that all men should thoroughly understand that, as surely as they try to do any work which is not their own on a station in the field, so surely will they neglect their own part and cause delay and confusion over the whole line.



TRAINING IN DESPATCH RIDING AND RELAY POST DUTIES

By CAPTAIN R. W. W. GRIMSHAW, 34th (P.A.V.O.) Poona Horse

BEFORE entering the domain of training let one first come to a clear understanding as to what is meant by the term 'despatch rider.' At first sight the reply seems too obvious for comment, but when one comes to classifying the duties of a despatch rider in contradistinction to those of an ordinary messenger one suddenly becomes aware that either the terms are synonymous and the official text-books are endeavouring to 'split hairs' over terminology, or that there really is a distinct difference between the duties required of each.

'Cavalry Training' lays down that four men per squadron are to be trained as despatch riders. A recent circular on training issued by the General Staff draws attention to the inadequate training of despatch riders. In both cases the term is used as if a despatch rider were a person somewhat apart from the common ruck—in other words, another specialist. If, however, one peruses any of the matter committed to writing in the field, or listens to ordinary military conversation, one arrives at the conclusion that the terms 'despatch rider,' 'messenger,' 'orderly,' &c., are used indiscriminately. The ordinary mortal recognises no distinction, and as the point of cleavage between the duties of a despatch rider and an ordinary messenger is apt to be somewhat obscure, it is suggested that the term 'despatch rider' be abolished, and all and every one carrying a message or despatch (the latter designation is generally reserved for important military communications) be called a messenger.

As was pointed out in a paper on messages in the April Number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, every trooper ought to be given training in carrying messages. Men who showed marked aptitude in this kind of work could then be afforded some further instruction, and it should be an understood thing that every unit maintained a certain number

of men who received special training—they would all be called messengers, however.

The person whose training will be considered in this paper is he who is intended to convey important messages considerable distances under exceptionally difficult circumstances. As the term 'despatch rider' is, presumably, used in the official books to denote this type of messenger, its use will be maintained throughout this paper.

The next point for consideration is, How many of these despatch riders should be kept up? 'Cavalry Training' lays down four per squadron. If one can rely on the acceptance of the principle enunciated in the paper on ground scouts which was published in the January number of this Journal, viz. that each man should be encouraged to specialise in something, a convenient number would be indicated by providing each section with one despatch rider; they will not last long in war. This man would not be a mere idler awaiting some phantom opportunity for employment. Normally he would perform the duties of an ordinary trooper. When at manœuvres or war, if no immediate prospect was in view of his being employed on difficult message work, he would be utilised as an ordinary messenger, taking his turn with others.

It has already been indicated how these men may be selected.

That such selections will prove successful in war may be open to criticism, but here, as in everything else connected with the peace training of an army, one is faced with an insurmountable barrier, and all one can do to neutralise it is a sustained vigilance during peace which ensures that, so far as human frailty can foresee, selection falls on those least likely to fail.

If one can picture to one's self a lonely man threading his way on horseback across a difficult country at night-time, possibly in face of most uncompromising weather conditions, the countryside hostile to him, and the whereabouts of the person to whom he is conveying a message only approximately known, one may grasp the difficulty of the task. Probably it is only one who has actually performed this duty who can appreciate the great difficulties, and in war, when operations are in progress in a foreign country, these difficulties are magnified tenfold. Only a big-hearted man can be expected to succeed. Power to endure great and prolonged physical exertion, combined with smallness of stature, is desirable, and good retentive

memory. The latter is specially useful not only for merely recollecting the gist of long messages, but also, without such a gift, one cannot easily move about a country, since half the art in doing so is the quick recognition of prominent objects either from previous first-hand knowledge of them, or by description of them. It may be noted here that none of these characteristics are very necessary for a ground scout, so the material from which they are drawn from need not be encroached on.

It must be accepted that a suitable type of man is forthcoming and that he has been furnished with a suitable type of horse. With regard to the latter, many of the points desirable in the man apply equally to the mount—smallness, compactness, good doer, and, above all, a good heart and of a temperament which willingly faces formidable obstacles, such as steep and awkward declivities, rivers requiring a strong swimmer, &c. With regard to the passage of rivers, a despatch rider may often have to ride for his life, and his willingness or the reverse to plunge headlong, fully accoutred, into a river and gain the opposite bank may mean escape or capture. Despatch riders should be afforded practice—say, twice a year—in ‘taking’ a 100-yards stream, and some old sets of equipment might be kept for the purpose.

The above traits both in man and horse are inherent; no amount of training will make any marked degree of difference.

One now arrives at a series of qualifications, the degree of efficiency at which is susceptible of improvement by training :—

I. Care of the person.

II. Care of the mount.

III. How to find the way about a strange country both by day and night in fair weather and foul.

IV. How, given very insufficient data, to follow up and find a person or unit and deliver a message.

The training under I. will possibly be met by the usual lectures on hygiene delivered nowadays to all ranks, supplemented by such practical experience as is obtainable by endurance rides. Much the same applies to II., but every despatch rider must be able to attend to minor matters that go wrong with shoeing. As pointed out by Mr. Beresford of the 10th Lancers : No man goes out motoring without some means of carrying out petty repairs. Some such instrument as

suggested by this officer should form part of the equipment of every despatch rider, and he should be taught to use it. Judging by the illustration (page 116, No. 33), a very slight modification would make it a most valuable wire-cutter—also a very necessary acquisition to a despatch rider.

Efficiency under III. and IV. can only be acquired by practice. This practice can be divided into :—

(a) *Indoor*, which provides instruction in orienting, by means of a magnetic compass, stars, sun, map, important physical features, and natural phenomena, such as prevailing winds and their effect on trees, shrubs, plants, snow, sand (information obtainable on these points from the 'Frontier's-man's Pocket-book'). For a *personnel* such as that composing our Indian Army and similar institutions, owing to illiteracy, the use of maps are debarred, but British *personnel* should not only be taught elementary map-reading, but might well be shown maps of foreign countries like France and Germany.

(b) *In the country*, where the information assimilated under (a) can be put to a practical test. Details of this will be given later.

The title of this paper covers not only the training of despatch riders, but also training in relay post work.

As already indicated, any trooper ought to be able to convey a despatch or message from one post to another. Certain is it that relay posts could not possibly be found from four despatch riders per squadron, so it may reasonably be assumed that any trooper may be called upon for duty with a relay post. Such being the case, an exercise may well be advised which will provide instruction not only for despatch riders, but also for relay-post commanders and the remaining *personnel* of the troop, all at the same time, and the following is put forward as one that may help in arriving at such a goal. A troop is suggested as the unit of instruction. Firstly, because it has been assumed that four men per troop, instead of four men per squadron, might well receive instruction as despatch riders. Secondly, the recent circular issued by the War Office apparently considers that despatch riders are to be trained in their troops. Thirdly, a troop is of convenient size for carrying out the exercises suggested.

Assuming one wishes to exercise a troop thus, let each section form one relay post, while the despatch riders are formed into one group at the disposal of the director of the exercise.

The instruction can be spread over three distinct phases, each one more difficult than the preceding one, and each inculcating particular lessons :—

I. Where the director of the exercise, accompanied by his post commanders and prospective despatch riders, conducts a tour, and in accordance with some special and general idea selects the position of a series of posts, pointing out how if a post were to be located somewhere near X, it should be placed and worked. These positions for posts would be selected with a view to their subsequent occupation when exercising the entire troop. Thus four post commanders receive instruction on the placing and management of posts, and each will know exactly the whereabouts of one another's post when the time comes to carry out the exercise with the full troop. Again, although despatch riders will not, as a rule, form the *personnel* of these posts for reasons already given, still, when carrying messages they will often have to make use of these relays for mounting themselves, &c., and it is essential, therefore, that they should have a thorough knowledge of the principles on which they are placed and worked, and by attending such a tour they assimilate these points.

II. Where the director indicates to post commanders an approximate position for a post and, when the exercise is carried out, leaves it to the commanders of posts to select the exact position. Here each commander only knows the approximate position of the posts on either side of him.

III. Where the director indicates an approximate position for the posts, as in II., and then when the exercise is in full swing changes the position of one or more posts, or extinguishes one. Each of the above exercises would be spread out over at least 24 hours, so that instruction may be afforded in working by night—a very different thing to working by day.

Before giving details concerning the actual carrying out of these exercises it is necessary to make a slight digression.

In all probability the introduction of mechanical road locomotion, wireless, and all kinds of air-craft will materially reduce the number of relay posts. Mechanical contrivances the efficiency of which depends on good thoroughfares will not be of much use outside Europe, but wireless and air-craft will be invaluable adjuncts to the service of intercommunication. It is dangerous, however, to place too great

reliance on such. After French's relief of Kimberley the despatch ordering him back to intercept Cronjé on the Modder was transmitted by telegram as well as by mounted messenger. As G.S.O. arranging for such a contingency would one have suspected that the telegraph line would fail? Hardly.

Again, during the English manœuvres two years ago in the Eastern Counties, when air-craft, wireless, and all kinds of mechanical road transport abounded, it was found that intercommunication between Cavalry headquarters and general headquarters was best maintained by well-mounted orderlies. Paradoxical as it may sound, in spite of all this, when regularity and reliability is a *sine qua non*, the old 'oss' has still to be reckoned with.

The following extracts on the subject of relay posts are taken from the 'Field Service Regulations' and 'Cavalry Training' respectively :—

1. If messages have frequently to be carried between any two points which are considerable distances apart, relay posts, consisting generally of a few mounted men, cyclists, motor-cyclists, or motor-cars, will be organised on the route by the General Staff.

One man of the post will always be ready to carry on a message. When motor vehicles are employed a supply of petrol should be arranged along the route.

2. The position of the post will be clearly marked by day and night. A register of the messages forwarded will be kept at each post, the date, hour of receipt, speed enjoined, and the name of the messenger being noted in each case. If the inhabitants are hostile, a guard may be necessary for the post.

3. The commander who establishes a line of relay posts must clearly lay down when and by whom they may be withdrawn, and must also appoint a commander for the whole line.—'Cavalry Training,' chap. ix., 190.

Skilfully placed connecting posts will facilitate the transmission of information. Their number and strength will be regulated by the nature of the country, the proximity of the enemy, and the troops available. As a general rule, however, whenever a reconnoitring detachment is to proceed to a considerable distance, its commander should drop his own connecting posts as he advances. These should be carefully hidden well away from towns and villages and close to

water; at times, however, concealment may be impossible, and they will be compelled to rely on force for their protection. In such circumstances the commander who establishes the post should be careful that its strength is sufficient for the task it has to perform.

Every man in a reconnoitring detachment should, if possible, know where connecting posts are situated.

The first point that strikes one is that the 'Field Service Regulations' and 'Cavalry Training' are at variance on the question of whether the post should be hidden or not. The writer suggests that possibly the 'Field Service Regulations' are considering the question of relay posts well within the area under occupation by one's own army, whereas 'Cavalry Training' is considering the situation of relay posts placed in an area the ultimate possession of which, to either side, is open to question. The point, however, might have been more clearly dealt with. An officer of great practical experience informed the writer that to advertise publicly the position of a post, as indicated by these Regulations, is, unless the country is completely under control, a suicidal proceeding. Further comment is unnecessary. It will be taken for granted that as the most likely kind of post to be established by Cavalry is that indicated in 'Cavalry Training,' secrecy as to its position is desirable; hence a tour conducted as suggested for Exercise I. should afford instruction on such lines. There now arise three or four questions for consideration which are not dealt with in the official text-books.

Firstly, if the post is concealed, what is the best method of indicating to messengers its exact whereabouts? If the post is strong and messages are expected by two or three different routes, it is necessary in selecting the position of the post to bear in mind that look-out men will be required to con the routes—especially at night. As many men cannot be spared for this (two at the outside), care must be taken to choose a place for the post which, in addition to affording concealment, facilitates observation. As every detachment is responsible for its own local protection, at least one sentry will always be required; and by judiciously placing the post, this sentry may well be able to carry out his duties of providing security to his post and at the same time direct messengers riding in. This is by no means easy to arrange, and considerable forethought and, above all, practice is necessary.

Secondly, in carrying out Exercise II. some arrangement other than fortuitous circumstances is desirable for disseminating all along the line at the earliest opportunity the exact position of each post. Is it desirable to await the first message?—or is it better for each post commander to despatch a man at once to the next post to reconnoitre the route thoroughly and locate the position of the post? If one adopts the latter course one deprives the post of one man for some two or three hours and imposes a considerable journey on the rider and his mount. Is this justifiable? Like many matters military, no fixed rule can be laid down. If the posts are well furnished with men and horses in good condition, and the intervening route is known to be difficult, a careful reconnaissance will, in the long run, probably save horse-flesh. If, on the other hand, the posts are weak and the men and horses already jaded, and the route is not believed to be difficult nor the next post hard to find, such a reconnaissance may be dispensed with; but it should be impressed on all post commanders that everything must be sacrificed to expedite the rapid transmission of information. And if doubt exists as to what procedure is expedient, let him in doubt ask himself the question: Will it expedite the transmission of information to do so-and-so? If the answer is in the affirmative, then he must do so-and-so.

If there is a commander of the line, it is his duty, by the timely issue of orders on the subject, to relieve post commanders (who are generally N.C.O.s) from having to make such decisions. Furnished with good maps, the officer ought to be able to say: The post commanders at 'A' and 'C' will, as soon as they have established their posts, reconnoitre towards posts 'B' and 'D,' &c., &c. Unless such orders are issued great waste of energy may take place by each post conducting a reconnaissance of the adjacent one.


Thirdly, arrangements must be made in the event of one or more of the posts being driven away by hostile enterprises of a minor nature. Such 'upsets' will be sure to occur in war. It by no means follows that because a post is threatened by the sudden appearance of a small reconnoitring detachment of the enemy too strong to fight, that, therefore, it is to break up and scatter for good and all. A move of a mile or two may be quite sufficient to ensure its safety.

Any move of a post from its original position, however, is a very serious embarrassment to the line, and unless instructions are issued

in anticipation of such an occurrence, communication may be seriously interrupted. The following expedient has been tried with success in peace training:—

The person responsible for placing the post, taking into consideration the general situation, must select some line for the post to retire on if forced to change its position under circumstances indicated above. Other expedients have been tried, such as blazing trees, making marks on the ground indicating the direction and distance to which the post has gone and having no prearranged line of movement; but the difficulty of making known the import of such signs to different posts and units which may use the line—and it is obvious that to be of any use all must know them—coupled with the infinite variety of situations that may arise, has convinced the writer that no arrangement other than that proposed is feasible. Even it may not stand the stress of war conditions, although repeated experiments in peace seem to indicate that some such expedient would be workable.


When adopted, post commanders should, for preference, be instructed to retire along one or other of the routes leading to the posts on either side. By doing so one minimises the chance of messengers from one side missing the post, and by despatching a man a short way along the other route with orders to hide somewhere close to the trail and warn all messengers of the change in position of the post and proximity of the enemy, some reasonable chance of keeping open communication is ensured. Sketch 'A' illustrates this.



SKETCH A

It is possible, however, that the movements of the enemy may frustrate any such arrangement. In such an eventuality the post commander must retire to whatever place is open to him and drop, possibly, two men to shadow both routes by which he is expecting messengers. Sketch 'B' illustrates this. Care must be taken to shadow the enemy whilst he remains in the vicinity, so that the moment he withdraws the post can assume its original position. This will absorb another man,

but as none of the horses of these men are being seriously worked, the efficiency of the post ought not to be impaired.



SKETCH B

It should be an understood thing that:—

1. As soon as the enemy depart, the original position of the post will be resumed.
2. That if messengers do not find the post where they expect it to be they must use great caution, and if, after casting around for a mile or so, they can see no traces of it or a sentry, they must at once proceed to the next post. At night, unless they pick up a sentry close to the position of the post at once, they are not to attempt any search.

Why a mile some may say? Well, the object of a relay post is to expedite intercommunication and save horseflesh. The writer has found by experience that if messengers attempt to search much further afield than, say, a mile, very grave delays and useless waste of horseflesh is the only result. If messengers attempt a search during darkness they will probably lose their way or be captured. It must be admitted that these remarks are entirely based on experiments carried out in peace, but in war it may surely be reasonably assumed that where operations are in progress in a strange country the chances of losing one's way or capture are considerably increased.

From a perusal of the foregoing remarks it may be adduced that as soon as a post commander has got things ship-shape in his post he should mount his horse and carefully reconnoitre the immediate neighbourhood of his post, selecting alternative sites to which he can remove his command if threatened by the enemy. He must select these sites with regard to the line of direction to adjacent posts,

and whilst occupied on this work he should further keep a look-out for supplies, water, fuel, &c.


With regard to these very desirable amenities, it will probably be found that the person responsible for placing the post must drop supplies sufficient to provision it for a few days.

A line of relay posts in an area the ultimate possession of which to one's own forces is open to question will under normal conditions be of a very ephemeral nature. If the area eventually passes to the enemy the posts will be withdrawn, and if occupied by one's own army these posts will soon be replaced by the telegraph or wireless line.

If some secrecy is to be maintained as to the whereabouts of the posts extensive foraging cannot be allowed. Water and some grass (pasturage or cut) is all that can be reasonably expected in a hostile country.

All these points having been brought out during the preliminary tour, the execution of the actual exercises can now be proceeded with. It is immaterial whether the line of posts are strung out over one general direction or grouped eccentrically round cantonments. The main object to be attained is to afford practice over ground that is not familiar to those under instruction. This is often extremely difficult to arrange. Most mounted men, after a sojourn for a year or two in one place, get to know the terrain so well that war exercises set on it become of little value. However, one must make the best of conditions which cannot be altered, and seek consolation by remembering that to reproduce in peace the complications and difficulties that arise in war is impossible. All that can be done is to try and approximate thereto, and under ideal conditions this approximation falls very far short of the reality.

Assume 'A' is a military station, and 'B,' 'C,' 'D,' and 'E' are four points some fifteen miles apart where, in accordance with a suitable general and special idea, it is proposed to locate relay posts and carry out Exercise I. A section is despatched to each, while the four despatch riders are grouped at 'A'. If the troop is weak only three posts can be established, or any other arrangement can be improvised which fits in with prevailing conditions. The supervising officer can now despatch a message from 'A' by a despatch rider



to any one of the points, bearing with him instructions to the post commander to circulate it by ordinary messenger from post to post and finally back to 'A,' while the despatch rider has orders to carry out an endurance ride by making a circuit of the entire 'course,' reporting at each post, where the N.C.O. in charge will note the time of arrival and departure, also the condition of his mount. If the latter shows any signs of undue distress a fresh mount will be supplied from the post.

How many such messages should be despatched depends, of course, on the strength of the posts. If they consist of six men and a N.C.O. arrangements can be made to move three men by day and three by night. Careful calculation as to time and space will, provided no hitch occurs, ensure the right number being employed.

The above will be found a comparatively easy exercise.

A suitable interval having elapsed, Exercise II. may be carried out in the same manner. This time the supervising officer should leave a deputy at 'A' as despatcher, and then make a circuit of the 'course' himself to see if the post commanders have properly placed their posts, and also to exercise himself with a view to leading officers' patrols, and to familiarise himself with the fatigues and difficulties that will fall to the lot of his despatch riders. It will not be out of place to point out that quite half the value of instruction is lost if those 'taught' believe that the teacher cannot or will not practise what he preaches. Criticism on errors can only carry weight when those criticised are fully aware that the critic has, in so far as it lay in his power to do so, brought himself face to face with the realities of the subject under examination.

In Exercise II., and, indeed, in every exercise, each man who carries a message should be instructed to compile a rough sketch or notes which can be placed at the disposal of post commanders concerned, so that the latter may be better able to direct messengers. It is not sufficient for merely the messenger who first moves to do this; each should do it, and by degrees all details, such as landmarks, &c., will be familiarised and work expedited. In broad daylight it may not be a very difficult task to proceed to 'B' and find a post. At night it is no easy task, unless all details connected with the exact position of the post are known—at least, that has been the writer's experience.

Lastly comes Exercise III. Here each post commander is aware of the direction in which each post will move if forced to do so. Con-

fidential instructions as to the time a post is to be moved or extinguished must be handed to post commanders concerned. Efforts should be made to time the moving or extinguishing of a post when no messenger is close by, otherwise there will be no instruction.

This exercise will be found to embody difficulties the average man has no conception of until he tries it.

These exercises can be made as easy or as difficult as the director chooses, according as he places the posts in positions which call for (1) easy work along main roads; (2) more difficult, through intricate lanes and farm tracks (this latter condition is only applicable to Western Europe); (3) very difficult, by importing cross-country riding, involving the use of a compass or star-bearings until the route becomes well known. Situation (3) is so difficult that it may well be reserved for the despatch rider. It has been found that where choice exists between, say, a circuitous road and a cross-country route connecting two posts, it generally saves time to go half as far again and stick to the road rather than attempt the 'point to point' line, and at night it pays to go twice as far by road. Even in countries like India, with large expanses of easy, negotiable plains, it will, as a rule, be found quicker at night to follow a country cart-track.

In placing posts therefore, see that too much is not demanded from the trooper and despatch rider in the way of cross-country work.

When the posts are situated round about a central point, as 'A,' a useful exercise for despatch riders is as follows:—Assume one of these despatch riders is absent completing the circuit, as already suggested, and has been gone two hours. Call up another and order him to intercept the former before he reaches a certain point. This involves some careful judgment of time and space, and the selection of a suitable route. Hosts of other exercises can be introduced. In deciding how far one should send despatch riders it must be recollected that until sixty miles have been traversed the average healthy riding man will show no signs of being 'rattled.' As to the horse, so many factors have to be considered that it is useless laying down any rule, and circumstances must alone decide how far each despatch rider's mount is to go. As General Rimington said at a recent conference: 'I can always get the men along; it is the horses that are the trouble.'

In these exercises all ranks should be encouraged (ordered, if possible) not to ask questions of inhabitants, so as to reproduce the situation

of operating in a country the language of which they do not know. There is a world of difference in working in England with English maps to working in Portugal with Portuguese maps.

Try and accept the state of the weather as it happens to be, and not merely practise under fair-weather conditions. A fall of snow so alters a landscape that even ten years' sojourn in a place will not protect one from making the most ludicrous mistakes.

Mounted troops moving in relief by route march can often seize the opportunity to exercise their men in relay post and despatch riding work over unfamiliar ground and under more realistic conditions than those obtaining from a fixed station; and, lastly, it should be impressed on all that in war the onerous duties demanded from both despatch riders and the *personnel* of relay posts offer countless opportunities for exemplifying that very desirable military virtue 'genuine altruism.'

7TH BENGAL LIGHT CAVALRY

THE illustration shows two squadron guidons of this regiment, the one bearing the arms of the Hon. East India Company being that of the commanding officer's squadron. The 7th Bengal Light Cavalry of the Hon. East India Company's Service was raised in 1805, when Lord Lake was before Bhurtpoor. In the Nepal war of 1814 the regiment belonged to the division under the illustrious Rollo Gillespie. It saw service with the force sent against the Fort of Hatras in 1817. It belonged to the centre division in the Mahratta war of 1817-19, and was present at the siege of Asserghur in 1819. It again saw service in 1834, and in 1846 formed part of the Sindh Field Force. It was also employed in the second Sikh war.

The regiment mutinied at Lucknow in 1857, and was disbanded the following year.

There is a print (No. 2) of the Ackermann Series of an officer of this regiment. The uniform was light blue; facings, orange; lace, silver. The plume of the shako was white.

These two guidons are of silk, embroidered.


N.B.—Squadron guidons were abolished on August 18, 1858.

S. G. E.



C.O.'s Squadron Guidon.

**7th
BENGAL LIGHT CAVALRY.**



Squadron Guidon.

(Specially painted by W. B. Woitten.)



THE 11th LIGHT DRAGOONS AT EL BODON.

EL BODON
(September 25, 1811)

No better example of the handling of small bodies of Cavalry acting on the defensive in close co-operation with the other arms is to be found than the action of El Bodon on September 25, 1811.

Lord Wellington, with the object of blockading Ciudad Rodrigo, moved to the upper waters of the Coa in July 1811 with an army of 40,000, including 4,000 Cavalry, but Marmont, having effected a junction with Dorsenne, arrived in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo on September 22 with a combined army of 60,000, of which 6,000 were Cavalry.

Wellington thereupon withdrew his troops to positions near Guinaldo, and Marmont, advancing on the 24th, passed a large convoy of provisions into the previously blockaded city of Ciudad Rodrigo.

This, followed on the succeeding day by a general advance of Marmont's Army, led up to the action of El Bodon.

The account of the battle so well told in the Historical Records of the 11th Hussars by Major Godfrey Williams, published in 1908, is as follows :—

‘At daybreak fourteen squadrons of the Imperial Guards drove back the outposts on the left wing of the Allied Army, but were eventually repulsed. While this encounter was in progress thirty squadrons of French Cavalry under General Montbrun, fourteen battalions of Infantry, and twelve guns, advanced towards Guinaldo. Lord Wellington therefore directed General Colville to form the 5th and 77th British regiments with the 21st Portuguese Regiment, and a brigade of Portuguese Artillery, on the hill over which the road to Guinaldo passed. Their flanks were supported by the 3rd and 4th squadrons of the 11th Dragoons and the 1st squadron of the 1st German Hussars, who formed part of General Alten's Brigade. This

Cavalry force was posted on the brow of the heights to the left of El Bodon.

'Disregarding the fire of the Portuguese guns, the French Cavalry swept across the plain, passed the front of the ravine, and in huge masses commenced the ascent of the hill. As the heads of the columns reached the crest, they were charged and overthrown by the two squadrons of the 11th commanded by Colonel Cumming and by the German Hussars. Confident of their superior numbers (ten to one) the French renewed their attacks for nearly an hour, making nearly twenty charges, only to be met each time and overthrown by the determined British troopers. Captain Michael Childers and Captain Cranstown George Ridout were the two squadron leaders of the 11th, and both greatly distinguished themselves. Captain Childers especially, both by his example and swordsmanship, encouraged his men to perform prodigies of valour, while Quartermaster Hall, having his saddle cut from his horse, charged again and again, being noticed as particularly forward and deserving of great praise.

'Meanwhile another body of the enemy's Artillery had swept over the Portuguese Artillery and commenced to cross the plateau. At this moment, however, the 5th Regiment, who had been lying down, suddenly leaped to their feet, and, pouring a volley into the advancing French, followed their fire with a terrific bayonet charge which swept the Cavalry from the plateau, driving them in confusion down the ascent, and recovering the captured guns. The annals of wars must indeed be carefully searched to discover such another instance of Infantry successfully charging victorious Cavalry.

'It was not, however, part of Lord Wellington's plan to commit his army to a serious engagement. The divisions had previously received orders to retire, when pressed, upon Guinaldo, and the necessity of this retrograde movement became now increasingly apparent. A large column of the enemy was observed to be working round the right flank with the idea of cutting off the retreat of the 3rd Division.

'The heights of El Bodon were therefore abandoned by our troops, who, with the Infantry in square and the Cavalry on the flanks, retired to Guinaldo. The battalions were frequently charged by the enemy's Cavalry. At one period the 5th and 77th were assailed on three sides at once, but continued their retirement with the greatest regularity, beating off every attack.

'The losses of the 11th during the day's operations were :—

'Killed: 1 sergeant-major, 8 privates, 1 sergeant, 9 horses.

'Wounded: 1 lieut.-colonel, 1 lieutenant, 1 quartermaster, 1 sergeant, 17 privates, 26 horses.

'Officers wounded: Lieut.-Colonel Cumming, slightly; Lieut. King, severely, arm amputated; Acting-Adjutant James Scrimgeour, severely (he died next day); Captain Ridout, Lieut. Smith, and Quartermaster Hall had horses shot under them.'

Of this action, Captain Tomkinson, of the 16th Lancers, in his "Diary of a Cavalry Officer in the Peninsula," says :—

'The 11th were particular steady, and the whole got off with very little loss. Lord Wellington was there, and aware of the critical situation they were in. Captain Childers, of the 11th, was the officer to whom the safety of the detachment is to be considerably ascribed. He charged bodies three times their number, rode at them with the greatest determination, and always succeeded. The conduct of the 11th Light Dragoons was such as must stamp them as soldiers doing their duty in a critical situation.'

Lord Londonderry (Colonel, 10th Hussars), in his 'Narrative of the Peninsula War,' says of the action :—

'It was my good fortune to be particularly mixed with this affair, and as one more brilliant has not often been accomplished by a handful of British troops, I shall give a detailed account of it.

'The attack was begun by a column of Cavalry, which charged up the heights in gallant style, cheering in the usual manner of the French, and making directly for the guns.

'Whilst this was going on in one part of the field, repeated and impetuous attacks were made in another, upon the handful of Cavalry under General Alten, which was manfully holding its own. Columns of the enemy's squadrons pushed again and again up the heights, but were overthrown as regularly as they came on, by short charges from our resolute troops, who drove them down the slope in great confusion, and with great slaughter. It is worthy of remark that on all occasions the assailants outnumbered the defenders four to one, and that, emboldened by their success over the outposts, they came on with the reckless bravery which is only exhibited by men accustomed to conquer; but nothing could exceed the steadiness of our Cavalry, and their excellence became only more apparent on

account of the great odds opposed to them. There were present at this rencontre two squadrons of the 1st King's German Legion and the 11th Light Dragoons, between whom it was impossible to determine which performed feats of greater gallantry; indeed, I can personally attest that the single source of anxiety to the officers in command rose from an apprehension lest these brave fellows should follow the multitudes down the cliffs and precipices into which they drove them. To hinder this were the efforts of myself and others directed, and it was only with considerable exertion that we succeeded. The action was continued until Captain Dashwood, an active officer of the Adjutant-General's department, suddenly discovered a heavy column moving towards the rear of our right, round which it had penetrated unobserved. Not a minute was to be lost, for even a minute's indecision would have enabled the French to accomplish their object of surrounding us. A retreat was therefore ordered, and the position abandoned.'

Of this memorable action Lord Wellington, a general as sparse in his compliments to the men who had done their duty well as he was lavish in his censure upon those who had failed in that respect, was pleased to issue an order, from which the following extract has been culled:—

'The Commander of the Forces has been particular in stating the details of this action in the general orders; as, in his opinion, it affords a memorable example of what can be effected by steadiness, discipline, and confidence. It is impossible that any troops can be exposed at any time to the attack of numbers, relatively greater than those which attacked the troops under Major-General Colville and Major-General Alten on September 25; and the Commander of the Forces recommends the conduct of these troops to the particular attention of the officers and soldiers of the Army as an example to be followed in all such circumstances.'

His lordship in conclusion eulogises the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Cumming and the Commanding Officers of the units engaged:—

In his public despatch Lord Wellington says:—

'Your lordship will have observed by the details of the action which I have given you, how much reason I have to be satisfied with the conduct of the Hussars and the 11th Light Dragoons of Major-General Alten's Brigade. There were not more than three

squadrons of the two regiments on the ground, this brigade having for some time furnished the Cavalry for the outposts of the Army, and they charged the enemy's Cavalry repeatedly, and, notwithstanding the superiority of the latter, the post would have been maintained if I had not preferred to abandon it to risking the loss of these brave men by continuing the unequal contest under additional disadvantages, in consequence of the immediate entry of fourteen battalions of Infantry into the action, before the support I had ordered up could arrive. Major-General Alten, Lieut.-Colonel Cumming, Lieut.-Colonel Arenschild, and the officers of their regiments particularly distinguished themselves on this occasion.'

The following extracts from letters written within a few days of the action by Captain Michael Childers, who, commanding a squadron at El Bodon, was on the Duke of Wellington's Staff at Waterloo and later commanded the 11th, well show the nature of the encounter:—

'Saturday, September 28.

'My dear Jack,—I have just come to say we have had a smart brush with the enemy's Cavalry, and I am in hopes have gained some credit. Cumming is slightly touched with a sabre in the arm, my lieutenant, King, has lost his arm, our Acting-Adjutant Scrimgeour killed, Quartermaster Hale slightly wounded. All the officers with the squadron were either wounded or had their horses killed or wounded. My mare was wounded in three places, a ball and three sabre thrusts on the head; my helmet saved my head a knock. We lost twenty men and horses.

'I have no time to say more. We are in high spirits, and I am very well.

'Truly your affectionate,
(Signed) 'M. CHILDERS.'

'Camp near Soiti, 1 league from Sabugal,

'September 29.

'My dear Jack,—I had not time to write before yesterday, and then little more than to tell you that I was in good health and had a sound body. The morning after the French got to Ciudad we were under arms before daylight, and by the time it was broad day by the help of my glass I saw from a height near where we were an immense column of Infantry marching from under the walls of Ciudad. It was impossible to guess the

strength of it, as it appeared three or four miles long. We afterwards discovered some Cavalry skirmishing near Carpio. Lord Wellington, who had observed them from Pastores, a village on our right, came and moved us to the left of the town with a brigade of Infantry under Colonel Bromhead, 77th, 94th, 5th, 83rd. Sutton was also there with two battalions of Portuguese. We waited on a height where there was a fine plain; in fact, the whole country from Ciudad to Fuenti Guinaldo is open, but hilly and rocky in some places. We waited there a considerable time with the Infantry and some Portuguese guns, having detached some skirmishers, who were employed the whole time, and we were informed that a strong column of Cavalry was advancing, which they shortly after did, charging the guns that were on the edge of the high ground to our right. They also charged the 5th and 77th, who drove them down the hill like a flock of sheep and retook the guns. They then came to our front and rather to our left, and the Brigade (which I must here tell you consisted of three squadrons of Hussars), the files of one of which I counted twenty-six, and I do not think anyone had thirty files; we had two, mine the left and the second one of ours had been sent to Pastores. My squadron, which has only thirty-two files and the other twenty-four (having sent picquets out in the morning), was ordered to charge them as soon as they made their appearance upon a part of the hill that was more accessible than the rest. The Hussars were ordered to charge, and the 11th to support; as we got the order some time before it was put in execution, we were complaining that we were not first sent, but we soon found out that there was game enough for both parties, and we both instantly charged and drove them down the hill, where there was an immense column. We, of course, did not follow them down the hill, but retired about 100 yards; they immediately followed us, and we charged and drove them down again; this continued for a long time, I should think an hour at least, in which it was reckoned we charged eight times, each time five or six times our number. The last charge we made with not more than twenty men; we got so mixed up with them as they stood firm and advanced on both flanks at the same time that we were obliged to retreat at a good gallop with them at our heels; in fact, I saw them stab one of our men, who, like a fool, was not looking behind him. We galloped I should think about three-quarters of a mile when we came up with a solid square of Infantry of the above-named regiments, and as we passed within sixteen

yards of them they opened their fire on our pursuers, and knocked a good many over whom we turned back and sabred. We were so mixed with the French that when the Infantry fired they killed one of ours and a Hussar. The conduct of the Infantry was admirable. Exactly the same steadiness as in a barrack yard. Our men really behaved very well, and General Stewart, the Adjutant-General, who was with us nearly the whole of the time, and certainly behaved nobly, came back, and, as Cumming was not then in the way, told me he was sent by Lord Wellington to thank us. As many columns of Infantry were halted on the hills, and Lord Wellington within a quarter of a mile, it was all seen, and really we were given more praise than you can imagine (all this *entre nous*).

'We then retreated with the guns, and the solid column of Infantry to Fuenti Guinaldo, about five miles. The most correct field day could not be more beautiful. We had the good luck to save the baggage of the 88th, 74th, 45th, which the French had taken, but we sent down about twenty men and got it back. The French followed us with their Cavalry and Artillery, but kept pace at a respectful distance; they only hit the squadron once, and hit a very fine young lad, a corporal of mine, in the head; nothing could be more sudden than his death, as I verily believe he was dead before he came to the ground. We lost about twenty men and horses. Lieut. King, my sub., lost his right arm, but is doing well. Cumming got two contusions on the right arm, but has nearly got the use of it. Our Acting Adjutant (Gould being ill) was killed. Quartermaster Hall was wounded with a sabre, but not dangerously. My troop has been very fortunate since we came to this country in non-commissioned officers: I lost two sergeants and two corporals with Lutyens, one corporal killed, the other wounded, a corporal with the Picquet with Lieut. Wood at St. Martin, and now two sergeants severely wounded, one corporal killed and two wounded and another had his horse shot; my sergeant-major had a knock on the mouth with the hilt of a Frenchman's sword; Ridout had his horse killed, as did Lieut. Wood.

'My mare was wounded in three places—two thrusts in the head and a spent ball in the neck. I got two blows on the helmet, but their swords were either not sharp enough or they did not hit hard enough.

* * * * *

'Yours affectionately,

'M. CHILDERS.'

COMMENTS ON THE ACTION

To strike a hostile flank a squadron, or even a troop, properly handled, can accomplish as much as long lines of Cavalry, as flank squadrons merely beat the air, at the same time exposing their own flanks.

However, to charge superior forces time after time and realise the exact moment in which to break away requires the highest discipline and perfect training of both man and horse.

To disentangle after having become over-involved and retire before a superior force of pursuing Cavalry, and then be ready to face about at the right moment, as explained in Captain Childers' letter, is a perfect example of good leading and training.

The close co-operation between Cavalry and Infantry is exemplified, and the dogged character of the British Infantry who in the Peninsula days preferred not to open fire until they could see the whites of the Frenchmen's eyes is well shown, also their dash and love of taking the offensive with the dreaded bayonet whenever opportunity offered.

W. H. R.

THE CAVALRY BENEFIT ASSOCIATION

A meeting of the above Association was held at the offices, 20 Victoria Street, S.W., on Thursday, April 30. It was unanimously decided to ask the Inspector of Cavalry to become the President of the Association. Major F. D. Tagart, late 18th Hussars, was re-elected Chairman of the Committee for 1914-1915.

The audited accounts for the past year were considered and passed as being most satisfactory; they show a considerable improvement on those of the previous year.

A hearty vote of thanks was accorded to Miss Cross, the Secretary of the Association, for the very excellent manner in which she has conducted the affairs of the Association and those of the various regimental societies under her charge during the year.

The present organisation will still permit of two further regiments joining the Association.

Major-General E. H. H. Allenby, C.B., Inspector of Cavalry, has since accepted the invitation of the Committee to become President.

TRAINING OF REGIMENTAL SCOUTS

By CAPTAIN P. H. A. ANDERSON, 21st (E.I.) Lancers

As all peace training must be based on a clear conception of what the individual may be expected to perform in war, some consideration of how the Scout may be used is necessary before discussing his training. 'Cavalry Training' lays down that every soldier should be trained in reconnaissance, and that those who show special ability should be trained as Scouts or dispatch riders. The leading of reconnoitring detachments is generally entrusted to officers, and the subordinate, though important, task of protection will be the most usual duty of the men composing that detachment. The success, failure, or destruction of the detachment will to a large extent be dependent upon the vigilance and training of the Scouts or points from the detachment, but the leader, and certain subordinates in the event of his being incapacitated, will be responsible for directing the movements of his detachment, observing, sifting information received, and forwarding it to the proper authorities. The trained Scout, on the other hand, may be expected to carry out a reconnaissance on his own initiative, appreciating what he sees and embodying the same in an intelligent report. A regiment sending out a reconnoitring detachment might be expected to include some of their trained Scouts in this detachment, thereby increasing the efficiency of the detachment, and even if leadership is not entrusted to them, the temporary splitting up of a patrol will often expedite the acquisition of information. There must also arise numerous occasions when the situation is not sufficiently important to justify the use of an officer, or an officer is not available, when trained Scouts can take their place.

Looking at the subject in its broadest aspect it will be seen that the training of Scouts falls under two headings: The ability to reach a position from which to observe, under which comes the use of maps, use of ground, preservation of direction, horsemanship; and secondly,

the ability to appreciate what he sees, which entails a knowledge of the tactics and formations of his different arms, writing messages and reports.

As regards the selection of material on which to commence training, the better educated the man the easier will he be to teach and the more he will learn in a given time than one who has not had that advantage. He should be a fair horseman—the best mostly gravitate to the riding school—and as regards his character generally the man that plays games and goes in for competitions will be likely to have his heart in the right place; and a Scout will on service require no mean amount of courage. As some elimination will probably be necessary it is best to start with a greater number than the authorised establishment. A thorough study of maps must be the first part of the Scout's education. That a higher standard must be aimed at than finding the way along well-defined roads, assisted by sign-posts and the local inhabitants, is of course necessary. Unfortunately, this is a standard that many men in the ranks do not greatly exceed, but detachments or Scouts on reconnaissance will generally have to avoid the beaten track; cross-country journeys will be the rule rather than the exception, and position and direction will have to be found and retained by the physical features of the country. A map will never replace a personal reconnaissance of the ground, but a good map should convey what type of country it depicts, and the possibilities of the ground from the various tactical points of view.

The official manual on map-reading gives all necessary details in imparting instruction in this subject, and it is only proposed to enlarge on certain points.

The chief difficulty will probably be found in teaching the methods by which hill features are shown, and a sand table will here be found useful. The materials required are a tray of the size it is intended to make the model, sand, some coloured wool, and a large-scale contoured map. The tray can be divided into squares to correspond with squares on the map after the principle of enlarging maps. The watercourse should be worked in first on the sand table and marked by blue wool, and then the hill features by working up from the low ground. Brown wool serves to show roads, and black railways, and small squares of cardboard can be used to represent buildings or villages. With a little practice a very fair representation of the

map can be quickly made. Models with the contours traced on them are useful in giving preliminary instruction in this subject.

In bad weather useful work can be accomplished in map-reading indoors, such as selection of lines of approach and positions of observation under a simple tactical scheme, the visibility of points, the nature and extent of country that one could expect to see from certain positions. Some time should be devoted to the study of foreign maps which to the eye accustomed to the English Ordnance Survey presents some difficulties. If these maps are enlarged and the authorised conventional signs substituted these difficulties will disappear. In working on maps indoors the country they represent should of course be unfamiliar to those receiving instruction. Information can seldom be obtained by Scouts unless they remain unobserved; the next step, therefore, should be to teach the Scout the use of ground to obtain concealment. Some scheme on the following lines may be used to give instruction in the use of folds of the ground, backgrounds, shadows, &c., and to show that on many occasions a suitable position for observation can only be reached on foot. A ridge is selected to which there are certain concealed lines of approach; the less obvious the latter are the better. On this ridge certain men can be stationed and their positions marked by large flags—say blue. The men stationed at the blue flags should have under observation certain other flags—say red—their duty being to see who takes the red flags or approaches them, without moving from the blue flags. The red flags should be so placed that a man could take them without being seen by the men stationed at the blue flag if the best use is made of the ground. A pair of Scouts should then be told off to seize each red flag, the position of the observers and the flag to be taken being pointed out to them. Other schemes of this nature will suggest themselves to accustom men to make the best use of ground. It should be impressed on the Scout that every wood, building, or other point which he cannot examine from a distance may conceal a possible enemy, and that he should order his movements accordingly. The human eye naturally detects life by movement; therefore, when observing, he should remain still and examine the country he proposes crossing thoroughly with his glasses. His movements to subsequent positions should be rapid and carried out without hesitation, but he should always have a plan in his head as to what he will do if surprised. A change of direction

after crossing an exposed piece of ground may enable him to escape the observation of the enemy, who may be expecting him, and consequently have their attention riveted on a certain point on his original line of advance. It is best to assume when within the possible vicinity of the enemy that all positions may be occupied by them until proved not to be. Detection by the enemy when known to him should not be advertised by the Scout standing still, as is so frequently seen in peace training; rather should he move as if unaware of his enemy's presence, but take the first opportunity to disappear from his view.

Observation and memory, which are by no means qualities common to every man, can be gained by training. The Scout's attention should be directed to tracks, deserted bivouacs, from paper left about—in the latter valuable information can sometimes be obtained—and the behaviour of birds and cattle to denote the presence of human life. He should not be dependent on a compass to know what direction he is proceeding in or the direction he has come from; the position of the sun, prominent features, roads, rivers, railways, &c., and the direction of the wind should enable him to preserve his sense of direction. He should be directed on a certain point some four or five miles away, and after having studied the map proceed there without a map and without questioning the inhabitants; the distances can be increased or diminished according to the progress the man makes.

The training outlined above presupposes a fairly frequent change of locality. Very little can be learnt if the Scouts remain in the training area of their station, which soon becomes as well known to them as the barrack square.

Working by night will probably be a common experience on service, but there is always a disinclination to do much of it in peace training. However, no good results will be obtained unless a good deal of time is given up to this rather irksome form of training. What training is given should be for the purpose of enabling men to get to a given point without losing their way on the darkest night. It is merely a matter of practice in using a compass and cannot be learnt in theory. No great knowledge of astronomy is required; the position of the Pole Star should be known and how to use stars to march on a compass bearing. If tracks or roads are available, bicycles, owing to their silence, should be used; and in any case those horses that neigh when in the proximity of strange horses should be known and left behind.

The movements that might be carried out at night would probably be either for the purpose of getting back information or reaching a position to reconnoitre from as soon as there is light, but as troops change their dispositions at night, and as they are likely to do so even more in the future than in the past, the Scout's ears must be trained to recognise the import of sounds that at night will carry a considerable distance.

Of horsemanship it does not appear necessary to write much, as the importance of this subject must be known to every Cavalry soldier. The Scout being frequently detached, and with no one at hand to advise him, will often have to rely on his knowledge of the treatment of cuts, galls, colic, exhaustion, and such like ailments as may overtake his horse on the road; besides knowing the principles of watering and feeding, detection of lameness and conditioning, he should have a good knowledge of pace in the sense that, given a certain task to complete in the shortest possible time, he should know how fast he can take his horse without causing undue distress, and keep something in hand for an emergency. Such instruction must be given practically; and for the reason that horses vary both in pace and staying power, the man should always ride the same horse as far as is practicable.

The above touches on the chief points in giving instruction under the heading of 'Ability to reach a position for observation'; what to report, and how to commit the results to paper so as to be intelligible to a second person, still remains to be learnt.

To commence the Scout's education under this heading, which really means his ability to appreciate what the enemy are doing when he observes them, it will be necessary for him to think out his solution of small tactical problems, his errors being subsequently pointed out to him. Owing to methods of protection it is not to be expected that the enemy's dispositions will be exposed in the form of a panorama before him; much will have to be inferred, and according to the amount of knowledge of how troops move to carry out certain specific objects, so will these inferences be valuable or the reverse. A common experience is to receive a message that the enemy have been seen in a certain locality. The natural queries that suggest themselves to the recipient would be: what were they doing? which way were they moving? of what arm? and what was their strength? which points the messenger is unable to answer satisfactorily. The result is that another


patrol has to be sent out, or a message to the original one, both occasioning delay and waste of material.

Probably none of the additional information required will be obvious in the first place or gained without thinking, and without using eyes and glasses and possibly moving to a more favourable position to observe. Some delay, certainly, but not time wasted when compared with the procedure that must follow the receipt of incomplete information. Some knowledge of tactics is moreover required. To give an elementary instance: A small party of Cavalry with no other Cavalry or troops moving in their vicinity will suggest a reconnoitring detachment; if, however, other groups of Cavalry are in the vicinity of that first observed, and moving in the same direction, it might reasonably be assumed that such was a protective screen of Cavalry covering a force moving behind it. There is the danger, of course, that too much may be inferred and too little seen, but it is rather intended that the inferences the observer forms may lead to further investigation, or at least further proof that they are correct. The tactical problems suggested as a means to gain an insight into the dispositions usually assumed by troops to carry out certain objects will necessarily have to deal with larger units than even a N.C.O. would ever be likely to lead in the field, but they need only be large enough to illustrate general principles which alike govern the handling of either small or large bodies.

Having trained the brain to think in what may be termed a 'military sense,' it still is necessary to train the eye. There is no great difficulty in doing this, as usually other troops, if not quartered in the same place, will be so at no great distance. The size and appearance of units of the different arms should be noted when closed up at the halt, and also when on the move, and some instruction given in the latter case in time and space. Opportunity should also be taken of watching the various arms in methods of protection, attack, and defence, and the preparation of a defensive position with reference to the number of troops allotted to a given frontage, the siting and concealment of fire trenches, and the Artillery positions. Due allowance will have to be made in the differences in strength of a unit before mobilisation; probably the strength of the units that will be watched will seldom be more than two-thirds of war strength, and sometimes only half. And, finally, how to transmit what is seen to paper in the form of a message or report.

The essence of all information must be relevancy, and for this reason whatever task is set to give instruction should be under a definite tactical scheme. No reconnaissance of road, river, railway, or position, &c., should be made without stating for what purpose the reconnaissance is required, as each of these features can be used in many different ways, and the object of the reconnaissance should be to test the observer's power of estimating the value of ground for the particular tactical requirements of the situation. A road or river report, as is frequently set, is merely a question of mechanical drudgery, giving a number of measurements which mean nothing to the reporter. As an example, if a road report is required, it should be stated for what force it is required—whether to be used by day or night—information as to the enemy's movements and our own forces, and the objective of the latter, &c.; in the case of a river, for what purpose the river is to be used, either passage or defence, or any of the numerous uses to which a river can be put, and such other information as would be necessary.

A good deal of practice will be required in reporting, in order to put quickly in clear and unmistakable language what is observed. It will frequently be found that a man has not embodied in his report much that he has seen which is essential; and though his report can frequently be amplified by questioning the man, such procedure is not always possible, and it may, owing to lapse of time, be valueless, and therefore should not be necessary. Those that can use their pencils should be made to supplement their reports by sketches, but the latter must include information that is not contained on the map, otherwise they are waste of time.



A NEW SYSTEM OF TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT

By CAPTAIN GEORGE BROMILOW, 14th Jat Lancers (I.A.)

IN this article I intend to put forward a new system of training for mounted combat which has been tried now for more than a year and found good; also a set of appliances which I have invented, by the aid of which all the most important principles of mounted combat can be very easily taught and practised. In the system I have gone back to the Middle Ages for my line to work on, and brought it up to date in accordance with modern ideas as expressed in the training manuals ('Cavalry Training and Manual of Instruction in Sword Practice for Indian Cavalry'). Before explaining the system I will quote a few extracts from the manuals to show what points we have to work for.

'*The Object of Mounted Combat* is to train the individual (and horse) to be able to make efficient use of the *arme blanche* in those situations in which he may find himself placed in action and successfully to apply to such circumstances the broad principles of fighting learnt in "Mounted Combat."

'Individual combat is more likely to occur in the *mêlée* which may take place after an attack by Cavalry on Cavalry, or on any of the other arms. Individual scouts and men on patrol may also come upon sudden situations in which they may have to engage in single combat to attain their object.

'In the *mêlée*, if both sides are equally determined, success depends to a great extent on the *handiness of the horse and the skill of the soldier* as a man at arms. Lack of space and speed may deprive the rider of the impetus which in the charge drives the point home, and he will be compelled to use a vigorous thrust to force his weapon through his opponent.

'*Principles of Mounted Combat*.—1. Keep your weapon pointed on your adversary.

'2. Attack rather than await attack, and deliver it with speed, energy, and dash.

'3. After parrying an attack, immediately return with a point (or cut, Indian Cavalry).

'4. Make every possible use of the speed and handiness of the horse.

'5. The same principles apply to fighting with the lance, but it is even more important for the Lancer to attack at speed, and thus obtain the full advantage of the terror which the lance inspires. He should prevent his opponent getting on his right rear.

'6. In the *mêlée* co-operation.'

Having seen what points are required, I will endeavour to show how the training can be carried out progressively. The main object of all these exercises, dismounted and mounted, is to give the man such control of his weapons as will enable him to adopt methods suitable to the occasion in the actual fight.

DISMOUNTED TRAINING

1. *Sword and Lance Practices*, as laid down in our training manuals, to teach the various positions and correct method of making points, cuts, parries, &c.

2. *The Tikona*. Diagram No. 1, Fig. 1.

This is a revolving hub with three spokes; each spoke has a peg through the end on which a dummy is made. The man, armed with either a stiff single-stick or dummy lance, practises points and thrusts on the dummies on the principle of a punch-ball. It takes a good point to push it round, and when it has revolved the man must choose his opening for the next point. About half a minute at a time is enough if it is done with vigour, putting in points as quickly as possible. This exercise is to strengthen and supple the sword arm and wrist; to train hand and eye to work together; to accustom men to see and take an opening quickly; to develop style.

It should be used in dismounted work on a post 4 feet 6 inches for high points and 1 foot 6 inches for low.



3. *The Mud-head*. Diagrams No. 1, Fig. 2.

This is a post with a large lump of mud on top for mud-cutting. It is to practise cuts, and ensure that cutting, if taught, is done with a true edge, and to develop style.

4. *Parry and Return Machines*. Diagrams No. 1, Figs. 3, 4, 5.

Posts with mud on top as a target for points and cuts and a dummy lance pivoted on side.

Diagrams No 1



APPLIANCES FOR DISMOUNTED SWORD PRACTICE

The instructor (or another pupil) stands on the opposite side of the post and works the lance for the man who is practising. It is on the

same principle as the method of instructor and pupil in 'Cavalry Training,' but the pupil is armed with a real sword and puts his cuts and points hard into the mud target. It is intended to make it become a habit to return mechanically immediately after a parry, to teach men to make strong parries with their swords, and develop style.

5. *Falling Posts.* Fig. 6.

Two posts, about 5 feet 4 inches apart, opposite each other, and so arranged that they will stand upright or fall backwards, but cannot fall forward. The two combatants mount the posts and their legs are strapped to the sides above the foot-rests. Each is armed with a stiff single-stick, and they fight as in loose play, but as soon as a good point gets home the man who is hit goes over backwards. There is no danger, as the post hits the mattress first and the rider feels very little shock. The only way to avoid falling is to be very quick and get in the first point, or parry and return quickly and upset your opponent. If the posts are put further apart, dummy lances may be used to fight with. It is a most useful exercise, as it amuses the men and teaches them to apply the lessons they have learnt on an opponent and to be quick.

6. Individual instruction in loose play with an instructor as found necessary. Very little will be needed if men have learnt the above lessons well.

MOUNTED TRAINING

This is in many ways a repetition of the dismounted work, but the man is given his chief weapon—the horse. It must be thoroughly impressed on him that this is his best and most important weapon; he must learn how to use it to the best advantage, and, similarly, the horse must learn to be used by being specially trained to the game. Above all, avoid getting horses hit on the head by a soldier who has not learnt to control his weapon; many first-class horses are ruined in this way before even they are properly trained. A polo pony is not taught polo by being hit with a polo stick nor a pig-sticker improved by being cut by a boar at its first entry to hog-hunting; therefore, a horse should be trained for mounted fighting by a sound preliminary system, to develop the particular qualities which are required in a fight, without allowing the horse to get hurt or frightened. Mounted combat between men should only be allowed when they have learnt

complete control of their weapons, and then a very little of it goes a long way. A timid, untrustworthy, or badly trained horse is a fearful handicap to even the finest swordsman, whereas a bold, properly trained horse must be worth its weight in gold if ever it comes to a life-and-death struggle in mounted combat. Most Cavalry officers know the lines from one of Lindsay Gordon's poems, which are very true :—

So the coward will dare on a gallant horse what he never would dare alone,
Because he exults in a borrowed force and a hardihood not his own.

Nearly all horses are gallant enough if given the chance, so it behoves every Cavalryman to give his horse every opportunity of becoming perfect, so that when the time comes for gallantry the rider will know that he can trust his horse to do his share of the business to the best of his ability. I will now explain how horse and man together can be progressively trained, and afterwards practised in all the main principles of fighting and avoiding knocks and bumps to the horse from other horses and their riders' uncontrolled weapons.

I. *Sword and Lance Practices* as laid down in the manuals. These are to teach men to make the various points, thrusts, cuts, parries, &c., without interfering with or frightening the horse, in the same way that the strokes at polo are learnt.

II. *Dummies and Sword Nullah*. Diagrams Nos. 2 and 2A.



To learn to apply the points, cuts, parries, &c., on an object, and to teach horses to approach those objects without fear. The sword nullah is a narrow passage just wide enough to allow a horse to canter along it; on each side posts or standards are placed, with dummy lances pointing at the rider as he canters along the nullah or lane. The rider must parry the lance to pass it, and then cut or point at a mud target. The lances are fixed to the posts in the same way as in the Parry and Return Machines. The head parries fall back into position suspended on chains; the other parries can have an arrangement of weight and pulley to bring them back to their original position.

III. *Tikona*. Diagrams No. 3.

This is the same as the Tikona for dismounted work, but is mounted on a very solid post about 7 feet high. A circle should be marked

out round it, 15 yards radius, with the post in centre. The man, armed with a dummy lance or stiff single-stick, starts outside the circle and attacks at full gallop for half a minute, going outside the circle after

Diagrams No. 2



Plan showing how posts are placed.





SWORD LANE. (MOUNTED)

each point, or attempts turning on the haunches and attacking again. No point should count unless the Tikona has revolved once. The attacker should keep his eyes and the point of his sword (or lance

point or butt) always directed on the Tikona. When using a sword the circle may be with advantage reduced to a 10 yards radius, but with

Diagrams No. 2A



MOVING SWORD FOR USE IN SWORD LANE

a lance it should be at least 15 yards, and may be increased with advantage to 20 yards.

The objects of this exercise are :—

1. To instil a spirit of vigorous offensive into man and horse.
2. To strengthen the arm and learn to avoid dropping weapons and sprained wrists.
3. To strengthen the man's seat and accustom him to the shock of impact.
4. To train hand and eye to work together and make men quick to see their best opening for attack and quick to take it.
5. To develop a good style.
6. To make horses handy and bold.


IV. *The Mud-head Lancer.* Diagrams No. 3.

This is a post fitted with an arrangement of pulleys which causes a dummy lance to revolve round the post and point in any direction where the puller desires. Above the lance an iron plate is screwed on to the iron pivot peg to take the mud for the swordsman to attack. The lance can be parried right, left, or upwards, but not downwards. When parried right or left the large reel (on which the lance is fixed) slips in the leather thong; when parried upwards it goes from the pivot in the butt. It is wrong to practise beating a lance-point downwards to get it out of the way, as it is then most likely to get the horse. In the practice against the Mud-head Lancer the attacker canters on either right or left rein round the outside of a circle (15 yards radius); the puller, seated in a hole in the ground about 10 yards from the post, holds the ends of the wires, which go from him through a pipe just below the ground to the ends of the leather thong. As the attacker canters round the puller follows him slowly with the lance-point. On the word 'attack,' the attacker turns in and rides straight past the post in order to point or cut at the mud. The puller keeps the point of the lance steady, pointing at the attacker. If the attacker can slip past the point without having to parry, he should do so, but if the point is on him he must parry it before he can deliver his attack. A canter should be maintained throughout this exercise, and the man should go outside the circle after each attack and circle till he attacks again. This exercise has for its object :—


1. To teach men the various means of attacking an armed man.

2. To accustom the horse to answer instantaneously to the rider's wish and to make him steady.

Diagrams No. 3



The Mudheaded Lancer.






THE TIKONA. (MOUNTED)

3. To develop skill and control of the sword and a good style of attack.

V. *Tilting*. Diagrams No. 4.

This is on the lines of the old-fashioned joust in a tourney. The two opponents start each end of a barrier as in the diagram and gallop straight at each other at the engage. The lances are made to slip on impact, and each man has also a tin target on his chest. The men tilt at each other's targets across the barrier, and on reaching the other end they turn their horses on their haunches in the round

Diagrams No. 4



Lance for Tilting and Mounted Combat

TILTING

school and tilt back again. In judging between two men, count one for each hit on the target and one for the first man back to his starting-point. Objects of the exercise :—

1. To harden the hearts of man and horse.
2. To accustom horses to face each other boldly.
3. To teach horses to turn on their haunches and get going again quickly.

4. To avoid accidents in teaching I. and II.

This completes the preliminary training. The horse and man should now be fit to give a good account of themselves in a mounted fight.

The final stage of mounted-combat training should now be found very easy and coupled with few unnecessary knocks and blows to the horses.

VI. *The final stage consists of:—*

- | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Single combat | } man and man (mounted). |
| 2. Pursuing practices | |
| 3. The <i>mêlée</i> | |

All these are thoroughly explained in 'Cavalry Training and Manual of Instruction in Sword Practice for Indian Cavalry,' and I do not propose to deal with them, as the object of this article was to bring forward a new preliminary system of training in order to save horses much pain and annoyance through no fault of their own. All the apparatus necessary for these exercises can be made up very cheaply by any fairly intelligent carpenter and blacksmith, and if made of substantial material will last indefinitely.

I am much obliged to W. Delf and Sons, Motor and General Engineering Company, Beccles, Suffolk, for the help Mr. Delf gave me in working out one or two ideas. Though he has not seen the appliances working (as I have had most of them made up in the regimental workshops), I am sure that if he is sent the diagrams which I have given, he will be able to make them up for any regiment requiring them who find they cannot make them up regimentally.







GENERAL SIR ROBERT WILSON.
(15th Hussars and 20th Light Dragoons).

1777-1849

GENERAL SIR ROBERT WILSON

By CAPTAIN CECIL BATTINE

OF all the distinguished soldiers brought forward by the long war against the French Revolution no British officer played a more interesting rôle than the subject of this sketch. He had the good fortune to take the field as a boy in 1794 with the British contingent in Flanders, and as the Commissioner of the British Government he served at the headquarters of the Russian Army in 1807, during the pursuit of the French in 1812, in the sanguinary German struggle in 1813, and finally with the Austrians in Italy during the last phase of the contest in the winter and spring of 1814. He was subsequently a Whig member of Parliament, and his last service was the Gibraltar command. Born in 1777, he died in London in 1849, having taken part in almost as much fierce warfare as the great Emperor against whom he fought.

Benjamin Wilson, the painter, was the son of a merchant of Leeds who made and lost a fortune. The youngest son had little or no artistic education and no resources, but managed to live with relations in London and to earn a very modest livelihood as a clerk while he taught himself to paint. Gifted with great talent his pictures became appreciated, and he was soon able to make £1,500 a year, which in those days was great wealth for an artist. He died when his son Robert was a boy at Westminster School, whence he was transferred to Winchester. Robert had the misfortune to lose his mother, too, while still a schoolboy. His sister Frances was married to Colonel Bosville of the Coldstream Guards, who was killed at the battle of Lincelles in the campaign of 1793; the news of his death caused the premature birth and death of a baby boy, so that misfortune darkened the youth of the young soldier. Benjamin Wilson had been averse to his son becoming an officer, and Colonel Bosville, his brother-in-law, also tried to dissuade him, saying that the profession was incompatible with independence of character. Nevertheless, it was the exciting spectacle of the Guards embarking for active service, together with the thrilling events of the campaign itself,

which decided young Wilson's choice. He found his way to the Court at Windsor and personally presented a petition to George III to be appointed to the Army. The Sovereign took gracious notice of him and promised to recommend him to the Duke of York, then commanding the British Forces in the field: 'Frederic will look after him,' he said.

The war with Revolutionary France, the longest, severest, and most critical ever waged by the British people, was put off by the Tory Government of Mr. Pitt, even after the hostile and reckless character of the new power had shown itself. The execution of Louis XVI caused a thrill of horror in England and prepared the nation for a crisis, but it was not until the French Government showed its intention of violating the treaties which at that time protected England from naval competition in the great Belgian port of Antwerp that our Government realised its vital interests were menaced. In spite of the comparatively recent lesson of the war with the American Colonies, British armaments, and particularly the British Army, had been allowed to sink into insignificance. It is true that the disasters of the American war had severely taxed the national resources and had absolutely imposed a cautious and economical policy, but, as at other epochs of our history, the reduction of armaments was carried unwisely far and had to be redeemed by the most lavish expenditure.

In alliance with Austria our Government sent an army to the Netherlands in 1793, where the first of the campaigns of the Revolution took place. We contributed less than 20,000 British troops, but had in our pay about 10,000 Germans. Wilson landed at Ostend, having spent £60 on his outfit and borrowed £100 from his sister Fanny for expenses. He had with him a mare purchased on credit from a dealer in Bath, and his allowance in the 15th Hussars was £180 a year, payable by his guardians after certain legal delays. On arrival at Ostend he became an honorary member of the Guards Mess, and flattering competition ensued to secure the new recruit. Colonel Churchill, of the 15th Hussars, however, was also living at the Mess, and his personality won the heart of young Wilson, who applied to the Duke of York for a cornetcy in that regiment. He joined it as the troops filed out of their winter quarters for the campaign of 1794.

A memoir which began with a fragment of an autobiography of our hero was published by John Murray in 1862. It gives a stirring description of the opening of that fateful struggle and of the battle

of Villiers en Couche. The march of the concentrated Allied Army had been badly planned, and the Emperor of Austria in person was intercepted by a French division in the neighbourhood of Cambrai. The Austrian general, Otto, resolved to attack this force on the morning of April 24, after having been reinforced by the British Cavalry, consisting of the 15th and 11th Hussars and a brigade of Dragoons. Only the 15th Hussars were in line, however, when he ordered the attack under the impression that he was only opposed by a brigade of French Dragoons. The brilliant and successful charge is described with great spirit in these memoirs. Two squadrons of the 15th and two squadrons of Austrian Hussars of the Leopold Regiment executed the attack. This small force charged uphill, jumped a sunken road, galloped through a line of French Infantry formed three deep, which fired a volley in their faces, then, streaming forward, our troopers routed and pursued the brigade of Dragoons against whom they had been sent. The rally and return ride were successfully effected, although Wilson states that every man and horse on our side had been touched by lead or steel in the fight.

This charge, which deservedly conferred great renown on the British Cavalry in general and on the 15th Hussars in particular, is of singular interest in estimating the theories of those writers who deny the possibility of successful shock tactics, and who assert that success can be attained in war by exchanging fire at a comparatively safe distance from the foe. Unfortunately a tragedy also occurred, for General Mansel, commanding our Dragoon brigade, had misunderstood the Austrian staff officer who carried him the order to support the Hussar attack; General Mansel therefore led his troops too far to the right of Otto's force, with the result that he was absent from the critical affair. Both Otto and the Duke of York expressed themselves with great severity at the Brigadier's mistake, and he was temporarily deprived of his command and then allowed to resume it. But the censure had broken his heart, and in the next engagement he threw his life away deliberately.

The year 1794 saw the turning-point in the Revolutionary war. During 1792 and 1793 the immense superiority of the Allies in numbers of trained men, in equipment, discipline, and in the general military value of their troops prolonged the opportunity of marching to Paris, of crushing the Revolutionary faction in power at the capital, and enabling the more moderate sections of the French nation to conclude

a reasonable peace. The deplorable incompetence of the Austrian and British supreme command, and the lack of unity in the political aims of the Allies, made it possible for the ragged and undisciplined legions of the Republic to defend their frontier behind the chain of fortresses which Louis XIV had caused Vauban to construct. In 1794 Carnot became War Minister of France, and very soon he organised the mighty resources which the Revolution had placed at the disposition of the State.

Carnot's genius enabled him to grasp the essential factors of successful war between the highly developed States of Western Europe. He resolved to use the central position of France to strike with overwhelming force at her enemies in turn. But in order to use such superior strength two things were also necessary : numbers in the ranks and talent in command. Accordingly, it was decreed that 1,200,000 conscripts from the whole of France should be enrolled in place of the Volunteers, whose efforts had proved spasmodic and unreliable; and the young commanders of ability were rapidly promoted to high rank in the hosts of the Republic. No excuse was taken for failure from a general. Half-hearted efforts and lukewarm or even cautious leadership was remorselessly punished with death on the guillotine. Thus manned, led, and goaded into action the French turned the tables on the rest of Europe, overflowed their own frontiers, and carried fire and sword into all the States of their enemies.

Wilson served with the 15th Hussars throughout the campaign of 1794. His regiment did valiant service on the rearguard during the retreat of the British and Hanoverian forces, first into Holland, and then finally into Hanover; but his own description of these disastrous days is all too brief, and with it closes his regular autobiography, though his own account of his military career is briefly given in the introduction to his work on the war of 1812. On his return to England the 15th Hussars were quartered near Weymouth, where he saw something of the Royal family and made the acquaintance of Jemima Belford, whom he married at Gretna Green on July 7, 1797, the reason for this romantic proceeding being that once again the law's delays in the case of wards in Chancery were too tedious for our hero's patience; but he drove off from his bride's uncle's house in Dover Street by consent of her mother and guardian. They were subsequently married in March 1798 at St. George's, Hanover Square. The wedding attracted a crowd of all ranks of society on account of the dazzling

beauty of the young lady and of the fame which already distinguished the bridegroom as one of the leaders in the gallant charge of Villiers en Couche—the Balaklava of the day—and of other feats of arms in which his regiment won distinction.

Almost immediately after his marriage the young soldier, who had been able to secure promotion by purchase, went to Ireland on the Staff and took part in the suppression of the Rebellion of 1798. From this date onward his promotion was rapid, and he secured employment in one after another of the expeditions launched against the French by our War Ministry. He served with the 15th Hussars on the Helder expedition. He became major in an Infantry corps, since disbanded, which served in the Egyptian campaign of 1800, and in 1802 published a history of it which attracted much attention. In this book he personally attacked Napoleon Buonaparte and accused him of massacring prisoners and other crimes; evidently he was influenced by the fear and personal detestation which the future Emperor inspired in our countrymen at that date, which was perfectly natural. In Sir Robert Wilson Napoleon was destined to find one of his most dangerous and pertinacious enemies. About the same date Wilson published a brochure protesting against flogging in the Army.

In 1804 Wilson was promoted to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the 19th Light Dragoons, and from that regiment he shortly afterwards exchanged to the 20th Light Dragoons; in 1806 he took this regiment to South Africa. His own account of his service at the Cape is most interesting as throwing a light on his own character and ambitions, and also as giving details about the country and people of that date which subsequent history has shown to be shrewd and statesmanlike. The brilliant soldier and diplomat naturally enough pined at his exile in a remote dependency from the European theatre at so critical a period. He liked the sturdiness and simplicity of the Dutch settlers, but their hatred of discipline, their ignorance of the march of civilisation and politics were not lost upon him, and he scented some of the trouble which this combination of good and bad qualities has brought about. The absence of the amenities of civilised existence bored our aristocrat, and he returned joyfully to England in time for the campaign of Jena in 1806.

In this war Prussia single-handed defied the French Emperor, though the Russians were still at war with him and prepared to assist. So suspicious had been the conduct of Prussia during the Franco-Austrian

campaign of the previous winter that Napoleon had not brought the mass of the Grand Army back to France, but had quartered it in southern Germany. When the preparations at Berlin left no further doubt of their hostile intentions the Emperor fell like a thunderbolt upon the decayed military organisation of the northern kingdom, shivered its cadres at the double battle of Jena-Austerlitz, and hunted their remnants to destruction by means of the most splendid Cavalry pursuit in history. The Russians, in the meanwhile, were gradually collecting their forces on the Prussian frontier, and Sir R. Wilson was attached to the Russian headquarter staff to maintain touch between the British Government and the operations of our Allies. He arrived on the scene in time to witness the fierce battles of Eylau, Heilsberg, and Friedland. This last battle, fought on June 14, 1807, vanquished the Russian forces as well as the sole surviving corps of Prussians, and imposed the necessity for making peace upon the Tsar Alexander. Napoleon personally conducted the negotiations with his late enemy at the conferences of Tilsit and beguiled him into an alliance directed in great measure against Great Britain.

The Peace of Tilsit gave Wilson the opportunity, which he promptly seized, of rendering a very important service. He became aware of the trend of the negotiations and their hostile import in time to slip away and, after a rapid journey to London, to warn the Cabinet in London of the intended accession of Russia to the French Alliance. In this way we gained twenty-four hours' start, which enabled us to seize the initiative at sea, to save much shipping, and also to make important captures. In 1810 Wilson published a history of the campaign of 1807 in Poland, which was of value at the time and was wonderfully accurate considering the materials at his disposal. He severely criticised the military dispositions of Napoleon in a way that was not altogether just or scientific, but which had the good result of encouraging British soldiers and statesmen to disbelieve the prevailing creed that Napoleon was invincible.

In 1808 and 1809 Wilson took part in the earliest stage of the Peninsula struggle, still lieutenant-colonel of the 20th Light Dragoons, but employed on the staff to levy, organise, and command a 'Legion' of Portuguese. Back in England in 1810, he was sent the following year on a half-military, half-diplomatic mission to Turkey, always with the task of fomenting hostility to France. He had been promoted brigadier-general. Learning of the outbreak of war between France

and Russia in the summer of 1812, he made the difficult journey from Bucharest across the southern provinces of Russia in time to join the Russian Army of Kutusov, then quartered south of Moscow, and awaiting the catastrophe of the French retreat.

Throughout the severe operations entailed by the pursuit of the Grand Army Wilson remained with the Russian headquarters in the field, helping with his experience and advice and ever urging the energetic chase of the formidable foe, which might have prevented the escape of any part of the French forces with their dreaded commander. He saw the battles of Jaroslavitz, Vyasma, and Krasnoi, and subsequently published reliable and intensely interesting particulars of the winter campaign. Still with the Russian headquarters he took part in the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen in the Saxon plains in May 1813. His military worth was now recognised by the Russian commanders, and he became intimate with the Tsar, who conferred upon him the Cross of St. George, the highest decoration which the Russian sovereign can bestow. Wilson thus had the unique distinction of having won the Cross of St. George and of Maria Theresa by brilliant exploits on the battlefield itself.

When Austria joined the European league against Napoleon Sir R. Wilson continued to act as British Commissioner at the Allied headquarters, where he exercised great military and diplomatic weight, and where he rendered most important service in keeping the ill-assorted alliance together, especially after Napoleon's astounding victory of Dresden drove the Austrians back into Bohemia. He continued at this post to the end of the German campaign and fought at Leipzig, but after this battle he was sent by the British Government in the same capacity to the secondary theatre of war in Italy, a slight which he bitterly resented. It is not quite clear why the Cabinet decided to deprive itself of his brilliant services at the headquarters of the Coalition at the very moment when his particular talents might have been most useful in keeping Austria up to the mark during the difficult and doubtful operations which the invasion of France was sure to entail. Probably the Tory Ministers entertained doubts of his absolute obedience, and suspected that he might not wish to see the victory of the Allies pushed as far as it was desired in London—namely, to the deposition of Napoleon and restoration of the Bourbons. Or the motive may simply have been jealousy.

Sir R. Wilson was not employed in the Waterloo campaign, but

in 1816 he was concerned with the Earl of Donoughmore in contriving the escape of a French officer who had been sentenced to death, for which he was censured in General Orders. He then got elected Whig member of Parliament for Southwark, and was implicated in a charge of interposing between the mob and troops, for which he was dismissed from the Army. In 1822 and 1823 he took part in the Civil dissensions in Spain, but on the accession of William IV to the throne he was reinstated in the British Army with the rank of lieut.-general. Still as a Liberal member of Parliament he supported the original proposals for the reform of the House of Commons, but became alarmed at the democratic tendencies of his party, which he eventually left and retired from politics because he foresaw that they would degrade England to a Republic in all but name.

Sir Robert Wilson was promoted general in 1841. His last military service was the office of Governor-General of Gibraltar, to which he was appointed in 1842. He died on May 9, 1849, having had perhaps the most distinguished career in its history which did not also bring high command of troops in the field. As a young cornet at the beginning of the Revolutionary war he won glory fighting hand to hand in Cavalry charges; as staff officer in Ireland, South Africa, and the Peninsula, but chiefly in his most important duties as representative of his country and the motive power of the European Coalition against Napoleon, which he helped to direct unsuccessfully in 1807 but with complete triumph in 1812, 1813, and 1814, Wilson played a great part in history. As a military writer he held a foremost position in his own day, and notably helped to keep up the confidence of his countrymen in the dark days of Napoleon's thrall over the Continent. As a statesman his critical talent and generous nature impelled him to join the party of innovation and reform, but his mental vision and capacity for statecraft enabled him to foresee the disastrous folly of unrestricted democracy, and induced him officially to separate himself from the Liberal party in the hour of its great triumph over the aristocratic Constitution which had been the system of government until 1832. In the library of the United Service Institution will be found books which give fuller and more detailed account of this romantic and adventurous career—a career which even at this distance of time may well inspire the officers of the Cavalry with pride as well as with the interest of his stirring life-story.

THE FRENCH HORSE-BREEDING AND REMOUNT ORGANISATION

*Compiled during a brief visit to France by the Director of Remounts
April 1914*

(By permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office)

PART I.

1. CONNECTION BETWEEN HORSE-BREEDING AND REMOUNT DEPARTMENT

THE production of sufficient horses of suitable type to meet the military demands both in peace and war has long been the object of anxious solicitude in France.

The breeding of horses of all kinds is directed by a most efficient branch of the Ministry of Agriculture, staffed by highly trained professional enthusiasts. Their avowed aim is to guide production along sound lines which shall provide for the requirements of the agricultural population the horses best suited to the soil and the most profitable to breed, but without losing sight of the essential object of the whole organisation, i.e. that horses used in civil life shall be of a type suitable for the supply of the army's requirements for war.

The Minister of Agriculture has the advantage, in shaping his equine policy, of the advice of a Joint Council of the Horse-Breeding Department and remount officials, which includes, further, the most prominent civilian breeders of horses of various types.

The working connection between the Horse-Breeding Department and the Army Remount Service is, moreover, very real and close.

The organisation of the latter is specially designed to fulfil the State's obligation to purchase as many as possible of the annual contingent of remounts direct from the man who has bred them under the guidance of, and with means supplied by, the Department of Horse-Breeding.

11. OUTLINE OF HORSE-BREEDING DEPARTMENT'S ORGANISATION

General Scheme for Provision of Stallions

First established in 1639, the system of State aid for horse-breeders has continued, with varying success and with only one break (i.e. during the Revolutionary period), till the present day.

The Loi Organique des Haras, passed in 1874, established the system as it now stands.

There are six circles (each presided over by an inspector-general) and there are twenty-five directors and forty-five sub-directors and superintendents, with a corps of attendants of various grades called 'Palfreniers.'

Within the circles are twenty-five stallion dépôts containing 3,450 stallions,* of which the most important are at Pin, St. Loe, Tarbes, Compiègne, and Pompadour. These dépôts serve 756 stations.

The latter has also the only brood-mare stable in France, and there are produced the Anglo-Arab stallions so largely used in the South of France.

The policy of the Department is based on a system of zones, the aim being to provide in each stallions of the type best suited to the soil.

For example, at Compiègne, in the Northern Zone, where heavy draught horses abound, the stallion dépôt contains only Boulonnais, Ardennais, and a few English hackney stallions.

Possibly the breeders would prefer heavy draught horses of Shire, or Clydesdale type, but the military consideration forbids; the Boulonnais and Ardennais are heavy enough for the plough, quick, active, hardy, and live on a comparatively small ration, and, above all, they are suitable for military purposes, for transport and even for Artillery, the strain of hackney being intended to increase their activity for this latter purpose.

At Pin and St. Loe, in the Central Zone, where lighter draught horses, high-class carriage horses, and the heavy-weight hunter class of saddle horse is produced, the stallion dépôts contain thoroughbred stallions, Anglo-Norman or half-breds, Percherons, and a few English hackneys.

* 545 thoroughbreds (Arab, Anglo-Arab, and English); 2,175 half-breeds (Anglo-Normans and a few roadsters); 730 draught horses (Percherons, Ardennais, and Boulonnais).

At Tarbes, in the Southern Zone, we find nothing but Anglo-Arabs and thoroughbred stallions, and the use of heavy sires is absolutely forbidden.

Privately owned Stallions

In addition to the 3,500 sires maintained by the State for service at nominal fees, there are three classes of privately owned stallions standing for public service. In 1911 their number was 8,140.

(a) *Approved stallions* (total, 1,736)—

(i.) Those whose covering fee is over £4 get no premium.

(ii.) Those whose covering fee is less than £4 receive premiums from a minimum of 300 francs (£12) in the heavy draught class to a maximum of 2,000 francs (£80) in the thoroughbred class. The premium depends on the value of the produce got by the stallion. £30,000 is the sum thus distributed annually.

(b) *Authorised stallions* are not good enough to win premiums but are good enough to have a formal certificate of excellence.

(c) *Accepted stallions* are certified as free from hereditary diseases, but that is all.

Without such a certificate no stallion of any breed is permitted to travel or stand for public service.

Brood Mares

The provision of brood mares is not neglected. Shows are held in every circle at which, in addition to prizes locally provided, the State gives handsome premiums for mares with foal at foot and for young brood mares which it is desired to devote to the stud. Permanent premiums for a certain number of years are given to the owners of these young mares, conditional on their appearance at subsequent shows a certain number of times with foal at foot by a State stallion.

Personnel of the Stud Department

The stud department is not easy to enter, and the officials are, in this democratic country, invariably gentlemen of good family.

The training is thorough; after two years at the College of Agriculture candidates may compete for the three stud department vacancies offered annually. Successful competitors must have proved not only their agricultural knowledge, but their aptitude for the special duties of the department. They then go through a two years' special course

at the Haras du Pin, which includes a study of the characteristics of all equine breeds, of the objects of, and results obtainable by, judicious mating, practical care of stallions, foaling mares and young stock, veterinary studies, shoeing, dietetics, treatment, &c.

The lectures are carefully chosen and the students have the advantage of observing the management of a mixed stud of 300 stallions in the most important breeding circle of France.

Finally, students complete three years' service with mounted branches of the army, where they learn the work demanded of the animals in the production of which they are to spend their lives.

The director of a district has arduous and responsible duties. First, he has the care of the stallions in his dépôt, where he himself resides, usually in some charming old Royal château, the property of the State.

During the autumn and winter he and his staff tour the district, inspecting, holding meetings of breeders, advising them as to the care of their young stock and the mating of their mares, and gathering information to guide them in the distribution of the stallions for the following year.

In the spring he sends out his stallions in groups to out-stations in charge of the corps of 'Palfreniers.' These are all old soldiers ranging from the ordinary stable helper to the stud groom, who takes charge of a group of stallions at an out-station.

The communes apply for a certain number of stallions to serve their district, and are responsible for supplying suitable accommodation both for the horses and their attendants.

The stud grooms in charge of detachments have considerable responsibility financially and otherwise, and the director and his staff are constantly on tours of inspection.

Finally, the stud officials attend all horse shows and preside over the distribution of the State premiums for mares, &c.

Arab Stud at Pompadour

The only real national stud in France is at Pompadour, where are maintained fifty brood mares of pure English thoroughbred, pure Arab, and Anglo-Arab strains.

There are also 100 stallions, which serve the surrounding district as well as the Pompadour mares.

The French have a tremendous opinion of the Anglo-Arab as a war horse, and it is to keep up the supply of sires of this type to serve the Southern Zone of France that the stud exists.

The two Eastern Arab stallions I saw did not strike me as of the type which we are taught to look on as the highest 'caste,' but their effect on the progeny is very marked.

Every precaution is taken to develop the young stock and give them bone, by liberal dressing of their pasture and careful feedings as soon as they can eat.

As three-year olds they are put in training and tested for speed and stamina.

The surplus mares are sold by auction and command high prices for the known worth of their particular strains of blood.

The colts which are deemed unworthy to become sires are castrated and go to the Remount Department.

The establishment is maintained on lavish lines, and is one worthy of the French nation.

General Remarks

Breeding in France is at present in a transition state.

In Normandy, the most important breeding district, very high-class carriage horses used to be produced in large numbers.

Motors have destroyed this industry, and this foundation stock of big upstanding carriage mares is being used more and more to mate with thoroughbreds to secure true Cavalry horses. The present cuirassier horse, which seems to me altogether too big for war, will doubtless lose in size and gain in quality, and a first-class Cavalry horse will result. In France the army is always up against the fact that it is practically the only large buyer of saddle horses, whereas we fortunately have the hunter market to keep our breeders busy.

However, all French remount officers say that the quality of their Cavalry remounts is improving, though they cannot breed the bone and substance that Ireland produces.

At their great horse show in Paris, the height, girth, weight, and bone of the saddle horse is given in the catalogue. A 16-hand saddle horse rarely has as much as 8 inches of bone, weighs more than 1,050 lb., or girths more than 74 inches. Undoubtedly the best French Cavalry horse is the Anglo-Arab, which, though light to look at, is extraordinarily enduring.

Provision of Funds for the Upkeep of the Stud Department

When one studies the elaborate organisation devoted to the guidance and stimulation of the horse-breeding industry, one naturally wonders where the money comes from.

The reply is from racing, the collection being made through the pari-mutuel or totalisator, which so largely supplants the bookmaker on French racecourses, and which pays a percentage to the State.

Racing in France is thus compelled to fulfil its duty to the State, i.e. the improvement of the national breeds of horses.

Two-year-old racing is discouraged, and long-distance races and steeplechases are looked on with favour.

In short those responsible for the government of the French turf seem to pay more regard to the national aspect of racing than do similar authorities in England.

(To be continued.)



THE INTERNATIONAL HORSE SHOW, LEIPZIG


By MAJOR M. F. McTAGGART, 5th (R.I.) Lancers

THE above title is not sufficiently descriptive of the Show which was held in Leipzig early in October last year; neither, indeed, is it an accurate translation of it. A horse show, such as we know them in England, it certainly was not. Beyond the fact that there were a couple of hunter classes, one for dealers and one for ladies' hunters (in both of which the horses had to jump), there were no prizes or competitions for horses as horses; neither were there any harness classes of any sort. It was, in fact, a show of riding competitions, prizes being awarded in each case for the best-trained horse and rider. The points of the horse were not considered. The principal events were the jumping competitions, but there were also many good prizes offered for 'school training.' I must use this expression because we have no word in English to describe what is meant. *Haute école* is not quite the word either, as no marks were given for fancy riding or unnatural antics. All that was required was a simple exhibition of all that is most perfect in a well-trained hack. A very delightful exhibition was the result, and one which we English would do well to emulate. We do not give nearly sufficient time or trouble to the balancing or mouthing of our horses, or to teaching them immediate obedience to the leg. Few people in England have ever ridden a perfectly schooled hack; but once they had they would soon realise its delights, and would never go back to the ill-balanced, badly mouthed horses so many are satisfied with to-day. It is easy enough to train a horse to jump, but it takes much patience and skill to turn one into a hack whose every stride is a delight, and who is absolutely obedient to the will of the rider. We have been a nation of horsemen for many years, but there is much we can learn from our Continental friends.

The course for the jumping competitions was laid out on, as

nearly as possible, similar lines to that which we shall meet in the Olympic contests at Berlin in 1916, so that it is as well that we should study it carefully, and have ourselves in readiness for that year. We possess the horses; we only require training and practice to make ourselves undefeatable. So let us learn our lessons before it is too late.

The arena was in the open air, very similar to the Richmond Horse Show. There were never less than sixteen jumps, and in the competition for the prize of the town of Leipzig twenty-one obstacles had to be negotiated. A plan of the course is as shown here.



The selection of the jumps was very well made, representing as far as possible every kind of obstacle that one would be likely to meet in crossing a stiff country. The only obstacles that were open to criticism were the piano jump and the bank. The first represented but very little difficulty; but it is not easy to imagine where one would be likely to meet such a fence, and had it been removed altogether, and had the remainder of the fences been set a little further apart, I think the course would have been slightly improved.

The bank was far larger than the double at Dublin, and resembled a fortification more than anything else. Its base was encased in wood and wattle-work, and looked altogether very artificial. But it was wonderful how well the horses negotiated it, and falls were few and far between. This was the only obstacle in the course

to which any exception could be taken. The rest were extremely fair, very well built, and of as natural an appearance as possible.

The Open Ditch.—The entries for these competitions were very good—about one hundred in each case, the actual runners amounting to between sixty and seventy. They were composed of, chiefly, Germans, Belgians (who brought over a strong contingent), and Swedes. Neither France, Italy, nor Russia was represented, and, I think, there was only one Austrian and one Englishman. As this is the first year that such a competition has ever taken place in Germany, the entries were very satisfactory. But the Committee hope that each successive year will make it more and more international as it becomes more widely known.

The horsemanship of the competitors was of a very high standard. Our Belgian friends are already well known to us on this side of the Channel. But the Swedes gave a very finished exhibition, and it is to be hoped we shall see more of them in London than we have done in the past.

I was much impressed with the horsemanship of Prince Friedrich Karl, who is well known not only in Germany but also in England as a good sportsman and a capital athlete.





Count Bernadotte, nephew of the King of Sweden, also rode very well, and succeeded in carrying off one of the premier honours.

The competition opened with the King of Saxony's prize, which, amongst other things, consisted of a cross-country ride of about thirty-two miles. The course had to be completed within about four hours. Over time disqualified, but no points were gained by doing the journey in less. The competitors started singly at intervals of about five minutes. As the natural obstacles in the country round Leipzig are very few, the jumps were almost entirely artificial. But an excellent course was mapped out, comprising as many and as varied obstacles as possible. There was nothing very difficult to negotiate, but such as they were tested very well the capabilities of a good hunter.


In this event the standard was not as high as one might expect, and no horses completed the test without several faults. It struck me as a competition in which the English would easily excel.







The illustrations give a very fair idea of what was expected and the sort of fences which had to be negotiated. The going was good on

THE JUMPS WITH THEIR MEASUREMENTS



4 **Double.** Ditches with water.. White rails.





the whole, but there was a good deal of plough, and in some cases it was rather heavy.

Nearing the end was a rail with ditch and a bank and rail.

After this portion of the competition was over the horses were examined as to condition. They then had to compete (the next day) in 'school work,' and, finally, jump the full course in the arena. This would appear to be a thoroughly good all-round test for a horse as a perfectly trained hunter, and one which we should do well to imitate.


The four days during which the Show lasted were full of the greatest possible interest, and it is much to be hoped that in succeeding years British officers will take an ever-increasing part. Should they contemplate doing so, they can be assured of a most cordial welcome and whole-hearted hospitality, not only from the members of the Committee, but from the officers of the garrison and all directly and indirectly connected with the Show.

During the week the author spent in Leipzig he experienced the greatest possible kindness, combined with a friendliness and a *bonhomie* which it would be hard to beat in any other portion of the globe.

This year is the first of the International 'Concours' in Leipzig. Let us wish them every success and increasing prosperity.

ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Prince Friedrich Karl of Prussia taking the bank.
2. The bank and rail.
3. The water-jump.
4. The footpath, or double rails.
5. The open ditch.
6. Stiff timber, early in the course.
7. The post and rails.
8. A water-jump half way round.
9. A rail with ditch, and a bank and rail—nearing the end.



THE RIDER'S SEAT



THE RIDER'S SEAT

Communicated at the request of
The COMMANDANT, THE CAVALRY SCHOOL

No. 1 in the illustrations, which is from a photograph of a bas-relief in the Assyrian Section of the British Museum, represents horsemen flying before the Assyrians, *temp.* ninth century B.C., and supplies perhaps the earliest illustration, of any value, of the rider's seat. This seat is practically the same as that adopted for flat-racing in the present day. It has been variously described by old authors as the Turkish, Eastern, or Spanish seat. It will be noted that the rider has no stirrups. Stirrups were not invented until the fifth century A.D., and were not common until the twelfth.

No. 2 is also from a photograph of a bas-relief, and shows the Assyrian seat in the eighth century B.C., which is our present-day military and hunting seat.

The redoubtable warrior Xenophon was born about 430 B.C. He was a great horseman and a deep student of the science of equitation. In his work on the subject, which is quoted by many authors of subsequent ages, the following passage occurs: 'Whether he uses a cloth or rides upon the bare back we should not have him sit as one who drives a chariot, but as if he were standing erect with his legs somewhat astride, for thus his thighs will cling closer to his horse, and, being upright, he will be better able to wield his lance and shield with more force.'

Xenophon's teaching was destined profoundly to affect the military or war seat of all Western nations for many centuries, and No. 3 shows the 1st Duke of Newcastle, *temp.* Charles II., obeying Xenophon's directions.

The Duke wrote the first standard English work on equitation. He frequently quotes Xenophon, and a passage in his Grace's book reads as follows: 'Nothing disorders a horse's mouth more than leaps.' We can well believe him; the seat is most unsuitable for jumping. It is interesting to note that Xenophon advocates holding on by the mane when negotiating a jump to avoid hurting the horse's mouth.

No. 4 is taken from an official print issued by the War Office in 1818 to illustrate the correct military seat. History relates that riding-masters were sent over from Hanover to teach the British soldier to acquire it. One Hanoverian, in his zeal for the straight-legged seat, succeeded in rupturing twenty men in one regiment. The contemporary text-book contained the following sentence: 'Good riding is incompatible with stiffness!'

The seat illustrated in No. 4 was the authorised one until the South African war broke out, excepting for Mounted Infantry, though some regiments rode slightly shorter than others. It is curious to note that the seat illustrated in the next (No. 5), which was almost universal in the hunting field throughout the nineteenth century, is the military seat of to-day.

It seems a great pity that during all the long period from the Peninsula to the South African war the British officer, who was as great a sportsman as he is to-day, should not have protested against the retention of the straight-legged seat for the Army, although it is true that until the Cavalry School was founded he had nothing to do with the teaching of equitation.

LETTERS ON POLO

By COLONEL J. VAUGHAN, D.S.O.

No 2.

TRAINING A POLO TEAM

Selection and Training of Players.—It usually happens that the best horsemen amongst the young officers of a Cavalry regiment are the worst ball hitters, and that those who have a quick eye for any kind of ball game are indifferent horsemen. It is seldom indeed that a recruit officer joins who is both a good horseman and a good ball hitter. This is probably owing to the way in which the boy has been brought up. Some boys ride from an early age, but few are properly taught: at best they can only ride during their school holidays.

My old friend, Maharajah Sir Pertab Sing, when on a visit to England, was taken round one of our most famous public schools. At the end of his visit he is reported to have said: 'I see boys run, I see boys play cricket, I see boys row, Laikin, why not boys ride?' I believe that he founded a scholarship at Jodhpore which carries with it the advantage of a pony being kept for the successful scholar.

The number of officers that have little experience of horsemanship prior to joining is probably increasing owing to the cult of the motor-car. To teach horsemanship, however, is our business in the Cavalry, and, though some men are handicapped by their build, the fact that a young officer is not at first a good horseman need not deter him from endeavouring to become a good polo player. On the other hand, even if a boy has a bad eye for ball games, his proficiency at polo need only be limited by his keenness. Of men with indifferent eyes who have worked themselves up to being first-class polo players there are very many examples. One of the assets, therefore, is a quick eye, but the greatest merit is keenness; for without it there cannot be that incessant, painstaking practice which alone ensures progress.

Assuming that we have a lot of keen young subalterns who are fair horsemen, and have average eyes, how can we develop them quickly into polo players? The best means is to institute plenty of small tournaments, such as inter-squadron matches, low handicap tournaments, and one-day tournaments. These give a zest to the play and

an immediate object of training. Nothing can be better than to see all the squadron leaders training their subalterns to such competitions.

We now come to the knotty point of choosing a regimental team. There are several methods of doing this, but they all come under the headings of democratic or autocratic. Democracies are good in theory but bad in practice. After experience of both methods and of compromises between the two I am strongly in favour of autocratic methods in choosing a polo team.

The regiment should select its polo captain and give him a free hand. If after three years he has achieved nothing and effected little improvement he should be deposed and someone else be tried. I say three years because I consider that is the time necessary to make a good regimental polo team, and in this I am borne out by Brigadier-General de Lisle, who trained the well-known Durham Light Infantry team in India in the 'nineties.

Before selecting a team it is necessary to see that the organisation is right, that the regimental polo is well run, that instruction is properly given to all young players, and that the polo club is on sound financial lines. All that is necessary is to copy our military systems of individual and collective training, of establishments, supply of remounts and annual castings. The good men will then inevitably come to the front, and with forethought and careful training ponies on which to mount them will equally be assured.

In selecting players there are certain qualities to be looked for. The first essential is, I think, temperament both in man and pony. The temperament must admit of combining an inward calm and quick thought with the fastest and most vigorous external hustling. Absence of excitability combined with a dash is what we require. One of my friends has this polo temperament so marked that wits declare that his brain does not begin to work till he is galloping eighteen annas. I have emphasised this point because it is often overlooked.

The second essential is good horsemanship.

The third essential is keenness of brain and eye.

The fourth essential is determination.

Lastly, to compete in the best-class polo a man must have a good physique to enable him to stay throughout a hard match.

Given these qualities, which can be cultivated like any other qualities, perfection of horsemanship and of stick work are merely matters of constant practice. Polo is proverbially a game in which develop-

ment is late. A great expert once told me that a man was too inexperienced at thirty-nine and too old at forty to be a good polo player. I think that he was thirty-nine and a-half when he made this remark ! But for regimental polo we must have dash ; therefore I counsel those selecting a team to select the younger of two approximately equal players provided that they are equally keen. The older man will probably not improve much, whilst the younger may—a great deal.

No young player comes out till he gets a pony that really suits him, and many young players never get such a pony. With a handy pony that starts quickly and stops quickly a young player gets confidence, and with confidence acquires rapidity of execution.

We will consider the training of players selected on the above lines.

The members of a team should never play in station or club games, except when it is necessary to do so to school ponies. It is better for them to play a match of only four chukkas and to spend the rest of the afternoon in schooling ponies or knocking the ball about. All kinds of bad habits are acquired by club games, such as calculating on players missing, reducing the pace to hit the ball, pulling up on the ball, and selfish play of every description. It is far better for teams to play four or six chukkas at top speed than eight or ten slow chukkas. A few fast chukkas also get men and ponies clear in the wind. Some men favour running—and this is suitable for gross men—but for the average man a few hard games of racquets or squash are much preferable, as these games also quicken the eye.

If the second team cannot put up a good game against the first team the latter must divide and play 1 and 2 against 3 and 4. The captain of a team should play 3, and in such games he will be able to gauge the merits and weak points of his forwards, and after the game can give them a few hints. Orders during the game should be limited to the fewest possible words, and on no account should players be cursed or praised by their captain during the progress of a match. Mental notes should be made where a player fails in tactics, and a word may be said quietly to him at the end of a chukka, or of a match.

Where a player fails in execution the only remedy is more practice. To curse a player during a match only makes him nervous, unless he is very bumptious ; while to praise him is waste of time and breath, unless he is diffident and needs encouragement.

The two most common faults are for young forwards to come

B B

rushing back in defence and for older players to think that the whole thing depends on them, and to forget that they have three other men on their side whom they can and must trust to do their job.

Team-play and Tactics.—There are numerous books which deal fully with these subjects, and I especially recommend General de Lisle's and Captain Miller's books on polo, also Mr. Buckmaster's short hints on combination at polo.

The positions of players when the ball is thrown in or hit out from behind or during a penalty hit should be thought out, and every man must know his exact place and duty.

Once the game is started all efforts should be concentrated on getting the ball through the enemy's goal. The game is won or lost by the number of goals scored. If goals are scored against us it is usually the fault of No. 3 and back, but if we lose through not scoring enough goals it is usually the fault of 1 and 2.

Polo is largely influenced by invisible moral elements. Even when things look bad for us we must continue to play the game and trust the other members of our own side.

More games are lost owing to want of trust in our own side than owing to any other reason. The enemy gets off with a run and has a lead of three or four goals. Our 1 and 2 lose confidence in the 3 and back, and so come rushing back in defence. When the 3 or back hits a backhander there is no one to pick it up and take the offensive, and consequently our side gets penned on the defence. The worse things look the more determined must we all be to play according to the book and keep our minds fixed on the attack. I think that this principle, and the habit of playing faster polo than your opponents are accustomed to play, will win more matches than anything else, in whatever class of polo you compete—junior tournaments, inter-regimental or international competitions. In conclusion I hope that these notes will interest readers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL and help those who agree with them to raise the standard of polo and thereby increase not only their own enjoyment but their fitness for war. I make no apology for making a Latin quotation, as when I complain of the inability of officers to write English I am invariably told that it is owing to the classical education of the public schools. Here, then, is our motto for polo players :

'Equam memento rebus in arduis
Servare mentem.'

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Revue de Cavalerie. February.—In this number General de Witte continues his account of the action of the Cavalry at Rezonville, describing particularly all that occurred about three o'clock on the afternoon of August 16—the arrival upon the scene of General Ladmirault, and the action of his Cavalry division under Legrand. The author certainly gives an admirable picture of a Cavalry battle, and describes in detail many of the personal incidents which took place, and how what appeared at one time to be likely to be a French victory was changed into a German success. This account is accompanied by good plans, by a 'state' of the French Cavalry at Ville-sur-Yron, casualty lists of both Cavalries, and short statements of the special work of the 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique, of the 1st Prussian Dragoons of the Guard, and of the 4th Cuirassiers. Captain d'Aubert also continues and concludes in this number his studies of the Cavalry fight; he insists that battles are won in peace time, and he passes briefly in review all the conclusions at which he has arrived in these studies in regard to the action of Cavalry, by shock or by fire, the duties of the Cavalry advanced guard, the employment of the attendant batteries, armament, and the action of heavy and light Cavalry. He always comes back, however, as do all modern Continental military writers, especially in France, to the work and training and knowledge of the leader; and by this he would seem to mean not merely the higher commander, but the leader in any rank, whose responsibilities are now so great, and whose knowledge must be equal to all that will be demanded of him in modern war. Captain Choppin tells the story of the battle of Montereau fought on February 18, 1814, at a period when the Allies had already crossed the Rhine and were menacing France with invasion. It was then that Napoleon called upon Pajol, gave him a force of 5300 conscripts, badly armed and worse found, and ordered him to defend with them the valley of the Seine, of the Yonne, and of the Loing. Pajol had then completed twenty-three years' service, had fought under Custine, Jourdan, Hoche, Joubert, Moreau, Marmont, Eugene, and Davout, had had twelve horses killed under him, and had himself been ten times wounded, while the latest of his wounds were still unhealed and his arm was in a sling when he led his troopers of a fortnight's service in the brilliant charge which won the *ponts de Montereau*. 'Colonne de Tadla' is the title of the extracts here given from a journal of the occurrences of six weeks in Morocco kept by Captain Cuny, commanding the 4th Goum à cheval, and who after a brief but very brilliant career was killed at Fez on April 17, 1912.

March.—General de Witte in this number commences the conclusion of

his study of Rezonville, and makes certain observations and comments upon the events he has previously described. Prefacing his remarks by the statement that the whole duty of Cavalry consists in: (1) reconnaissance prior to the battle; (2) intervention in the battle; (3) pursuit after the battle: he then proceeds to show how the Cavalry on either side performed or failed to perform their duties under these several heads. Captain de Warren describes the operations of 1913 in Eastern Morocco, gives the orders issued, and shows by sketches the positions occupied; it is very pleasant to note the admiration which the Moroccans have inspired in their French conquerors. Of interest, too, in this connection is a very brief account of the services of the Cavalry regiments of Algeria; and when one reads all the 'Honours' now to be found upon their standards it is difficult to believe that the first of these distinguished corps was only raised as recently as 1832.

April.—General de Witte's series concludes in this number, and at the end of it will be found an interesting comparison of the French and German Cavalry in 1914. Of the *French Cavalry* he says that it has now ten permanently and uniformly organised divisions; the old *brigades de corps* have disappeared and have been replaced by a single corps regiment of six squadrons, two of which are formed of reservists. During peace the squadrons are attached to Cavalry divisions in order to avoid any appearance of having organised two widely different Cavalry bodies. At the same time de Witte suggests that six squadrons, two being composed of reservists, are hardly sufficient for the service of a corps of 40,000 men. Each Cavalry division has three four-gun batteries, while a machine-gun section is attached to each brigade. Each division has also a cyclist group, while the number of aeroplanes to be allotted to each is under consideration. Of the *German Cavalry* the following notes are given:—Owing to the three years' service and the large number of re-engaged men, the German squadron never receives more than thirty recruits per annum, and its men and horses are *never* attached for any duty foreign to the squadron, thus permitting the training to be pursued with a method and a regularity unknown in France. The regiment contains five squadrons all of the same identical composition; there is no depot squadron, but on mobilisation one of the five is told off for the depot, the choice being usually decided by drawing lots. The twelve regiments quartered in Alsace-Lorraine have thirty more men and twenty more horses on their establishment than have regiments stationed further in the interior. By reason of the augmentations sanctioned in June 1913 Germany has now 109 regiments of Cavalry, while France has no more than ninety-three, including the Cavalry in Algeria. In Germany all the administrative work is performed by special functionaries, so that the executive have nothing to do but to carry on the purely military training. Germany has hitherto steadily refused to form permanent Cavalry divisions, fearing thus to create two Cavalries, and holding that all regiments should be at all times ready to take their places in the Cavalry division or with the Infantry division. On mobilisation Germany would probably form twelve Cavalry divisions, each of six to eight regiments, an artillery brigade of three four-gun batteries, six machine guns and departmental troops. 'D. G.' contributes an article on 'Cavalry Corps,' and, after a careful consideration of all that is to be said for and against their organisation, urges that the Cavalry corps has been condemned as *pas maniable* because it has hitherto been always improvised, and recommends that corps with commanders and staffs should be created and appointed.

In 'La Cavalerie au feu et sous le feu' Captain de Prévoisin gives an interesting account of many historical incidents where Cavalry have employed fire with advantage, and emerged from it practically unscathed. This number closes with the first part of an article by Dr. Thoosis suggesting that the trooper should be selected with a care equal to that now bestowed upon the choice of the remount.

Militär-Wochenblatt. No. 36, dated March 14, has an account of the changes to be made in the French Horse Artillery by the introduction of a three-year period of army service. Up to October 1 last the eight Cavalry divisions then in existence each had a brigade of two batteries and two or six ammunition wagons according to whether the batteries were on the reduced or higher establishment. There was thus only the comparatively low number of sixteen horse batteries, but this was increased when the 9th and 10th Cavalry divisions were created in Tours and Limoges. Later, however, when the division was made up of three brigades, it became desirable to add another horse battery to the Artillery brigade, and this will be one result of the return to the three years' army service, for by 1916 at latest the French will possess thirty Horse Artillery batteries. The horsing of the existing batteries receives high praise from the German critic, who premises that the shortcomings in training of men and horses due to two years' service will now be quickly overcome. It is recognised that the ammunition question is a very burning one for Horse Artillery acting with Cavalry, and it is considered that full wagons and extra horses should be available within certainly the first six hours after mobilisation has been ordered. By next year it is thought that France may have ten Horse Artillery brigades, each of three batteries, and 360 fully-horsed ammunition wagons. More than half of the French Cavalry divisions and their attached Artillery brigades are permanently quartered in the vicinity of the German frontier. The peace establishment of the horse battery is to be three officers, 175 of other ranks, and 200 horses, leaving only fourteen men and fifteen horses to be added on mobilisation. The gun is not, the German writer considers, better than a compromise; and the French military papers have contained many complaints as to its efficiency, urging the re-arming of the batteries with a new gun on the Deport system.

No. 37, of March 17.—There has lately been considerable exchange of views in the German military journals on the subject of distant and close reconnaissance, and such well-known writers as Generals von Unger, Wenninger, and others have taken part in the discussion. In this number of the *Wochenblatt*, Colonel von Bülow writes on the same subject and gives his opinion thus: Distant reconnaissance is concerned with operations, and instructions regarding its conduct are given out by the Chief Command—in certain circumstances by a divisional commander—from intelligence to hand. Close reconnaissance has to do with a tactical objective, and instructions regarding it are issued by commanders to subordinates, and should also be communicated to those engaged in distant reconnaissance in order to avoid anything like overlapping. Neither of these forms of reconnaissance can ensure absolute security, for which every arm must take precautions of its own. On the march the security of the Infantry must be ensured by mounted officers and by cyclists. On peace manoeuvres distant reconnaissance must be practised, or else when war breaks out this will never be properly done by the divisional Cavalry.

In the same number there are some remarks on the abolition of mounted

Infantry in the British Army. Stress is laid upon the relief thus afforded to Infantry battalions which in peace time had to send their best non-commissioned officers and men to instructional and 'refresher' courses at Mounted Infantry schools, while on mobilisation the robbing of battalions to furnish Mounted Infantry is described as a positive danger, considering the weakness of home service units and the immaturity of their *personnel*. Our long-service Cavalry should, it is suggested, be fully equal to the carrying out of both purely Cavalry and Mounted Infantry work; while the opinion is expressed that we have in this country none too many remounts suitable for the Yeomanry, who, after all, so says the writer in the *Militär-Wochenblatt*, are only to be considered as Mounted Infantry at best.

No. 60, dated April 30, contains some remarks on the new Regulations governing the employment of the machine-gun sections with the French Cavalry, which were published at the end of last December, and wherein the organisation and combat methods laid down differ very widely from those in use in the German Army. In the French Army a machine-gun section is attached to every Cavalry brigade, and even the corps Cavalry regiment, containing six squadrons, will in the future have such a section. The section comprises one officer and twenty-seven other ranks, thirty-five horses, two guns, and one ammunition wagon. The guns are drawn each by four horses, the wagon by six, driven from the saddle; the whole of the detachment is mounted, and the uniform corresponds to that of the Cavalry regiments to which the sections are attached, except that where attached to cuirassier regiments the detachments wear no cuirass. The personal armament is revolver and sword; each detachment carries ten entrenching tools. Men and horses belong to squadrons, and only come together for machine-gun training. The gun is the 1907 model St. Etienne, as used in the Infantry, and is on the Hotchkiss principle; can be fired either from its carriage or from the ground on a tripod. Gun and tripod weigh 32.7 kilogrammes; the bullet is the D of the Lebel rifle. Four kinds of fire are recognised: 1. *Tir par séries*, when one or two series of four belts each of twenty-five rounds—i.e., 100 to 200 rounds—are fired uninterruptedly; (2) *tir continu*, continuous until 'Cease fire' is given; (3) *tir intermittent*, employed against objects suddenly appearing, or only visible at intervals; and (4) *tir coup par coup*, very slow fire, intended to convey the impression that Infantry alone is in action. No. 1 is the description of fire most often employed. There are four *rates* of fire: *Rapide* (more than 300 rounds per minute), *moyenne*, *lente* and *très lente* (only about 100 rounds per minute). Further, there is the *tir bloqué*, which is but seldom employed, either at long range to get observation or against a very small target at ordinary ranges, and *tir débloqué*, which can be *avec fauchage* or *sans fauchage*, the first being that more usually employed. The French machine-gun Manual does not recognise anything corresponding to the German *Tiefenfeuer*. The two guns of a section frequently fire with two elevations differing by 50 mètres. The divisional commander can concentrate the six guns of his three brigades under the senior machine-gun commander should he so desire. The Manual contains a special section on the employment of machine guns with Cavalry when mounted or in the fire fight on foot. The guns should be used to force a defile and, in the dismounted fight, in the attack on a point of appui; against Artillery from a flank; against hostile Cavalry attacking mounted; or in the surprise of the enemy's reserves. The machine-gun commander must precede his guns and always be on the look-out for opportunities of action; he must not hesitate to risk his guns,

and tripod fire is to be considered more reliable than fire from the gun-carriage. The use of single guns is recommended under certain conditions, but mass fire is not to be dispensed with. It is the intention in the French Army to give every regiment of the Cavalry divisions a machine-gun section in the near future.

No. 76, dated June 4, contains a paper on the horse requirements of the Russian Army, a subject to which increased attention has lately been directed by reason of the augmentation of the Russian Cavalry and Artillery. The equine resources of Russia are very great, but the breed of horses is of very unequal quality, and the remounts suitable for military purposes are mainly drawn from the Warsaw, Kieff, Odessa, and Moscow districts. The Steppe region supplies a large number of horses, but these are chiefly used to mount the Cossacks and to eke out the resources of the districts producing the better-bred animals. Horse-breeding operations have lately been set on foot in the Don country, and grants are given to breeders, who have in return to sell a proportion of their produce to Government at a fixed price. Prices have gone up greatly in recent years, but they vary widely according to the class of remount purchased by the Government; thus while a Steppe pony can be bought for £20, the better-bred remount suitable for Cavalry and Artillery runs up to £70. The Remount is under the War Office, and comprises fourteen remount commissions for Europe and one for Siberia; these examine horses at two and a half and three years, paying a small sum to secure a future call on them if suitable at the age when ordinarily purchased in the autumn. Remounts in Russia are bought between three and six years, and are then sent to the Cavalry and Artillery depôts to be broken, not being distributed to the troops until the following summer. Eleven years' service in the ranks is all that is expected of the Russian remount. The equine requirements of the Russian Army were last year 13,000, and are already over 14,000 this year; and it is stated that export of horses from Russia is likely to be forbidden. This report is already causing some anxiety in Germany, which imports an average of 50,000 horses annually from Russia. Few of these are accepted for military use, but the check to imports can only have the effect of raising the price of German remounts.

Kavalleristische Monatshefte. March.—A short but instructive paper opens this number on 'Army Cavalry and Attached Infantry.' The writer considers that it was a feeling of inferiority, due to the two-year period of army service, which induced France to lead the way in the endeavour to add to the fire-power of her Cavalry by attaching mobile Infantry to her Cavalry bodies. That the general idea was correct is borne out by the fact that a Cavalry division comprising twenty squadrons could not dismount more than 1800 to 2000 carbines, equal to no more than two Infantry battalions; while even if machine guns were added to the mounted arm they would probably be overpowered by those belonging to the opposing Infantry. Thus it came about that the French, as the result of many experiments, first introduced cyclist detachments in 1895 as auxiliary arms to the Cavalry. Italy followed suit two years later, Austria in 1911, and Germany in 1913, it being noticeable that the innovation was last accepted in those armies which had always laid most stress upon the preservation of the purely offensive spirit in the mounted arm. The organisation of cyclists in European armies is thus stated:—

Germany has eighteen companies of cyclists in her rifle battalions, each

of three officers and 113 other ranks, representing 110 rifles and 113 rigid machines.

Austria has four cyclist companies with the 11th, 20th, 24th, and 29th Rifle Battalions: these are organised partly as cyclists, armed with rifle and bayonet, partly as machine-gun sections, the *personnel* being armed with pistols and bayonet. The machines are of the folding pattern, even for the machine guns. The attendant medical service is mounted on rigid machines, which have arrangements for carrying wounded.

Italy has three cyclist companies in each of twelve Bersaglieri battalions, each company having four officers and ninety of other ranks; the machines are of the folding pattern, except for the officers, who have motor-bicycles. On mobilisation a battalion of cyclists would be attached to each of the four Cavalry divisions. A corps of volunteer cyclists has also been organised, but these are intended for coast defence only.

Russia has so far only organised an experimental cyclist detachment in one of her Guard brigades.

England does not appear to have attempted any cyclist organisation in connection with her Cavalry: the ten battalions so far formed are intended for coast service only.

Belgium has on mobilisation one cyclist company of four officers and 134 other ranks for her Cavalry division.

Holland has organised four such companies, but they are only for attachment to her Infantry divisions.

France has a cyclist detachment told off for each of her ten Cavalry divisions. The detachment comprises three companies, 400 strong on a war footing, armed as Infantry, having folding bicycles, the officers mounted on horses.

Switzerland possesses eight cyclist companies (one for the Army Cavalry), each 170 strong.

All these countries have given an increased number of rounds to their cyclists, whether carried on the man or in reserve. The author makes a number of criticisms; he holds that the whole object of the existence of cyclists being the augmentation of fire power which they afford, everything should be sacrificed to give them a very large ammunition supply; the machines should be folders, and always carried by the riders when dismounted; cyclists will be of most use with the reconnoitring squadrons, but when employed with the main body should be responsible for safeguarding main roads and searching important junctions and intelligence centres. Valuable as will be the attachment of cyclist companies, the Cavalry leader will be wise who does not too firmly tie himself down to them. Lieutenant-Colonel Count Zedtwitz has some remarks on the Japanese 'Cavalry Training' of 1912. He is not altogether pleased with it, considers that it is badly put together, is no advance on the German Manual which appeared earlier, and holds that the free hand given to subordinates may result in the leader finding himself bereft of reserves at a critical moment. Colonel von Horn contributes a very short paper on the German remount, and expresses the opinion that the troop horse is over-worked, over-weighted, and underfed; and that, especially during the autumn manœuvres, so much is taken out of him that in France it is always hoped that war, when it comes, may commence after the *Kaisermanöver*, when the German Cavalry horses are thoroughly knocked up. The writer pleads for an addition to the forage ration, for lighter troopers, and for a 'close season' for all remounts of from four to six weeks every year, when they may not be worked, only gently exercised. Lieutenant-

Colonel Count Spannochi continues his translation of the Russian Cavalry Manual of 1912.

April.—The two first papers in this number are concerned with the Italian Cavalry. General von Bernhardi writes on the Cavalry of the Italian army, with special reference to the riding establishment at Tor di Quinto; and an Italian officer, Colonel Baron Cantoni, describes the training and employment of his arm. General von Bernhardi is of opinion that the system does not produce horses sufficiently handy for use in the *mêlée*; Baron Cantoni's paper is a very detailed criticism of the Italian Cavalry training and a comparison with those of other countries, and especially of Germany. The translation by Count Spannochi of the Russian Cavalry Manual is completed in this number. The remaining papers in this issue are for the most part replies to opinions on such matters as 'Communication Detachments' and their equipment and duties, and 'Reconnaissance and Security,' which appeared in previous numbers; but there is an instructive article by an Austrian officer, who describes in great detail the training he gave himself and his horse 'Alerta' in order to win some of the famous high-jumping competitions at Turin and elsewhere, until he cleared the remarkable height of 2.08 metres, or about 6 feet 8½ inches—a record for Austria-Hungary and also for Germany. The writer bought 'Alerta' out of the Remount as a four-year-old in 1910—purely from his pedigree, once before having had a very fine jumper by the same sire; from the description the horse does not read like the remarkable jumper he trained into.

May.—Lieutenant-Colonel Beké gives a short account of the operations of the allied Cavalry in the campaign of 1864, when Prussia put in the field a Cavalry division of two brigades each of two regiments *plus* three regiments of divisional Cavalry, while Austria's contribution was one Cavalry brigade only, comprising two regiments. The events are described; the Cavalry had not many opportunities for distinction during this war, but such as they were the Allies fully availed themselves of them, although it is clear that they did not always have matters entirely their own way. In an article on 'The Supply of the Cavalry Division in the Field' the author passes in review four of the ordinarily accepted views regarding the methods of supplying a Cavalry division probably moving considerably in advance of an army. It is, he declares, usually accepted that since the trains cannot be expected to keep up with the Cavalry, the division, men and horses, must live on the country; that these trains can be handed over for safeguarding to any corps *quelconque*; that forage is everywhere forthcoming; and that in case of need—when its own trains cannot come up—the division can confidently draw for supplies upon any other neighbouring unit. The writer takes each of these premises and deals with them in turn: he shows that even in European countries a Cavalry division cannot live on the country without losing efficiency, and that even where rations for men may be gathered in, forage in sufficient abundance is rarely to be come by without an amount of pre-arrangement which is, under the circumstances, usually out of the question. To this succeeds a highly interesting account of the early operations of the Bulgarian Cavalry division in Thrace. Rittmeister Schwarczer, of the Honved Cavalry, contributes a prize essay in which he has some very practical suggestions to make for the improvement of the marksmanship of the Cavalry in the field, and the number closes with a lament over the recent reduction of the number of Horse Artillery batteries in the German Army.

'The 15th (The King's) Hussars.' London. Caxton Publishing Company, Surrey Street, W.C.

An exhaustive review of the history of that distinguished Cavalry regiment, the 15th (The King's) Hussars, which has just appeared from the pen of Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B., can hardly be compressed into the space at the disposal of the reviewer.

This handsome work is published in two forms—one, the larger, an *édition de luxe*, the other somewhat smaller in bulk, and in consequence less weighty in the hand. Both editions are the same as to their contents and differ only in matters of margin and binding.

And, first, we have to congratulate Colonel Wylly on the results of his labours, for as a regimental history the subject was not quite so easy to handle as may at first be supposed, and for this reason: owing to luck, good or bad, the most celebrated services of the regiment are comprised between the year 1760, when the 15th had been hardly a twelvemonth in existence, and the field of Waterloo, in 1815.

The account of the Seven Years' War is a distinct addition to our knowledge of the subject. The relation of the 'Affair at Emsdorf'—at which the newly raised Elliott's Light Horse covered itself with glory—may specially be mentioned, whilst the other battles of the campaign are treated equally well, foreign sources of information being considerably and most wisely drawn upon.

The events of the Flanders campaigns of 1793 and 1796, and that of the Helder in 1799, occur in succession; and a large amount of interesting and in some respects hitherto unknown information is now obtained.

Later we get the story of the disastrous Coruña campaign, to be followed by the Vittoria campaign, and that which culminated in the passage of the Pyrenees, the Battle of Orthes, and the concluding battle of the war at Toulouse. For the year 1815 we have Waterloo.

Then a long break occurs in the history of the active war services of the regiment, for by ill luck it was not employed in either the Crimean campaign or in the Indian Mutiny. It was not until October 1878, when the Afghan campaign was entered upon, that the 15th was again actively engaged. Its last service in the field was in the first Boer War, in 1881.

It goes without saying that, in addition to his account of the military achievements of the regiment, Colonel Wylly has not neglected its peace service, and this portion of the book is often rendered far more interesting than could have been hoped by the use the author has made of letters, anecdotes, &c., in addition to the useful war diaries which, having been kept by old-time officers of the regiment, have been placed at his disposal.

Other chapters follow the conclusion of the military history proper. Mr. D. Hastings-Irwin contributes a most scholarly collection of notes on uniform and equipment—a portion of the book in which, as far as we are aware, the subjects embraced have never been better done.

Notes on sport and a novel section on regimental songs are also included.

A number of Appendices conclude the work, in which the Peninsula and the Waterloo Medal Rolls have their place.

There are twelve coloured illustrations, which are perhaps peculiar in the fact that there is no ground for the horses to stand upon and no background; many of the horses are apparently unshod.

The plate of Dress Sabretasches is worthy of the highest commendation. We heartily congratulate both the author and also the gallant regiment whose history he has so skilfully given to the public.

NOTES

APPOINTMENTS AND COMMANDS

ON the occasion of His Majesty's birthday, the King has been graciously pleased to approve the following appointments :—

18th (Q.M.O.) Hussars :—H.M. the Queen, to be Colonel-in-Chief.

19th (Q.A.O.R.) Hussars :—H.M. Queen Alexandra, to be Colonel-in-Chief.

7th (P.R.) Dragoon Guards :—H.R.H. the Princess Royal, to be Colonel-in-Chief.

The undermentioned officers have been appointed to command the following Territorial Mounted Brigades respectively :—

London : Colonel A. H. Taylor, D.S.O., late 13th Hussars.

Lowland : Colonel F. Lee, late 4th (Q.O.) Hussars.

OUR ILLUSTRATIONS

THE frontispiece of this Number of the JOURNAL, 'A Very Gallant Gentleman,' is from the original painting by J. C. Dollman, R.W.S., executed for the Cavalry Club, and is now on exhibition in the Royal Academy.

Messrs. Thomas Forman and Sons, of Nottingham, have published a facsimile in colour of this great picture, size, including the mount, 30 inches by 22 inches. The artist's proofs are £3 3s. (limited to 300), prints £1 1s.

The original sketch in black and white of the 11th Light Dragoons at 'El Bodon' is by Mr. W. B. Wollen, the well-known military artist, and can be purchased from him at 10 Queen Anne's Gardens, Bedford Park, London, W.

RELIEFS

THE proposed programme for the ensuing year is as follows :—

2nd Life Guards, Regent's Park to Windsor.

Royal Horse Guards, Windsor to Regent's Park.

2nd Dragoon Guards, Aldershot to Dublin.

Royal Scots Greys, York to Edinburgh.

5th (R.I.) Lancers, Dublin to Aldershot.

15th (The King's) Hussars, Longmoor to York.

18th (Q.M.O.) Hussars, Tidworth to Hounslow.

19th (Q.A.O.R.) Hussars, Hounslow to Tidworth.

MOUNTED BANDS.

A SUGGESTED REFORM.

BY 'FAIRPLAY.'

IN this age of reforms and changes which have swept through the British Cavalry during the last decade—much to its advantage no doubt—one almost hesitates to suggest further changes unless they be vitally necessary; so many old customs and traditions have already gone by the board.

Reading the heading of this article it might be thought that the writer was about to suggest the entire obliteration of the Cavalry Mounted Band as also a thing of the past. Far from this being the case, all that is intended is to endeavour to suggest how the Cavalry band can be adapted to suit modern ideas, and how it can be resuscitated where it used to be, and be of practical service to the officers and men of its regiment, and not, as it is now, seldom seen or heard by them.

Fifteen years ago a Cavalry regiment stationed at home at the time of the annual regimental or brigade training went forth daily from barracks at the hour of 8 A.M. or thereabouts, full of pomp and ceremony, to its daily drill; men and officers were a splendid pageant in blue or red, with white gloves and belts, beautiful black jack-boots, and with their mounted band at their head; and after various intricate movements they returned to barracks, their band still at their head, punctually in time for 11 A.M. stables.

As a contrast we see in this year of 1914 that same regiment, if stationed at home, at the same period of the year sneaking out of barracks at the same hour or earlier; men and officers are attired in their serviceable but unpicturesque uniform; they also are going out to brigade or regimental training, but there is no returning to barracks at 11 A.M. for them, nor have they the mounted band at their head. Indeed, how could the wielder of the bassoon or the four-legged bearer of the kettle-drums be expected to carry these burdens for such long days?

The critic may say at once that the Cavalry band can do and does do a great deal besides for its regiment, even if it cannot be used during the actual training.

Let us look into the question and see what it actually does do.

The band parades mounted for the three or four ceremonial parades in the year, it plays the regiment to church on foot every Sunday, and plays at the officers' mess one or two nights a week when it has no better private engagement. It does not go on manœuvres, so during this period of the year it is not seen or heard by the regiment; and beyond these few occasions the band does literally nothing except practise and fulfil private engagements.

Infantry bands, on the other hand, are still of great practical value to their regiments. They accompany their battalion everywhere in peace, at all trainings and manœuvres; they are there prepared to cheer up the men on their return from long field days or on long marches on manœuvres, they play also in the camps and bivouacs, and undoubtedly are a great incentive to recruiting in country towns and villages; and their private engagements seldom appear to stand in the way of their military duties when their battalion needs them.

The establishment of a Cavalry band in peace is, roughly, forty men,

including the trumpeters and boys in training; in war they are at once absorbed into the ranks as soldiers.

Nowadays with regiments at war strength in horses and at peace strength, or often under that, in men, the ever-increasing wail of the squadron leader is for more horse-keepers. The band here represents at least thirty possible horse-keepers, but they cannot be counted on to look after horses regularly; when in barracks they must practise their instruments, otherwise they do not play well enough to get private engagements, and if they do not get private engagements no really good musician will remain in the service on his scanty pay as a musician. During these engagements naturally they do no work at all in the stables.

Here, then, is another complaint against the present system. They do not play for their regiment, nor do they help to groom the horses or do guards and fatigues, so all their share of the soldiering work is thrown on to their comrades.

It is easy, no doubt, to criticise and destroy; but the question arises (assuming that some of these complaints are justified), what changes can be suggested that will improve the present state of affairs?

The French nation have the reputation of being one of the great authorities on Cavalry at the present date; let us look for a moment at their system.

They, with their compulsory system, have no need of a band as a recruiting agent as we have, but nevertheless they are great believers in the value of military bands to rouse the men's spirits, and their Cavalry bands accompany the regiments everywhere as such; they have no mounted band of instrumentalists as we have, but have instead a mounted trumpet band. These trumpeters consist of two or three men a troop, some trained, some learning, making a total of eight per squadron, or thirty-two per regiment. These men ride in the rear rank of their troop at drill or manœuvres and act as horse-holders, orderlies to officers, and messengers; directly the field day or exercise is over they are at once called up to the head of their squadron or regiment and play inspiring marches and popular tunes. The trumpet has keys and resembles a large cornet. In the charge the whole of the trumpeters sound the charge independently; and they invariably play their regiment or squadron through every town or village, and play also dismounted in the billets during the evening on manœuvres, and the troopers, and civilians, male and female, gather in crowds to hear them, and thoroughly enjoy the music. At reviews they trot and gallop past playing at the head of their brigades, massed, and play extraordinarily well.

To sum up the situation and compare the two nations.

The French Cavalry band :—

1. As musicians are always with their regiment, mounted, available to play at any moment.
2. As soldiers and musicians they keep their own horses always.
3. As soldiers they ride with their own troops when at drill or manœuvres. They are used as horse-holders in dismounted work, thus releasing more rifles.
4. Play equally well on foot to march to.

The English Cavalry band :—

1. Deprives its regiment of thirty efficient horse-keepers and soldiers.
2. Never accompanies the regiment to drill or manœuvres, and is therefore then of no use as a recruiting agent.

3. Parades mounted occasionally for reviews and on foot for church and at the officers' mess.

4. Is frequently absent altogether fulfilling private engagements.

5. Is very expensive to keep up.

Here we have the two nations side by side. In the Conscript Army the band is sharing the work of the regiment, taking part in the training as soldiers, and playing for the benefit of its own regiment, while in the Voluntary Army, which, one would think, needed a band far more to advertise its attractions, we find the band doing practically no military work as bandmen and little work as soldiers. One can only hope that it is filling the minds of possible future recruits with dreams of military glory when it plays to them on Brighton Pier or at the 'White City' while the rest of its regiment is sitting in a wet bivouac on manœuvres.

Detractors of these arguments will say that a trumpet band cannot compare with a mounted brass band, and that a trumpet band is of no use to play in barracks and will get no private work. This may be so, but even a trumpet band is better than no band at all as is now the case. Also let the critic go to France and hear a really good Cavalry band play, mounted and dismounted, before he condemns them. The second objection possibly does hold good, but surely it might be feasible to train the best of the trumpeters, who are enlisted for twelve years against the French three years, to perform on stringed instruments and form a small orchestra to take private engagements when not wanted for military duties. Perhaps they would not reach so high a standard as at present as musicians, but the regiment would benefit, for surely the band is for the benefit of the regiment itself and not for private individuals. In many Cavalry regiments a small string band exists already, and is often much preferred by the officers to the full band.

In conclusion, it is not suggested for a moment that our Cavalry bands are trying to avoid their military duties; through no fault of their own, but owing to their organisation, they have been gradually driven out of their proper places as soldiers and musicians, and are becoming troops of itinerant musicians, wearing the uniform of distinguished regiments and otherwise having scarcely any share in peace in the soldiering life and work of the regiments to which they belong. Moreover, their share of the military work and hardships of the regiment is thrown on to their comrades' shoulders without getting the advantage of their services as musicians. These few remarks and suggestions apply naturally only to our Cavalry of the Line, and no one would contemplate depriving the Household Cavalry of their splendid mounted bands, which are so often seen and heard at Court functions, and are of real practical value.

DIRECTORS OF MUSIC

An Army Order issued last month provides for the appointment of directors of music. The conditions are as follows:—

A bandmaster, under the age of fifty-five, may be granted a commission as director of music with the honorary rank of lieutenant. On being so promoted he shall receive the same rates of regimental pay and allowances as a quartermaster of the regiment or corps to which he is gazetted. He shall retire from the Army at the age of sixty-five.

THE EVOLUTION OF LIGHT DRAGOON HEAD-DRESSES

BY D. HASTINGS-IRWIN

THE evolution of the head-dress of the Light Dragoon brings into prominence a greater variety of design than that of any other section of the British Army.

Apart from the different shapes instituted by authority from time to time, there were certain regimental peculiarities, all of which require notice.

The Light Troops added in 1755 to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Dragoon Guards, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 10th and 11th Dragoons were the forerunners of the Light Dragoon regiments raised in 1759, which, with the exception of such as were made Hussars in 1806, namely the 7th, 10th and 15th, and the 8th in 1822; and of the Lancers of 1816, viz. the 9th, 12th and 16th, and of the 17th in 1822, remained as such in the Army Lists until 1864, when a general change to Hussars took place.

The original 'Light Troops' were disbanded in 1779. Those of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, 1st, 6th and 11th Dragoons were absorbed into the newly-raised 20th Dragoons, the others being taken over by the 19th and 21st Dragoons. The earliest example of their helmet that I have come across is that preserved in the Zeughaus in Berlin, and which is one of those worn by the Light Troop of the 1st (Royal) Dragoons about 1755. Fig. 1 shows its design. It is made of black-japanned iron, or steel, with a white metal crest, and a short red wavy horsehair plume, and with a black-japanned turned-up peak of tin. On it is the royal cypher 'G.R.' with the letters 'I,' 'D,' on either side, surmounted by a crown, all in yellow enamel, but with a red cap inside the crown. The crest is 3 inches high in front and $1\frac{3}{4}$ inches behind, with a head of Medusa in front, and sixteen air-holes down each side, through which the red horsehair shows. Whether or not a turban was originally worn round the bottom of the head-piece I am unable to say; but, at any rate, none exists on the specimen in Berlin. There is, however, a stud fixed behind, which suggests that it was originally intended for hooking up the ends of the turban, which according to later regulations, was to be made so as to hang down to protect the back of the neck in bad weather.

The design is no doubt the same as that worn by all the Light Dragoon troops when first raised; but some of the contemporary prints show *red* instead of black enamelled peaks.

The next oldest specimen is also in the Berlin Museum, and a front view of it is shown in Fig. 2. It is one of the helmets worn by the 'Royal Foresters,' a regiment of Light Dragoons raised in 1760, and subsequently numbered the 21st Light Dragoons, but finally disbanded in 1763.

It will be observed that the turned-up peak is of a curious and unusual design, and is of metal covered with scarlet cloth and edged apparently with white tape. The crown, cypher, letters, and the scroll inscribed with the regimental motto '*Hic et ubique*,' are of brass, mounted on the cloth face. The head-piece is of copper, enamelled red, with a brass strip on each side, and the crest is of white metal, $1\frac{3}{4}$ inches high in front, tapering down to $\frac{3}{4}$ inch behind, with twelve open air-holes on each side. The plume is of scarlet short wavy horsehair, like that of the earlier helmet.

Helmets of type 1 were worn until 1784, when that which is generally

known as the 'Light Dragoon helmet' was introduced. The 15th Light Dragoons were, however, exceptions to this rule, as three different types of helmet are known as having been worn by them, as far as can be ascertained, between 1763 and 1784. The oldest is that in the Royal United Service Museum in Whitehall. It is shown in Fig 3, and has a black steel, or iron, head-piece, surmounted by a crest of white metal, on which is a short red wavy horsehair plume, hanging over the left side. The peak is of black enamelled metal, with the lion of England on a green ground in the centre, surrounded by a garter inscribed '*Honi soit qui mal y pense*,' and surmounted by a crown with a crimson cap. On either side are the regimental guidon in red, and a Bourbon flag in white enamel. Below is a scroll inscribed '*The King's Regiment*,' and on each side, below the flags, are the words '*At Emsdorf*.' Round the bottom of the head-piece is a scarlet silk turban, with two ends and silver tassels. Across the sides of the head-piece are scrolls of olive branches.

There is in the officers' mess of the 15th Hussars an old helmet which, in my opinion, is the second in chronological order. The head-piece is of black enamelled metal, with a brass band up each side. The crest is brass, with black enamelled imitation air-holes at the sides, and the plume is similar to that first described. The peak, however, differs in the central design. It is of black enamelled copper, and the following inscription, granted as a regimental distinction in 1768, is embossed round the upper edge:—'*Five Battalions of French defeated and taken by this Regiment, with their Colours and nine pieces of cannon, on the plains of Emsdorf; July the sixteenth, 1760.*'

The central design consists of the Lion of England, surrounded by the Garter, and below it a scroll inscribed '*Merebimur*'; and on either side the regimental guidon and Bourbon flag, and a cannon. Not being enamelled they show as copper on a black ground. The plume is of red horsehair, and the turban is of blue silk.


The third of these 'regimental' helmets is of similar design, but the crest is not so high and is made of white metal, with open air-holes down the sides. Instead of copper strips up the sides there are bands of acorns and oak leaves. This is probably the helmet replaced by that of the '*Light Dragoon*' type. It, as before stated, was introduced in 1784, and was worn by some of the Light Cavalry until 1812 and by the Royal Horse Artillery until 1820.

It was a neat and serviceable head-dress, much in favour with King George III., who, although several times pressed, refused to sanction its abolition. It is shown in Fig. 4, and consisted of a black leather, or enamelled metal, head-piece, with a metal-bound peak, and a black bearskin crest over the top. A red and white upright feather plume was originally worn on the left side, and a badge of regimental design on the right. Across the top of the peak was a narrow metal band bearing the regimental title. A silk turban of the colour of the regimental facing was attached by small brass chains to the lower side of the head-piece.

The rule as to the turban being of the colour of the facings does not appear to have been rigorously adhered to; and, later, in some cases the colour of the side plume was altered, the 10th Light Dragoons at one time wearing a yellow plume, and the 15th Light Dragoons a scarlet one. For example, about 1800 several regiments wore yellow turbans round the helmet; while some regiments wore black, and the 10th Light Dragoons and

one or two others wore strips of leopard skin. The reason for the changes is not apparent, but that they were made is clear from contemporary pictures.

In the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution there is a curious helmet of the 8th Light Dragoons dated 1800, and which comes into the



category of 'Regimental' helmets. It is shown in Fig. 5, and, as far as I know, is peculiar to this regiment. The helmet is made of iron or steel, with brass mounts, and has a scarlet horsehair plume and a black silk turban. On the front of the crest is a lion's head, and below it an Irish harp.

C C

I have come across helmets belonging to other regiments which in no way conform to the Dress Regulations of the period. It is possible that they were suggested alterations and may never have been adopted.

In 1806 the head-dress of the Light Dragoons was a black beaver shacko, with a bell-shaped body, 11 inches diameter at the top and 7 inches to 8 inches below, according to the size of the wearer's head (see Fig. 6). It was 8 inches high, and had a black patent leather peak. A false peak of felt was turned up behind; and a band of yellow or white braid, $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches deep, was worn round the top to correspond with the gold or silver braid worn by the officers. In front was a braid wheel and loop, and brass roses were mounted at either side, from which depended brass cheek scales. A short vertical white plume was worn with this shacko.

A head-dress of this type was worn by the Light Dragoons until 1859, though slight differences in the height and the diameter of the crown took place from time to time. For example, in 1822 the Dress Regulations lay down the height as 8 inches and the diameter of the top as 11 inches; in 1826 the height was increased to 9 inches, whereas in 1831 it was ordered to be 6 inches (see Fig. 7). In 1855 the cap was cylindrical instead of tapered, and was $7\frac{1}{2}$ inches diameter, being 7 inches deep in front and 8 inches behind (see Fig. 8).

In 1822 the shacko was made of black beaver, with a black sunk glazed top, and tapered down to suit the size of the wearer's head. A general description as follows is laid down for the officers in the Dress Regulations of the period, but no doubt each regiment altered it somewhat. 'Round the top a rich 2-inch oak-leaf lace, with a black silk $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch binding round the bottom. An embroidered ornament with double "G.R." in the centre, surrounded by a garter, decorated with the rose, thistle and shamrock; the whole upon a black velvet ground, and communicating with a bullion chain loop to a rich bullion rosette with a black velvet centre. Richly engraved scales with lion's heads at the bottom, fastened at the top above the rosette with lion's paws. Rich dead and bright gold cord lines and acorns encircle the cap, top and bottom, tying in a double knot on the right side, passing through a ring, and looping either to a button on the jacket, or to a hook on the cap just under the ring.' A black leather strap was used to secure the cap under the chin.

The plume was of red and white drooping horsehair, 23 inches long, with a gilt ring and socket.

Those regiments of Light Dragoons which were made into Hussars in 1806 wore busbies, or, as they were then called, 'fur caps,' from 1806 to 1812, when the shacko was re-instituted; but in 1857 it was in turn replaced by the busby, which has since been worn by all Hussar regiments. The 7th Hussars wore busbies at Waterloo, possibly owing to the shackos not having been then received from England. Those of the 11th Light Dragoons and 15th Hussars were received in September 1812 and March 1813 respectively.

In 1846 a new shacko was instituted. It was of black beaver, as before, but was only 8 inches diameter at the top, 7 inches deep in front and 8 inches behind. The sunk top was made of patent leather bound with gold oak-leaf lace $1\frac{3}{4}$ inch wide, and a patent leather peak embroidered with gold 1 inch wide. A large gilt and silver Maltese cross was worn in front, with regimental devices, and surmounted by a crown; and a gilt chain was provided, fastening with roses at the sides. A gold cord line was worn twice

round the cap, and crossing at the back. The plume was of white swan's feathers 14 inches long and standing 8 inches above the top of the cap.

The plumes have varied in size, colour, and material from time to time. In 1822 they were of red and white drooping horsehair 23 inches long; in 1831 of drooping black cocktail feathers 21 inches long on a 9-inch stem; while in 1834 they were reduced to 20 inches on an 8-inch stem. In India black hair plumes 15½ inches long on an 8-inch stem were worn.

In 1857 a new type of head-dress, shown in Fig. 9, was introduced, and the following is the description in the Dress Regulations of the period.

'Chaco body covered with Paris velvet; height, front 5½ inches, sides 6¾ inches, back 9¾ inches; patent leather sunk top 1½ inches less in diameter than size of head; patent leather band ¾ inch wide round bottom of cap; gold 1½-inch oak band round top of cap; nearly horizontal patent leather peak, projecting 2½ inches, and laced with ¾-inch gold embroidery. Burnished gilt plain chain ¾ inch wide; with rose ornaments each side of chaco; gilt lion head with ring immediately below gold band at back of chaco, also gilt hook to fasten up chain. Front ornament, a gilt and silver Maltese cross, with crown above, according to regimental pattern. A gold gimp and orris cord worn once single round the chaco. A gilt plume socket corded ball with four upright rays, with a horsehair plume of regimental colour standing 5 inches above the top of the chaco.'

When all the remaining Light Dragoon regiments were converted to Hussars the busby was adopted as the head-dress, and has been worn ever since, though it, too, has suffered slight alterations in height, &c., from time to time, but it is too well known to need more detailed reference.

When first introduced it was very much larger than that now worn, and had a much higher plume. Moreover, there was no embroidery on the bag. Since its reintroduction the 15th Hussars, unlike other regiments, have never worn the cap-lines round the busby, but hanging down from the underside of the bag.

Most of the descriptions given refer to the officers' head-dress; but those of the men were of exactly the same size, and only differed in that they were ornamented with yellow, or white, braid and cord, and that the badges were of white metal instead of silver; and the plumes of horsehair, when the officers wore feathers.

All the figures are drawn to the same scale for ease of comparison. Fig. 6 is an officer's shako of the 17th Light Dragoons, and Fig. 8 that of a trooper of the 15th Light Dragoons. Figs. 7 and 9 show officers' caps of the 11th and 14th Light Dragoons respectively.

THE 5TH CAVALRY BRIGADE

Colonel Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bart., D.S.O., late 19th (Q.A.O.R.) Hussars, and the London Mounted Brigade, has been appointed to command the 5th Cavalry Brigade, with headquarters at York.

This Brigade, which made its first official appearance in the May *Army List*, consists of the Royal Scots Greys, now stationed at York, the 12th (P.W.R.) Lancers at Norwich, the 20th Hussars at Colchester, and the G. and O. Batteries Royal Horse Artillery at Ipswich.

YEOMANRY TRAINING

BY YEOMANRY SQUADRON LEADER

COLONEL TROTTER'S invitation to Yeomanry officers in the April number induces me to make some remarks on the subjects already raised, and also to put forward some suggestions of my own.

On the subject of training recruits separately their first year I entirely agree with 'Brigade Major.' A squadron is all too small as it is, and if all recruits are taken away it will be perfectly ludicrous to attempt squadron training with the residue, and it would be most unpopular. I have also sufficient confidence in the average Yeomanry officer to believe that the recruits will actually learn quite as much from the combined efforts of the officers, permanent staff, and men of the squadron as they would from the adjutant and permanent staff alone, who would, I think, find their task too difficult.

The idea of bringing recruits out two days before the rest of the regiment has its attractions, but the men are certainly not accustomed to it yet universally, and it would interfere a good deal with recruiting for some time; moreover, someone has to be found to train them, as I do not think the permanent staff alone would find it easy to handle such a number without assistance.

On the subject of attendance at manœuvres I again entirely agree with 'Brigade Major.' A composite squadron is an expedient only and not a very satisfactory one, it can hardly be expected to pull well together; but we have certainly learnt a good deal by attending manœuvres as a brigade which has been of great use to us.

I do not think the gain to a regiment and the Yeomanry as a whole under 'Yeomanry Colonel's' proposals would be nearly so great as under the plan of whole brigades attending as part of their training, and I have been twice, and hope to go again several times. A quarter of the men of my squadron, probably half of whom will have left by next year, will be a very small leaven compared with the number I should have next year if my whole squadron had gone on manœuvres; the difference between a squadron before and after manœuvres, or even a trek of two or three days, is quite extraordinary.

I certainly support 'Brigade Major' in voting for 'bringing the whole up to a higher standard,' and I most emphatically disagree with Colonel Trotter's comment that 'Brigade Major' appears to be a strong advocate of quantity and not quality; it seems to me an entirely incorrect description of 'Brigade Major's' views.

I now wish to advance a few suggestions of my own, based upon my experience in commanding a squadron for seven trainings.

Firstly, would it be quite impossible for us to have the same organisation for war as for peace? I would refer to Yeomanry Training, Section 2, 'Organisation,' Sub-Section 5, and ask whether the principle there laid down is in any way complied with by our present arrangements for mobilization.

There must be something wrong with a system which on mobilization entirely breaks up one of our squadrons and distributes its men among the others.

We now have 4 squadrons, each of 4 troops; these have to be converted

into 3 squadrons, each of 4 troops. Each mobilized squadron will therefore receive $1\frac{1}{3}$ troops from the demolished squadron, and will have itself to make 4 new troops out of $5\frac{1}{3}$: so that all local patriotism and comradeship, hitherto carefully fostered, will be destroyed, and at the very moment when cohesion is most wanted our system introduces confusion. It means that my squadron will receive one officer and 30 or 40 men who know nothing of its leader and his methods, and I have either to destroy their existence as a troop and send them piecemeal to my troops, thus making all my troops unhomogeneous, and putting one of them under a strange officer, or I have to keep the newcomers together as a troop and divide my own 4 troops up into three, and so destroy all their existing local comradeship: in my case this will be particularly difficult, as I have 4 distinct recruiting centres and maintain a troop at each.

Secondly, could we not have a large enough establishment to provide 4 subalterns to each squadron and machine gun, scout and signalling officers as well? We really need special officers for these duties more than Regular troops do, owing to scouts and signallers needing special instruction throughout the training; and to take an officer away from a squadron to do it seriously interferes with the proper training of the squadron.

Thirdly, I desire to propound my own pet theory, which I fear may be regarded as almost revolutionary.

I wish to suggest that, bearing in mind our probable duties and our armaments, the drill of Yeomanry might be still further simplified.

I start from the two premises—

(i) that we are intended, as our men are recruited, for service in this country only;

(ii) that our arms in war would be the same as they are in peace.

In fact, the matter of our training hinges upon the two questions, What weapon are we going to use, and what sort of place shall we generally be in when we want to use our weapon? My experience at training and on manœuvres, both as part of a brigade and on detached duties, has made it clear to me that as a rule in this country, when we want to move from place to place, we must do so in column of sections or half sections, and that when we need to use our weapons we shall usually be in that formation, and that we shall only waste time if we try to move where we can get into another formation.

In 1912 my squadron was away from camp for five days; in that time it marched 150 miles, and during the whole time it never got out of half sections except to camp at night.

I have consequently come to the conclusion that line formations are of no practical value to Yeomanry, for we shall seldom be able to form even troops; and if we do our present drill will be very difficult for we are only trained to drill in single rank, and we cannot well alter that on mobilization, but our troops will be about 32 strong in the ranks, besides plenty of serrefiles, and how can such a troop be wheeled either quickly or accurately? I have seen troops of 24 and 28 Yeomen try it, and the result is not worth the time and trouble given to it.

I suggest, therefore, that the normal formation of a troop should be 'column of sections,' and of a squadron 'line of troop columns,' which might be called 'line,' and 'column of sections,' which might be called 'column.' This would enormously simplify drill, for all that would be necessary would be to obtain quickness and accuracy in wheeling the sections in all directions and in increasing and diminishing the front up to sections.

We should thus save all the time now spent in trying to obtain some sort of accuracy in wheeling troops and performing troop and squadron drill generally, and should have this extra time, which I estimate at certainly one-third of the time of preliminary training and two days at camp, available for practising many important duties in the field which we really have hardly time to deal with now. I anticipate that the chief criticisms that will be made upon this suggestion are :—

(i) That the handiness of men and horses is much improved by the present drill.

(ii) That the present drill is very valuable for purposes of discipline.

(iii) That parts of England are open, and that line formations will be better there.

I answer to these :—

(i) From my experience it is the quick wheeling of sections that makes men and horses handy far more than any movement of the troop in line.

(ii) I acknowledge that line formations promote discipline, but I believe that under the system I suggest it will be possible to improve even on the existing discipline; for at present the section is one of several standing in line and not distinguishable as such from others in the troop. Under my proposal the section will be always a distinct visible unit, and it will be much easier to make the section leader more important and responsible, and that is a change that can have nothing but good results upon discipline.

(iii) In every way I think my proposal is an improvement even in open country. Many of us know how when we are trying to move unseen up a small fold of the ground it is hard to ensure that the flank men of our troops do not show above and spoil the whole movement; a column of sections follows much more closely and accurately the careful movements of the leader himself, and when we must cross an open spur, we can form line of troop columns and extend and gallop just as well as, if not better than, in column of troops: and the leader has the additional advantage of having all his troop leaders up in front within easy reach of him. I believe, too, that a squadron in line of troop columns offers a worse target for artillery than a squadron in column of troops; but I am open to correction by artillerymen on this point. I think, too, that we shall get our men to carry out this simple form of drill much more quickly and accurately in much less time than it would take to get them equally accurate in troop movements.

To summarise, I contend that we should obtain drill and formations entirely suitable to our needs, and should eliminate much useless work, and consequently should have more time available for more necessary purposes.

I CANNOT agree that, although we depend on voluntary service, efficiency should be sacrificed to popularity, and I firmly believe that there are still plenty of young men who are patriotic enough to give personal service to their country for a longer period than is now required, provided their service was properly recognised.

I quite agree with what 'Brigade Major' says about the brigadier and staff watching the regimental training daily, and in every way assisting the commanding officers. I did not intend to refer to these inspections.

It would be interesting to know on what authority 'Brigade Major'

states that for recruits to drill apart from their squadron for the first year of their service would be unpopular, and would be bad from a recruiting point of view. It would also be interesting to hear the views of Yeomanry officers on this point.

It is certainly a disadvantage to have a weak squadron when performing such duties as outposts, advanced and rear-guards, &c., but except during, possibly, squadron training, one does not often see a squadron of line Cavalry with as much as 75 per cent. of its peace establishment on parade while practising such duties.

Surely Yeomanry N.C.O.s should know their work and be able to carry out the duties of each rank before being promoted. This was the practice in the regiment which I used to command, and therefore they did not require a permanent staff S.S.M. at their elbows.

That the training is only fifteen days instead of eighteen days was not the fault of the men or the employers of labour, but of the authorities, who would not find the money for the eighteen days, as provided for in the original scheme. It would now be difficult to alter this without a very strong reason. But is not the plea of efficiency a strong enough one?

In my experience the only way that a Yeoman, of whatever rank, can learn his duties properly, is to be attached to and work with Regular Cavalry, and with this view a large number of Regular and Yeomanry officers I have spoken to quite agree. I am convinced that small units of Yeomanry attached to and working with Regulars learn more themselves, and by imparting the knowledge they pick up to their comrades in their own regiment do more for that regiment as a whole, than if it went to Cavalry training or manœuvres as a complete unit. As to the expense, I have no means of checking the figures given by 'Brigade Major,' but they seem very extravagant.

The whole question is whether the training that is now carried out by a squadron or regiment of Yeomanry is sufficient to make it in any way fit to take its place as a valuable unit in a scheme for general mobilization, and whether a commanding officer can be expected to bring his regiment to a state of anything like the efficiency required in the short time at his disposal. After deducting the days of assembly, dismissal, and Sundays, he would be lucky if he had more than ten days for the training of his command.

The time available for training depends, I believe, more on the Treasury, and to some extent on the goodwill of employers of labour, than on the willingness of the men to serve for a longer period, provided the date for training is fixed to suit the general convenience of each regiment.

C. W. T.

In the forthcoming army manœuvres, which take place in the West Midlands during the month of September, a large number of Territorial troops is to be employed. The muster of these units will reach a total of about 9,000 of all ranks and arms, a higher number than that of former years.

The Yeomanry to be employed will consist of the Notts and Derby Mounted Brigade, and the Welsh Border Mounted Brigade.

These two brigades will assemble on September 5, and will train in the manœuvre area north of Hereford and Worcester until the 15th, when they will then join the Army Exercises, being dismissed on the 19th.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE MILITARY TRIALS AT THE HORSE SHOW.

This is the first time that such trials have been seen in England, and some of our officers did very well. There is no doubt that we understand feeding and conditioning horses better than the Continental nations do, but it was in the manège work that we failed. The other tests were so easy that no horses lost points for being over time, and only a few lost marks for lack of condition or unsoundness. Consequently it was impossible for an officer who had dropped marks in the manège test to regain the amount he had lost in the following three days.

There is one point that the foreign officers rightly insist on very strongly, and that is what they call 'le calme' with which the movements are made—i.e., all movements must be made absolutely smoothly and as if the horse took an interest in his work. This is the great fault of our military manège work; the aids are much too roughly applied. If you look at one of the foreign officers doing any school movement it is almost difficult to see him give the aids at all, and the horse passes from one movement or pace to another with perfect smoothness and without any excitability. This is only arrived at by patient training. It is not necessary to have a riding school in which to train a horse, as he can be equally well trained in the open or even when hacking on a road.

To take the movements *seriatim* :—

1. *The Walk in Balance*.—It is important that the horse gets his hocks well under him and propels himself with his hind legs, holding his head high and the frontal bone more or less perpendicular to the ground.

2. *Walk at Liberty*.—The rider's hand should not be stretched out, but he should ride with a completely loose rein, the horse walking out freely, with his neck stretched out, at about five miles an hour.

3. and 4. The same remarks apply to the trot in balance and trot out. At the collected trot the rider should 'bump' in his saddle; this assists the application of the aids.

5. *Down the Centre Right and Left Half Passage to End of Manège and Halt*.—Most British officers did this very badly; they compelled their horses to do it by force instead of the horses doing it naturally because they had been well trained. The legs were used far too strongly and drawn back too far. There was no sympathy about the movement whatever.

6. *Turn about on the Haunches on a Fixed Pivot*.—Many British officers did not understand what this means, and several of them did the 'pirouette,' which is more difficult; but as it was not required by the programme, of course secured no marks. This is a particularly simple but important movement in the early schooling of every military horse or polo pony, and is simply designed to make them throw their weight on their hocks in turning. It should be done quite slowly and smoothly.

7. *Turning about on the Haunches on a Moving Pivot*.—Was badly done. The haunches and the fore hand did not follow two separate tracks as they

should, and some officers only made a half turn and then made straight for the centre of the manège at an angle. The short figure of eight was perhaps the best manège work that our officers did, but the use of the riders' legs and the reins in changing was much too violent.

8. *Change of lead in four time on a straight line down the centre.*—Hardly any officers, British or foreign, did this absolutely correctly, as it is a difficult thing to do and wants a good deal of training. The best way to train a horse to do this is first of all to make sure that he will spring off on whichever leg you wish from the halt, walk, or trot. When he has learnt this you can teach him to change in, say, eight time, and as his training progresses gradually reduce it down to four time, or even less.

9. *Halt.*—One must take care not to excite a horse if it is wished to get him to stop exactly at a given point with his weight equally balanced on all four legs.

It is to be regretted that we did not do better in these trials, but there is no cause for discouragement, and with more care over the manège work we should easily hold our own. In teaching a horse manège work the principle to be observed is to do a little every day, if it is only ten minutes, and in doing this to gradually accustom the horse to work smoothly with very delicate aids.

There is still another point, and that is 'that it cannot be done for us by anyone else.' It is true that a non-commissioned officer or rough-rider can teach the horse the first aids and the preliminary work of this schooling, but it is quite hopeless for anyone to go into the ring on a horse that he has not schooled himself.

It is hoped that these few remarks may be of service to our officers for another year.

IMPORTANT

The staff of the JOURNAL is limited, and it is therefore necessary for all officers who obtain the JOURNAL direct from the Managing Editor to report any alteration of rank or address immediately, as it is quite impossible to follow up the stations of individual officers; every effort will, however, be made to trace the movements of regiments.

PLEASE NOTE!

Owing to doubt having been expressed as to the extent to which officers may contribute articles to THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, in view of the recent amendment to paragraph 423 of the King's Regulations, it is notified for general information that THE CAVALRY JOURNAL is issued with the sanction of the Army Council. Officers are, consequently, encouraged to submit papers for publication, on the understanding that should their articles pre-judge questions under consideration by superior authority, or criticise existing orders or regulations, the Editor will make such amendments in the text as he may deem advisable.

INDIA

AGE LIMIT FOR CAVALRY COMMANDERS

AN Indian Army Order has lately been published regulating the appointment of commanders of units in the Indian Army.

It ensures that Cavalry and Infantry officers will not be allowed to assume the command of their units after attaining the ages of forty-eight and fifty years respectively; and that they will vacate their appointments on attaining the ages of fifty and fifty-two years of age.

There can be no doubt that Cavalry leaders should be young men, and from the distinction drawn in the Army Order it seems that the authorities recognise that Cavalry leaders should be younger than Infantry commanders.

A glance at history shows that most of the great Cavalry leaders were quite young men. Murat was a Lieutenant-Colonel at twenty-seven years of age, he commanded the whole of the Cavalry in Napoleon's Syrian campaign at thirty-one years of age, was a Lieutenant-General at thirty-three, and five years later commanded the independent Cavalry in the Ulm campaign. He was a king at forty-one years of age.

This may be regarded as accelerated promotion! We cannot, of course, hope to rival these conditions during peace, but we may at least agree that, from the point of view of efficiency, the new conditions of tenure of command in the Indian Cavalry are a step in the right direction.

HORSES AND THEIR COST

It may be of interest to those Cavalry officers who are coming to India to learn that Government have recently sanctioned horses being purchased from the ranks at a graduated scale for depreciation after eight years of age. An old but reliable horse can now be bought for £28, which is useful in a pigsticking station.

Nearly all Indian Cavalry regiments will shortly have horse runs in the new canal colonies. Those regiments which have now had runs for some years past are, as a rule, better mounted than those which have been without them, and their funds are in a better state. This means that in future years a large number of Indian Cavalry regiments will be country-breds. This is undoubtedly a good thing, as helping to make the country, in this respect, self-supporting in time of war.

At present, however, the Waler is the most popular horse, and costs about £23 to £25 at the port, as a five-year-old.

Few, if any, Indian Cavalry regiments purchase Arabs, but the market is still kept going by the Imperial Service troops. Government, also, purchase a few of the better-class Arab horses for light Cavalry remounts.

As regards polo ponies, Australian shippers realise that it is worth while bringing horses over in better condition than was formerly done. It is rare that a customer will buy now without riding the animal, as so much depends on the way he carries himself. The dealers, therefore, rough-break a horse to saddle as soon as possible after landing.

The average price of raw ponies at Bombay is £50. But it must not be supposed that they will only cost £50 landed at an up-country station. There are measuring fees, stable commission, veterinary charges, rail fare, rugs, &c., to be added. It is a good tip to take your own horse clothing

when going down to the stables, as it is wonderful how bills mount up, and one usually gets an inferior article at a fabulous price if one leaves it to the dealer to supply gear; £10, however, should cover the cost of these extras, and the raw pony should be landed at the station for £60 or £65.

The pony must be kept for some time to acclimatise at a cost of Rs. 25 to Rs. 40 a month, according to the way the animal is looked after, and on a graduated scale for the owner's rank (according to the time-honoured custom of the East !)

It is almost an axiom that no pony becomes a first-flight polo pony under two years, so that a pony may represent £100 odd when he is the finished article. Allowing for risks of training, it does not pay an owner to sell such an animal under £200. But the ponies which just miss, or are not yet first flight, can be purchased at anything from £100 to £130. These prices are again dependent on the season of the year. In October the prices are high, and in March, after the tournaments, the price drops.

There are a large number of Arab ponies playing polo in the country, but their prices are low compared to Walers; they generally sell from Rs. 800 to Rs. 1,800. In first-class polo only about one Arab to six Walers is seen in the game. The Arab trains quickly to a certain standard, and is easy to play. He is a good beginner's pony, and does very well for station polo; but he is not of much use in a big tournament, unless he is absolutely thoroughbred and under a very light weight.

REGIMENTAL HISTORIES

The attention of the Council of the Royal United Service Institution having been drawn to the considerable number of regiments and corps who are now compiling, or about to compile, their Regimental History and Records, the Council desire to intimate that the Institution is prepared to render every assistance and advice in the matter, especially on the following points :

- (1) Suggestions as to an Author.
- (2) Selection of Printers and Publishers.
- (3) The style and size of the Book, Type, and Binding.
- (4) The method of Illustrating, Colour and otherwise, Artists, Photographers, &c.
- (5) Preparation of List of Officers.
- (6) Where and how research information may be obtained.

ARMY RESERVE

It has been decided to allow a limited number of Section A or B Army Reservists belonging to certain Cavalry regiments to return to the colours, to complete their period of original enlistment. These men must be able to give at least two years' clear service after réjoining and must have had a military character of not less than ' fair ' when transferred to the Reserve. They will be required to rejoin in the rank of private and will not be liable for drafting abroad. At present only unmarried men will be accepted.

Any Reservist wishing to avail himself of this opportunity, or desiring further information on the subject, should apply personally or by letter to the Officer in charge of Records of the regiment to which he belongs.

A NEW METHOD IN TRAINING RECRUITS TO JUMP

By CAPTAIN W. S. E. MONEY, *22nd Sam Browne's Cavalry*

IN training recruits to ride it is a recognised thing that at the very commencement of their training the great object is to give them confidence. This is specially the case when they first start to go over jumps. The old theory that no one could learn to ride until he had fallen off a certain number of times, though it may be sound to a degree, at any rate is not carried into practice when training the recruit. Naturally the greatest dread that a recruit has when about to take his first jump is that he is going to fall and hurt himself. Therefore, the first object is to prevent him from doing this. A very excellent method, extensively in use, is the 'stirrup strap,' which came generally into fashion on the publication of Major Birch's 'Modern Riding.' A short description of this is necessary to compare it with another method, about to be described, and which the writer holds to be more effective.

A strap is attached to one stirrup, and then passed under the horse, and made fast to the other stirrup. The recruit then mounts and is put over jumps. This method serves its purpose extremely well in that it prevents the recruit from falling off, but it does not give him a proper 'feel' of the saddle. It is apt to bring his knees right away from the saddle, as he turns his heels inward to get a better purchase of the stirrups. Also, if he leans too far over on one side or the other he is very likely to lose his stirrup, and so the value of the strap is lost also.

The other method, which the writer has applied successfully to the recruits of his regiment, is as follows:—

The ride of recruits is drawn up in front of a jump and told to let their stirrup leathers out by a few holes (three to four). They sit down in their saddles, *place the leathers over their thighs as far up as possible*, and then take their stirrups. By this method it is claimed—

- (a) The recruit is unable to fall off.
- (b) The more he presses down in his stirrups, the better the grip he gets of the saddle.
- (c) His legs and thighs are in their natural positions, and he instinctively brings the right muscles into play.
- (d) He cannot lose his stirrups unless the leathers are too long. This should be carefully guarded against by the instructor.
- (e) Should the horse fall there is less danger of being dragged than with the stirrup strap.

It has only to be tried once personally to become convinced what a real 'feel' of the saddle can be obtained by this method. It must be understood that this is only a means to an end, and recruits should not be allowed to employ this method once confidence has been established.

In conclusion, the writer, although he imagines himself to be the inventor of this method, would not be in the least surprised, only a little hurt, to hear that it was as 'old as the hills.'

Neither this method nor Lieut.-Colonel Birch's is approved at the Cavalry School. The object of giving recruits a lot of jumping is to give them a strong seat and light hands. Consequently, excepting for the first lesson or two to give them confidence, all such mechanical aids to remaining in the saddle do not help to achieve the object.—*Editor, CAVALRY JOURNAL.*

*The Royal Academy,
1914.
From the painting by Captain Adrian Jones, M.V.O.
(By kind permission).*



THE CAVALRY JOURNAL—No. 35.



FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS, V.C., K.G., K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., V.D.

BELGIUM

MACHINE GUNS DRAWN BY DOGS



FOREIGN

Austria-Hungary.—A Cavalry division, bearing the number 9, will be raised at Pardubitz; its brigades will be numbered 1 and 9, and it will be composed of the 1st, 4th, 11th, 13th, and 14th Dragoons. The 9th Brigade of Artillery will be allotted to it.

The 3rd Cavalry Division, headquarters Vienna, composed at present of three brigades, each of two regiments, will for the future have two brigades, one containing three regiments. The 4th Cavalry Division at Lemburg is for the future to have two brigades, each of two regiments, instead of as at present one brigade of two regiments and one extra regiment.

A Remount Commission is about to be appointed composed of an officer of the rank of major-general as president, an officer to make purchases, and a veterinary officer. The duties of the commission will be to deal with all questions of the purchase of saddle-horses for the Cavalry and Artillery; it will decide upon purchase prices and the situation of the remount dépôt.

Belgium.—During 1913, 2,193 men were recruited for the Cavalry, representing an increase of one-third incorporated in previous years.

Denmark.—The Cavalry School in Denmark is designed mainly to raise the standard of equitation and to encourage a knowledge of veterinary subjects. The riding course lasts two years, and is attended by first lieutenants and sergeants of Cavalry and Artillery possessing special qualifications: three officers and six non-commissioned officers join the school every year; they are taught in addition hippology, fencing, and tactics. The school is usually commanded by an officer trained at Saumur, and is said to be doing excellent work in a small way.

The contingent of Cavalry recruits in 1913 numbered 420: the 'first period' of instruction lasts for 200 days, from April 15 to November 2; the 'further period' is for 340 days, and is carried out by only about three parts of the year's levy of recruits. Thus the greater number of the men 'put in' eighteen months' training; the reservists are trained for two periods each of twenty-five days at the end of their third and fifth year.

Officers are supplied free with chargers. The horses of the Army Service Corps and of the military and Cavalry schools are the sole property of the army, the others being boarded out among farmers. Two-thirds of the horses are Danish, the remainder coming from Ireland and Germany; the Danish remounts are of very good quality, especially the Artillery.

The Cavalry is composed of four regiments, two active, each of four squadrons, and two reserve regiments; in every regiment each squadron has a machine-gun section attached to it.

Germany.—During the first ten months of 1913 Germany imported no fewer than 142,088 horses, exporting only 5,324.

Holland.—The peace establishment of the Netherlands Army contains 5,890 horses, of which 2,618 belong to the Cavalry. Nearly all these latter are purchased in Ireland by a remount commission comprising three officers, one of whom is a veterinary surgeon. This commission buys every spring an average of 380 remounts, aged from three and a half to five years, at an average price of £50 (about). There is a remount dépôt at Millingen, the staff of which consists of a major-commandant, a medical officer, a veterinary officer, ten non-commissioned officers, and 134 men. Officers are expected to provide their own remounts, receiving an *indemnité de monture* of £17 a year (roughly) per charger.

SPORTING NOTES

POLO

INTERNATIONAL TRIAL GAMES

It was a pity that several prominent polo correspondents should have thought fit in their early criticisms to discourage Lord Wimborne's team in their first effort against Mr. Buckmaster's side at Ranelagh. No one with a knowledge of polo could expect any other result, and to have been defeated by nine goals to six in their first attempt, and by nine to eight at Hurlingham in their second, by the four best players in England at the moment, was no disgrace; but it was evident that the players originally selected by Lord Wimborne were not the right combination in the places they were then playing in for the task desired.

At Hurlingham, on May 9, Capt. the Hon. D. Bingham took Major Mathew-Lannowe's place and played well, especially for his first attempt on ponies he is not used to. After the match the special committee appointed by the Hurlingham Club to assist Lord Wimborne out of his difficulties met to select a side to go to Meadowbrook, and it was decided to ask Capt. Leslie Cheape and Lord Wodehouse to join the side, the former having played a brilliant game at No. 1 and the latter at back during the afternoon for Hurlingham, they, with Capt. Bingham at 2 and Major Barrett at 3, to be the team selected; and although not perhaps the best side that could be chosen, it is the best under the difficulties which present themselves. It was at the end of last summer that Lord Wimborne conceived the idea of getting a team together, and he then started collecting the ponies, and recently took his selected team to Madrid for practice. All praise is due to him for his sporting efforts, but it is to be regretted that he did not consult the Hurlingham authorities earlier.

Lord Wodehouse declined again to join the team, but Capt. Leslie Cheape consented, as also did Mr. Traill; and Capt. Vivian Lockett, having sufficiently recovered from his illness, has also sailed for New York.

The team is now greatly strengthened by the assistance of Mr. Traill, one of the best backs in the world, which releases Capt. Cheape, who is undoubtedly a better forward, from that position.

Capt. Tomkinson (1), Capt. Cheape (2), Capt. Barrett (3), Mr. Traill (back) now form the team, and opposed to them will be Mr. R. La Montagne, Mr. J. M. Waterbury, Mr. D. Milburn, and Mr. Larry Waterbury, a team considered as strong as that including Mr. Whitney last year, and, if anything, more formidable in respect to pace.

On June 8 news came of an accident to Capt. Cheape, his cheek-bone having been cut by a ball and the cartilage of his nose damaged and his eye closed; and though, in a very sporting manner, arrangements have been made to postpone the match from to-day, the 9th, until Saturday 13th, the injuries must inevitably handicap his play and prejudice the chances of the team. It is announced that Capt. Vivian Lockett has completely recovered from his indisposition, and will take his place at back in place of Mr. Traill. This is a very wise decision, as the latter, owing to his serious accident, has been unable to play up to his real form this year. (Written previous to the matches being played.)

Results of Matches

First Match.—England 8 goals, America 3 goals.

Second Match.—England 4 goals, America $2\frac{3}{4}$ goals.

In the first match the challengers obtained two goals at the commencement of the first chukker, and never looked back; in fact, the defenders were outplayed and their ponies outpaced. This pronounced victory came as a great surprise and there was much talk amongst the Americans of changing the team. However, their Polo Association wisely decided only to change the places and put Mr. Milburn again at back, a place from which he should never have been taken.

The Second Match

Again the challengers went off with a lead in the first period of two goals, which was increased at the end of the fourth, when the score stood at 3 to nil. At the end of the seventh the score was England $3\frac{1}{2}$ goals to America $2\frac{1}{4}$. A foul against Capt. Lockett in the eighth lost half a point, and then Mr. Milburn scored, thus putting the Americans for the first time ahead by a quarter; but they lost a half by a cross by Mr. Milburn, and soon afterwards Capt. Barrett scored a goal and won the match by 4 to $2\frac{1}{4}$.

We are informed that one of the best-known polo-players in England recently stated that it was ridiculous sending out a team composed of 'Cavalry officers' who only understood the rudiments of the game, an opinion that doubtless will be altered now, not only on account of this victory, but also of the Cavalry Club victory over the Old Cantabs in the Ranelagh Open Cup Final.

WHITNEY CUP TOURNAMENT

1st Life Guards, eight goals; Magpies, seven goals

Though the weather was unpleasant, much interest was taken in the two Whitney cup-ties played at Hurlingham. The tournament attracted a good entry. The Life Guards conceded the Magpies two goals start under the handicap, though the latter side included Lord Dalmeny and Lord Francis Scott. They are seven and six goals men respectively. It was a great fight with any amount of hard riding, and when the fifth period ended each side had five goals to its credit. Afterwards it was a case of six all, then seven all, and then the 1st Life Guards, when the game was nearly over, hit through again, and so won by eight goals to seven. Teams:—

1st Life Guards: Capt. J. J. Astor, Capt. G. E. Miller-Mundy, Major E. H. Brassey, and Capt. L. H. Hardy.

Magpies: Capt. E. B. G. Gregge Hopwood, F. Bellville, Lord Francis Scott, and Lord Dalmeny.

12th Lancers, nine goals; Royal Horse Guards, six goals

Two ties in the tournament were played at Roehampton. The first, on the centre ground, resulted in a win for the 12th Lancers, who, after conceding a start of two goals to the Royal Horse Guards, beat them by nine goals to six. The polo in this match never reached a high standard. The Royal Horse Guards were below their usual form, Capt. Harrison alone doing himself justice. Capt. Bowlby was hitting badly, while Capt. Fitzgerald was suffering from a bad wrist. Beyond hitting several nice goals, Capt. Foster did little. The 12th Lancers were only a trifle better, but this was their first fast-galloping game of the season. The 12th Lancers soon made up

the start of two goals, and by the end of the first period the scores were two each. Then for a time the Royal Horse Guards had a little the better of the game, and led by one goal at the end of the second, third, and fourth periods. In the fifth Capt. Fitzgerald had to retire for a time owing to his injured wrist. His place was taken for this period by a substitute. Whether it was his absence or an improvement in the play of the 12th Lancers it is impossible to say, but by the end of this period the 12th Lancers were leading by seven goals to five. They added two more goals in the next period, and finally won by nine goals to six. Just at the close of this match Capt. Harrison's pony fell over the boards and threw its rider, who, however, luckily escaped with a shaking. Teams:—

12th Lancers: E. H. Leatham, Capt. T. R. Badger, B. G. Nicholas, and R. Wyndham-Quin.

Royal Horse Guards: Capt. A. W. Foster, Capt. G. V. S. Bowlby, Capt. J. P. Fitzgerald, and Capt. J. F. Harrison.

Final.—12th Lancers, eleven goals; 1st Life Guards, four goals, the players being:—

12th Lancers (24 points): Mr. E. H. Leatham, Capt. T. R. Badger, Mr. B. G. Nicholas, and Mr. R. S. W. R. Wyndham-Quin (back).

1st Life Guards (24 points): Capt. L. H. Hardy, Capt. J. J. Astor, Capt. G. E. Miller-Mundy, and Major E. H. Brassey (back).

Umpires: Major F. H. Blacker and Mr. H. S. Blane.

There was a very large attendance at Hurlingham to witness the finish of the fifth annual tournament for the Whitney Cup. Of the eleven teams that had competed this season the two that had qualified to fight out the final were both regimental sides. The Lancers, who are a very keen polo corps, in which every officer, from the commanding officer downwards, is a player, had last season upon their return from foreign service many polo successes. They won the Subalterns' Cup tournament at Ranelagh, and were most successful in provincial polo, for playing at Norwich, where they are quartered, they gained the holdership of both the County and Junior County Cups, and also the tournament in the south-eastern division for county novices. In this match they met the 1st Life Guards on level terms, for each side's aggregate handicap was twenty-four points. A goal by either side was recorded in the opening period, that for the Lancers being the result of a free hit for a cross, while the equalising goal was hit by Capt. Astor. Capt. Badger, whose brilliant play was a feature of the match, was very prominent in the next period, and hit the Lancers' second goal, while early in the next stage he scored again after a fine run. After Capt. Astor had put through for the Life Guards, the latter were within an ace of drawing level at three all, but one good shot by Capt. Miller-Mundy unluckily hit a pony, and on another occasion the Lancers' back met the ball almost on the goal line. At the end of the period the Lancers were attacking again, Capt. Badger once more hitting through. In the fourth period, after Capt. Astor had scored with a straight drive, reducing the Lancers' lead again to only one goal (4—3), the 12th made three goals in quick succession. This proved to be the turning point of the game, for subsequently the Lancers, who had a distinct advantage in ponies, quite outplayed their opponents. Capt. Badger made a fine goal in the fifth period, hitting through at a difficult angle. There was no score in the penultimate period, but in the last stage the Lancers put on three more goals, and after Capt. Hardy had hit a final goal for the Life Guards, the

Lancers rode off easy winners by eleven to four. All the members of the winning side played well up to their form, and combined admirably. Capt. Badger, as already stated, was particularly brilliant, scoring eight times, while for the losers Capt. Astor and Major Brassey did best. Capt. Miller-Mundy worked very hard at No. 3, but at No. 1 Capt. Hardy was handicapped by having to ride strange ponies, and so was unable to show his true form. The challenge cup, which was the gift in 1910 of Mr. H. P. Whitney, was presented to Capt. Badger by Lady Eva Wyndham-Quin, and the team received many congratulations on their fine victory.

THE REGIMENTAL TOURNAMENT

RULES

Under the above heading we have been in correspondence with a general officer who still takes the greatest interest in regimental polo, and who considers that having to register ponies by June 1 is harmful to the officer of moderate means—those who have wanted to buy ponies at the end of May well know these difficulties. Sellers hold them up, knowing that when teams are short, ponies must be purchased by a certain date. It is quite understood that these lists are asked for by June 1 to prevent a regiment at the last moment paying fabulous prices for animals from other regiments which have been beaten; this could easily be arranged by a rule that no pony is to play for more than one team during the tournament. Possibly an exception might be made for regiments beaten in the first round, as it would be some consolation, after being beaten, to be able to dispose of some of its ponies. The result of the present tournament shows the impossibility of legislating against the rich; both teams in the final were beautifully mounted, and it is a fact that large sums were paid for many of the ponies. It is also open to question whether the old system of playing the complete tournament in London was not a better and a more economical one than the present arrangement.

INTER-REGIMENTAL TOURNAMENT

The tie in the above-named competition between the 16th Lancers and the 4th Hussars, played at the Curragh, resulted in an easy victory for the first-named regiment by ten goals to none. Teams:—

16th Lancers: Mr. R. A. J. Beech, Mr. E. H. L. Beddington, Capt. G. E. Bellville, and Major C. L. K. Campbell (back).

4th Hussars: Mr. W. A. C. Heyman, Mr. J. R. McC. Lonsdale, Capt. A. V. W. Stokes, and Mr. H. K. D. Evans (back).

The winners will have to meet the 5th Lancers in the last tie in the Irish section.

In the Salisbury Plain district the 18th Hussars have scratched to the 9th Lancers.—Played June 10.

ALDERSHOT.—In the first round of the Inter-Regimental Tournament two matches were decided at Aldershot. That between the 5th Dragoon Guards and the King's Royal Rifles was very uneven, the first-named side winning by no fewer than sixteen goals to love. Teams:—

5th Dragoon Guards: Mr. A. D. Winterbottom, Capt. M. A. Black, Mr. H. O. Wiley, and Lieut.-Col. G. K. Ansell (back).

King's Royal Rifles: Mr. A. H. Brocklehurst, Capt. E. B. Denison, Mr. H. C. M. Porter, and Mr. W. A. C. Saunders-Knox-Gore (back).

The contest between the 11th Hussars and the Queen's Bays was marred

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by an accident to Major Ing, who had a fall in the fifth period and had the misfortune to break a collar-bone. Capt. H. W. Hall took Major Ing's place for the rest of the game. In the result the Hussars qualified for the next round by the narrow margin of six goals to five. Teams :—

11th Hussars : Mr. L. H. Jefferson, Mr. A. T. Peyton, Lieut.-Col. T. T. Pitman, and the Hon. C. H. G. Mulholland (back).

Queen's Bays : Major G. H. A. Ing, Major A. E. W. Harman, Major B. H. H. Mathew-Lannowe, and Capt. M. C. C. Pinching (back).—Played June 12.

NORWICH.—The tie in the first round of the Inter-Regimental between the 12th Lancers and the 20th Hussars was decided at Norwich. After an even game during the first four periods the Lancers went ahead, and they won easily at the close by ten goals to three. Teams :—

12th Lancers : Mr. E. H. Leatham, Capt. T. R. Badger, Mr. B. G. Nicholas, and Mr. R. Wyndham-Quin (back).

20th Hussars : Capt. J. C. Darling, Capt. C. G. Mangles, Capt. F. B. Hurndall, and Mr. D. C. M. Beech (back).

CANTERBURY.—The 6th Dragoon Guards and 3rd Hussars played their tie in the first round of the Inter-Regimental Tournament at Canterbury. At all points of the game the Carabiniers showed a great superiority over their opponents, whom they eventually defeated by sixteen goals to none. Teams :—

6th Dragoon Guards : Mr. P. H. Compton, Major W. E. Watson, Capt. M. N. Kennard, and Major S. W. Webster (back).

3rd Hussars : Capt. F. C. Watson, Mr. C. F. Clarke, Capt. J. J. Dobie, and Mr. R. R. de C. Grubb (back).

Royal Horse Guards, seven goals ; 19th Hussars, three goals, the players being :—

Royal Horse Guards : Capt. A. W. Foster, Capt. G. V. S. Bowlby, Mr. P. V. Heath, and Capt. J. F. Harrison (back).

19th Hussars : Capt. W. E. Lyon, Mr. B. Hay, Capt. H. E. A. Platt, and Mr. H. J. Bigge (back).—Played Tuesday, June 16.

1st Life Guards, six goals ; Royal Horse Guards, five goals

The Blues took the field fully expecting an easy defeat, which was not by any means realised, and it turned out a very interesting and exciting match, though not an exhibition of high-class polo. In the fifth period the Blues had a lead of three goals, the score standing at five to two in their favour. With the exception of Captain Harrison both teams appeared to tire, and the Blues should have been able to have retained part of the advantage they had obtained, but the Life Guards, pulling themselves together, hit four more goals, gaining a victory by the narrow margin of one goal a minute before time, chiefly owing to brilliant play on the part of their No. 1. Teams :—

1st Life Guards : Capt. Lord Hugh Grosvenor, Capt. J. J. Astor, Capt. G. E. Miller-Mundy, and Major E. H. Brassey (back)

Royal Horse Guards : Capt. A. W. Foster, Capt. G. V. S. Bowlby, Mr. P. V. Heath, and Capt. J. F. Harrison (back).

16th Lancers, seven goals ; 5th Dragoon Guards, one goal

The 16th gained an easy victory, but it was not a good game, and there was little science displayed. Major Campbell narrowly escaped an injury

in the fourth period when his pony fell over the boards, but he was able to resume after ten minutes. Teams :—

16th Lancers : Mr. G. F. H. Brooke, Mr. E. H. L. Beddington, Capt. G. E. Bellville, and Major C. L. K. Campbell.

5th Dragoon Guards : Mr. A. D. Winterbottom, Capt. M. A. Black, Mr. H. O. Wiley, and Lieut.-Col. G. K. Ansell.

15th Hussars, twelve goals ; Royal Scots Greys, three goals

The Greys fell to pieces after the fourth chukker, at the end of which the score stood at four goals to three in favour of the 15th Hussars, who then took matters into their own hands and won by twelve to three. Capt. Borwick played well for the Greys throughout, and Colonel Bulkeley-Johnson during the latter part of the game ; but the combination of the 15th was too good when they really got going, as was expected. Teams :—

15th Hussars : Mr. B. Osborne, Capt. Hon. D. Bingham, Capt. F. W. Barrett, and Mr. J. Godman (back).

Royal Scots Greys : Capt. W. Long, Capt. M. Borwick, Mr. H. N. Scott Robson, and Lieut.-Colonel C. B. Bulkeley-Johnson (back).

Umpires : Major F. H. Blacker and Mr. H. S. Blane.

12th Lancers, eight goals ; 9th Lancers, six goals

Under ordinary circumstances the 12th Lancers would probably have won by a wider margin, but their back, Mr. B. G. Nicholas, put his shoulder out in the third chukker, his place being taken by Mr. Eden, a very capable substitute who played well at back. They were then leading by three goals to one, at half-time by six to three, and ultimately won by eight to six. Their victory was due more to good cohesion and team play than to play of individuals. Teams :—

12th Lancers : Mr. E. H. Leatham, Mr. R. Wyndham-Quin, Capt. T. R. Badger, and Mr. J. Eden (B. G. Nicholas).

19th Lancers : Mr. G. H. Phipps-Hornby, Capt. F. O. Grenfell, Capt. J. G. Porter, and Capt. A. N. Edwards.

SEMI-FINALS.

1st Life Guards, six goals ; 15th Hussars, four goals

The result of this match was a surprise to most people, and to have beaten such a strong team reflects great credit on the 1st Life Guards. It was a victory richly deserved, for they quite outplayed their opponents both collectively and individually, and were much better mounted. I was informed that Capt. Bingham was suffering from an attack of fever. The Life Guards played a far better game than they did against the Blues, and appeared to be much fitter and consequently hit harder and better ; and where all did so well it would be unfair to individualise the players of many notable and clever shots, one of which was particularly brilliant. Teams :—

1st Life Guards : Capt. Lord Hugh Grosvenor, Capt. J. J. Astor, Capt. G. E. Miller-Mundy, and Major E. H. Brassey (back).

15th Hussars : Mr. Osborne, Capt. Hon. J. D. Y. Bingham, Capt. F. W. Barrett, and Mr. J. Godman (back).

Umpires : Capt. L. W. Sadleir-Jackson and Major F. H. Blacker.

12th Lancers, 13 goals; 16th Lancers, 1 goal

Teams: 12th Lancers—Mr. E. H. Leatham, Capt. T. R. Badger, Mr. B. G. Nicholas, and Mr. R. W. Wyndham-Quin (back).

16th Lancers—Mr. G. F. N. Brooke, Mr. E. H. L. Beddington, Capt. G. E. Bellville, and Major C. L. K. Campbell (back).

This match, played on Wednesday, July 1, was marred by a mishap to Mr. Wyndham-Quin, who was ridden into and knocked over, his pony falling on him with its full weight. Only six minutes of the game had been played and no score recorded. After waiting a quarter of an hour the game was proceeded with three aside, the 12th Lancers having exacted the extreme penalty of No. 8 and called upon Capt. Bellville to retire from the game, which in consequence was robbed of all further interest. We are informed that this is the first time since the rule was made that this penalty has been claimed, and in consideration that this was an accident in riding off, pure and simple, it would appear to us that this rule requires to be amended.

FINAL

12th Lancers, 7 goals; 1st Life Guards, 6 goals

Played Saturday, July 4, and witnessed, we believe, by a record crowd for this match.

Their Majesties the King and Queen were present, and also H.R.H. the Prince of Wales. At the end of the match, the winning team having been presented, her Majesty the Queen handed the Cup to Capt. Badger. The match, as was expected, was very evenly contested, and the play good, both teams being remarkably well mounted—the 12th Lancers being a shade the better in this respect; at any rate, their ponies stayed the longest. The 12th owe their victory chiefly to the fine play of Capt. Badger, though at a critical moment in the sixth chukker, when the Life Guards were leading by six to five, Mr. Nicholas made a wonderful save, and a goal at that time would have probably given a victory to the ultimate losers. The 12th opened with the first goal, soon followed by one from the Life Guards, for whom Major Brassey, assisted by his pony, who kicked it through, added another.

At the end of the second chukker the Life Guards were leading by four to one. The 12th now put in some very good work, obtaining two goals in the third and one in the fourth chukker, thus equalising. Each side added a goal in the fifth, and the Life Guards one in the sixth, thus leading by one goal, and it was soon after this that Mr. Nicholas saved as referred to above. At the commencement of the final chukker the Life Guards had the best of the game, but the 12th buckled to, and with some fine team-play obtained two more goals and the match, thus winning the tournament for the first time. They also obtained another goal at the last moment, but the bell started ringing before the ball was over the line, and it was not counted.

Teams: 12th Lancers—Mr. E. H. Leatham, Capt. T. R. Badger, Mr. B. G. Nicholas, and Mr. R. W. Wyndham-Quin (back).

1st Life Guards—Capt. Lord Hugh Grosvenor, Capt. J. J. Astor, Capt. G. E. Miller Mundy, and Major E. H. Brassey (back).

Umpires—Major F. H. Blacker and Mr. H. S. Blane.

INDIA

The introduction of the handicap system into Indian polo has increased the number of tournaments to such an extent that a whisper has been heard at Headquarters of young officers devoting too much of their time to the game and too little to the serious business of life. To prevent the whisper 'breaking into storm' an Army Polo Committee, with the Inspector of Cavalry at its head, is considering the question of a close time for polo, or at any rate for the larger fixtures, and it is probable that a rule will shortly be promulgated under which none but purely local tournaments can take place between November 15 and February 15.

The Inter-Regimental was won this year by the 17th Lancers, and the Native Cavalry Tournament was won by the 9th Hodson's Horse. This tournament used to take place at Umballa. It is now played at Delhi, and is the principal event of the season in the new capital. Polo is looking up in the Indian Army. It will not be long before a Native Cavalry regiment wins the Inter-Regimental.

POINT-TO-POINT

3rd Hussars.—The races held by the 3rd Hussars took place at Smeeth, in the East Kent country. Results :—

Subalterns' Cup.—Mr. Petherick's Chouch, 1; Mr. Whiston's Gay Lad, 2; Mr. Clarke's Bob, 3.

29th Brigade and 'C' Battery R.H.A. Race.—Mr. Jardine's Puck, 1.

Regimental Cup.—Mr. Elliott's Irritation, 1; Capt. Olive's Wendy, 2; Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy's Coronation, 3.

Farmers' Race.—Captain Spanton's Captain, 1; Mr. E. W. Baker's K. P., 2; Mr. F. Hobbs's Lady, 3.

Foxhunters' Plate.—Capt. Grubb's Thomas Brown, 1; Mr. Cliff's Socks, 2; Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy's Admiral, 3.

York and Ainsty Hunt.—These chases took place in delightful weather, in the neighbourhood of Easingwold, near York, and drew together a large concourse of supporters of the hunt and farmers of the district. The latter were hospitably entertained to luncheon by the joint masters, Lord Furness and Mr. Miles J. Stapylton. Results :—

Members' Race (catch weights, 12-7): Capt. M. Graham's Weathercock II. (Owner), 1; Mr. C. Thompson's Orchid (Mr. R. Thompson), 2; Earl of St. Germans's Markeshift III. (Owner), 3. Won by a length and a half; three lengths separated second and third. Twelve ran.

Royal Scots Greys Regimental Race (catch weights, 12-7): Major F. Swetenham's Robert (Owner), 1; Major A. G. Seymour's York IV. (Owner), 2; Mr. W. S. Cornwallis's The White Knight (Owner), 3; Mr. L. H. S. Bowlby's Spitfire (Owner), disqualified. Spitfire finished a short head in front of Robert, but was disqualified for taking the wrong course. Twelve ran.

Open Sweepstakes (catch weights, over 12-7): Mr. G. H. Davy's Jump for Joy II. (Capt. Graham), 1; Earl of St. Germans's The Galoon (Owner), 2; Mr. A. Lord's Red Star II. (Owner), 3; Mr. G. Kenyon's Saturday Night (Mr. Sutton), disqualified. Saturday Night passed the post first, but was disqualified for taking the wrong course. Fourteen ran.

'Punchestown Week' may be written down as one of the most successful there has ever been. Mr. R. McK. Walters tells me that the patronage

given was vast. It was fortunate that the weather proved so bright and fine, for a 'wet Punchestown' is something of a minor National calamity.

Half the secret of the success of Punchestown lies in the fact that every possible interest in the chasing world is catered for; while of course, as a social function, it became firmly established years ago, and society must 'do' the Kildare and National Hunt gathering each season. With regard to its well-arranged programme, we have first of all the farming interest catered for by the provision of two good-class races, each endowed with substantial money value, and a cup goes to the winner; the Kildare Hunt followers have the Hunt Cup to run for, while hunting men generally have their wants supplied by the provision of the Downshire Plate and the National Hunt Cup; and then the military have their Maiden Hunters' Plate and the more important Grand Military. The owner of the regular chaser can enter his horse or horses in the Conynham Cup, the Prince of Wales' Handicap, the Kildare Hunt Plate, or the Drogheda Plate. Thus every interest throughout Ireland is represented on the programme, with the result that entries pour in from every side.

The most successful trainer at the meeting was Michael Dawson, of Rathbridge Manor, Curragh. He had four winners, who accounted for five races, Jerry V. (Mr. D. R. Cross, 16th Lancers) being the dual scorer. 'Jerry' is a decidedly good type of hunter-chaser for military events across country; he took the Irish Maiden Hunters' Plate, and the still more important Grand Military. I cannot remember if that 'double' was ever before accomplished at the meeting, but if it was it must have been a very long time ago. Dawson's other horses who won were Nella's Favour, in the Downshire; Cathal, the Prince of Wales' Handicap; and Fast Brendan, the Drogheda Plate.

12th Lancers and Norwich Staghounds.—The results of these races, held at Ketteringham, near Norwich, were as under :—

12th Lancers Subalterns' Race : Mr. E. H. Leatham's Knight Errant IV. (Mr. B. G. Nicholas), 1; Mr. W. R. Style's Matador II. (Owner), 2; Mr. R. Moore's Redwing (Owner), 3. Also ran : Bonny Lass, Hengist, and Agnes III. Won by a distance.

12th Lancers Regimental Race : Mr. Wyndham-Quin's Bucklight (Owner), 1; Mr. J. Eden's The Sinner (Major Fane), 2; Colonel Wormald's Robin a Tiptoe (Owner), 3. Also ran : Clob, Acrobat, Bulgar, Discrelin, and Grenden. Won by twenty-four lengths, ten lengths separated second and third.

6th Dragoon Guards.—A crowd of over 6,000 attended the Point-to-Point Races held at Naccolt, near Wye, by the 6th Dragoon Guards, from Canterbury. Results :—

Subalterns' Cup : Mr. K. S. Hunter's Moss Rose (Owner), 1; Mr. J. N. Kidd's Red Spider (Owner), 2; Mr. J. Preston-Whyte's Balaclava (Owner), 3.

Nomination Race : Major Lamont's Golden Moss (Owner), 1; Capt. Heseltine's Call Boy (Owner), 2; Lieut. J. C. Petherick's Gosoon (Owner), 3.

Carabiniers' Light Weights : Mr. J. N. Preston-Whyte's Jim (Owner), 1; Major Webster's Jim Larkin (Owner), 2; Capt. M. N. Kennard's Yeoman IX. (Owner), 3.

Carabiniers' Heavy Weights : Major S. W. Webster's Mullonac (Owner), 1; Mr. P. M. Keran's Dawn IV. (Owner), 2; Capt. H. Sadler's Nigger (Owner), 3.

Farmers' Race : Mr. T. Hopkins's Barnes (Mr. Chatterton), 1; Capt. J. P. Spanton's Captain (Owner), 2; Mr. F. Hobbs' Lady (Owner), 3.


PIG-STICKING

The Kadir Cup still remains the principal event of the season, but it has a very near rival nowadays in the Muttra Cup, which has been revived by the Inniskilling Dragoons on novel and very sporting lines. This regiment arrived in Muttra in the autumn of 1911. Pig were plentiful and sportsmen keen; but it soon became evident to Colonel Neil Haig that the honour of 'first spear' rather than the death of the boar was the sportsman's object, and that consequently many a pig escaped that should otherwise have been killed. To prevent this he first made a rule that 'no first spear should count if made behind the back rib.' The necessity for scientific spearing was at once apparent, but something more was still required to demonstrate the need for scientific hunting. Colonel Haig therefore thought the thing out, and finally invented a contest between teams of three, the winning team to be that which, in the course of the meeting, had killed the greatest number of pig.

The first of these contests was held in March 1913, and was most successful. It was won by 'R' Battery, R.H.A., a team of good pig-stickers mounted on good horses and trained by their Battery Commander—that greatest of hog-hunters, Major Wardrop—to work together.

Their methods were as follows :—

The best-mounted man was the leader, the second dropped back about ten yards and to the right of the pig, and the third lay about fifteen yards immediately behind the leader. By this means the pig was first hunted by the fastest horse, and, when he jinked, the slower horses were ready to lead to the right or left as required. The following diagram shows three phases of the hunt carried out by this method. P is the pig, A, B, and C are the riders :—



In 1913 there were eight entries for this competition. This year there were twenty, but this number had to be reduced to fifteen owing to the difficulty of procuring sufficient fodder, for there is famine in the land.

Each team was allowed seven horses and, to begin with, four runs whether they killed a pig or not. But only those teams who still retained a chance of winning the cup were allowed to take part in the final runs.

The cup was eventually won by the 3rd Skinner's Horse with a score of six kills out of seven runs. Captains Medlicott and Manderson and Mr. Gray, the son of a well-known sportsman on the Bombay side, were the members of the team. All were well mounted and well drilled, and, under the leadership of Captain Medlicott, hunted most scientifically on all sorts of ground.

The Kadir was won this year by Captain Medlicott, and both the Gujerat Cup and the Salmon Cup by Mr. Gray. Skinner's Horse have therefore swept the boards in the pig-sticking contests of 1914.

FOOTBALL

THE CAVALRY CUP

SEMI-FINALS.

19th (Q.A.O.R.) Hussars *v.* 6th Dragoon Guards.—This tie was played on April 1 at the Army Athletic Ground, Aldershot, in splendid weather before 1,000 spectators. The Hussars were much the better team, and fully deserved their victory of three goals to love. The referee appeared extremely severe on tackling and charging, especially in the penalty area, and the Dragoons' backs suffered in consequence. The first goal was obtained after ten minutes, Godfrey being fouled by Gillham when he was clean through, and Connolly scored from the penalty. The Hussars attacked hotly, and, Collins had several shots to clear. Only twice did the Dragoons break away, and on each occasion they should have equalised, but McWilliam shot wildly when in front of an open goal. Just before the interval came the second penalty, but Connolly shot straight at Collins, and he effected a clearance. The Dragoons gave a better display on resuming, but their forwards were slow and lost several chances of scoring. On the other hand, the Hussars were always dangerous.

12th (P.W.R.) Lancers *v.* 18th (Q.M.O.) Hussars.—The 12th Lancers from Norwich and the 18th Hussars from Tidworth met twice on the Army Football Ground, Aldershot, to decide which should oppose the 19th Hussars in the final; and, after an exciting game, the Lancers won by 2—1. The first meeting had been productive of an indifferent game, in which, after extra time, both teams had scored three goals.

The replayed tie was of quite a different character. Play was fast throughout, and fairly even, the Lancers, however, putting more method into their work, and consequently their attacks were more dangerous. But for the fine play of the Hussars' backs, they would have taken an early lead, and added steadily all through. As it was, Rabjohn scored for the Lancers with a fine effort, and just on half-time Busby equalised for the Hussars. On crossing over, the Lancers had the better of the play, and Petty scored what proved to be the winning goal.

FINAL


12th (P.W.R.) Lancers, 2; 19th (Q.A.O.R.) Hussars, 0.—Play was very keen in this match, at Craven Cottage, on April 24. The 12th Lancers won by two goals to none, and, as the better balanced and more skilful side, merited their success. The defenders played a big part in the game, the wind, blowing directly down the field, fully testing the kicking of the backs.

The Lancers were often hard pressed in the second half, when the Hussars in their turn had the wind behind them, and the result was often in doubt. When one goal to the bad and with twenty minutes left for play, the Hussars were awarded a penalty kick, but this failed. The Lancers scored once in each half, and both goals were obtained by Shoeing-Smith Bird with capital left-foot shots. The first goal was the result of a fine dribbling run by Shoeing-Smith Rabjohn. Great enthusiasm prevailed, many men of both regiments being present. The Hussars have won the cup more than once, the last time in 1908, but this year the Lancers were too good for them.

Teams: 12th Lancers—Hooper; Stone and Hammond; Martin, Stewart, and Collier; Harper, Pretty, Bird, Rabjohn, and King.

19th Hussars—Laxton; Deakin and Matthews; Fitsall, Connolly, and Withers; Fox, Kunkler, Bullock, Godfrey, and Chalkley.

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